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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf)
of itself and all others similarly situated, )
ED QUINN, on behalf of himself and all )
)
other similarly situated,
)
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
)
)
vs.
)
)
)
CTIY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
)
municipality,
Defendant/Respondent, )

Supreme Court No. 44074

)

---------.)
CLERK'S RECORD

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock.
Before HONORABLE Stephen S. Dunn District Judge.
For Appellant:

Blake G. Hall
Hall Angell Starnes, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
For Respondent:

Nathan M. Olsen
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen
485 E. Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
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Case: CV-2014-0001520-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn
Hill -VU Mobile Home Park, etal. vs. City Of Pocatello

Hill -VU Mobile Home Park, ED Quinn vs. City Of Pocatello
Date

Code

User

4/15/2014

LOCT

KENDRAH

er

Robert C Naftz

NCOC

KENDRAH

New Case Filed-Other Claims

Robert C Naftz

COMP

KENDRAH

complaint Jury Demand and request for class
certification;

Robert C Naftz

SMIS

KENDRAH

Summons Issued

Robert C Naftz

KENDRAH

Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not Robert C Naftz
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings
below Paid by: Petersen Moss & Hall Attorneys
At Law Receipt number: 0012514 Dated:
4/15/2014 Amount: $96.00 (Check) For:

ATTR

CAMILLE

Plaintiff: Hill - VU Mobile Home Park Attorney
Retained Michael D Gaffney

ATTR

CAMILLE

Plaintiff: Quinn, ED Attorney Retained Michael D Robert C Naftz
Gaffney

ATTR

AMYW

Plaintlff: Hill - VU Mobile Home Park Attorney
Retained Nathan M. Olsen

ATTR

AMYW

Plaintiff: Quinn, ED Attorney Retained Nathan M. David C Nye
Olsen

5/6/2014

MOTN

NICOLE

Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Without Cause
I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1)(E)

Robert C Naftz

5/14/2014

ORDR

NICOLE

Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify
Without Causes/ J. Naft 5-14-14; transferred to
Judge Dunn for reassignment

Robert C Naftz

5/16/2014

DISA

KARLA

Disqualification Of Judge -Automatic

Robert C Naftz

ORDR

KARLA

Administrative Order of Reference; matter
referred to Judge Nye for resolution; /s J Dunn
05/16/14

Stephen S Dunn

DISQ

KARLA

Disqualification Of Judge

David C Nye

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs motion to disqualify for cause IRCP
40d2A2: aty Nathan Olsen for plntfs

David C Nye

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; on Motion to Disqualify for
David C Nye
Cause IRCP on 7-17-2014@ 2pm: aty Nathan
Olsen for plntf

CAMILLE

Affidavit of counsel in support of motion to
disqualify for cause: aty Nathan Olsen for plntf

KENDRAH

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
David C Nye
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Hall Angell
& Starnes Receipt number: 0021231 Dated:
6/27/2014 Amount: $66.00 (Check) For: City of
Pocatello (defendant)

CAMILLE

Objection to plaintiffs motion to disqualify for
cause; aty Blake Hall for def City of Pocatello

CAMILLE

Answer to Complaint; aty Blake Hall for Def City David C Nye
of Pocatello

6/16/2014

6/27/2014

Judge

Robert C Naftz

David C Nye

David C Nye

David C Nye
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6/27/2014

ATTR

CAMILLE

Defendant: City of Pocatello Attorney Retained
BlakeG Hall

David C Nye

7/1/2014

CAMILLE

Affiavit of service - srvd on City of Pocatello on
6-18-2014

David C Nye

7/7/2014

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Nathan Olsen;
for plntfs

CAMILLE

Notice vacating hearing; Plaintiffs Motion to DQ
on 7-17-2014 @2pm:

David C Nye

HRVC

AMYW

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
07/17/2014 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated

David C Nye

7/10/2014

HRSC

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/17/2014 02:00
PM)

David C Nye

7/14/2014

ORDR

AMYW

Order for Submission of Information for
Scheduling Order; /s/ J Nye, 7-14-14

David C Nye

CAMILLE

Joint submission of information for scheduling
order; aty Blake Han for ef

David C Nye

7/28/2014

Judge

aty Michael Gaffney David C Nye

7/31/2014

HRSC

AMYW

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/20/2015 01 :30 David C Nye
PM)

8/6/2014

ORDR

AMYW

Order Setting Jury Trial; /s/ J Nye, 8-6-14

David C Nye

8/7/2014

AFFD

AMYW

Affidavit of Nathan M. Olsen; atty Nathan Olsen
for pltfs

David C Nye

APPL

AMYW

Application for Pre-Judgment Write of
Attachment Pursuant to IC §8-502; atty Nathan
Olsen for pltfs

David C Nye

HRSC

AMYW

Hearing Scheduled (Order to Show Cause
09/08/2014 02:00 PM)

David C Nye

OSCI

AMYW

Order To Show Cause; atty Nathan Olsen for pltfs David C Nye

8/18/2014

CAMILLE

Certificate of service - (Order to Show cause and Davld C Nye
this certiicate) aty Nathan Olsen

8/21/2014

CAMILLE

Notice of service - first set of discovery requests
to to def and this notice: aty Nathan Olsen for
plntf

David C Nye

8/29/2014

CAMILLE

Defendants intent to appear and contest entry of
pre judgment writ of attachment; aty Blake Hall

David C Nye

9/2/2014

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Nathan R Starnes; aty Blaek Hall for David C Nye
def City of Pocatello

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Joyce A Stroschein ;
for Def. city of Pocatello

aty Blake Hall

David C Nye

CAMILLE

Defendants response to plaintiffs order to show
cause; aty Blake Hall for city of Pocatello

David C Nye

MOTN

AMYW

Motion for Order Shortening Time; atty Blake Hall David C Nye
for def

NOTC

AMYW

Notice of Hearing; atty Blake Hall for def

8/11/2014

David C Nye
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User

9/2/2014

MOTN

AMYW

Defendant's Motion to Quash Subpoena to David David C Nye
Swindell; atty Blake Hall for def

9/5/2014

ORDR

AMYW

Order Shortening Time; Isl J Nye, 9-5-14

David C Nye

NOTC

AMYW

Defendant's Notice of Intent to Produce
Testimony and Evidence at Hearing on Order to
Show Cause; atty Blake Hall for def

David C Nye

9/8/2014

DCHH

AMYW

Hearing result for Order to Show Cause
scheduled on 09/08/2014 02:00 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Stephanie Morse
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100 pages.

David C Nye

9/9/2014

MEOR

AMYW

Minute Entry; Motion to Quash Subpoena is
GRANTED, OSC hearing vacated; /s/ J Nye,
9-9-14

David C Nye

9/11/2014

ORDR

AMYW

Order Quashing Subpoena; /s/ J Nye, 9-11-14

David C Nye

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Defs responses to plaintiffs
first discovery requests, and this notice: aty
Blake Hall

David C Nye

9/24/2014

10/16/2014

ORDR

AMYW

Order Transferring Case; matter transferred to J
Dunn based on agreement by the parties; /s/ J
Nye, 10-16-14

David C Nye

12/2/2014

ORDR

KARLA

Order for Submission of Information for
Scheduling Order /s J Dunn 12/01/14

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Parties agreed response;
for plntf

Stephen S Dunn

ORDR

KARLA

Order Setting Jury Trial /s J Dunn 12/19/14

Stephen S Dunn

HRVC

KARLA

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
07/20/2015 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated

Stephen S Dunn

HRSC

KARLA

12/15/2014
12/19/2014

aty Michael Gaffney

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 08/04/2015 09:00 Stephen S Dunn

AM)
HRSC

KARLA

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/05/2016 09:00 Stephen S Dunn

AM)
2/17/2015

CAMILLE

Motion for certification; aty Michael GAffney for
plntf

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Logan Robinson;' aty Micahel
Gaffney for plntf

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs Memorandum in support of class
certification; aty Michael Gaffney for plntf

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Ed Quinn; aty Michael Gaffney for
plntf

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Michael D Gaffney; aty Michael
Gaffney for plntf

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set on 3-16-2015 @2pm:
aty Micahel Gaffney for plntf

Stephen S Dunn
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Code
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2/17/2015

HRSC

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/16/2015 02:00
PM}

CAMILLE

Amended notice of hearing; set for 4-13-2015@ Stephen S Dunn
2pm: aty Michael Gaffney for plntf

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/13/2015 02:00
PM}

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Defendants Motion for summary judgment; aty
Blake Hall for def

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set for 4-13-2015 @ 2pm:
aty Blake Hall

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 04/13/2015 02:00 PM)

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Second Affidavit of Joyce A Stroschein;
Blake Hall

CAMILLE

Defendants Memorandum in support of motin for Stephen S Dunn
summary judgment; aty Blake Hall

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs Fact and expert witness disclosure;
aty Michael Gaffney for plntf

Stephen S Dunn

KARLA

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
03/16/2015 02:00 PM: Continued

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Matin for enlargement of time and to continue
hearing, IRCP 56(c): aty Micahel Gaffney for
plntf

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Michael D Gaffney; aty Michael
Gaffney for plntf

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Withdrawal of motin for enlargement of time and
to continue hearing, IRCP 56(c): aty Michael
Gaffney for plntf

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Nathan M Olsen in support of plaintiffs Stephen S Dunn
Memorandum in opposition to Citys Motion for
Summary Judgment; aty Nathan Olsen

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs Memorandum in opposition to Citys
motion for summary judgment; aty Nathan
Olsen for plntfs

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Defendants response in objection to motin for
class certification; aty Blake Hall fair def

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Third Affidavit of Joyce A Stroschein;
Hall forded

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Blake G Hall; aty Blake Hall for def

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Defendants reply memorandum in support of
motin for summary judgment; aty Blake Hall for
def

Stephen S Dunn

MOTN

KARLA

Motion to Shorten Time (Gaffney)

Stephen S Dunn

ORDR

KARLA

Order Shortening nme /.s J Dunn 04/10/15

Stephen S Dunn

2/26/2015
2/27/2015

HRSC

3/16/2015

HRSC

3/18/2015
3/27/2015

CONT

3/30/2015

4/1/2015

4/7/2015

4/8/2015

4/10/2015

Judge

aty

Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

aty Blake Stephen S Dunn
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4/10/2015

MOTN

User

Judge

CAMILLE

Defendant response in opposition to plaintiffs
motion to strike portions of stroschien affidavits:
aty Blake Hall for def

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Defendants response in oppositin to plaintiffs
motin to strike affidavit of Blake Hall and third
affldavit of Joyce Stroschein ; aty Blake Hall

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Blake Hall;

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Sarah Roberts; aty Blake Hall

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Leslike Georgeson'; aty Blake Hall for Stephen S Dunn
def

OCANO

aty Blake Hall for def

Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Joyce

Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

A. Stroschein Filed August 28, 2014, The Second
Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein Filed March 13,
2015 and Third Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein
Dated 4-2-15. Michael D. Gaffney, Attorneys for
Plntfs.
OCANO

Motion to Strlke Affidavit of Blake G. Hall and
Third Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein (IRCP 7
(b)(3)), Michael D. Gaffney, Attorneys for Plntfs.

OCANO

Affidavit of Michael D. Gaffney In Support of
Stephen S Dunn
Motion to Strike Affidavit of Blake G. Hall and
Third Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein, Michael D.
Gaffney, Attorneys for Plntfs.

4/20/2015

CAMILLE

Defendants Fact and expert witness disclosure;
aty Blake Hall for def

5/22/2015

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Logan Robinson;
for plntf

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Nathan Olsen; aty Nathan Olsen for
plntf

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum ; aty
Nathan Olsen for plntfs

Stephen S Dunn

5/29/2015

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Ed Quinn; aty Nathan Olsen

Stephen S Dunn

6/5/2015

CAMILLE

Fourth affidavit of Joyce Stroschein; aty Blake
Hall for def

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Defendant Sur Reply Memorandum in support of Stephen S Dunn
motion for summary judgment; aty Blake Hall for
def

CAMILLE

Motion objecting to and to strike the fourth
affidavit of Joyce Stroschein; aty Nathan Olsen
for plntf

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Motion forleave to file first Amended complaint;
aty Nathan Olsen forplntf

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Amended complaint Jury demand and request for Stephen S Dunn
class certification; aty Micahel Gaffney for plntf

6/12/2015

6/15/2015

Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

aty Nathan Olsen Stephen S Dunn
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Code

Judge

User

6/18/2015

CAMILLE

Defendant response in oppositin to plaintiffs motin Stephen S Dunn
to strike fourth stroschien affidavit ; aty Blake
Hall

7/6/2015

CAMILLE

Motion for leave to file AMICUS Curiae Brief of
Notional Association of Home Builders in
Opposition to Defs Motion for Summary
Judgment; aty Steven Taggart for national

CAMILLE

AMJCUS CURIAE Brief of Notional Association of Stephen S Dunn
Home Builders in Opposiiton of Def City of
POcatello's Matin for Summary Judgment; aty
Steven TAggart

CAMILLE

Defendants response in oppositin to plaintiffs
motion to amend complaint; aty Blake Hall for
def

Stephen S Dunn

HRVC

KARLA

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
08/04/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

Stephen S Dunn

DCHH

KARLA

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Stephen S Dunn
04/13/2015 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Sheri Nothelphim
Number ofTranscript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less 100

CAMILLE

Defendants opposition to motion for leave to file
Amicus Curiae Brief; aty Blake Hall for def

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Renewed motion for leave to file first amended
complaint; aty Michael Gaffney

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Memorandum in support of renewed motion
forleave to file first amended complaint; aty
Michael Gaffney for plntf

Stephen S Dunn

OCANO

Notice of Hearing; Renewed Motion for Leave to
File First Amended Complaint on 8-10-15.;
Michael D. Gaffney, Attorney's for Plntfs.

Stephen S Dunn

7/13/2015

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing on motin forleave to file Amicus Stephen S Dunn
Curiae Brief on national association of Home
Builders in opposition to Defendants Motion for
Summary Judgment; aty Steven Taggart ·

7/16/2015

CAMILLE

Defendants response in opposition to plaintiffs
renewed motion to amend complaint; aty Blake
Hall for def city of pocatello

Stephen S Dunn

AFFD

KARLA

Affidavit of Blake G. Hall

Stephen S Dunn

MOTN

KARLA

Motion to Vacate Hearing on Plaintiffs REnewed
Motion to File Amended Complaint (Hall}

Stephen S Dunn

8/7/2015

ORDR

KARLA

Order; vacate and reset hearing to 08/1715 at
2:30 p.m. /s J Dunn 08/07/15

Stephen S Dunn

8/10/2015

HRSC

KARLA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/17/2015 02:30
PM)

Stephen S Dunn

7/7/2015

7/8/2015

7/10/2015

7/27/2015

Stephen S Dunn
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KARLA

REply in Support of Renewed Motion for Leave to Stephen S Dunn
File First Amended Complaint (Olsen for
Plaintiff)_

KARLA

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Stephen S Dunn
08/17/2015 02:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Sheri Nothelphim
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less 100

CAMILLE

Defendants Response in opposiitn to plaintiffs
motin to amend complaint; aty Blake Hall

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Defendants Opposiitn to Amicus Curiae Brief:
aty Blake Hall for def

Stephen S Dunn

KARLA

Minute Entry and Order; Court allow Amicus
Curiae Brief; Court take Motion for Leave to File
First Amended Complaint under advisment; s/ J
Dunn 09/02/15

Stephen S Dunn

MARLEA

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Stephen S Dunn
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by:
petersen moss & hall Receipt number: 0028214
Dated: 9/3/2015 Amount: $10.00 (Check)

HRVC

KARLA

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
01/05/2016 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

DEOP

KARLA

Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant's
Stephen S Dunn
Motion for Summary Judgment, Discussing
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification, and
Denying Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Leave to
File First Amended Complaint; /s J Dunn 11/09/15

JDMT

KARLA

Stephen S Dunn
Judgment entered in favor of Defendant and
against Plaintiff and case is dismissed; /s J Dunn
11/09/15

CSTS

KARLA

Case Status Changed: Closed

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Blake G Hall in support of request for
costs and attorneys fees: aty Blake Hall for def

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Defendants Memorandum of authority in support Stephen S Dunn
of costs and attorneys fees against plaintiffs: aty
Blake Hall

11/24/2015

CAMILLE

Motion to reconsider; aty Michael Gaffney for
plntfs

Stephen S Dunn

12/4/2015

CAMILLE

Motion to disallow; aty Nathan Olsen for plntf

Stephen S Dunn

12/8/2015

CAMILLE

Memorandum in support of motin to reconsider;
aty Nathan Olsen for plntfs

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set on 1-11-2016 @ 2pm:

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Defendants response to plaintiffs motin to
disallow;
aty Blake Hall

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set for Plaintiffs Motion to
disallow on 1-11-2016 @2pm: aty Blake Hall

Stephen S Dunn

8/14/2015

8/21/2015

DCHH

8/31/2015

9/2/2015

MEOR

9/3/2015

11/10/2015

11/20/2015

12/11/2015

Stephen S Dunn
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CAMILLE

Defendants opposition to plaintiffs motin to
reconsider;
aty Blake Hall

Stephen S Dunn

HRSC

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/11/2016 02:00
PM)

Stephen S Dunn

CSTS

CAMILLE

Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk
action

Stephen S Dunn

1/6/2016

MEMO

KARLA

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Stephen S Dunn
(Olsen for Plaintiff)

1/12/2016

DCHH

KARLA

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Stephen S Dunn
01/11/2016 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Sheri Nothelphim
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less 100

2/10/2016

DEOP

KARLA

Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiffs Motion Stephen S Dunn
for Reconsideratlon /s J Dunn 02/08/16

ORDR

KARLA

Order Granting Defendant's Request for Costs as Stephen S Dunn
a Matter of Right, Denying Defendant's REquest
for Discretionary Costs and Denying Defendant's
Request for Attorney Fees; Is J Dunn 02/08/16

CAMILLE

Amended Judgment; Judgment is entered in
favor of the Def and ag the plaintifss this case is
DISMISSED, costs are awarded to the def inthe
amount of $66.00: s/ Judge Dunn 2-8-2016

CAMILLE

Filing: L4 -Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Stephen S Dunn
Supreme Court Paid by: Michael Gaffney
Receipt number: 0009679 Dated: 3/22/2016
Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: Hill -VU Mobile
Home Park (plaintiff) and Quinn, ED (plaintiff)

APSC

OCANO

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Stephen S Dunn

NOTC

OCANO

NOTICE OF APPEAL: Michael D. Gaffney,
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Stephen S Dunn

MISC

OCANO

Recerved check # 52624 in the amount of
$100.00 for Clerk's Deposit.

Stephen S Dunn

OCANO

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL: Signed
and Malled to SC and Counsel on 3-24-16.

Stephen S Dunn

OCANO

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT
AND RECORD UNDER RULE 19 OF THE
IDAHO APPELLATE RULES; Bake G. Hall,
Attorney for City of Pocatello.

Stephen S Dunn

KARLA

Request for Additional Transcrlpt and Record
Stephen S Dunn
Under Rule 19 of the Idaho Appellate Rules (Hall)

TAMILYN

Request for Addltional Transcript and Record
Under Rule 19 of the Idaho Appellate Rules-thru
atty Blake Hall

12/22/2015
12/23/2015

3/22/2016

3/24/2016
4/12/2016

4/15/2016

MISC

Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

9

Date: 5/25/2016

Sixth Judicial District Court - Bannock County

Time: 04:14 PM

ROA Report

Page 9 of 9

User: OCANO

Case: CV-2014-0001520-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn
Hill-VU Mobile Home Park, etal. vs. City Of Pocatello

Hill - VU Mobile Home Park, ED Quinn vs. City Of Pocatello
Date

Code

User

4/29/2016

MISC

OCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Received Notice of Stephen S Dunn
Appeal with Exhibit A Attached and Respondent's
Request for Additional Transcripts and Record See Attachement. Set Due Date - Reporter's
Transcripts lodging date is 5-27-16. and Clerk's
Record Due 7-1-16.

5/16/2016

MISC

OCANO

NOTICE OF LODGING; Rodney M. Felshaw

MISC

OCANO

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS Received in Court Stephen S Dunn
Records on 5-16-16 for the following hearing:
Motion for Summary Judgment held 4-13-15.

MISC

OCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Received Notice of
Transcript Lodged by; R. Felshaw on 5-19-16.

Stephen S Dunn

NOTC

OCANO

NOTICE OF LODGING; Sheri L. Nothelphim on
5-25-16.

Stephen S Dunn

MISC

OCANO

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS Received by
email in Court Records on 5-25-16 for the
following hearings:
Hearing held 8-17-15 and
Hearing held 1-11-16.

Stephen S Dunn

5/25/2016

Judge

Stephen S Dunn
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Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT
OFTHESTATEOFIDAHO,INANDFORBANNOCKCOUNTY

ROBERT C.

HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

NAFTZ

CaseNo.Q.l·JJ)\4-1520 ·()(...
COMPLAINT JURY DEMAND AND
REQUEST FOR CLASS
CERTIFICATION

vs.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant. .
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs,liill-Vu Mobile Home Park, Ed Quinn and all others
similarly situated and for ·a complaint against the above named Defendant alleging as follows:

COMPLAINT JURY DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION - Page 1
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JURISDICTION
1. This action is brought for damages and other appropriate relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for violation of the Plaintiffs' civil rights under the color of state and federal law.
2. Defendant, the City of Pocatello (City) is a municipality incorporated in the State of

Idaho and administered pursuant to LC.§ 50-101 et. al., and located within Bannock County.
3. The Court has jurisdiction over the City under LC.§ 5-514.
4. Bannock County is the proper venue for this action under l.C. § 5-402 or 404.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
5. The City has implemented "system capacity fees," sometimes referred to as

"connection fees" or "capacity fees" which a person must pay along with a separate "building
pennit fee" prior to or in relation to new construction. Capacity Fees consist of separate fees
charged for water, waste water, and waste collection as set by the City Council on an annual
basis.
6. Usually at the same time the City sets Capacity Fee rates, the City sets monthly "User

Fees" for customers of the City water, wastewater and sanitation collection system.
7 The City deposits the collected Capacity and User Fees into separate accounts for

water, waste water, and sanitation.
8. Pursuant to Idaho law and the State and Federal Constitution, Capacity and User fees

can only be used for their intended purposes, including operation, maintenance, repair,
replacement of the existing system and bond repayment.

COMPLAINT JURY DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION -Page 2
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9. Around 2005, the City initiated a policy with regard to the Capacity and User Fees
titled under various names, including "Return on Equity,"''Rate of Return," "Franchise Fee," and
"Payment in Lieu of Taxes" hereafter collectively referred to as "PILOT.
10. In late 2006, City Mayor Chase requested an opinion from the Attorney General for
the State ofldaho (IAG) on the legality of the PILOT policy. In an opinion dated February 6,
2007, the IAG told the City that the policy did not comply with law, setting forth the statutes and
case law supporting such opinion. The City did not disclose the IAG's opinion to the public. It
also disregarded the opinion and continued with the PILOT policy.
11. Since 2007, no less than $30 million has been transferred by the City from the
water, sewer and sanitation accounts under the guise of its PILOT program to fund the general
activities of the City. No less than $6 million has been transferred as such since 2011.
12. The City has also admittedly promoted, planned and spent Capacity Fees for capital
improvement projects that expand the water, wastewater and waste collection systems without
first obtaining a bond as required under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act (IRBA). The IRBA only
allows Capacity Fees to be utilized for maintenance, repair and replacement of the existing
system.
13. The Building Contractoi:s Association of Southeast Idaho (BCASEI) filed an action
in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for Bannock
County (Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C) (Idaho Case) challenging the legality of the City's
Capacity Fee and User Fee policies, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

COMPLAINT JURY DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION - Page 3
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14. In a November 15, 2013, Memorandum Decision and Order the Idaho Court held that
the City's PILOT programs, or any other program with a similar intent are unconstitutional and a
violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.
15. During the discovery stages of the Idaho case, the City failed to produce the 2007

IAG opinion and any related correspondence or documents pertaining to that opinion although
such information was clearly requested. The IAG opinion and its related correspondence was
provided only through a subpoena by the BCASEI issued directly to the State ofldaho in January
of 2013.
16. The BCASEI had to pay the City over $2,500 just to obtain the City's financial
records to determine the flow of the Capacity and User Fees.
17. The City has also either destroyed or failed to keep and maintain records
pertaining to its Capacity and User Fee policies. Some records have been destroyed after the City
became aware of pote~tial claims with regard to these policies. Such conduct constitutes a
violation of the Idaho Municipal Records Retention Act I.C. § 50-907, et al., and spoliation of
evidence.
18. During the course of the litigation in the Idaho case, as a reaction to a court decision,
the City withdrew no less than $2,608,220 from the general fund equivalent to the amount of
Capacity Fees collected by the City since 2007, and have deposited such funds into separate
accounts, $1,391,089 in City"Fund 37" and $1,217,131 in City "Fund 38" which remain
unallocated by the City.

COMPLAINT JURY DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION - Page 4
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COUNT I - UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING
19. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference.
20. The 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the states under
the 14th Amendment, prevents the talcing of private property without due process of law or
without just compensation.
21. Idaho Const. Art. I§ 14 essentially incorporates the 5th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.
22. Under U.S. C. 42 § 1983, a person who is deprived of their rights under the color of
·any act, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any public entity is entitled to redress
at law or in equity.
23. Under the doctrine of"Res Judicata" the Court should accept and adopt the
declaratory ruling by the Idaho court that the fees transferred for use under the City's PILOT
policy were impennissibly assessed and collected.
24. In addition, the City's use of Capacity fees for the purpose of capital improvement
projects that expand the system are likewise impermissible and a violation of the IRBA.
25. The City's unlawful fee policies have resulted in the taking of private property of the
plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals.
26. The City's actions have resulted in a violation of the Constitutional rights, by the
taking of private property without due process of law and without just compensation.

COMPLAINT JURY DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION - Page 5
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27. The plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals and entities have suffered injury
caused by the City charging an unlawful fee and seek compensation for damages in an amount
which will be proven at trial, which in any event is many times in excess of$25,000.

COUNT II - UNJUST ENRICHMENT
28. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference.
29. Plaintiffs have conferred a benefit on the City in the form of Capacity and/or User

Fees which have been used by the City for purposes not authorized by the Idaho Constitution.
30. The City has been knowingly and willingly receiving an improper benefit at the
expense of the plaintiffs and other similarly situation individuals and entities.
31. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the City to retain this benefit
without properly reimbursing plaintiffs and other who have paid the fees.

COUNT III""'" EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND/OR EQUITABLE TOLLING
32. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference.
33. The City knowingly made a false representation of, concealed and/or destroyed
material facts to the detriment of the Plaintiffs.
34. Alternatively or in addition, essential information bearing on the Plaintiffs' claims
could not be discovered through reasonable diligence.
35. Alternatively or in addition, the City's fee policies, i.e. PILOT program and capital
expansion without proper bonding procedures, were void as a matter of law.
36. The Plaintiffs had no knowledge of the concealed or falsely represented material

facts.
COMPLAINT JURY DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION - Page 6

16

COUNT IV-ATTORNEY FEES
37.

All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference.

38.

The Plaintiffs have retained the services of the above named legal counsel to

pursue their rights.
39.

The Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their attorneys fees and expenses under I.C.

§§ 12-117, 58-115, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and any other applicable statute or rules.

CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION
40. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference.

41. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of a Class consisting

of all individuals or entities who have paid Capacity or User Fees to the City since 2007.
42. Class certification, including the possibility of subclasses, is warranted and

appropriate under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiffs pray for the following relief:
1. For a monetary judgment consisting of all improperly collected and spent Capacity and

User Fees since 2007, plus interest at the statutory rate of 12% per annum.
2. That there be immediate injunctive relief and/or pre-judgment writ of attachment

freezing and prohibiting the use of funds contained in City Fund 37 and 38 as referenced in this
complaint, pending the outcome of this case as a potential source for recovery.

COMPLAINT JURY DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION -Page 7

17

....

I

I

O

..

"

3. That the City should be required to deposit all monies collected from the unlawful fee
into a common fund and all members of the class should be allowed to petition the fund for a
recovery of their damages.
4. That punitive damages be awarded for the City's wrongful conduct pertaining to the

Plaintiffs' equitable estoppel claim.
5. An award of attorney fees and costs, and further that the City should be required to

reimburse the damages fund for any such awarded attorney fees based upon the allegations
contained herein so as not to further harm the class.
6. Any other legal or equitable relief deemed justified by the Court.

PLAINTIFFS REQUEST A JURY TRIAL FOR ANY ISSUES

DATED this

ABLE BY JURY

1f:___ day of April, 2014.
Nath ··.
PETERSEN

.

sen

Moss HALL & OLSEN

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY

HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No.CV-2014-1520-0C

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY WITHOUT
CAUSE

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
Plaintiffs' Motion to Disqualify Robert C. Naftz as the presiding Judge having been
received and reviewed and the requirements for disqualification without cause having been met;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable Robert C. Naftz is disqualified from
presiding over this case without cause and a different Judge will be assigned.
DATED this 1!:l._ day of May, 2014.

District Judge

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISQUALIFY WITHOUT CAUSE- Page 1
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a duly certified Clerk of this Court, and on this
day of May, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of the forgoing on:
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

~

[
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

Ji_

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile @ (208) 524-3391

ROBERT POLEKI
Clerk of the District Court

Deputy

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISQUALIFY WITHOUT CAUSE- Page 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDlcir!JL g i ~ ·
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED
-QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated,
Case No: CV-2014-01520-0C
Plaintiffs,
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER OF _
REFERENCE

vs .
. CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.

The Honorable Robert C. Naftz, District Judge, having been disqualified by the
Defendant under I.R.C.P.40(d)(1)(E),
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above entitled matter is
hereby REFERRED to the Honorable David C. Nye for complete resolution.
IT IS SO ORDERED .

. DATED this 161h day of May, 2014.

Case No.: CV-2014-01520-0C
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER OF REFERENCE
Page 1 of 2
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c,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \\ R day of
2014, I
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon eac oft e following individuals
in the manner indicated.
Suzrume Johnson
Trial Court Administrator

() U.S. Mail
(X) Email

( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile
Michael D. Gaffney
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

() U.S. Mail
( ) Email
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

Nathan M. Olsen
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen
485 "E" Street
Pocatello, ID 83402

() U.S. Mail
( ) Email
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

Judge Robert Naftz

() U.S.Mail
() Email
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

Judge David Nye

(
(
(
·(

) U.S. Mail
)Email
) Hand Deliver
) Facsimile

Deputy Clerk

Case No.: CV-2014-01520-0C
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER OF REFERENCE
Page 2 of 2
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
/SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgh@hasattomeys.com
sla@hasattomeys.com
nrs@hasattomeys.com
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
-

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
v. -

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
By and through counsel of record, Defendant the City of Pocatello, submits the following
as an Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint Jury Demand and Request for Class Certification, filed
April 15, 2014, (hereinafter "Complaint").
In answering this Complaint, Defendant expressly reserves, in addition to the defenses set
forth below, all defenses provided for or authorized by Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and all
other defenses provided by law. Moreover, Defendant states that its investigation of this matter

ANSWER TO COMPlAINT -1
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is continuing and as such, certain averments, statements and defenses may change in the future in
light of additional or newly discovered information.
GENERAL DENIAL

Defendant denies any and all allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint not expressly admitted
herein.
JURISDICTION

1. With regard to Paragraph 1, Defendant denies the same.
2. With regard to Paragraph 2, Defendant admits the same.
3. With regard to Paragraph 3, Defendant denies the same.
4. With regard to Paragraph 4, Defendant denies the same.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

5. With regard to Paragraph 5, Defendant admits only the existence of a connection fee
or capacity fee, but denies the remainder of this paragraph.
6. With regard to Paragraph 6, Defendant denies the same.
7. With regard to Paragraph 7, Defendant denies the same.
8. With regard to Paragraph 8, Defendant denies the same.
9. With regard to Paragraph 9, Defendant denies the same.
10. With regard to Paragraph 10, Defendant denies the same.
11. With regard to Paragraph 11, Defendant denies the same.
12. With regard to Paragraph 12, Defendant denies the same.
13. With regard to Paragraph 13, Defendant admits the same.
14. With regard to Paragraph 14, the Memorandum Decision and Order speaks for itself.
Therefore, Defendant denies the same.
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT - 2
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15. With regard to Paragraph 15, Defendant denies the same.
16. With regard to Paragraph 16, Defendant denies the same.
17. With regard to Paragraph 17, Defendant denies the same.
18. With regard to Paragraph 18, Defendant denies the same.
COUNT I- UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING

19. With regard to Paragraph 19, this paragraph contains· no allegations of fact, and
therefore, Defendant denies the same.
20. With regard to Paragraph 20, the 5th Amendment speaks for itself. Therefore,
Defendant denies the same.
21. With regard to Paragraph 21, the Idaho Constitution speaks for itself. Therefore,
Defendant denies the same.
22. With regard to Paragraph 22, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 speaks for itself Therefore,
Defendant denies the same.
23. With regard to Paragraph 23, Defendant denies the same.
24. With regard to Paragraph 24, Defendant denies the same.
25. With regard to Paragraph 25, Defendant denies the same.
26. With regard to Paragraph 26, Defendant denies the same.
27. With regard to Paragraph 27, Defendant denies the same.
COUNT II - UNJUST ENRICHMENT

28. With regard to Paragraph 28, this paragraph contains no allegations of fact, and
therefore, Defendant denies the same.
29. With regard to Paragraph 29, Defendant denies the same.
30. With regard to Paragraph 30, Defendant denies the same.
ANSWER TO COMPlAINT · 3
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31. With regard to Paragraph 31, Defendant denies the same.
COUNT III- EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND/OR EQUITABLE TOLLING

32. With regard to Paragraph 32, this paragraph contains no allegations of fact, and
therefore, Defendant denies the same.
33. With regard to Paragraph 33, Defendant denies the same.
34. With regard to Paragraph 34, Defendant denies the same.
35. With regard to Paragraph 35, Defendant denies the same.
36. With regard to Paragraph 36, Defendant denies the same.
COUNT IV -ATTORNEY FEES

37. With regard to Paragraph 37, this paragraph contains no allegations of fact, and
therefore, Defendant denies the same.
38. With regard to Paragraph 38, Defendant is without information sufficient to either
admit or deny, and therefore, deni~ the same.
39. With regard to Paragraph 39, Defendant denies the same.
CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION

40. With regard to Paragraph 40, this paragraph contains no allegations of fact, and
therefore, Defendant denies the same.
41. With regard to Paragraph 41, Defendant is without information sufficient to either
admit or deny, and therefore, denies the same.
42. With regard to Paragraph 42, Defendant denies the same.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

1. Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each and every allegation contained therein, fails to state a
claim against Defendant upon which relief can be granted.
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT -4
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2. Plaintiffs have failed to comply with requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act.
3. Defendant is entitled to immunity as set forth in the Idaho Tort Claims Act.

4. Plaintiffs are barred from maintaining this action against Defendant under the doctrines

of absolute immunity and/or qualified immunity.
5. All relevant decisions regarding or affecting Plaintiffs made by Defendant were based on

legitimate constitutional and statutory reasons.
6. Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust administrative remedies with regard to some or all of the

claims asserted for which exhaustion is required under applicable law.
7. Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue claims in this matter and/or Plaintiffs' claims are moot

and/or not yet ripe.
8. Plaintiffs have failed to establish an "actual controversy'' as required by law for the relief

sought.
9. Plaintiffs' claims are precluded by the doctrines of Waiver, Estoppel and/or Laches.

I 0. Plaintiffs' claims are precluded by the applicable Statutes of Limitations, including but
not limited to Idaho Code§ 5-219 and other applicable statutes.
11. Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate damages, if any.
12. The actions of Defendant were at all times carried out in good faith. Defendant had

objectively reasonable belief that all conduct was lawful at all times stated in Plaintiffs'
Complaint.
13. Equitable remedies are not appropriate.
14. Defendant has not engaged in any conduct that would violate or be contrary to public

policy.
15. Plaintiffs' purported tort claims are barred by the economic loss rule.
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT - 5
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16. The actions of Defendant alleging a violation of statute and purported tortious conduct
were totally unforeseeable to Defendant and therefore had no duty nor opportunity to
prevent the alleged hann.
17. Plaintiffs' and any of the purported "similarly situated" Pocatello residents lack standing
to assert a claim under the Complaint.
18. Plaintiffs and some or all memb_ers of the purported class lack standing to assert claims
because they have not suffered any damage or injury.
19. Plaintiffs and any of the purported class cannot satisfy the requirements for class
certification.
20. Plaintiffs' Complaint and the averments contained therein fail sufficiently to allege the
times and places at which certain material events described in the complaint allegedly
occurred, and such claims therefore are barred and/or subject to dismissal pursuant to
Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
21. The foregoing defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any and all of Plaintiffs'
claims for relief In asserting these defenses, Defendant does not admit that Defendant
has the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses, but, to the
contrary, asserts that by reasons of the denials and/or by reason of relevant statutory and
judicial authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses and/or
the burden of proving the inverse to the allegations contained in many of the defenses is
upon the Plaintiffs. Defendant does not admit, in asserting any defense, any
responsibility or liability, but, to the contrary, specifically denies any and all allegations
ofresponsibility and liability in Plaintiffs' Complaint.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT• 6
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22. Defendant may have additional defenses to Plaintiffs' Complaint, but cannot at this time,
consistent with Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, state with specificity those
defenses. Accordingly, Defendant reserves the right to supplement the Amended Answer
and add additional defenses as discovery in this case progresses.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Defendant has been· required to retain counsel to defend this action, and is enti.tled to

· recover reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in the defense of this action from Plaintiffs,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Idaho Code§§ 12-117, 12-120, 12-121, Rules 54 and 58 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and all other applicable laws allowing for the recovery of costs or
attorney fees in this action. Defendant denies that Plaintiff is entitled to any award of attorney
fees.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment as follows:
1. That Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, with Plaintiffs taking nothing ·
thereunder;
2. That the Court no certify the purported class;
3. That Defendant be awarded costs and attorney fees necessarily incurred in defending
this action;
4. For such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
DATED this di&day of June, 2014.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this~ day of June, 2014, by the method indicated below:
Michael D. Gaffuey, Esq. BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls,,ID 83404
Fax: 529-9732
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

[)d Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

[>(] Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

Fax: 524-3391
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Nathan M. Olsen
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen
485 "E" Street, Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Fax: (208) 524-3391
ISBN: 7373
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY

HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated,

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C

Plaintiffs,

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
vs.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on Plaintiffs' Application for Prejudgment
Writ of Attachment Pursuant to I.C. § 8-502 and the Court having made a preliminary
determination from the file that the Plaintiffs have met the requirements of LC. § 8-502 and

a

I.R.C.P. 6{c)(2) for the Court to issue an order to show cause as to why prejudgment writ of
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE - I
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attaclunent should not be entered pending a hearing and Plaintiffs meeting their burden at said
hearing set below.
Now THEREFORE, IT Is HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1.

On the 8th day of September, 2014 at the hour of 2:00 o'clock p.m., at the

Bannock County Courthouse, Defendant shall appear and show cause if there be any, why a
Writ of Attaclunent should not be issued in the manner requested by Plaintiffs in their
application.
You ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that in the absence of such appearance, such order shall be
issued without further notice to you. You are notified that any party electing to produce
testimony or other evidence, or to cross examine the adverse party at the hearing scheduled
herein, must give to the court and to opposing counsel notice thereof which must be received
at least 24 hours prior to· such hearing. This order constitutes such notice to Defendant by
Plaintiffs.
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED

that the Plaintiffs cause a copy of this order to be

served on the Defenq.ant as soon as practicable, but in no event less than five (S) days prior to
the hearing scheduled above.
DATED this If!. day of August, 2014.
.,

?tZ
David C. Nye
District Judge
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621 ..3008.
ISBNo. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgh(@,hasattorneys.com
s1a@hasattorneys.com
nrs@hasattomeys.con1
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itse]f and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and a1l others similarly situated,

_Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C

AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STROSCHEIN

Plaintiff,

v.
CITY OF POCATELLO, anJdaho
municipality,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO

.,
: ss.

County of Bannock

Joyce A. Stroschein, being first duly sworn. deposes and states as follows:
I.

I am the designated Interim Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") for the City of Pocatello._ I

have served in the finance department of the City since October, 20~1 including City Controller
from 2006-2008 and the Finance Manager from 2008-2014. I am knowledgeable regarding the
AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN • 1
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financial affairs of the City and its adoption of policies related to the Payment-In-Lieu-Of-Taxes
("PILOT") component of the user fees, return on equity. and the Capacity/Connection fees.
2.

The City owns and operates a municipal sewage collection and treatment system that

includes sewer trunk lines to. transport sewage to treatment plant facilities designed to treat raw
sewage. That system was financed, in part. by the issuance of revenue bonds, pursuant to Article
8, Section 3, Idaho Constitution and the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, Idaho Code §§ 50-1027
through 50-1042.

3.

The City owns and operates a sewage collection system and treatment system pursuant to

Idaho Code Section 50-1028, et seq. The wastewater treatment facility is called the Water
Pollution Control Facility (WPCF). The area served by the WPCF includes the cities of
.

.

Pocatello and Chubbuck and some connections within the area of city impact within Bannock
County but outside the city boWidaries. The WPCF was originally constructed as a primary_
treatment plant in 1959.
4.

The "Return on Equity" policy, which no longer exists, referred to city-owned public

utilities {i.e. water, sewer) making a transfer to the general fund. Prior to the Court's holding in

Building Contractors Association ofSoutheast Idaho v. City ofPocatello, the City charged the
city-owned public utilities a fee. The general theory behind the implementation of this fee was
that these public utilities are businesses operated by the public that could and do operate in other
comn1unities as for-profit private enterprises. The utilities were treated commensurately with
privately owned utilities
S.

In prior years, the City described the transfer as a ''rate of return" or "return on equity" as

if the taxpayers were the shareholders (which they are). In approximately 2011, the City re-
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described the transfer as a Payment-In-Lieu-Of-Taxes ("PILOT9'). The phrase "rate of return,"
"return on equity," or "PILOT" are synonymous. This change made the PILOT directly
comparable to private utilities operating in the·community. The PILOT was calculated on the
prior year city property tax levy rate multiplied by the-estimated market value per the most recent
financial plan prepared by an outside consulting engineer. The rate of return was part of the
annual budget process and the rates were set each year and approved by the City Council.
6.

The PILOT expense component of the user f~ (rate of return) was a payment in lieu of

taxes fee charged directly to the utility. The charge operated like property taxes assessed to and
paid by Idaho Power or Intermountain Gas (except the PILOT charge does not include County or
school district taxes). The PILOT charge would most accurately be described as a cost of doing
business for both the water and sewer departments. Both the water and sewer department
recovered the PILOT charge through the fee charged to all users of the water and sewer system..
7.

Payment in lieu of Taxes (PILOT), as well as the predecessor "rate of return" or "return

on equity," was designed to be a fair and reasonable payment implemented to keep Pocatello
resident• s property taxes lower and still provide the necessary water and sewer services at
reasonable rates. The City's water and wastewater utility were financially self-sufficient with
funding for capital and operating requirements derived primarily from rates, w_hich included the
PILOT charge. The utilities are responsible for planning, construction. operatin~. and
maintaining water and wastewater facilities.
8.

The existence of the PILOT is irrelevant to the policy decision to require capacity fees for

new utility connections. There is no overlap between the PILOT component of the user fee and
the coJmection/capacity fee. The City has never charged a PILOT component to the
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connection/capacity fee.
9.

Following the Court's decision in Building Contractors, however, the City immediately

discontinued the PILOT charge to the utilities and therefore each of the Pocatello resident users
saw an immediate decrease in their water and sewer utility bills. On December 19, 2013, the
City lowered utility user fees in compliance with the Building Contractors decision. Pocatello
residents saw an approximately 1Oo/o decrease in their monthly water and wastewater bills.
10.

The focus of the Connection/Capacity fee is on backbone utility infrastructure that serves

all utility customers with a capacity that was purchased and constructed by ratepayers long ago.
The connection/capacity fee has nothing to do with taxes. The capacity fee is intended to
recover a new connector's proportionate share of the Citis wastewater and water backbone
facility costs. A new customer must "buy-in" to the existing system by making a contribution
-equal to the amount of equity a similar existing customer has in the system. The
connection/capacity fee is not the cost to provide new service to the new customer. Rather, when
new capacity is needed, all customers will bear the cost proportionately. The
connection/capacity fee is not used for future expansion.
11.

The Cmmection/Capacity Fee is a fee that is a one-time fee charged to all new connectors

to a system. The connection/capacity fee was phased in during FY2007 after several years of
increasing numbers of new connections. This fee is intended to recover a new connector's
proportionate share of the City's wastewater backbone facility costs. The Connection fee is a
contribution equal to the amount of equity a similar existing customer has in the system. The
connection fee is to offset the cost for existing users whose capacity will be diminished by the
new users and will, thus, require replacement of existing infrastructure more regularly. The
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collection of the capacity fee is based on the size of the connection requested by the customer
and is generally paid at the time a building permit is issued so that all permit fees and utility
hookup fees are known in advance. The connection fee is a one-time fee assessed prior to
connection to the line in accordance with the current fee resolution adopted by the City Council.
12.

The connection /capacity fee is a policy choice adopted by the City upon

recommendation of a water and wast~ater study provided by Red Oak Consulting. The
connection fee was deemed a fair method of ensuring that new users were providing fmancial
support for the use of the existing infrastructure. Capacity fees are irrelevant if there are no new
connections. They may be immaterial if new connections are infrequent. But when growth is
more rapid, new connectors can r~pidly consume existing capacity; restoring it can cause rates to
increase for existing: ratepayers with no compensation for the capacity that they paid for.
Industrial users can consume capacity in bulk amounts with little notice.
13.

Following the Court's decision in Building Contractors, the City made no changes to the

connection/capacity fee. The City has never charged a PILOT component to the
connection/capacity fee and the two different fees have no relationship. Based on the Building

Contractors decision, the connection/capacity fee was deemed appropriate and the amount was
upheld. Because no PiLOT component charge has ever been collected from the
connection/capacity fee it was not improperly collected. Because the fee was declared
constitutional and the amounts were correct, the City's collection of the connection/capacity fee
should not serve as a source of recovery for the PILOT component of the user fee. Attached
hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of a December 26, 2013 memorandum I prepared
for the Mayor, City Council members, and the City's legal department addressing the Capacity
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Fee calculations.
14.

The water and wastewater departments have money held in four different fund groups.

The first fund group is Fund 31 and 32. Funds 31 and 32 are the operating funds. This fund is
comprised entirely of user fees that are collected by the water and wastewater departments,
respectively. Funds 31 and 32 would be the only funds which record user fees that contain a
PILOT component charged by the water and wastewater departments. The second fund group is
Funds 37 and 38. Funds 37 and 38 are the funds which record the connection/capacity fees.
These :funds are comprised entirely of connection/capacity fees that have been collected by the
City's water and wastewater departments. At no point has the City ever deposited any user fees
that contain a PILOT component into Funds 37 or 38, these funds represent the entirety of the
connection/capacity funds collected by the City since its inception in 2007. The third fund group
is Funds 60 and 61. Funds 60 and 61 are the debt service funds for the water and wastewater
departments. The debt service funds are reserves that are set aside to meet the annual debt
service payments required by the bond covenants. In the past monies are transferred into these
funds from Funds 31 and 32, but after the creation of Funds 37 and 38 we have budgeted and
transferred monies to Funds 60 and 61 to cover the required current debt service payment. The
final group is FWids 73 and 74. Funds 73 and 74 are the construction funds. These funds are
where all of the proceeds from the bonds are placed for water and wastewater. Money for
bonded projects will be withdrawn from these funds to pay for approved bonded projects.
Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of the City's Monthly Cash Report for
July 2014.

·ts.

The Monthly Cash Reports are public records and can be accessed on the City's website
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at http://www.pocatello.us/finance/finance_cash.htm. The Monthly Case Report identifies the
current cash in each of the City's respective funds, including the funds above.
16.

Flllld 37 holds the connection/capacity fees for the water department. Fund 38 holds the

connection/capacity fees for the wastewater department ("WPC"). Each of the respective funds
contains all of the connection/capacity fees gathered between 2007 and current. Fund 37 and 38
is dedicated to holding only the conneetion/capacity f~s. There .are no other funds that are held
here, including PILOT component user fees.
17.

Funds 37 and 38 were initially created in March 2013 to increase transparency of how the

connection/capacity fees were spent. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of
the Monthly Cash Reports for February 2013 and March 2013 showing no fund 037 or 038 in
February 2013 but showing those as created in March 2013 with beginning balances drawn from
the corresponding operating funds in an amount equal to the amount ever collected in the
capacity fees since inception in 2007.
18.

Consistent with the FY2014 Budget for the City, the City has detennined that the

eonnection/capacity1fees will be used for debt service. As such, the City budgeted approximately
$725,826.00 for debt service for the water dep~ent in FY2014. The City intends to use the
remaining funds from Fund 37 for debt Service in FY2015. The City has budgeted
approximately $1,384,780.00 for debt service for the wastewater department in FY2014. This
will exhaust nearly all Qf the funds in Fund 38. Both Fund 37 and 38 have scheduled September
payments and will execute as budgeted.

Fund

03 7-3000-520.95-03

Budget·
$725,826.00

Year to Date Actual
$553,831.24

Remaining Budget Balance
$171,994.76
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038-0000-520.95-03

$1,384,780.00

$237,961.74

$1,146,81826

19. · At present, the remaining balance will be $171,994.76 for Fund 37 and $1,146,818.26 for
Fund 38. Using this approach, all of the connection/capacity fees can be accounted for and there
has been no funds transferred to the general funds from the connection/capacity fees. As of June
30, 2014, Fund 37 contained $1,057,908.12 and Fund 38 contained $1,285,169.46. These funds
hold all the cash ever received since 2007 for all the capacity fees. The only expenditures are the
year to date transfers noted above for related debt service. For FY2015, the water department is
scheduled to draw on their capacity fee cash for debt service substantially as was done in
FY2014. Because virtually all oft.he capacity funds from Fund 38 will be expended in FY2014,
the wastewater department will rely on operating funds for debt service transfers during FYIS.
20.

Freezing Funds 37 and 38 will have significant implications on the City's retirement of

debt obligations. As previously, addressed, none of the cash found in Funds 37 and 38 contain
any user fees with the PILOT component and freezing these funds will effectively nullify the
Building Conwactor's decision that the connection/capacity fee was constitutional and properly
assessed.
FURTHER YOURAFFIANT SAVETH NAUGHT.

Dated thiso'f day of August, 2014.

<e:~~

fj_

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned. a Notary Public in and for said State, this~

day of August, 2014.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
_JJ~.·eby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this-~-ay of August, 2014, by the method indicated below:
·
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Fax: 529-9732
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 524-3391

[v{Mailing

("j Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

[\ii' Mailing

('j Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mayor Blad, Council Members, Legal Department

i

FROM: David Swindell, Chief Financial O f f i c e r · ~ ~
SUBJECT: Capacity Fee Calculations
DATE: December 26, 2013
1. FORINFORMATION.

I

'.

2. Purpose; To provide information regarding how ca.pa.city fees are determined and to prove that
the calculation does not involve Payment In lieu Of Taxes (PILOT) or any other operating cost.
3. Discussion.

a. General. On December 19, 2013 the City lowered utility user fees in compliance with a
court decision. That decision said that charging the PILOT was improper and we needed to lower
user utility rates commensurate with this utility expense reduction. All of this came about from a
lawsuit :from the contractors association that objected to the utility capacity fees. The capacity fees
do not involve PILOT and were not adjusted. Representatives of the contractors association
complained to you during the meeting of December 19 and threatened "contempt of court" among
other things. When asked "what are we missing?'' the representatives skirted the question; but it
was obvious to everyone that the complaint was that user rates had been lowered, but the capacity
fees had not.

the

b~ Understading Essential. Given stakeholder complaints, it is important that evecyone
understand a few things about capacity fees. This memo attempts to accomplish the following:
• Convey the rationale for ·capacity fees
• Demonstrate the calculations involved
• Assure you that the calculation does not involve a PILOT or any other operating expense
• Provide some history and context for the fees.

c. Rationale. A capacity fee is a "buy-in" contribution from a new connector to
compensate the utility for the value of the capacity ~ up by the new connector. Absent a
capacity fee, the existing ratepayers will be responsible for re..generating the capacity. The impact
on ratepayers varies with the situation. If there· are no new connectors, then the whole thing is
irrelevant. If new connections are very low, then the impact may be immaterial. But ifnew
connections start to rise, the impact on ratepayers can be big. Mrs. Jones on Maple Street who has
lived here for 30 years starts to see utility rates rise because of new subdivisions on the periphery
(or in Chubbuck, since we run the wastewater treatment plant for them).
Right now, with new connections at about l/3 ofnormal (normal being about 1SO new single family
home starts per year), capacity fees equal about 2% ofwater revenue and 3% of sewer revenue. But
lUlder normal conditions it would be double or triple that.· In 2006, we had 306 single :tlunily
connections; 6 times the present rate -with concurrent impacts on capacity and need to re-generate.
A capacity fee helps to mitigate the impact on c~t ratepayers. There is always some judgment

1

44

·involved. A community doesn't have to have capacity fees or doesn't have to charge the full
recommended rate (in 2007, the city charged 75% of the rate in an attempt to moderate the impact
on new connectors).
.
'
.
A community can pmchase capacity and then give it away for free. But it doesn't have to. As the
utility systems become ever more complex and expensive, each unit of capacity becomes more
valuable. That's why most utilities have capacity fees these days. The court decision upheld your
right to charge such fees and upheld the calculations. Naturally, the builders would like to have the
capacity for free-they want their subsidy back. Unable to win that policy argument, they engaged
in a lawsuit that has now come full circle. PILOT fees and the impact on rates aside, the capacity
fee issue is right back where it always was - a policy decision. There is always some room for
compromise, ~ut in the long~ the city utilities will find it difficult to buy capacity and then give
it away for free. These are busmess-like activities and that is obviously not a sustainable business
practice.

d. Calculation. The basis for the calculation of our capacity fees is to value the "backbone"
system and divide by the capacity (in residential equivalents). This results in dollars per unit of
capacity. Note that this calculation does not include any operating expense. There is no labor, no
chemicals, no electricity, and no PlLOT or taxes or transfers of any kind There is no relationship
to the operating expense nor oper~ting revenues.
e. Detailed calculations. Per above, the capacity fee calculation should not contain any
PILOT, But did it? To know for sure, we need to look at the calculations in the last rate analysis
an4 verify that.
Water: An excerpt from the Water Financial Planning Study of2010 is at TAB A. Page 6-1
provides a dis_cussion of the calculation method. Appendix D shows the detailed calculations.
Table 6-1 shows the value of the backbone system at $54.548,685 as of 2010. Table 6-2 adds
$311,000 to that total from planned 2010 additions to the backbone (from line 28, table 2-2; it was
the land pmchase for the planned new operations facility). The resulting $54,859,685 is adjusted
for estimated 2011 inflation. We then add planned 2011 backbone investments of 445,000 and
subtract existing principal debt and planned principal debt (which we did not take on but did plan
for in the study). The result is $48,135,185 net backbone equity. The system has 18,623 single
family residential equivalents. Dividing the $48M by the 18,623 units= the capacity fee of $2,580
per single family equivalent
Note that the addition or elimination of the PILOT or any other operating cost has no bearing on
these calculations. ·
Wastewater: An excerpt from the Wastewater Financial Planning Study of2010 is at TABB.
Page 6-1 provides a discussion of the calculation method. Table 6-1 shows the summary
calculations the value the backbone ofthe collection system at $33,056,000 and the value of the
treatment plant at $51,885,300. These 2009 replacement costs are adjusted for 2010 inflation (line
27). Table 6-2 provides allocation percentages of various components of the system to either basic
volume, or to constituent components used in industrial customer calculations.
Treatment Plant: Table 6-3 shows the Treatment Plant calculation. It takes 1he 2010 values from
Table 6-1 and adds a 2011 inflation component, for a 2010 value of $58,113,650. Line 4 adds
2
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$525,000 for scheduled 2011 improvements and lines 5-7 subtract existing debt. The resul1ing
equity value of the plant is $41,932,986 Qine 8). The system averages 6,966,200 gallons per day of
flow. Dividing the $41M by the daily flow provides a cost per gallon per day of flow of$6.02. Per
the· discussion, a residential equivalent in our community is 185 gallons per day. The indicated
capacity fee is $6.02 x 185 = $1,113.70, which was ro1mded down to $1,110 (table 6-5).
CoHection System: Table 6-4 displays the Collection System calculation. The $34,708,800 from
table 6-1 is adjusted for 2010 debt payments and additions to $35,593,159 (line 11). 'Inflation for
2011 is added on line 12 and scheduled improvements are added on line 14. This results in equity
in the collection system of$37,622,859 Qine 18). The system.has an average flow per day of
5~~60,900 gallons after subtracting Chubbuck's collection system. Dividing $37,622,859 by
5,960,900 gallons per day = $6.31 per gallon, per day. The indicated collection system capacity fee
is $6.31 x 185 gallons per day or$1,167.35, rounded upto tb.enearest$l0 as 1,170 for aresidential
%" or 1" connection (table 6a6).
AJJ with water, operating expenses are nrelevant to these calculations. There is some professional
judgment for inflation rates and so o~ but it sho"Qld be obvious by inspection that 1he capacity fees
should not have involved the PILOT and they did not involve the PILOT. ·
f. Histeriea1 eontext. Another way to label this section might be "It's not 1960 anymore."
Capacity fees in most utilities started to appear in the 1980's, 1argely in response to expenses
associated with the Clean Water Act of 1970. Water and wastewater utilities were a far cry from
the simple cheap systems of the previous generation. One does not have to go that far back in
Pocatello history to find a sewer system of basic lagoons ,.... a lot ofraw sewage went into the river.
But with growth and increasing dissatisfaction with pollution, those systems became untenable and
ultimately illegal. As the systems were improved, they became more expensive - a unit of capacity
became more 'dear. The trends continued. In the 1990's, the city imposed a modest capacity fee for
the first time. The building community didn't like it and persuaded the city council to remove it.
But the cost pressures remained. Between 1994 and 2005, the sewer system added $26,252,969 in
debt, largely to meet new EPA requirements. Water systems were also ever more complicated,
regulated and expensive. Once again, a unit of capacity was ever more dear. In 20061 the city
experienced significant growth (306 single family building permits, double prior years). Given this,
in 2007 the Council once again voted for capacity fees, this time much larger and in both water and

sewer.
The building community again objected and this time filed a lawsuit. The lawswt
detennined that the city should not charge a PILOT operating cost to nu:epayers, but confirmed the
· capacity fees.
builders will undoubtedly come &aclc to the political mode. That is where this
policy decision should reside, but one should note that all the pressures that created capacity fees
still exist. The latest BPA sewer permit may require $19M of additional capital related debt within
the next two years. We're not going to add much capacity; rather·once again it makes the existing
capacity compliant and legal. Once again, a unit of capacity becomes more dear. The ability to
create it and give it away for free becomes ever less sustainable.

The

3

46

TAB A
City of Pocatello

'

-l

911 North 7th Avenue • P.0. Sox 4169 • Pocatello, ID 83205--4169

!

Water UtilityFinancial Planning

Study
June 181 2010
'J

.

I-

I

I
Report Prepared By:

II ,

• : : ! REilDAK.
:•~·.~• CONSULTING
• • •

l aJ"I···" or M,AI..CGLII 111111:fl,E

I

1DD FIiimore Street
5466003

Suite200
Denver, CO 80206

' :-

303-316-6500

1

:

i

I,

1i

!
!

47

C\

()

-.-··J

City of Pocatello

Section 6:
System Capacity Fees
;

i

l

I
J!

-1

II
I

I
l

:.::: RElJDAK
• .•.. CONSULTING
• •

t • •

I -

A DIVISID" OF Ho\U9L1- PIHII

't
;

'

I

54660!13

f

i

;

!

48

-

()

A

\i._.Ji

6. System Capacity Fees
6.1. Introduction
The City charges water capacity fees to all new connectors. This fee is intended to
recover the new connector's proportionate share ofthe City's water backbone :facility
costs. The current water fees have been in effect since October 2009.

8.2. System Buy-in Method
The capacity fee calculations performed in this study are based on the system buy•in
method. This method is based on the concept that existing customers, through rates and
other assessments, have developed a valuable water system. A new customer must "buy.
inn to this system by making a contribution equal to the amount of equity a similar
existing customer has in the system. Note this is not the cost to provide new service to the
new customer, and when new capacity is needed, all customers will bear the

cost.

To compute the system capacity fees using the system buy-in inetho~ the following
general procedure is used:
II Determine existing water system equity.

I! Estimate system capacity.

I

II Calculate unit equity cost.
• Calculate capacity fee.

i

I-

Implementation of fees desisned using the system buy•in method results in new
customers paying their proportionate share of facility costs incurred to serve them. The
fees are dependent on the capacity required to serve a customer and the unit equity cost of
existing :lacilities expressed. as dollars per unit of capacity. Fees using the system buy.in
method can readily be calculated using utility fixed asset records. Because fees can be
traced to such records, they are generally understood by customers and supported on an
engineering economic basis.

I

6.2.1, System Equity
Determination ofthe system value is the first important consideration in using the system
buy-in methodology to compute capacity fees. System value is calculated by adding
replacement cost of existing backbone system jnvestment to the cost of planned capital
improvements. The backbone system includes all major water distribution and production
facilities.
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Replacement cost represents the cost of duplicating existing facilities at current prices.
The cost to replace the City's water system was developed using historical cost
information :from fixed asset records and restating these costs in current dollars using the
Construction Cost Index (CCI) published by Engineering Newa-Record (ENR). Table 6-1
shows the allocation of system assets to functional cost components to arrive at 2010
replacement costs.
To determine net equity in the system, replacement cost ofthe existing bacJ.cbone system
is reduced by the outstanding debt on related facilities. Equity is not reduced by
accumulated depreciation. Once a new customer connects to the water system, that
customer begins paying charges for service sbnilar to all existing cusromers. These
charge, typically Jnelude payment for retirement of outstanding debt For this reason, it is
necessary to deduct outstanding debt :from system value before developing these fees.
Table 6-2 develops the system capacity fee for the study period. System net equity is
projected to increase from $48.l million in2011 to $625 million in 2015. These
increases are due to the addition of scheduled major capital improvements, reduction in
outstanding debt, and ail annual inflation allowance of 5.0 percent.

6.2.2. Equivalent Capacity Units
In order to apply an equitable fee to new customers, all customer classes and meter sizes
need to be expressed in common capacity units. The standard capacity unit is defined as
having the average water oharacteristics ofan existing customer with a I-inch meter.
Meter .sizes 1-inch and smaller serve about 66 percent ofthe Citys water customers.
Capacity units are determined for all other meter sizes based on the meter capacity ratios
ofmaxbnum safe continuous capacity as published in the AWWA M6 manual. The
number of capacity units is projected to increase from 18,623 in2011 to 19,363 in 2015.
8.2.3. Unit Fee Calculatlon
The capacity fee per capacity unit is the result of dividing the net equity of backbone
system investments by the total capacity units. The proposed 2011 capacity fee is $2,580
for a customer with a I-inch water meter or smaller. Table 6-3 shows existing and
proposed water capacity fees for each meter size for the study period.
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City of Pocatello1 Idaho
Water Utility

Table 6-1
6/1812010

Total System Assets
Replacement
2009
Original

Une

Cost

Descr1,t1on

No

$

1
2

Transmission and DiStribution Mains

3
4

Booster Pump S1al:ions
Wells

5

Intake

6
7
B

Meters

9

Total System Assets

10

2010 Inflation Allowance of 5 Percent

11

Total System Assets at RCN

Land

Storage

24,805,400
1,034,650
607,968
997,827
23,QOO
5,566,445

66,364,975

5,801,039
38.863,019

97,018,577

Backbone
·facHltles

0

$

30,527,900
1,034,600
1,311,600
3,271,600
126,000
15,679,385

1,034,650
1,311,825
3,271,559
125,984
15,679,385
41,710
9,188,690

25,892

General Plant

CostNew
(RCN)
2009-CCI lndeJ1;
$

0

0

51,951,085

4,850,900

2,597,600

101.869,477

· !54,j~;sas

f'repared by Red Oak Consulting
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Table a..2

City of Pocatello, Idaho
· Water Utility

6/18/2010

Development of System Capacity Fees
Line
No.

Description

2011
$

Fiscal Year Ending See!!mber 30
2012
2013
2014
$
$
$

2016
$

2

Backbone System Investment
Annual Inflation of 5%

54,859,685
2,743,000

58,047,685
2,902,400

60,995,085
3,049,800

64,324,885
3,216,200

67,571,085
3,378,600

3

Total Water System Backbone Investment

57,602,685

60,950,085

64,044,885

67,541,085

70,949,685

4

Scheduled Backbone Improvements

445,000

45,000

280,000

30,000

311,143

5

Less: Outstanding Principal
Existing

6

Proposed

8,495,000
1,417,500

.8,140,000
2,748,375

7,770,000
2,425,500

7,385,000
2,102,625

6,990,000
1,779,750

7

Tata.I Outstanding Principal

9,912,500

10,888,375

10,195,500

9,487,625

8,769,750

8

Net Water System Backbone Equity

48,135,185

50,106,710

54,129.385

58,083,460

62,491,078

9

Tota!Single Family Equivalents (SFE}

18,623

18,835

19,007

19,187

19,363

10

Capacil¥ Fee, $ per-SFE

-2,510

2,660

2,850

3,030

3,230

1

(a) 1 SFE iB maximum capacity requ}Ted iD service a typical single tamily home.

()
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City of Pocamllo, Idaho

Table 6-3

Water Utility

6118/2010

Proposed Capacity Fee Schedule
Cunent

Description

Water
lleterfa)

Fee

2011

2012

$

$

$

Proposed Faes
2013
$

2014.
$

2015
$

C)

Capacity
Ratios

Size

3/4"
1"
1112•

Z'
3n

1.00

2,600

2,580

2,660

1.00

2,600
5,200
8.320
18,200

2,580
5,180

2,660
5,320
8,510

2.00
3.20
7.00

8,260
18,060

18,620

2,850
2,850
5,700

9,120
19,950

3,030
3,030
6,080
9,700
21,210

3,230
3,230
6,460
10,340
22,610

(a) Meter sizeS greater than 3 inches assessed on an indMdtJal basis.

.r,........,\
·;t,~~
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City of Pocatello, Idaho
Water Utilily
Capital Improvement Program
OPTIMAL
Line RJNDING

TableZ-2
6/18/2010
..

I Constraint
Fundlnn

20
21

0%

0%

Cash

22
23
24

0%

0%
0%

Gash

2

0%

Cash

2

0%

D"A.
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

Cash
Cash
Cash

2

0%

cash
Cash

2
2

Cash

2

9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

25
26
2:1
28
29
30

0%
0%
0%

0%

2

2
l?.

1
2010

Descri1111on

OP I CAP I IYJ!e I Fund
()OA,
2 Waler line Replacement Projecls (2 Miles per year @ $28 ff)
0% Cash
0% Cash
2 Gravel Crushing
0%
()OJI,
Cuib and Guler Replacement
0% Caah
2
004 0% Cash 2 Asphalt Replacement
Water Line Replacement Projeds
2
0%
0%- Cash
Cash
2 Chlorine Building per DEQ
0%
0%
()OA,
0% Cash 2 Soft Starts I Electrical Upgrades
Well #22 &#30- Replac:ement
Cash
2
0%
0%
2 Satterfield Well-Connect to H"ighland Golf Course Water System
0%
0% Cash
2 Highland Tank- Interior Painting
0% Cash
0%
0%
2 Booster Upgrade - Spaulding & Barton
0% cash
Decommlslon Westello Tank- small
2
0%
0% Cash
2 High Country Tank Liner
0% 0% Cash
0% Cash
2 PocateUo Creak Area-Well for H"ighland Tank
0%
Aquifer Recharge and Recovery Area
2
0%
0% Cash
North well Field
2
0%
0% Cash
Central Water Shop Facirlty
INT
0%
0%
2
2
Vehicles and Equipment
0%
0%
Cash
2
Gravel
0%
0% C&sh
0% Cash 2 Cum and Gutter Replacement
0%

No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

-~·

$

2

3

4

2011

2012

2013

300,000

300,000

30,000
30,000
·200,000

30,000
30,000

300,000
30,000
30.000

300,000
30,000
30,000

200,000
400,000

200,000
400,000

200,001)

$
31ltl,OOO
30,000
30,000
200,000

400,000

400,000

30,000

30,000
250,000

30,000

$

400,000
'15,000
30,000

s

15,DOD
30,000.
250,000

$

5'
2014
$

6
2016

()

250,000
200,000
200,000
200,143
75,000

1,500,000
283,270

1,500,000
317,270

319,670

340,170

299,000

30,000

30,000
100,000

Asphalt Replacement
Ma!nllne Replacement
Qni, Ton Diesel Truck
Valve Truck

385,000
32,000
150,000
85,000
25,000
1,240,000

KVABackup Generator
S~DASysmm
Wa18r Rlgh1s Acquisition

Land Purchase for Water Shoe
South vallev Waler Tank
Total Capital lmprowmentiS

(~'\
i"'.:;,,;.ii-:.:..J

1,240,000

~~4,D2.a,722
4A28,270

-1,240,000

1,240,000

1,240,000

~12,270

2.799,670

2,820,170

1,570,143
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6. System Capacity Fees
6.1. Introduction
The City charges wastewater capacity fees to all new connectors. This fee is intended to
recover a new connector~s proportionate share of the City's wastewater backbone facility
costs. The current wastewater fees have been in effect since October 2009.

6.2. System Buy-in Method
The capaoity fee calculations performed in this study are based on the system ·buy-in
method. This method is based on the concept that existing customers, through rates and
other assessments. have developed a valuable wastewater system. A new customer must
"buy-in" to this system by making a contribution equal to the amount of equity a similar
existing customer has in the system. Note this is not th~ cost to provide new service to the
new customer, and when new capacity is needed, all customers will bear the cost.
To compute the system capacity fees using the system buy-in method, the following
general procedure is used:
. f

II Determine existing wastewater system·equity.
II Estimate system capacity.
1111

Calculate unit equity cost.

• Calculate treatment plant capacity fee.
II Calculate collection system capacity fee
Implementation of fees designed using the system buy-in method results in new
customers paying their proportionate share of filcility costs inourred to serve them. The
fees are dependent on the capacity required to serve a customer and the tmit equity cost of
existing facilities expressed as dollars per unit of capacity. Fees using the system buy-in
method can readily be calculated using utility fixed asset records. Because fees can be
traced to such records. they are generally understood by customers and supported on an
engineering economic basis.
8.2.1. System Equity

Determination of system value is the first important consideration in using the system
buy-in methodology to compute capacity. System value is calculated by adding
replacement cost of existing backbone system investments to the cost of planned capital
improvements. The backbone sysmm includes all major wastewater collection and
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treatment facilities. Backbone collection mains are defined as the system of major
wastewater collection interceptor sewer mains, typically including those greater than 12inches in diameter. Assets have been grouped into two categories, treatmentwrelated
facilities and oollectionwsystem facilities. This separation recognizes that certain
customers will not receive benefit ftom the collection system inftastructure, such as
Chubbuck customers located north ofl~86.
Replacement cost represents ~ eost ofduplicating existing facilities at current prices.
The cost to replaoe the City's wastewater system was developed using·historical cost
infonnation ;from· fixed asset records and restating these costs in current dollars using the
Construction Cost Index (CCI) published by Engineering NewswRecord (ENR). Table 6~ 1
shows the allocation of system assets to furictional cost components to arrive at 201 O
replacement costs. Table 6-2 shows the percent allocation to functional cost components
for each asset category.
To determine net equity in the system, replacement cost ofthe existing backbone system
is reduced by the outstanding debt on related :facilities. Equity is not redtJ,ced by
accumulated depreciation._ Once a new customer connects to the wastewater system, that
customer begins paying charges fur service like all existing customers. These charges
typically include payment for retirement of outstanding debt. For this reason, it is
necessary to deduct outstanding debt from system value before developing these fees.
Table 6-3 develops the treatment plant capacity fee for the study period. Treatment plant

net equity is projected to Increase ftom $41.9 million in 2011 to $60.1 million in 2015.
Table 6-4 develops the collection system capacity fee for the study period. Collection
system net equity is projected to increase from $37.6 miHion in 2011 to $48.4 million in
· 2015. These increases are due to the addition of scheduled major capital improvements,
reduction in outstanding debt. and an annual inflation allowance of 5.0 percent.
6.2.2, Equivalent Capacity Units
In order to apply an equitable fee to new customerst aU customer classes need to be
expressed in common capacity units. For purposes of this caleulation, the standard
capaoity unit is based on the syst.em maximum month flow in gallons per day (gpd). The
standard capacity unit is a single fiunily equivalent with a 1winch water meter contributing
185 gpd ofwastewater flow. Fees for other water meter sizes are based on meter capacity
ratios ofmaximum safe continuous capacity as published in 1he AWWA Manual 1116. The
number of capacity units is projected to increase :from 6,966,200 gpd in 2011 to
7,I06,600gpd in2015;
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6.2.3. Fee Calculation
The treatmeQt plant capacity fee per unit is determined by dividing the net equity of
treatment plant assets by the total capacity units. This unit cost is multiplied by 185 gpd
and the relative meter capacity ratio for the mef.er size caloulated. The proposed 2011
treatment plant capacity fee is $1,110 for a customer with a 1-inch water meter.
Table 6-S details the capacity fees for each ineter size for the study period.
The collection system capacity fee per unit is detennined by dividing the net equity of
collection system assem by the total capacity units. Total capacity units are reduced by
the amJUal flows from Chubbuck customers north of l-86 since these customers do not
benefit from the collection system inftastructure. This unit cost is multiplied by 185 gpd
and the relative meter capacity ratio for each meter size. The propose4 2011 collection
system capacity fee is $1,170 for a customer with a 1-inch wa1er meter. Table 6-6 details
the capacity fee for each water meter size for 1he study ~eriod.
Table 6~7 details the proposed 2011 capacity me for a large industrial user. This fee is
based on the Individual fl.ow and strongth characteristics for c;aeh customer. The fee is
split by the functional components ofthe sysrem.. Line 31 states the functional unit costs
on a unit per day basis, depending on the unit basis for each functional cost component.
Line 32 states the functional unit costs on a mm per gpd basis.
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System Capacity Fee Tables
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City of Pocatello, Idaho
Wastewater Utility
Total System .Assets

Table 6-1
6f18i2010
Replacement
Cost New

Line
Descrlf!!ion

No

1

Aeration Basins

2
3

Airport Farm

4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Aeration Lift Station
Blower Building
Biosoftds Land Development
Chlorine Con1act basins
Co-Generation Bultding
Chloline Room
Collection System
DAF #1 and #2-WAS Thickener
Digester Control Building
General Plant
Headworks.
General Plant. Treabnent
Outfall
Primary Clariffers
Primary Digesters
Primary Pump House
RAS Pump House
Raw Sludge Pump Hause
Secondary Clartfiers
Sludge Lagoon
Sludge Storage Tank
Land

]

Backbone Facilities

Original
Cost

(RCN)

Collection

Treatment

2009..CC[ Index

Sr!tam

~

$

$

Plant
$

total

$

$

'""..;J

5,548,400
34,800

5,548,400

19,100
1,961,500

19,100
1,961,500
1,172,100
430,BOO
6,045,200

2,954,610

5,548,395

17,688
10,294

34,762
19,052
1,961,460
1,172,098
430,607
6,045,208

1,342,590··

859,891
216,113
4,477,999
893,334
23,076,199
2,138,543

95,148
827,583
2,508,985

8,614,558
532,875
2,599,925
2,524,668
168,120
4,800
934,022
294,952
892,365
27,781

1,172,100

1,477,453
82;640,089
2,875,628
464,642
2;156,031
3;297,754
13,077,543

33,058,000

464,600
0
3,297,800
13,077,500
689,300
4,058,800

889,185
56,900,224

136,681,281

1,477,500
33,056,000
2,875,600

464,600

1,637,400
119,100
1,394,400

0
3,297,800
13,077,500
689,300
4,058,800
4,603,500
491,400
12,200
1,210,000
1,264,500
1,637,400
119,100
1,394,400

33,056,000

51,885,300

84,$41,300

"689,318
4,058,765
4,603,528
491,405
12,189
1,209,965
1,264,496
1,637,385
119,099
1,394,411

430,800
6,045,200
1,477,500
0
2,875,600

34,800

4,608,500

491,400.
12,200
1,210,000
1,26,4,500

25

Total System Assets

26

2010 Inflation Allowarme of 5 Percent

1,652,800

2,594,300

4,247,100

27

Total System Assets at 2010 RCN .

34,708,800

54,479,600

89,188,400
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Table&,2
611812010

Wastewater Utility
Percent Allocation of Backbone Assef:a

Ccnnmon

.--------------,,,------,--=-----------to
.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.;:Com=::.ma:.D::.n:.:m::.=::AD~.....,,......---------1f serwd
by the

Cun,mers

Line

No.
1
2
3

4
5

Daacript1on
Aeration l!asins
Airport Farm
·Aendlon Lift staUon
Blower Billlding
Blosolfds Land Development

Vollmle

Total

BOO
55%
25%

100%

100%
10~,(,

55%
26%

25%

50%

50%

8
a
10
11
12
13
14
16
1S

Chlorine Room
Colection systam
OAF #1 and #2 .WAS Thlnkener
ClgesterConlnil BuDdl~
General Plant
Headworl!s
Other
Outfall
Primary Clariliers

17
ti
19

Primary DlgesteJs
Primary Pump HoUae

100%
100%

100%

RAS Pump Hause
Raw Sludge Pump House
Seeondal)' Ciarifiels

100%

100%

Sludge Lagoon
Sludge Slorage Tank

100%

100%
100%

35%

10%

25%

25%.

35%

10%
25%

25%

100%

Chlorine Conlacl basins
Co-Genel'811on Building

100%

Ph0a1Jhorus

Collection
System

100%

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

TKN

25%

100%

I
7

2D
21
22
23

Slranpth
TSS

100%
100%

· '100%

25%

25%

25'lr,

25%

25%

25%

100%

100%
100%
100%

100%
25%

10!m

25%

100%

100%

25%

25%

25%

25%

100%
100%

25%
25%

25%.

25%

25%

25%

25%

25%
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City of Pocatello, Idaho
Wastewater Utility
Development of Treabnent Plant System Capacity Fees
Une
No.

Descrie!!2n

Table 6-3

6/1812010
Fiscal Year Endl!!Q seetember 30
2013
2014
2012
$
$
$

2011
$

1

Backbone System Investment
Treatment Plant Fadities

2

Annual Inflation of 5%

3

Total WWTP System lnvesbnent

4

Scheduled Backbone Improvements

5

Less: Outstanding Principal
Existing

I,-,.--,- _ _
. -

2015
$

<)
\,.:£"-.:i.'y:

68,376,550
3,418,800

76,795,350

2,931;900

65,120,550
3,256,000

58,113,850

61,510;550

68,37&,550

71,795,350

80,635,150

525,000

3,650,000

0

5,000,000

1,100,000

16,705,664
0

15,704,301
3,689,892

14,664,426
3,569,067

13,584,558
9,464,671

12,463,156
9,134,255

55,346,350

58,638,650

2,767,300

3,838,800

6

Proposed

1

Total Outslanomg Principal

16,705,664

19,394,193

1.8,233,493

23,049,229

21,597,411

8

Net Backbone WWTP Equity

41,932,986

45,726,357

50,143,057

53,746,121

60,137,739

9

System Average Day Flow, gpd

6,966,200

7,001,000

7,036,000

7,071,200

7,106,600

10

Capacity Fee, $ per gpd

8.02

6.53

7.13

7.60

8A6

C)
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Table6-4

City of Pocatello, Idaho
Wastewater Utility

6/18/2010

Development of Collection System Capacity Fees
Line

Backbone Syslem Investment
11

Fiscal Year Ending September 30
2012
2013
2014

2011
$

No.

Collection System Facilities

12

Annual Inflation of4%

13

Total Collection System l11vestment

14

Scheduled Backbone lmprovements

Less: Outstanding Principal

$

$

2015

$

$

35,593,159

37,822,859

45,556,359

1,881,100

39,803,959
1,990,200

42,244,159

1,779,700

2,112,200

2,277,800

37,372.859

39,503,959

41,794,159

44,356,359

47,83~159

250,000

300,000

460,000

1,200,000

600,000

0

D
D

0

0

D

0
0

15
16

Existing

Prcposed

0
0

17

Tot.al Outstanding Principal

0

0

0

0

0

18

Net Backbone Collection System Equity

37,622,859

39.803,969

42,.244,159

48,556,359

48,434,159

System Average Day Flow, gpd

6,968,200
. 1,005,300

7,001,000
1,025,400

7,036,000

7,071,200

1,045,900

1,066,800

7,106,600
1,088,100

. 5,960,900

6,975,600

5,990,100

6,004,400

6,018,500

6.31

6.66

7JJ5

7.59

8.05

19

20
21

22

·Less: ChUbbuck N of 1-86, gpd
Net Collecffon System Average Mon1h Flow
Capacity Fee,$ per gpd

i"~
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City of Pocatello, Idaho

Table 6..S
6/18/2010

Wastewater Uti~ity
Proposed Treatment Plant Capacity Fee Schedule
CUrrent (

Fee
$

Description

Water

Capacity

Meier la)

Ratios

:

2011
$

Proeosad Faes

2012
$

2014
$

2013
$

2015
$

()

Size
Single Family Residential, gpd

314• (b)
1"
1112"
2"
3"

1.00
1.00
2.00
3.20
7.00

1,100
1.100
2,200
3,520
7,700

185

185

185

185

185

1,110
1,110
2,220
3,550
7,770

1,210
1,210
2,420
3,870
8,470

1,320
1,320
2,640
4,220
9,240

1,410
1,410
2,820
4,510
9,870

1,570
1,570
3,140
5,020
10,990

(a) Water meter sizes greater than 3 inohes a8898S8d on an individual basis.
(b) Based on skrgle ti:lmily equiVa/9nt (SFEJ with a contributed volume of 1B5 gallons per day (gpd).

r)'-)

t
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City of Pocatello,. Idaho
Wastewater Utility

Table 6-6
6/18/2010

Proposed Collection Syetem Capacity Fee Sch_edule
eurrant
Fee

De8Crll!tiDn

I

$

2011

2012

$

$

Proposed Fees
2013
$

2014

2015

$

$
-~·

\.__)

capacity
Ratios

Water

Me1Br(a!
Size
Single Family Rasidentlal, gpd

1.00
1.00
2.00

3/48 (b)
1·
1112"
2"
3"

690
690

3..20

1,380
2,210

7.00

4,830

1·85

185

185

185

185

1',170

1,230
1,230
2,460
3,940
8,610

1,300
1,300
2,600
4,160

1,400
1,400
2,800
4,480

9,100

9,800

1,490
1,490
2,980
4,770
10,430

1,170
· 2,340
3,740
8,190

(a) water meter sizes greater than 3 Inches assessed on an indMdual basis.
(b} Based on :single family equivalent (SFE) with a contributecl volume of 185 gallons per day (gpd).

Prepared by Red oak Consulting
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Clly of PocateDo, Idaho

. Bukbon• Tl'Hbnent Plant: r:wwrP1 .
Total
$

Descril!!!llll

Slnnlltb
TSS
$

BOD

Ylllllme
$

1

Aerallon Basins

Airport Farm

7
8
9

10
11
12

13
14

5,548,400
34,800
19,100

Aemllcn Ufl stalitm
BloWer Building
Bloaollds Lend DSW1lopmi,nt
Chklrlne Ccntacl basins
Co-Generauon Building
Chlcllne Room
Cclleclion System
OAF 01 andt12.•WAS lhinkener
Dlgealer Conliul Building
General Plant
Keadwnrks

1,961,500
1.172,100
430,600

$

1,477,l:iDO
3S,115!J,DDO
2,875,800

Backbon.

1KN

Phll&l!hOIU5

s

$

s

0

3,297,800

13,077,500
1189,800
4,058,800
4,803,500
491,400

other

16

Primary Clariliera

17

Primay Digesters.

18

23
24

Pmay Pump House
RAS Pump House
Raw Sludge Pump House
secondary Clarffi"'""
Sludge lagoon
Sludge storsge Tank
Gelll!l'III Plant

25

T11tal Syllfem Assets at RCN

26

2010 Inflation Allowance Df 5 Percant

27

Total System AsSelll at RCN

28

19

ao

12.211D
1,210,000
1,264.l!OO
1,637,400

•

554,BDD
8,700

1,076,800
295,000

298,000

686,500
293,000

196,200
298,000

3,022,800

3,022,800

116,200

116,200

()

1,477,500
33,056,000

2,675.BDD
116,2GO

116,200

D
3,'2$1,800

688,300

4,058,800
1,150,900

1,150,900

1,150,900

1,150,900

1,210,000
318,100
409,400
29,800
872,600

318,100
408,400
29,800
136,800

31Ei,1DO

491,400
12,20D

538,4110

84,941,3UO

6,956,,3GO

9,738,800

. 13,883,700

6,0S9,300

3,180,000

33,056,0CO

/..,..,,...~

4,247,100

347,'BOD

486,900

693,7.110

264.lilJQ

158,000

1,852,100

"~,,)

89,18B,411D

7,3114,10D

1D,22S,1DI!

14,556,91111

5,343,800

3,318,0DD

34,708,800

Less: outstandl119 Fmclpal on Debt

17,669,942

6,822,5-42

3,316,SOD

4,721,4DII

1,733,200

1,078,200

0

29

Net System Equity

71;5111,458

48'f,BSB

8,909,100

9,835,500

3,810,BIIO

2,241,BOO

34,7DB,800

3D

Units
Ml!Dlimum Cllpacll.y Units

31

32

119,100

IP.!!

6,931,600

lbrlid!!l
2.1,40D

capaclly.Fea,$ per unit per day

D.D7

capacity Fee,$ per unit per gpd

0.07

llelldar

lbaldg:

409,<IUD

29,BOO
84,900

SPJ!

28,700

2,DDD

lbsld!!!
600

5,845,000

822.88

415,00

1,BD5.30

3,736.33

5.84

1.00

1.42

0.52

o.:az

5.84

,,_t111r 2010.

--------·----~------. ·-----,
, ····-

1,941,900
8,700

1,394,400

(l!J lm:lllrtes lnffatirm allDWem.:s ors

·1

8,700

316,100
409,400
. 29,800
261,700

21
22

•

3,061,600
8,700

430,600

454,60D

OUlfall

-·

19,iDD

8.045,200

15

'!I,

Collact"ion
$Yalem

System AssllS at Raplaeement Cost New (RCN) (a)

2
3
4
5
6

I.,

Table8~7
6/18/2010

Wast.ewa1er Utility
Development of Capacity Faa for Large lndUsbial Uaer

Line
. N11.

',I ,,,-L.,..,...,,,...........__. • • ' - - - - - . 1 - - ,

Ptvpan!d by Red Oak Consulting
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CITY OF POCATELLO
STATEMENT OF CASH, CASH EQUIVALENTS AND INVESTMENTS BALANCES FOR .CITY FUNDS
AS OF FBBRUARY 28, 2013
.
..........._._

·--~-::r

--=+ .1 -- . F- ----- -- --- -' . -=t=-=+=----------- --

··----~3-·--·-1------ - --·--·--- -·4--·---=e-·-· ·---====~·:=-:±~==----~.---,
-----i-·--·------·
-------- ··-----:.:~:\o
-·--1·-·
---~ --------- · ·----=---=-L____
___
-~-+--·--·-·
-----

· - , - -.. . ._,__ .-...-.......__...__....J...............-....

.............

__.._._...___..__,_ _ _.,.

Cash on H a n d ! · - Cash in Banks
·

·-

$ Value at2

12,658,226.76

Cash held b)l third parties
__ ___l
-- - Cash held at the St~~-of Idaho Investment Pool

-]_.

684,271.95
6 676,027.59

. -~------- ·--·

~nnai:;r~- _-±==:==i=_
~
·--i -~- --------·---

~i

-------1·-c-u-r-re_n_t~l-n_v_e-st_m_._e_n_ts_ _,_ _ _ _,_ _---+-----

___+_,,____ -~

==-----·--·-···--·

CityGov~:=c~~=.Deposit
--·------- - · - - · Total cash equivalents
_
"The Oumber'': I1own
Total cash and cash equivalents
:i;,, .... _ · 1 7 rrom 1ast

--··-- ---·1 =· ]

I
..._ ..___, ~ - - -Long-Term Investments !

----

,J1

-&!'It.
·--8AiS~-i-n-'
cash O 'short term
•
invest, 1ents

!General Government - State Investment Pool Bond Fund

·--·----- ·-----·------

- - - - - -·---·
--=r------$·~=-,-5-,0-3-7-,7-9-4-.9-?_-11

·r·

-----·----=~+--=---.
.·=--·--1-··-t-----i- .
___. ;____ _,____j_ _

$

2,593,9;:;
$2,593,954.73
22,638,093.73

Rec !iJSGnts

isl

---------·

tota in longe"iferm -+ $
5,037,794.97
1
imv istments !
_ _ _ __,_ _ _ ___,., _______ ._____ _J___,_ - - - · - -,--=-=:!====:::f::==!.-____ji-,-- -·-----11

1

Total lon1g-tenn investments

Total Cash, Cash Equ!valents and ··-·--·-·- ----1.l!A l·l-the-city-i noney-wei---.f.--1----------4
-~Lon~!m .!~v~stm~~--------t-.-------·--~~,011.,.T_ f:"-' $
27,675,888.70

_______

[

··--- L _--·-·

r·_- ...J~

·-----t~:·;~~~~1

_--] __ ·- _I

·- --~ ··-.: _____· - ~ ~~-----·--~ --:,

71

--

~- .

{~-~\
\

/r

~-.,,-i"

()

"'-·--.. . . . . . -..-.-.. ----........_...,__........ CITY OF POCATELLO
....---.. . . . . . ._...____. . .. . . , ...----g·. . . . . . -.....,.,. . . . . ..__... .,. . . . . .
STATEMENT OF C~S!'I, CAS~~VALENTS AND INVESTMENTS BALANCES FOR C)'J!'"~UND!...__ _
---·------·-·--··-·-·-·---..·-·--·-----------AS OF MARCH 31, 2013

-·-----·--··--·-·. ----------·-·--·. -·----

72

(,

.... ,-.":\

~-- ....i

FJ.Lf:LJ-

BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
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1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
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Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C
AFFIDAVIT OF NATHAN R.

STARNES
Plaintiff,

v.

- ..,.,

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Boruieville

)
: ss.
)

Nathan R. Starnes, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am one of the attorneys for the Defendant in the above-referenced matter. I am over
the age of eighteen and competent to testify. This affidavit is based on my personal
knowledge unless otherwise stated.

AFFIDAVIT OF NATHAN R.STARNES-1

73

2.

That attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Complaint in the
case of Building Contractors Association ofSoutheast Idaho v.. City ofPocatello,
Bannock County Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C (minus exhibits).

3.

That attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of the Affidavits of David
Swindell filed in the case of Building Contractors Association ofSoutheast Idaho v.

City ofPocatello, Bannock County Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C (minus exhibits).
4.

That attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the Court's
Memorandum Decision and Order dated March 28, 2013, in the case of Building

Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho v. City ofPocatello, Bannock County
Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C.
5.

That attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the Court's
Memorandum Decision and Order dated November 15, 2013, in the case of Building

Contractors Association ofSoutheast Idaho v. City ofPocatello, Bannock County
Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C.
6.

That attached hereto as Exhibit Eis a true and correct copy of the Court's Order
Denying Costs dated January 10, 2014, in the case of Building Contractors

Association of Southeast Idaho v. City ofPocatello, Bannock County Case No. CV2011-5228-0C.
7.

That attached hereto as Exhibit Fis a true and correct copy of the Court's Decision on
Plaintifrs Application to Show Cause dated February 3, 2014, in the case of Building

Contractors Association ofSoutheast Idaho v. City ofPocatello, Bannock County
Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
AFFIDAVIT OF NATHAN R.STARNES-2
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~

Dated this

A day of August, 2014.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public ir1 and
for said State, this ZEI- day of August, 2014.

LESLIE GEORGESON
Notary Public

State of Idaho

AFFIDAVIT OF NATHAN R.STARNES-3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
...JJE_eby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this ~ aay of August, 2014, by the method indicated below:
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Fax: 529-9732 .
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 '"E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 524-3391

~ Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

[ ('I: Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

AFFIDAVIT OF NATHAN R. STARNES - 4
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STEPHEN S. DUNN

Nathan M. Olsen
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen
485 "Eu Street, Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 5234650
Fax: (208) 524-3391
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
BUILDING CONnt,\CTORS
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST IDAHO,
an Idaho non-profit corporation,

A'/ .J.<.!'Jl'!v
wL
4.4::r, 'l..!ff~'

Case No. - f\JJ
\..,t •

1

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendants.
I.

Plaintift Building Contrac~ors Association of Southeast Idaho (Bui~ders Ass'n) is

a non-profit corporation in good standing with the State ofldab.o.
2.

Defendant, the City of Pocatello·(City) is a municipality incorporated in the State

ofidaho and ·administered puisuantto I.C. § 50-101 et. al. .
3.

Builders Ass'n is a trade association cons~sting of members in and aroup.d the City

of Pocatello. The·purpose of Builders Ass'n is to fost~r trade and commerce of the residential
and commercial housing industry, including providing ~liable infonnation about the industiyJ

.

the promotion ofunifonnity and certainty in customs and usages of trade and commercet

78

advance the civic, commercial and industrial inter,;!stS of the industry within the territory covered
by the association.

4.

Members of the Builders Ass'n routinely do business in the City of Pocatello,

have obtained construction pennits, paid sewer and water system capacity fees(Connection Fees)
to the City, a,nd in m~y cases are themselves users of the City's water and sewer system.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
Background
5.

The City requires a builder to pay a Connection Fee in order to obtain a building

pennit fee for the construction of any new residential or commercial building. Such fees are set
hy resolution by the ·city Council, and vary depending on the size of the connection and other

fact,m,
6.

In recent years the City has dmm.ati¢allv increa.sed Connection Fees. In 1997 the

Connection Fee was approximately $300 per residential dw.clling, .hut.has rose to o:vei:.$5)000 on
-

--~--- ... ..

--

~~

~-----~ .

.

....

average by 2008.
7.

f

Members of the Builders Ass'n have been greatly concerned about these increases

because of their impact on the industry and on consumers and because of concerns about the
legality of such increases. Accordingly, the Builders Ass'n attempted to work with the City to
discuss and resolve their concerns·. In particularJ the Builders Ass'n was concerned that
Connection Fees were being improperly imposed as an unauthorized tax 11Tlfairly targeted to a
small minority.
8.

On August 3, 2006, the Builders Ass'n's attorney wrote to the City Council

· questioning the legality of the Connection Fee as it was being charged (attached and incorporated

COMPLAINT - fage 2

.....

79

herein as Exhibit "A.") The letter noted strong precedent under Idaho law that connection fees
are not to be used primarily for revenue raising purposes or for "future expansionn of the City's
water and sewer services, but rather for operation and maintenance of the system. The letter
further stated the Builders Asstn• s position that "growth pay for itself' through the proper
implementation of an ..impact fee" through the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act, and
encouraging the city to pursue such an approach.
9.

On August 18, 2006, the City responded to the Builders Ass'n's letter

acknowledging that conneGtion fees cannot "be used to :finance the future expansion needs for the
City's water and wastewater fees" and were therefore not "impact fees.,, (See Exhibit "B'

.

.

attached and incorporated herein.) The City claimed that the Connection Fees charged· were
within the guidelines of Loomis v. Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P2d. 1272 (1991), which allows

for calculation of Connection Fees under an "equity buy-in" scheme that talces into account the
new users' portion.ofwha.tit woJJ,ld oo~t to.replace the system.
10.

Through subsequent communications with the City. Builders Ass'n learned that

the City had based its Connection Fee on calculations perfonned by a consulting finn retained by
the City (Red Oak.) Builders Ass'n obtained the summary report from Red Oak, which makes
the claim that the study W!!S based in part on planned "capital improvements." (See Exhibit "C"
attached and incorpqrated herein.) The study listed a number of proposed capital improvements
that were clearly designed to increase capacity of the system.
11.

The City issued a public flyer "Question and Answer" handout with regard to the

purpose of Connection Fees titled "Growth Pays

for Growth" which indicated that development

80

results in "capacity fee increases'' that are "dedicated

for capital improvements/' (See Exhibit

('D" attached and incorporated herein.)
12.

In subsequent meetings between the City and the Builders Ass'n, the City

reiterated its position that the fees should be and

are only being utilized only for operation and

maintenance, and that improv~ments that "increase capacity'' will be funded by some other
means than connection fees.
13. · Conc~med about whether such a policy was truly being implemented, the Builders
Ass'n requested detailed records from the City about its calculations of fees and other relevant
informati?n, The City responded by indicating that such a request involved thousands of
documents and would charge the association a substantial sum for copying those records.

14.

About mid 2007, the housing and construction sectors throughout the country and

in Pocatello experienced a severe decline that continues to this day. The number of new

_£_0:1)Struction pennits issu~4_inJ~Q~~t~UP dm.PP~.21lllicantlv) During this decline, .:the-mneunt
charged for Connection Fees as a part of the pemrlt increased or remained the same.
15.

After nwnerous attempts to obtain the City's complete records through inform.al

measures failed, on June 9, 2010, Builders Ass'n submitted a fonnal request under Idaho's
freedom ofinformation laws, I.e. § 9-337 et. al., consisting of nine separate categories of
•

records. After a great deal of resistence, follow-up, and demand from the City for costs well
ab.ove what should have been necessary to gather the records. the.City finally on October 15,
2010, provided the Builders Assn 'n enough records for the· association _to conduct an adequate
examination.

COMPLAINT-Page 4
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16.

In total, the Builders Ass'n paid at leas.r$2.565 directly to the City for the

production of the requested records. AU of those funds were paid under protest, reserving all
rights, and on,ty for the purpose of expediting the obtaining of such records.

Improper Transfers to the General Fund
r,

- 17.J

City records indicate that water Connection Fees were deposited and co-mingled

into an account with water user fees (the "Water Fund.") Likewise, sewer connection fees were
deposited and co-m~gled with the sewer user fees (the "Water Pollution Control Fund;"
lS.,

Since at least 2005, the City has transferred substantial funds from both the Water

Fund and the Water Pollution Control Fund into the Cny·s general revenue fund. In 2011 alone,
$2,848,891 has been transferred from these two funds in the general ftm.d. Since 2005, at least
$17,952,136 has been tran~ferred from these two :funds into the general fund.
19.,
Ii.

The City's stated pmpose for the transfers from the Water Fund and the Water

Po11ution Control Fund into the general fund is_to ~'.gejgfimgJh_e_a..Qtivities of the General Fund.'!.-· -20.

The City's attempted justification for the transfer of fees in the general fund is a

so called "return on equity" _or "enterprise funds" policy that was never approved by any
ordinance, resolution or any other formal or public procedure, other than by a "draft letter" to a
constituent prepared by the City Mayor in 2005 (attached and in~orporated herein as Exhibit
"E"). According to the policy stated in the letter, the City treats the transfers to the general fimd
as a "rate of return" or profit on the "equity" of the public owned utilities. The policy further

states that "the money goes to the General Fund which the City Council utilizes as a property tax
substitution."

COMPLAINT-Page 5
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Since lea.ming this infonnation, the Builders Ass'n has since independently

21.

Ieamed that in 2007 City Attorney Dean Tramner sought an opinion from the Idaho State
Attorney General regarding the legality of the so called "return on equity" policy. Dep·uty
Attorney General S. Kay Christensen, Chief of the Contracts and Administrative Law Division,
rendered a vvritten opinion to 1v.Cr. Tranmer dated February 6, 2007 (attached and incoiporated
herein as Exhibit "F"Jtbat unequivocally declares that the return on equity "practice, as it is
currently being applled, does not confonn to the requirements of existing law." The opinion
concludes that the policy is illegal as an improperly levied and "disguised tax."

Notwithstanding the Atto:m~y General's 2007 opinion, the City has continued to

22.-

'implementthe ureturn r:>n equity" palicy.The City did not provide the Attomey General's 2007
opinion to the Builders Ass'n in response to its June 9, 2010, freedom ofinfonnation request,
.

even though it clearly fit within the documents requested.

I

I'

·- ----Im_p_!~e!JJse
of Fees .(or Capital Improvements_and.Expansion~-stem
..........

23.

The records provided by the City identify no less than 50. capital improvement ·
l

projects in waste management and no les~ than 30 water related capital improvement projects in
the last sevenyears.)Ofthese 80 projects, the City identified only five projects (one related to
·water and four related to sewer) that were financed through the bo~ding procedures required by

I4~.P Code §50-1026 et. al.

24.

The City's records further indicate that major funding for capital improvements

was taken from the Water Flllld and the Water Pollution Control Fund. From 2003-2009, the
City spent $6t323,738 out of the these funds for sewer projects, with an additional $960,000 that
was budgeted for 2010. During that same period the City spent $7,255,766 out of these ftmds
IL,
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toward water projects, with a staggering $7,255,766 that was budgeted for 2010. In total, nearly
$25 millfon was spent or budgeted for water & sewer capital improvement projects from 2003
through 2010, all of which was financed with Connection Fees and user fees.

25.

Many if not most of the projects were for expansion of the system, rather than

repair or maintenance. In the early 2000's the City retained MWH Associates to prepare a
"Recommended Plan and Capital Improvement Plan" that contmns a number of recommended
"improvements" to ~'expand the distribution system and provide additional sources of water
supply in response to growth."

The Arbitrary Method for Calculating the So-Called "Equity Buy~In"
26.

The City has attempted to justify the calculation of Connection Fees under the

"equity buy in" concept as set forth in Loomis v. Hailey, 119 Idaho 434 (1991). In this decision,
the Idaho Supreme Court upheld a method used by the City of H~~y to calculate connection
fees, whereil! ~~ qty ~f:EJ~ley dete;cmine.d the new user's proportionate-Share-ofwhat:-it-weulcl-cost to "replace'~ the system.
27.

The Citis records suggest several major departures or deviations

from the equity buy-in method allowed 1U1der Loomis, including the following:
a.

A portion of the connection fees ·~e being utilized for general
expenditures by the City, as admitted by the City as a "property t~
substituti~n." Under Loomis such fees can only be utilized for

"maintenance, repair or replacement" of the system, and not as a revenue
raiser.
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b.

A portion of the fees are being utilized for improvements designed to

expand the system, strictly forbidden by Loomis.
c.

A portion of the fees are being utilized for capital improvements, meaning
improvements with a useful life of 10 or more years, which were not
approved under the bonding procedures set forth under §50-1026 et. al.

d.

The Connection Fees were not d~posited into a separate or "segregated
account" where they were only used for repair, maintenance or
replacement of the system, as was the case in Loomis.
The exponential increases in the connection fees are wildly

e.

disproportionate to both the increases in the ratepayer user fees and the
actual growth (as detennined by increase in new connections), which have
consistently been less than l % annually, suggesting that ColUlection Fee
pa~ers. are tnifairlyshoulderingJ~e brudens of growth_and otber._Cify.. - -· ---- --·--- Projects;
f.

The City has provided no calculations regarding the ''equity buy in"
method, other than the summary statements by Red Oak consultants.

g.

No effort has been made by the City to determine if the assumptions about
the Connection Fee provided by its consultants in previously years occurs
in actuality. fustead, it has simply accepted and adopted additional

assumptions by the consultants.
h.

The City's shoddy record keeping, as evidenced by the more than 1DO man
hours it allegedly took to gather the records and the unorganized manner in
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which the records were kept and monitored; suggests_ that there was little
or no accounting for the planning and use of CoDilection Fees. It appears
that the planning and tracking of such fees and the projects was done, if at
all. on an ad hoc basis.
COUNT I -DECLARATORY ACTION
~QLATION OF THE TAX AND POLICE POWER
LIMITATIONS OF THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION
28.

Under the Idaho Constitution Art. 7 § 2 only the State Legislature has the

authority to issue or authorize taxes or "forced public contributions" to generate revenue.
29.

The City's authority to collect fees, including Connection Fees, are limited to the

police powers found under Idaho Const. Art. 12 §2. There must be a Pf?portionate nexus
between the fees and their regulated use. Such fees must be rationally related to the cost of
enforcing the regulation and cannot be assessed purely as a revenue-:generating scheme.
30.

T~e Idaho Revenue ~':~~ ~ct, I.C. _§ __?0-1026 et. _al. allows the collection qf

Connection Fees, but only for operation, maintenance, replacement, and depreciation of the
system, including maintaining reserves for bond expenses, but not for generating revenue that is
transferred to the general fund or paying for expansion of the sy~em.
31.

The City's Connection Fee policies are beyond the scope allowed under the Idaho

Constitution, including but not limited to the following:
a

By its own admission and against the counsel of the Idaho State Attomey
General's office, the City has transferred a portion of the Connection Fees
into the general fund as a ''property ~ax substitute'; to be used for the
general and unlimited purposes of the City.
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b.

The City has been and continues to utilize the Connection Fees for
mu1tiple water and sewer capital improvements that expand the system.

c.

Neither the calculations of nor the use of Connection Fees are based on
maintenance, repair, or replacement of the system.

d.

There is a weak or woeful lack of accounting for the Connection Fees,

which are coNmingled with user fees and utilized as general revenues, for
capital improvements or for other purposes on an "ad hoc" basis.
32.

A real controversy exists between the City and Builders Ass'n, including its user

fee and Connection Fee paying members.
33.

Builders Ass'n is an interested person entitled to obtain a declaration of rights,

status or other legal relations pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1202.
34.
---

Builders Ass'n and the public at large is entitled to a declaration that the City's

Connection
Fee policy, as it has been implemented
since at lea~ 2005, and. as currently
..... .-...,--··-··--- ....... -,__
·-

.

constituted, is in-violation of Idaho's Constitution with regard to taxing and regulatory authority.

·C()UNT II-DECLARATORY ACTION
FAD.,URE TO FOLLOW THE BONDING PROCEDURES
35.

All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference.

36.

Pursuant to Idaho Constitution Art. III§ 3, municipalities are prevented from

incurring debt without first securing a two-thirds vote of the electorate. This includes
expenditures fot'capital improvements/' meaning the purchase of new equipment or facilities
with a: useful life of 10 or more years.
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37.

Special bonding procedures for water and sewer projects are set forth under I.C. §

50-1026 et. al:. I.C. § 50-1028 prohibits municipalities from constructing projects 11primarily as a

source of revenue to the city."
38.

I.C §§ 50-1030 through 50-1033 limits th~ collection of fees for "maintenance,

repair and replacen1:ent" of the system, and prohibits use of fees for "expansion" of the system.

39.

The City has violated these bonding requirements set forth under the Idaho

Constitution and the Code, including but not limited to the following:
a.

Incurring debt by engaging in a mun.her of capital improvement projects
without first obtaining a two thirds vote of the electorate.

-b.

Improperly utilizing Connection Fees through its so called "return on
equity" or "enteiprise funds". policy to provide a source of revenue to the
city.

c.
__.__.

Utilizing Connection Fees and user f~~-s _!'U)f!.Y..fQJ,'. capital imt2fOYement
"'"'" ~ - ~ - -

•

- H - - ~. . . . . . .

projects without first obtaining a two thirds vote of the electorate.
d.

Utilizing Connection Fees and user fees for projects that expand the

system.
40.

A real controversy exists between tI:e City and Builders Ass'n, including its user

fee arid Connection Fee paying members.
41.

Builders Ass 'n is an interested person entitled to obtain a declaration of rights,

status or other legal relations pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1202.
42.

Builders Ass'n and the public at large is entitled to a declaration_ that the Citf s

Connection Fee and user fee policy, as it has been implemented since at least 2005, and as
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\.

currently constituted, is in violation of Idaho's Constit1,.1.tion and Code with regard to the bonding
requirements.

COUNT III -INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
43.

All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference.

44.

The City has and continues to impl~ment a Connection Fee polic)' that is

unlawful, inequitable, and a violation of Plaintiffs members' rights. ·
45.

The c<;>ntinuance of the City's Connection Fee policies will result in waste or

irreparable injury to Plaintiff and its members.

46.

Plaintiff and its members are entitled to mjunctive relief requiring the City to

cease and desist its current unlawful Connection Fee collections and policies.

•

COUNT IV -DECLARATORY RIGHTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING
47.

All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference.

48 .. __'I~h~ ?~ ~endment o~I)nited States Constitution,_as.applied.to the..statci
under the 14~ Ame~dment, prevents the taking of private property without due process of law or

withoutjustco:rnpensation.
49.

Idaho Const. Art. I§ 14 essentially incorporates the 5th Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution.
50.

Under U.S.C. 42 § 1983, a person who is deprived of their rights under the color

of any act, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any public entity is entitled to
redress at law or in equity.
51.

The City's unlawful Connection Fee policy has resulted in the taking of private

property of members of the Builders Ass'n.
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52.

On behalf of its members, Builders Ass •n is entitled to a declaration that the

City's policies have resulted in a violation of their Constitutional rights, by the talcing of private
property without due process oflaw and without just compensation.

COUNT V-ATTORNEY FEES
52.

All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference.

53.

The Builders Ass'n has retained the services of Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen to

pursue its rights.
S4.

The Builders Ass'n is entitled to recover its attorneys fees and expenses unde~ I.C.

§12-117, 42 U.S .C. § 1983, and any other applicable statute or rule.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiff prays for the following relief:
1.

That the Court declare the City's connection fee policies

to be a violation of the

Idaho State Constitution.~ Cg_~_as 3.U.unauthorized tax.
2.

· - · ...-- · -·

That the Court declare the City's connection fee policies to be a violation of the

Idaho State Constitution and Code in regafd to bonding requirements.
3.

Thatthe Court declare the City's connection fees policies to be a violation of the

:United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution as a taldng of private property without just
compensation, for which the Plaintiff is entit1ed to equitable and legal remedies under U.S.C. 42
§ 1983.
4.

That the Plaintiff be provided injwictive relief by cease and desist of the

enforcement and collection of the City's current connection fees.

COMPLAINT - Page 13

90

5.

That the City be required to repeal all prior co1111ection fee policies and prepare a

· new connection fee policy that is valid under Idaho and U.S. law, and that the Plaintiff and any
other interested memb~r of the public have the opportunity to review and provide input in the
development of such policy.
6.

A declaration by the Court that any proposed fee by the qty to "fund the costs of

growth" be implemented according to the strict provisions of the Idaho Development Fee hnpact
. Act.
.

7.

That a detennination be made of the precise amount of connection and user fees

that have been improperly collected and utilized since at least 2005.
8.

That Plaintiff be awarded damages in an amount to be determined by the court at

trial for overcharging the amount due it for search and copying costs of records under Plaintiff's
freedom ofinfonnation request.

9.

That the Plaintiff 1,~ !!,Y@'!;l~q its~asg,nable a;ttorney fees and costs. In the event of-

default a reas9nable fee is the sum of $20,000.
IO.

Any other legal or equitable relief deeme · justified by the Court.

DATED: December

k,

2011

N than M. Olsen
Of Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A.
490 Memorial Drive
P. 0. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630
Telephone (208) 522-3001
Fax (208) 523-7254
!SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484
bghall@nhptlaw.net
slangell@nbptlaw.net
nrstarnes@nhptlaw.net
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
BillLDING CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST IDAHO,
an Idaho non-profit corporation,
Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. CV-2001-5228-0C

AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K
SWINDELL IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bannock

)
: ss.
)

David K. Swindell, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am the current Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") for the City of Pocatello. I have served

as the CFO of the City since August, 2001. I am intimately familiar with the financial affairs of
the City and its adoption of policies related to franchise fees, Return on Equity policies,
Enterprise Funds, and the Capacity/Connection fees.
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2.

The City owns and operates a municipal sewage collection and treatment system which

includes sewer trunk lines to transport sewage to treatment plant facilities designed to treat raw
sewage. That system was financed, in part, by the issuance of revenue bonds, pursuant to Article
8, Section 3, Idaho Constitution and the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, Idaho Code§§ 50-1027

through 50-1042.
3.

The City owns and operates a sewage collection system and treatment system pursuant to

Idaho Code Section 50-1028, et seq. The wastewater treatment facility is called the Water
Pollution Control Facility (WPCF). The area served by the WPCF includes the cities of
Pocatello and Chubbuck and some connections within the area of city impact within Bannock
County but outside the city boundaries. The WPCF was originally constructed as a primary
treatment plant in 1959.
4.

A franchise fee is a fee for use of the public right of way imposed on most utilities for

operating within the public right of way within the City limits. Telephone is exempted by the
state constitution. The fee is calculated as a percentage of gross revenw,s. For example, electric
has a franchise fee of l %; natural gas has a franchise fee of3%; cable has a franchise fee of 5%.
5.

An impact fee is governed by Idaho Code§ 67-8201 et seq. The impact fee is designed

to ensure that new growth does not pay for more than its share of new growth. The focus of an

impact fee is capital expansion of specific new facilities to accommodate specific new
development such as construction of a new fire station to serve a new subdivision. The
connection fee (capacity fee) that is the subject of this litigation is not appropriately classified as
an impact fee. The focus of a capacity fee is on backbone utility infrastructure that serves all
utility customers with a capacity that was pmchased and constructed by ratepayers long ago.
The capacity fee is intended to recover a new connector's proportionate share of the City's
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wastewater and water backbone facility costs. "A new customer must "buy-in" to this system by
making a contribution equal to the amount of equity a similar existing customer has in the
system. Note this is not the cost to provide new service to the new customer, and when new

capacity is needed, all customers w,11 bear the cost." (City of Pocatello Wastewater Utility
Financial Planning Study, June 18, 2010 Red Oak Consulting, page 6-1 "System Capacity Fees",
emphasis added). Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the June 18, 2010
City of Pocatello Wastewater Utility Financial Planning Study prepared by Red Oak Consulting.
Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of the June 18, 2010 City of Pocatello
Water Utility Financial Planning Study prepared by Red Oak Consulting.
6.

The "rate of return" policy refers to city-owned public utilities (i.e. water, sewer, etc.)

making a transfer to the general fund. These are businesses operated by the public that could and
do operate as for-profit private enterprises in other communities. For example, Pocatello
operates a public water department, while most water service in Boise is provided by United
Water, a for-profit private company. Similarly, in Pocatello the electric service is provided by
Idaho Power, a for-profit private company, while in Idaho Falls the electric service is provided
by the city government. Private utilities have their natural monopoly power regulated by the

Idaho Public Utilities Commission; government-owned utilities have their monopoly power
regulated by both state law (rates reasonably related to cost of service) and by voters directly
electing the Mayor and City Council (CEO and Board of Directors of the city water enterprise,
etc).
· 7.

In prior years, the city government described the transfer as a "rate of return" or "return

on equity" as if the taxpayers were the shareholders (which they are). Fairness and
reasonableness was established by comparing the city's rate of return on the utility equity at a
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rate of 6.5% compared to the 11.5% to 13.5% allowed for private companies by the Idaho Public
Utility Commission. The rate of return is part of the annual budget process and the rates are set
each year and approved by the City Council.
8.

For the past two years~ the rates have been re-described as a franchise fee (% of gross

revenues) and a payment-in-lieu-of-taxes (PI~OT) to make it directly comparable to private
utilities operating in the community such as Intermountain Gas. The PIWT is calculated on the
prior year city property tax levy rate multiplied by the estimated market value per the most recent
financial plan prepared by an outside consulting engineer.
9.

For FYJ 3 the budget entry for the internal franchise fee is:
Account ..••• : 2013 1-0000-393-99.00
Description •.• : TRANSFERS/ NONRECIPROCAL
Seq#
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00

Code
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013

Freeform information
FROM 030-3001-520-9503 6% FRANCHISE
FROM 031-3001-520-9503 6% FRANCHISE
FROM 032-3010-520-9503 3% FRANCHISE
NOTE 1) 6% AND 3% FRANCHISE BASED ON FY11 ACTUAL
REVENUE
NOTE 2) LONG TERM GOAL TO REDUCE SANITATION &
WATER FRANCHISE FROM 6% TO 3% SO THAT AU ARE
EQUAL. TO BE PHASED IN FUTURE RATE REVISIONS AND
BUDGETS.

Amount
408,368
571,033
252,051

For FY13 the budget entry for the Payment-in-lieu~of-Taxes (PILOT) is:
Account ...•. : 2013 1-0000-370-61.00
Description .•. : INTERFUND REVENUES/ PAYMENT IN LIEU OF TAXES

Seq # Code Freeform information
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
10.0

2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013

030-3001-530.9615 SANITATION
031-3001-530,9615 WATER
032-3010-530.9615 WPC
050-5000-530.96-15 INFO TECHNOLOGY
052-5200-530.9615 UTILITY BILLING
SANITATION VALUE: 6,899,332
WATER VALUE: 102,912,607
WPC VALUE: 142,439,166
PM1' IN LIEU OF TAXES BASED ON FY12 TAX RATE
0.008955293

Amount
61,786
921,613
1,275,584
3,703
2,644
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1.0.

These amounts are equal or less than the amounts calculated into each utility's five year

financial plan, which provided for these payments as well as planned operating, maintenance,
debt service capital and reserve requirements. Idaho code regulates transfers to the General Fund
via two sections of law:
•

Idaho Code§ 50-1033 states that no transfer can be made until full and adequate
provision has been made for debt service, operation and maintenance, and reserves. The
city has made full and adequate provisions by incorporating all aspects into the financial
plan prepared by an outside consulting engineer.

•

Idaho Code § 50-1028 states that the city cannot operate the utilities primarily as a source
of revenue to the City.

11.

The City of Pocatello complies because the: amounts involved are far less than 50% of the

utility revenue. The combined amounts ofFY13 franchise fee and PILOT are 13.8% of planned
revenue for water and 16.5% for sewer. Both amounts are reasonable for businesses that operate
in the public right of way. That they are as large as they are is also a function of modest revenue
provided by rates that are modest in comparison to others in our region. For example, FY12
single family residential sewer rates were $22.47, compared to $25.90 (Blackfoot); $42.14
(Nampa) and $43.77 (Meridian).
12.

The internal franchise fee/ Payment in lieu of Taxes (PILOT). as well as the predecessor

"rate of retum" or "return on equity," is fair, reasonable and legal. The utilities are treated
commensurately with privately owned utilities. Further, the existence of such franchise fees and
PILOT is irrelevant to the policy decision to require capacity fees for new utility connections.
Irrespective of the franchise/PILOT fees, it is only a policy decision as to whether new
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com1ectors should be required to buy into the utility system from which they have consumed
existing co1U1ection capacity.
13.

In stark contrast to impact fees, the Corutection/Capacity Fee is a fee that is a one•time

fee charged to all new corutectors to a system. The connection/capacity fee was phased in during
FY2007 after several years of increasing numbers of new collllections. This fee is intended to
recover a new connector's proportionate share of the City's wastewater backbone facility costs.

In essence, a new customer must "buy-in" to the existing system that has been developed and
paid for by prior uses of the system. The Collllection fee is a contribution equal to the amount of
equity a similar existing customer has in the system. The Connection fee is not the cost to
provide new service to new customers; when new capacity is needed, all customers will bear the
cost equally. The connection fee is to offset the cost for existing users whose capacity will be
diminished by the new users and will, thus, require replacement of existing infrastructure more
regularly. The collection of the capacity fee is based on the size of the connection requested by
the customer and is generally paid at the time a building permit is issued so that all permit fees
and utility hookup fees are known in advance. The collllection fee is a one-time fee assessed
prior to connection to the line in accordance with the current fee resolution adopted by the City
Council.
14.

The com1ection /capacity fee is a policy choice adopted by the City upon

recommendation of a water and wastewater study provided by Red Oak Consulting. The
connection fee was deemed a fair method of ensuring that new users were providing financial
support for the use of the existing infrastructure. The City could have adopted other policies but
the City felt the connection/capacity fee was the more equitable method for both new and
existing users. Capacity fees are irrelevant ifthere are no new connections. They may be
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immaterial if new connections are infrequent. But when growth is more rapid, new connectors
can rapidly conswne existing capacity; restoring it can cause rates to increase for existing
ratepayers with no compensation for the capacity that they paid for. Industrial users can
consume capacity in bulk amounts with little notice. Fairness requires policy in the matter to be
in place before growth occurs. Capacity fees are common and a recognized "best management
practice" for utilities. A 2010 voluntary survey in the Association of Idaho Cities shows that
many cities have capacity fees or the equivalent (AIC 2010 utility survey, pp. 51 - 57). Attached
hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the AIC 2010 utility survey.
15.

The City's water and wastewater utility are financially self-sufficient with funding for

capital and operating requirements derived primarily from rates. The utilities are responsible for
planning, construction, operating, and maintaining water and wastewater facilities. Once a user
is connected to the system, they begin paying charges for service like all existing customers. The

service charges typically include payment for retirement of outstanding debt.

16.

The capacity/connection fees are collected and segregated into the appropriate water and

wastewater funds. They are not dedicated to any particular capital project because it is a "buy in
fee" to compensate the ratepayers for the capEJcity that they already purchased and installed. It is
not an impact fee and not accounted for as such.
17.

Water and wastewater capacity fees are reviewed annually. The fees were last modified

on August 16, 2012 and became effective on October 1, 2012. The current fees are:
Water:
System capacity fees:
1 inch connection
1 '12 inch connection
2 inch connection
3 inch connection
4 inch connection
6 inch connection
8 inch connection

FY2013
$2,850.00

$5,700.00
$9,120.00
$19.950.00
assessed individually
assessed individually
assessed individually
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IO inch connection
12 inch connection

assessed individually
assessed individually

Water Pollution Control (sewer):
System Capacity Fees, Treatment plant
%" water connection
l" water collllection
I W' water connection .
2" water connection

FY2013
$1,320.00
$1,320.00
$2,640.00
$4,220.00

System Capacity Fees, Collection system
%" water connection
l" water connection
1 W' water connection
2" water connection

FY2013
$1,300.00
$1,300.00
$2,600.00
$4,160.00

Large Industrial User Capacity fee (abnormal strengths, multiple meters, meters larger than 2", or BODs
or total suspended solids greater than 200 ppm, or TKN greater than 35 mg.11, or phosphorus greater than
7mgll)

Volume, gallons per day
BOD, lbs per day
TSS, lbs per day
TKN, lbs per day
Phosphorus, lbs per day
Collection system, gallons per day

FY2013
$0.07
$322.86
$415.00
$1,805.30
$3,736.33
$5.84

These fees are as recommended by an outside consulting engineer for FY2013 in studies
prepared by Red Oak Consulting in June 2010. (See Exhibit A and B).
18.

The City breaks the sewer capacity fees into two parts, one for the sewage treatment plant

and one for the sewer collection system. This is because Chubbuck operates its own collection
system but discharges to the City of Pocatello~s wastewater treatment plant. By agreement, new
connectors in the City of Chubbuck pay the Pocatello treatment plant capacity fee; Chubbuck
remits that to the City of Pocatello monthly. Chubbuck operates its own collection system and
administers its own capacity fee for that system.

\\
\\

\\
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FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in and
for said State, ~s 'f'lb day of October, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

.,J hereby certify that I served a true copy ofthe foregoing document upon the following
this L day of October, 2012, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary postage affixed
thereto, facsimile, or over.night mail.
Nathan M. Olsen
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Fax: 208-524-3391

Jlq Mailing
[ ]
[]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

Hand Delivery
Fax
.
E-Mail
Overnight Mail
Courthouse Box

. id

~~
_-. a - > -

.

L
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.

NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A.
490 Memorial Drive
P. 0. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630
Telephone (208) 522-3001
Fax (208) 523-7254
/SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484
bghall@nhptlaw.net
slangell@nhptlaw.net
nrstarnes@nhptlaw.net
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
BUILDING CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST IDAHO,
an Idaho non-profit corporation,

Plaintiff,

l

:t

Case No. CV-2001-5228-0C

I

l
I SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K.
·/ SWINDELL
i

i
-~

v.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO

County of Bannock

I

.f
l

I
!
I

)
: ss.
)

David K. Swindell, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

1.

I am the current Chief Financial Officer ("CFO'') for the City of Pocatello. I have served

as the CFO of the City since August, 2001. I am over the age of eighteen and competent to
testify in this matter. This affidavit is based on my personal knowledge unless otherwise stated.

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K. SWINDELL - 1
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2.

In my capacity as the CFO for the City of Pocatello, I am intimately familiar with the

financial affairs of the City and its adoption of policies related to franchise fees, Return on
Equity policies, PILOT fees, Enterprise Funds, and the Capacity/Connection fees.
3.

The capacity/connection fees are irrelevant to the PILOT (rate of return) fees. The

capacity/connection fee is a one-time fee charged to all new connectors to a system. This fee is
intended to recover a new connector's proportionate share of the City's wastewater backbone
facility costs.
4.

The PILOT fee (rate of return) is a payment in lieu of taxes fee cbarged directly to the

utility. The fee operates like property taxes assessed to and paid by Idaho Power or
Intermountain Gas (except the PILOT fee does not include County or school district). The
PILOT fee is a cost of doing business for both the water and sewer departments. Both the water
and sewer department recover the PILOT fees through the fee charged to all users of the water

and sewer system.
5.

If a resident in Pocatello is using the sewer and water facilities in Pocatello, they will pay

the monthly user rate (which includes a pro rata share of the PILOT fee). If a resident fails to
pay their monthly user rate, their water and sewer services will be discontinued.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
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BUILDING CONTRACTORS
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STATE OF IDAHO

)
: ss.

County of B8Ill1ock

)

David K. Swindel], being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am the current Chief financial Officer ("CFO") for the City of Pocatello. I have served

as the CFO of the City since August, 2001. I am over the age of eighteen and competent to
testify in this matter. This affidavit is based on my personal knowledge unless otherwise stated.

THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K. SWINDELL~ I

105

2.

In my capacity as the CFO for the City of Pocatello, I am intimately familiar with the

financial affairs of the City and its adoption of policies related to franchise fees, Return on
Equity policies, PILOT fees, Enterprise Funds, and the Capacity/Connection fees.
3.

Plaintiff has a fundamental misunderstanding of how capital improvements are financed

by the City. A capital improvement do~ not have to be paid for by a bond. There is no
requirement that a municipality go into debt to build capital improvements. Often times, the City
will pay for capital improvements projects without any debt being incurred. These projects are
financed entirely from user fees that are col1ected and accumulated over time. Where a very
large project is required and it is not practical to finance the project without debt, a bond will be
requested. Under Idaho law, a revenue bond is appropriately issued pursuant to Article 8,
Section 3, Idaho. Constitution and the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, Idaho Code §§ 50-1027 through
50~ 1042. It is worth emphasizing, however, that not all capital improvement projects are
financed through a revenue bond and there is no legal requirement that a municipality undertake
debt to finance capital improvements when the improvement can be paid using existing cash
reserves.
4.

User fees have no relationship to the connection/capacity fee. The connection/capacity

fee is only charged to recover a new connector's proportionate share of the City's wastewater
and water backbone facility costs. "A new customer must "buy-in" to this system by making a
contribution equal to the amount of equity a similar existing customer has in the system. Note

this is not the cost to provide new service to the new custon,er, and when new capadty is
needed, all customers will bear the cost." (City of Pocatello Wastewater Utility Financial
Planning Study, June 18, 201 O Red Oak Consulting, page 6-1 "System Capacity Fees", emphasis
added). Of importance, and framing how the City views a capacity fee, the connection/capacity

THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K. SWINDELL - 2

106

fee does not cover expansion. Thus, the Connection fee is a contribution equal to the amount of
equity a similar existing customer has in the system. The Connection fee is not the cost to
provide new service to new customers; when new capacity is needed, all customers will bear the
cost equally. The connection fee is to offset the cost for existing users whose capacity will be
diminished by the new users and will, thus, require replacement of existing infrastructure more
regularly.
5.

The water and wastewater departments have money held in four different fund groups.

The first fund group is Fund 31 and 32. Funds 31 and 32 are the operating funds. This fund is

comprised entirely of user fees that are collected by the water and wastewater departments,
respectively. The second fund group is Fµnds 37 and 38. Funds 37 and 38 are the capacity fees.
This fund is comprised entirely of the connection/capa~ity fees that have been collected by the
water and wastewater departments. The third fund group is Funds 60 and 61. Funds 60 and 61
are the debt service funds for the water and wastewater departments. The debt service funds are
reserves that are set aside to meet the annual debt service payments required by the bond
covenants. The final group is Funds 73 and 74. Funds 73 and 74 are the construction funds.
These funds are where all of the proceeds from the bonds are placed for water and wastewater.
Money for bonded projects will be withdrawn from these funds to pay for approved bonded
projects. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the City's Monthly Cash
Report for June 2013.
6.

The Monthly Cash Reports are public records and can be accessed on the City's website

at http://www.pocatello.us/finance/finance_cash.htm. The Monthly Case Report identifies the
current cash in each of the City's respective funds, including the funds above.
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7.

Currently, the City· has not spent any of the connection/capacity fees. Rather, these fees

have been placed in a dedicated fund (Fund Nos. 37 and 38). Fund 37 holds the connection/capacity fees for the water department. Fund 38 holds the connection/capacity fees
for the wastewater department ("WPC"). Each of the respective funds contains all of the
connection/capacity fees gathered between 2007 and current (as of July 2013). As of June 2013,
Fund 37 contained $1,391,089.36 and Fund 38 contained $1,217,131.20. Fund 37 and 38 is
dedicated to holding only the connection/capacity fees. There are no other funds that are held
here.
8.

Funds 37 and 38 were initially created in March 2013 to increase transparency of how the

connection/capacity fees were spent. As of todays date, none of the connection/capacity fees
have been spent Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of the Monthly Cash
Report for February 2013. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the
Monthly Cash Report for March 2013.
9.

Currently, I am in the process of compiling the FY2014 Budget for the City. The City

has determined that the connection/capacity fees will be used for debt service. As such, the City
has budgeted approximately $725,000 for debt service for the water department in FY2014. The
City intends to use the remaining funds from Fund 37 for debt service in FY2015. The City has
budgeted approximately $1,384,000 for debt service for the wastewater department in FY2014.
This will exhaust nearly all of the funds in Fund 38. Using this approach, all of the
connection/capacity fees can be accounted for and there has been no funds transferred to the
general funds from the connection/capacity fees.
10.

All of the bond funds have been placed and segregated into construction accounts found

in Funds 73 and 74. Of the initial $9.5 million dollar water bond from 2008, there remains
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approximately $1,303,841.57 of that bond. The remaining amount has been spent on capital
improvements projects (e.g., water main replacement or construction of the South Valley Water
Tank). Currently, there are no bond proceeds in Fund 74 (WPC). Despite the construction funds
being exhausted, the City still must retire the bond. This is done using funds from user fees and
connection/capacity fees over the course of several years. The funds that are used to make the
annual debt service payment sit in a reserve account fund (Funds 60 and 61 ).
l l.

While the City does budget for certain items, the amounts actually expended may not be

consistent with the budget. More specifically, a budget is simply an attempt to identify how
money that is collected by the City will be spent in a given year. If the money collected for the
year is lower than that budgeted, the money cannot be spent consistent with the budget.
Furthennoret as it relates to water and wastewater budgets, the budget does not differentiate
between bonded funds and user fee funds. The City wi11 spend fees consistent with the available
funds in the operational fund (and when available, funds in the construction fund). Simp]y
because a project is budgeted for does not mean that the project actually was carried out.
Moreover, just because a project is budgeted at a certain amount does not mean the project
actually cost that same amount.
12.

It is also important to emphasize that the connection/capacity fee is entirely separate from

the ROE or PILOT fee. As I have explained previously, the PILOT fee (rate of return) is a
payment in lieu of taxes fee charged directly to the utility. The fee operates similar to the
property taxes assessed to and paid by Idaho Power or Intennountain Gas (except the PILOT fee
does not include County or school district). The PILOT fee is a cost of doing business for
both the water and sewer departments. TI1e respective departments charge user fees and those

fees take into consideration the PILOT fees that have been charged. The PILOT fee is set by the
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City, with my assistance. The PILOT fee is derived from the City's property tax against the
systeins valuation. The PILOT fees are not assessed to any specific individual or entity in the
City but are only assessed against the water or wastewater department respectively (there are
other departments that a1so pay PILOT fees). Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct
copy of the FY2014 Budget worksheet accounting for the PILOT fees (including the FY2013 tax
rate being applied).
13.

I have reviewed the expert report and affidavit of Mr. Hunter. Mr. Hunter incorrectly

asserts that the finance department of the City lacks appropriate oversight. I personally am
involved with multiple discussions with the City's legal department regarding all aspects of the
City's budget and fee systems. Numerous discussions with legal counsel have occurred about
the appropriateness of the PILOT fee and the best method to implement this fee. The PILOT fee
has no relationship to the connection/capacity fee. If the connection/capacity fee is detennined
to be unreasonable, the PILOT fee is not invalidated.
14.

I have also infonned the auditor of all potential legal issues, including the PILOT fee.

Each year the auditor has separate meetings with the City's legal staff and the Mayor. I am
present at both meetings to explain the nature of the office call (make sure the auditor is aware of
the City's lawsuits and that Management understands their role). I then leave to ensure my
presence does not improperly influence the auditor. Following the meetings, the auditor prepares
a note disclosure in the published financial report that identifies any financial exposure that is
material to the entity. The City takes its responsibility in keeping the auditor infonned very
seriously and has done so each year. Mr. Hunter's assertions that the City's financial department
lacks oversight is conc1usory, false, speculates about what conversations were had with the
City's auditor. The City complies with all aspects ofGAAP.
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15.

Because I have a background in accounting. I am aware of general accepted accounting

principles ("GAAP"). I employ those principles when I prepare financial statements for the City.
Mr. Gallagher's statement that GAAP is not applicable in developing his recommended rates is a
correct statement of fact. Accounting principles relate to how transactions have occurred and
what the financial position of the entity is at a specific point in time. Accounting principles are
not forward-looking with an attempt to predict future needs. Conversely, the purpose of a
financial rate study, such as the rate studies used to detennine the capacity fees, is necessarily
forward-looking. Accounting principles can help determine what fuel costs may be in 3-5 years,
what an EPA discharge pennit may require, or what the effect a significant boom in development
might be on the existing water systems. A financial rate study is designed to specifically address
these concerns in an effort to assist the City can maintain viable and long-lasting infrastructure.

Without a rate study, the City would never be able to plan for future needs based on current
trends. As the City's CFO, I rely heavily on these types of studies, in conjunction with
discussions with the various utility superintendents and the Direct of Public Works to ensure the
City's future needs are accounted for and met. The failure to use rate studies that project future
needs wou]d be a breach of my obligations to the City and its residents.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
II
II

II
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DAVID K. SWINDELL

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO, before me the tmdersigned, a Notary Public in and
for said State, this _b2. day of August, 2013.

I

•

-

-----·--

KONNI R. t<~NDELL
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this 4 day of August, 2013, by hand delivery, maiJing with the necessary postage affixed
thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail.
Nathan M. Olsen
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Stt'eet
Idaho Fa11s, Idaho 83402
Fax: 208-524-3391

[ ] Mailing
Hand Delivery

~

[ ] Fax
[ ] E-Mail

[ J Overnight Mail
[ J Courthouse Box
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
901 Pier View Drive, Ste. 203
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522w3003
Fax (208) 646·7108
JSB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgh@hasattorneys.com
sla@hasattorneys.com
nrs@hasattorneys.com
Attorneys .for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
BUILDING CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST IDAHO,
an Idaho nonwprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2001 w5228·0C

FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K.
SWINDELL

v.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Bannock

)

: ss.

David K. Swindell, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
I.

I am the current Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") for the City of Pocatello. I have served

as the CFO of the City since August, 200 I . I am over the age of eighteen and competent to

testify in this matter. This affidavit is based on my personal knowledge unless otherwise stated.
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2.

The PILOT fee is charged to the water operating fund (Fund 031) and the wastewater

op_erating fund (Fund 032). The City does not charge a PILOT to the water capacity fee fund
(Fund 037), nor the wastewater capacity fee fund (Fund 038).
3.

The PILOT fee is independent from and has zero relationship to the connection capacity

fee.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA VETH NAUGHT.

~~-~
DAVID K. SWINDEL

SUBSCRI!1~.4itf,m SWORN TO, befol'e me the undersigned, a Notary Public in and
for said State, this~y of August, 2013.
_.

....

-

-

..._

KONNI R. KENDELL
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

...

Residing at: -'+*"'-- =-::.-~-,,,_.-=---...RF-My commission expires:_..:....,;,.~..:...:~~--
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I sel'ved a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this~ day of August, 20 I 3, by the methoo indicated below:.
Nathan M. Olsen
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Fax: 208-524-3391

J<1

Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery

[ ] Fax
[ ] E-Mail.

[ ] Overnight Mail

[ J Courthouse Box

~£/M
~ALL'
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
Register No.CV-2011-5228-0C
)

BUILDJNG CONTRACTORS,
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST
IDAHO, an ·Idaho non-profit corporation,
Plaintiff,

-vs-

)
)
)
)
)
)

)

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
Municipality,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

)

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION

)
)
)
)
)
)

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter is before the Court on the City of Pocatello's (Defendant or City) Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed with accompanying memorandum and affidavits on November 13,

2012. ·The Building Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho (Plaintiff or Association), filed a
response memorandum on January 4, 2013, along with the affidavits of Nathan Olsen, Syd

Wood, and Ed Quinn. Also under consideration are Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the affidavit of
David Swindell and Motion for Relief under I.R.C.P. 37(b), filed on January 4, 2013, and
Defe.t~dant's Motion to Strike Affidavits of Ed Quinn and Syd Wood, filed on January 1lt 2013.
The Court heard oral argument on all these matters on January 14, 2013, taking them under
advisement. Subsequently, on February 13, 2013, the Association filed a Supplemental Response
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT-I
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to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's IRCP 37 Motion for
Sanctions, which included an Affidavit by Nathan Olsen with attachments that included new
evidence. In response, the City filed Defendant's Surreply in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment on February 27, 2013. Neither party objected to these new submissions. Since the last
two submissions were further evidence and argument on the merits of the Motion for Summary
Judgment pending before the Court, the Court deems these as new filings that the Court was
required to consider before entering a final decision on the pending Motions. Therefore, the
Court considers the matter submitted for final decision on the date of the Defendant's last
submission, February 27, 2013. After carefully reviewing the motions, memorandums, affidavits,
and oral argument on these matters, the Court now issues its opinion on the 1) Defendant's
Motion to Strike Affidavits of Ed Quinn and Syd Wood; 2) Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment; and 3) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of David Swindell and 4) Plaintiff's
Motion for Relief under I.R.C.P. 37(b).
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" I.R.C.P. 56(c); Arreguin v.
Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 145 Idaho 459, 460, 180 P.3d 498, 500 (2008); Northwest Bee-Corp
v. Home Living Service, 136 Idaho 835, 838, 41 P.3d 263,267 (2002); see also Cox v. Clanton,
· 137 Idaho 492, 494, 50 P.3d 987, 989 (2002). When considering a motion for summary

judgment, a court should liberally construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the nonmoving party. Id. (citing S. Griffin Contr., Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 135 Idaho 181,

185, 16 P.3d 278,282 (2000)). "I.R.C.P. S6(e) provides that the adverse party may not rest upon
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT-2
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mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a
genuine issue for trial." Carnell
(2002) (citations omitted).

Y.

Barker Mgmt., Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 327, 48 P.3d 651, 656

"Affidavits supporting or opposing the motion for summary

judgment 'shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affinnatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein."' Id. "The
admissibility of the evidence contained in affidavits

and

depositions in support of or in

opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold question to be answered before
applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule to determine whether the

evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial." Id Normally, summary judgment must
be denied where reasonable persons could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting
inferences from the evidence presented. Id
-The moving party has the burden of showing the lack of a genuine issue of material fact.

Northwest Bee-Corp, 136 Idaho at 838, 41 P.3d at 267. To meet this burden, the moving party
must challenge, in its motion, and establish through evidence that no issue of material facts exists
on an element of the nonmoving party's case. Id. The nonmoving party "may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial." Id (quoting IRCP 56 (e)). Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the
moving party, when the nonmoving party fails to esta~lish the existence of an element essential
to that party's case upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Smith v. Meridian

Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714,719,918 P.2d 583,588 (1996).
Evidentiary rulings shall be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Perry v.
Magic Valley Reg'/. Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 50, 995 P.2d 816 (2000). Upon review to
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detennine whether a trial court abused its discretion, this Court inquires: (1) whether it correctly
perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion
and consistent1y with applicable legal standards; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. Id.; Swallow v. Emergency Med ofIdaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592J 67 P.3d
68, 71 (2003) (citing State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 962 P.2d 1026 (1998); Sun Valley

Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co.• 119 Idaho 87, 94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)).
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to make a showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc.• 126 Idaho 527, 530-31, 887P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994).
This standard is set out in a United States Supreme Court case which has been adopted by the
Idaho Supreme Court:

The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of Summary Judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, agamst a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential.to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a
situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete
failure of proof conceming an essential element of the non-moving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is entitled to a
Judgment as a matter oflaw...
Cellotex Corp. v. Catrett, 417 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (see Bade/Iv. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101,102
(1998)). Thus, a responding party cannot raise meritless defenses or claims to defeat summary
judgment. Rather, a Defendant must introduce facts into the record that support each element of
each defense or claim asserted.
Summary judgment is mandated when a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I.R.C.P., Rule 56(a); Myers v. A.O. Smith Harvestor Products, Inc., 114 Idaho 432, 437 (Ct.

App. I 988). That is, if there is no cognizable claim or defense, then no genuine issues of
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material fact are at issue and, as a matter of law, the motion for summary judgment should be
granted.

Upon a party's request for summary judgment, a district court has the authority to render
summary judgment in favor of any party, moving or non-moving, even if the non-moving party
has not filed its own motion. Sirius LC v. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38, 40-41, 156 P.3d 539, 541--42

(2007). "The district court may grant summary judgment to a non-moving party even if the party
has not filed its own motion with the court. A motion for summary judgment allows the court to
rule on the issues placed before it as a matter of law; the moving party runs the risk that the court

will find against it." Fuller v. Dave Callister, 150 Idaho 848,851,252 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2011)
(quoting Harwoodv. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672,677, 39 P.3d 612,617 (2001)).

BACKGROUND AND FACTS
This cause of action arises out of connection or capacity fees for water and sewer services
that the City assesses to builders of new constructions. The City owns and operates a sewage
collection and treatment system. 1 The wastewater treatment facility is called the Water Pollution
Control Facility (WPCF) and serves the cities of Pocatello and Chubbuck and other areas within
Bannock County. 2 The WPCF was originally constructed as a primary treatment plant in 1959.
The system was financed by issuing revenue bonds pursuant to Article 8, Section 3, Idaho
Constitution and the Idaho Revenue Bond Act3 The connection/capacity fee was phased in
during FY2007 and was adopted by the City upon the recommendation of a water and

wastewater study provided by Red Oak Consulting.4 According to the City, the

1 Affidavit of David K Swindell

in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 1 3, filed on November 13, 2012.

~Swindell Aff.).
Id.
3 ld at !2.
4 Id at, l4.
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connection/capacity fees are based on an "equity buy-in" system, which is designed to recover a
new connector's proportionate share of the City's wastewater backbone facility costs. The new
user's one-time contribution is intended to be equal to the amount of equity a similar existing
customer already has in the system. 5 When new users connect to the system, the existing
capacity that has been funded by the existing users is diminished as the cost of replacing and
maintaining existing infrastructure is accelerated.6 Therefore, the City maintains that the
connection fee is simply the necessary amount that new users must pay to buy-in to the currently

existing equity that old users have funded. The assessment of the collection fee is based on the
size of the connection requested by the customer and is generally paid at the time a building
permit is issued. 7 Connection fees are a one-time assessment as opposed to user fees that are
assessed monthly to each existing user for services.8

DISCUSSION
I. Motions to Strike
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) gives the following direction regarding affidavits in
support of or in opposition to motions for summary judgment:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.

A. Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Ed Quinn
The City moves to strike paragraphs 7; 8-12; and 13 of Ed Quinn's affidavit, arguing the
statements are irrelevant, lack foundation, or constitute hearsay. The Court will address each of
the paragraphs in turn:
5 Id

Id
7 Id.

at113.

6
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1. Paragraph 7. Mr. Quinn's statements as to the impact of the capacity fees generally
on his personal business, although of questionable relevance because the financial impact is not
an issue dealt with in appellate decisions on this type of fee, will, nevertheless, be considered by
the Court. However, the remainder of the statements in this paragraph lack foundation as to
personal knowledge, make legal conclusions (i.e., that members have been "deprived" of their
money and property, suggesting that the fee is illegal), or are argumentative (i.e., "draconian.")

To this extent paragraph 7 is STRIKEN.

2. Paragraphs 8~12. As in paragraph 7, Mr. Quinn's statements in paragraphs 8·12 deal
primarily with the economic impact of the fee on his personal business. Although such
statements could be relevant to showing an injury in fact if the connection fees are unreasonably
and arbitrarily imposed contrary to ldaho law, no damages are sought in this case, so the
relevance is questionable. Although Quinn may have not laid a sufficient foundation to support
authoritative and broad statements about the housing and construction markets in Southeastern

Idaho, the Court finds that Quinn, as a business owner and builder of new constructions in
Southeaster Idaho, has the requisite personal knowledge to state whatever knowledge he has
about housing and construction conditions in Idaho are affecting his business and his ability to
make a profit. The Court DENIES the City's Motion to Strike paragraphs 8 through 12.

3. Paragraph 13. The Court STRIKES the first two sentences of paragraph 13, finding
that they lack a foundation for personal knowledge The Court STRIKES the word "artificial" ·in
the last sentence as being argumentative and making a legal conclusion, but does NOT STRIKE

the remainder of the last sentence for the same reasons outlined above.

8

Id at,i 15.
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B. Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Syd Wood
The City moves the court to strike paragraphs 3; 5; 6~7; 8; 9; 10.1; 10.2; and llof Syd
Wood's affidavit. The City genera1ly objects to any commentary or conclusions that Wood
makes to exhibits that he attaches to his affidavit, arguing that the exhibits speak for themselves
· and that such commentary is irrelevant and inappropriate. The Court will address each of the
paragraphs in tum:
1. Paragraph 3. The Court STRIKES paragraph 3 as stating information which is

hearsay and not relevant to the issues in this case. The connection fees that were implemented in
FY2007 are the subject matter of this litigation.
2. Paragraph 5. The Court agrees that there is no foundation to qualify Wood to offer

an opinion on whether the methodologies Gallagher used in calculating the connection fees in
2006 are sound. The Court STRIKES the last sentence of paragraph 5.
3. Paragraphs 6N8. The Court STRIKES all of paragraphs 6 through 8, excepting the

first sentence of paragraph 6, as lacking foundation, offering legal conclusions or argument, and
as hearsay without foundation or identified exception. The Exhibits attached to the affidavit
which are identified in these paragraphs are NOT STRIKEN and are considered for any relevant
evidence or inference they may offer.
4. Paragraph 9. The Court DENIES the motion to strike paragraph 9 and Exhibits F, G,
and H. The City argues that the full and complete exhibits were never presented with the
affidavit and that Wood cannot lay a foundation that the exhibits are true and correct copies. But
Wood testifies that he submits the exhibits which were a portion of the City's discovery
responses, which lays a sufficient foundation. The City does not argue that the exhibits are
inaccurate as submitted nor does the City identify how the exhibits are incomplete. Although the
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Court will detennine how "significantn the documents are, the three pamphlets/binders labeled as
Exhibits F through Has follows: 1) Exhibit F - J-U-B Final Report for City of Pocatello, Idaho
Facilities Plan for the Wastewater Collection System update, 2002; 2) Exhibit G - a
Montgomery Watson June 1997 report entitled "City of Pocatello, Idaho Facilities Plan for the
Water Pollution Control FaciHties"; and 3) Exhibit H - City of Pocatello Water System Master
Plan and Development of Water System Model - August 2006. These exhibits will be considered
by the Court as it deems appropriate.

5. Paragraph 10.1.9 As to paragraph IO.I, the City argues that Exhibits F and G speak
for themselves and that Wood~s commentary regarding the exhibits is· inappropriate and
ittelevant. The Court STRIKES paragraph 10.1, except as it is used to simply enter Exhibits F
and G into evidence. The Court will make its own determinations as to what relevant material the

reports contain.
6. Paragraph 10.2. As to paragraph 10.2, the City argues that Wood does not have the
foundation to state whether the documents referenced in this paragraph are complete, or whether
the projects listed in the JUB reports have or have not been completed. The Court STRIKES
paragraph 10.2 in its entirety, agreeing with the City that Wood does not have the expertise, does
not lay a foundation and/or does not have the personal knowledge to state what capital
improvements have been started/completed in recent years and whether the documents the City
has provided to the Association were complete.

7. Paragraph 11. Finally, as to paragraph 11, the City argues that Wood,s commentary
on Exhibit H is irrelevant and unfounded, and that he particularly does not have the foundation

Wood's affidavit contains two paragraphs numbered IO. In its Motion to Strike, the City has numbered these
paragraphs I 0.1 and 10.2. For the sake of clariflcation, the Court will follow the City's designations.

9
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or expertise to opine whether the projects have been bonded or are intended for expansion of the
water and sewer systems. The Court STRIKES paragraph 11, except as it is used to enter Exhibit
H into evidence. The Court agrees that Wood has not laid a foundation for his statements that the
projects are not bonded and that they are designed to expand the system. The Court is capable of
drawing its own conclusions from Exhibit H.

C. Plaintiffs Motion to $'trike Affidavit of David Swindell a$ found in its
opposition memorandum to Defendant~s Motion ,for :Summary Judginent
The Association argues that paragraphs 4 through 7 and IO through 16 of David
Swindell's Affidavit contain statements that lack foundation, constitute legal opinion, are
conclusory, or are irrelevant, and that the Court should disregard those portions of Swindell's
affidavit in denying the City's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The City explains that Swindell is the City's Chief Financial Officer and outlines his
qualifications for the position, including an Economics and Engineering degree from the United
States Military Academy at West Point, 10 a Master's in Public Administration from Princeton
University, 11 a ce~ification in research and systems analyst, 12 and a certification as a government
financial manager earned through the Association of Government Accountants. 13 Given
Swindell's education and his position as CFO with the City, the Court concludes that Swindell is
qualified to explain the policies and programs regarding the City's implementation of connection
fees in the last several years.
The Association has failed to identify what portions and for what reasons it believes
Swindell's affidavit should be stricken as inadmissible. However, the Court has reviewed the

16

Deposition of David Swindell., p. 24:12-25:4, attached at Exhibit 7 to Affidavit ofNathan M. Olsen, tiled on

January 4, 2013. (Swindell Depo)
11

Id at 25:14-1.S.
at26:l-13.

12 Id
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noted paragraphs and makes the following rulings. The Motion as to paragraph 4 is DENIED.
Swindell is explaining the City's view of a franchise fee. While questionably relevant to the
issues present here, it does offer background infonnation on the City's view. The Motion as to
paragraph 5 is DENIED for the same reasons concerning an impact fee, except the sentence
reading: "The connection fee (capacity fee) that is the subject of this litigation is not
appropriately classified as an impact fee." This sentence is STRIKEN as offering a legal

conclusion. Paragraph 6 is STRIKEN as lacking foundation. Paragraph 7 is STRIKEN except
for the first sentence up to the word "shareholders" and the last sentence. Both of those
sentences identify how and why the City determines a "rate of return;' which is relevant and
which Swindell is qualified to offer. The remainder of paragraph 7 lacks foundation and offers a
legal opiniori. The first sentence of paragraph 10 is NOT STRIK.EN. The remainder of
paragraph IO is STRIKEN as offering legal opinion and argument. The first two sentences of
paragraph 11 are NOT STRIKEN. The remainder of paragraph 11 is STRIKEN as lacking
foundation and offering legal opinion and argument. Paragraph 12 is STRIKEN as offering legal
opinion and argument. Paragraph 13 is NOT STRIKEN, as it offers the City's position on how
and why the connection fee is calculated. The first seven sentences of paragraph 14 are NOT
STRIKEN as they offer the City's reasoning for implementing the connection fee.

The

remainder of paragraph 14 (the sentence starting with ''Fairness requires ... ") is STRIKEN as
lacking foundation and offering a legal opinion. Paragraphs IS and 16 are NOT STRIKEN
because they offer facts about how the connection fee is collected and used. However, the legal
opinion offered at the end of paragraph 16, i.e., "It is not an impact fee ... ,, is STRIKEN.

13 id.

at26:IS-19.
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II. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Preliminary Arguments

1. StandingThe City alleges that the Association lacks standing in this case, requiring dismissal,
because the Association 1) does not allege an "injury in fact" and 2) their asserted harm is a
generalized grievance shared by all or a large class of citizens. 14
To establish standing a litigant must "allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a
substantial likelihood the relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed iajury." 15 An injury
in fact is a showing of a "distinct palpable injury" and a ''fairly traceable causal connection

between the claimed iajury and the challenged conduct." 16 The City argues that because the
Association itself does not build new constructions and is not, therefore, subject to the
connection fees, the Association has failed to plead the requisite injury in fact.
The City also asserts that the Association does not have standing because it has claimed
ua luum that is a generalized grievance shared by all or a large class of citizens." 17 The City

points to the Association's claim alleging the ''public at large" is entitled to a declaratory ruling
that the connection fees are statutorily impennissible and also that the connection fees are an
impennissible tax applicable to all. 18
The Association responds that it has ''associational standing. n Pursuant to Lateral Water

Users Association v. Harrison, a non-profit association must prove the following to establish
associational standing: 1) its members would.otherwise have standing to sue in their own right;

Young v. City ofKetchum, 137 Idaho 102, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002).
Id. at 104; 1159.
16 Mii~. v. 1(/QhO Power Cc., 116 Idaho 635, 639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989).
17 ¥01mgv. i:-1010/Ke.tchum at 104; 1159.
18 $ee1Cornplaim, ,m 34, 4.2
14 See
15
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2) the interests the plaintiffs seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and 3)
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individuals in the
lawsuit. 19
The Builder's Association is a trade association which was created to "foster trade and
commerce of the residential and commercial housing industry, including providing reliable
infonnation about the industry, promotion of uniformity and certainty in customs and usages of
trade and ·commerce, encouraging enlarged and friendly intercourse among those affiliated with
, dustry .... ,,20
them

The Association contends that each of its members have an injury in fact, and therefore,
would have standing to sue in their own right because each of them are builders that are required
to pay the City's connection fees when they build new constmctions.21 Next, the Association
claims it meets the second associational standing requirement because it is clear from the
Association's mission statement, cited above, that the Association is seeking to protect its
members from what it believes are impennissible connection fees. Thus, the issue is allegedly
germane to the Association's purpose to "advance the civic, commercial and industrial interests
of the industry." Finally, the Association conceded at oral argument that it is not seeking any
damages and is only seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Therefore, it argues that neither
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation cif its members because if the
Court declares that the connection fees as currently imposed by the City are impermissible and
issues an order requiring the City to "cease and desist" its current connection fees policies, then
all of the Association's members will benefit alike.

19

Beach Lateral Waters Users Association v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600,603,300 P3d 1138, 1142 (2006).

°Complaint, ,i 3.

2

21

See Affidavit of Ed QuiM at ,r 4, flied on January 4, 2013. (QuinnAff.)
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Tiie Court tinds that the Plaintit'f meets au of :the requiteme:hts ofassodational standing~
and therefore DENIES the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on standing.
2. Immunitv

The City next asserts that it qualifies for immunity from these claims, as a govemment.
entity, under the "discretionary function'' defense against tort claims per I.C .. § 6-904(1).
The Court concludes that this immunity defense only applies to claims for money
damages for tort claim pursuant to l.C. §6-901, et seq.22 The Plaintiff has conceded that it is
seeking declarative and injunctive relief only, pursuant to LC. §10-1202.23
Since the Associatioi1 is not seeking monetary damages, the City's immunity

defenses under the Idaho Torts Claim Act are inapplicable,· The Cou.1: DENIES the
City's M:otion for Summary Judgment as it relates to tort claim immunity.

3. Takings CJaim

As to the Association's unconstiiutional takings claim in Count IV of the Complaint, the
City asserts that, pursuant to LC. § 6-904A(l), a government entity is immune to any claim

which arises out of the assessment or collection of any tax or fee. In the prayer of the Complaint,
paragraph 3, the Association petitions the Court to declare the City's connection fees policies to
be a violation of the United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution as a taking of private
property wit.liout just compensation and grant Plaintiff the appropriate equitable and legal

remedies under U.S.C. 42 § 1983. Presumably, the Association is arguing that the City's

I.C. §6-902 defines a "Claim" as "any written demand to recover money damages from a governmental entity or
its employee." I.C. §6~903( 1) provides that government entities are liable for money damages arising out of its acts
or those of its employees. Finally, J.C. §6-904{1) provides that government entities shall not be liable for any claims
{i.e., for money damages as defined above] arising out of the use of its discretionary function.
3 In paragraph 8 of its Complaint, the Association seeks "damages" for the copying costs the City assessed to it as
part of the Association'sFOIA request before the litigation began. However, at oral argument, the _Association
conceded that it is not seeking monetary damages in connection to any government action regarding the imposition

22
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connection fees are both unconstitutional and statutorily impermissible and that the payment of
such fees in the past have constituted an unlawful taldng of the Association's members' property.
However, as stated above, the Association has conceded that is not seeking any monetary
damages. Therefore, the Court finds that without a claim for damages, the Association has failed
to state a claim upon which relief can be ·granted in Count IV of its Complaint. ·Therefore, the
Court GRANTS the Citfs Motion for Summary Judgment asto Count IV.
·B. Arguments on the Merits

The Association seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the City's current
connection fee policies, alleging that the collection fees are in violation of Idaho Constitutional
and statutory law, particularly the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, because: 1) revenue from the
connection fees are improperly being transferred to and used by the general fund; 2) connection
fees are improperly being used for capital improvements and expansion of the system; and 3) the
City's method for calculating the "equity buy-in" is arbitrary and unreasonable. The City seeks
summary judgment on the Association's Complaint; arguing that there are no genuine issues of
material fact on these questions.
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed the statutory legality of sewer and water system
connection fees, and particularly of an "equity buy-in" system used to calculate connection fees,
in Loomis v. City of Hailey. 24 Pursuant to Loomis and its progeny, in making a detennination

whether connection fees and an equity buy-in system are statutory permissible, a Court must
determine two things: 1) whether the revenue collected from connection fees is used for a

of the connection fees, but that at the conclusion of this litigation, it will seek to recover the copying costs, not as
damages but as costs of litigation in a motion for reasonable attorney fees and costs.
24 Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991).
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pennissible purpose under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act and 2) whether the fees are reasonably
and not arbitrarily determined. The Court will address each of these issues in tum.
1. Are the City's Connection Fees Used for a Pennissible Purpose?

The Loomis Court expounded in detail a mWJicipality's statutory authority to create,
maintain, and operate public works and to assess fees to the users of such works. Pursuant to its
proprietary function, municipalities may construct and maintain certain public works. The grant
of authority for public works is specifically codified in the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, I.C. §501027 et seq. Particularly, I.C. § 50~1028 explains:

Any city acquiring, constructing, reconstructing, improving, bettering or
extending any works pursuant to this act, shall manage such works in the most
efficient manner consistent with sound economy and public advantage, to the end
that the services of such works shall be furnished at the lowest possible cost. No
city shall operate any WQrks pdmarHy as a source ofrevenue to the city, but shall
operate all such works for the use and benefit of those served by such works and
for the promotion of the welfare and for the improvement of the health, safety,
comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the city. [Emphasis added].
Pursuant to I.C. § 50-1030(e), cities may issue revenue bonds ''to finance in whole or in
part, the cost of acquisition, construction, reconstruction, improvement, betterment, or extension
of any works." Under J.C. § 50-1030(f), municipalities may "prescribe and collect rates, fees,
tolls, or charges ... for the services, facilities and commodities furnished by such works.,,2s The
Idaho Supreme Court held, in Loomis, that the "Idaho Revenue Bond Act authorizes the
collection ofsewer connection fees ... so long as the fees collected pW'Suant to the Idaho Revenue
Bond Act are allocated and budgeted in conformity with the Act."26

2s

Id

26 Loomis at 439;

1277.
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The primary test in determining whether rates and fees are in accordance with the Idaho

Revenue Bond Act is whether they are "imposed primarily for revenue raising purposes. " 27 The

Loomis Court held that connection fees segregated from the general fund and used for
"maintenance, depreciation and replacement of system components" were not imposed primarily
for revenue raising purposes.28 Later, in Viking Construction, Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irrigation

District, the Supreme Court explained the issue is not whether the funds are kept in a segregated
account from the general fund but that the funds "were not used for city functions other than the
sewer and water systems."29
Additionally, the Loomis Court held that, under I.C. §50-1033, reserves held for
"expenses of operation, maintenance, replacement and depreciation" of public works could be
accumulated from the revenue of the imposed fees. 30 In City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello,
the Idaho Supreme Court added that an eleven percent (11 %) "rate of return" charged by the City
of Pocatello to the City of Chubbuck for use of Pocatello's sewer treatment facilities was not
imposed "primarily as a source of revenue" because there was no evidence that the revenue was
not being used for the purposes prescribed under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, i.e., for the
maintenance, depreciation and replacement of system components.31
The Association contends that the evidence supports the conclusion that the connection

fees imposed by the City of Pocatello violate the Idaho Revenue Bond Act because they are
assessed and used primarily as a source of revenue to the City and as a means to fund capital

17 Id

Id. at441; 1279.
Viking Construction, Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irrigation District, 149 Idaho I87, 197,233 P.3d 118, 128 (2010)
(Viking Const.) (Italics in original).
30 Loomis at 440; 1278.
31 City ofChubbuckv City ofPocatello, 127 Idaho 198,202, 899 P.2d411, 415 (1994).
28

29
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improvements and expansion to the cWTent system, contrary to the instruction that "the proceeds
of the connection fee for water and sewer service are dedicated to those systems."32
a. ls there a genuine issue of fact that ·connection ·fees are being assessed

primarib'. as a source of revenue to. the City?
The Association argues that the City does not dispute that it is transferring funds from the
water and sewer accounts into the general fund via programs that have been called by various
names, such as "Return on Equity," "Rate of Return.," "Payment in Lieu of Taxes" (PILOT), and
"Franchise fee" programs.
In previous years, programs that transferred money from the water and sewer funds to the
general fund were called uRetum on Equity," or "Rate of Return." programs. The programs
returned a profit of 6.5% and, according to Dave Swindell's affidavit, treated the taxpayers as if
they were shareholders in a private company. 33
In an August 22, 2005 letter to Logan Robinson, City of Pocatello Mayor Roger W.
Chase explained that that the "'Return on Equity" program assesses a 7% rate of return on each
utility which would be transferred to the General Fund which the City Council would use as a
''property tax substitution."34 Mayor Chase emphasized that in comparison, private utilities
charged as much as 11.5% to 13.5% as a rate of retum.35 The Association alleges that since
2005 the City has transfe1Ted substantial amounts of the water and sewer funds into the City's

VikingComt.• 149 Idaho at 196,233 P.3d at 127, citing Loomis at440; 1278.
Swindell Atf. 17.
.
34 Mayor Chase August 22, 2005 letter to Logan Robison, attached as Exhibit D to Affidavit of Syd Wood, filed on
January 4, 2013. Also attached as Exhibit 18 to Swindell Aff., which is attached as Exhibit 7 to Olsen Aff. (The
Jetter from Mayor Chase in both exhibits sits behind David SwindeII's September 29, 2010 Memo.) ("Mayor Chase
2005 Letter").
·
JS Id

32

33
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general revenue fund as part of the "Return on Equity" program. The Association maintains that
$2,848,891 was transferred in 2011 alone, with similar transfers occurring in previous years. 36

In his affidavit, Swindell explained that in recent years the city has been describing
transfers from the water and sewer funds to the general fund as a "franchise fee" or as a
Payment-in-lieu-of-Taxes (PILOT) fee. 37
In his letter to Logan Robinson, Mayor Chase explained the Payment in Lieu of Taxes

program is a policy "to have the 'enterprise funds' make a payment irt lieu of taxes to the
General fund based on the depreciated valuation of their physical plants and last year's city
property tax levy -rate."38 Mayor Chase described it as similar to the federal government's
"payment of PILOT to some local communities, and is a method to pay something for their use
of police, fire and streets" as if they were a private utility. 39
Regardless of what the transfers are called or described, it appears that the City does not
dispute that it is transferring some water and sewer funds to the General Fund.40 The City argues
that such transfers are permissible as long as the fee is not designed primarily as a source of
revenue. 41 Specifically, the City argues that it transfers some funds for operational costs and
asserts this is permitted by J.C. § 50-I033(b) and City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello. 42 The
City argues that these transfers cover the utilities' uses of city services such as HR) financial, and

36 David Swindell September 29, 2010 Memo to City Clerk, attached as Exhibit D to Affidavit of Syd Wood, filed
on January 4, 2013. Also attached as Exhibit 18 to Swindell Aff., which is attached as Exhibit 7 to Olsen Aff.
("Swindell Memo").
17 Swindell Aff. at 1 8.
38 Mayor Chase 2005 Letter.
3' Id
40 Swindell Aff. at 19. There is certainly evidence to suggest that this may be in the millions of dollars a year.
41 Apparently, the City takes the position that any transfer ofless than 50% of the connection fee to the general fund
is less than a "primary" use of the funds for revenue pwposes. See Swindell Aff., 1 11.
42 City o/Chubbuck, 127 ldahoat 202, 899 at 415. ("[T]he Revenue Bond Act allows the collection of revenues
sufficient to cover the costs of operation, maintenance, replacement and depreciation, including creating and
maintaining reserves for such expenses.").
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accounting. 43 The City contends that I.C. § 50-1032 allows the City to "prescribe and collect
reasonable rates, fees, tolls or charges for the [public work servicesJ ... such as wiUproduce
revenue at least sufficient" to pay bonds and provide for operation and maintenance of the works.
The City also relies on J.C. § 50-1033 which allegedly allows a city to apply revenue to certain
enumerated costs, and also states that "[u]nless and until full and adequate provision has been
made for the foregoing purposes, no city shall have the right to transfer the revenue of such
works ... to its general fund." The City uses these statutes to support its contention that once it has
used the water and sewer revenue to fulfill all statutory requirements identified by law, then a

City may do something else with the funds, even transfer them to the general fund for any
purpose it wishes.
It is the Court's view that LC. §§ 50-1032 and 50-1033 must be reconciled with the grant

of authority stated in I.e.§ 50-1028 -that public works "shall be furnished at the lowest possible
cost" and that "no city shall operate any works primarily as a source of revenue to the city." The

Idaho Supreme Court, in ruling on similar issues, has made it clear that the issue is not
necessarily that the funds are segregated from the general fund, but that they are "[n]ot used for
city functions· other th.an the sewer and water systems" under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. 44

This certainly means that the connection fees may be used for "operation, maintenance,
replacement and depreciation, including creating and maintaining reserves for such expenses."
Thus, a transfer of even the connection fees from the water and sewer accounts to the general
fund for purposes of paying the utilities' operational costs is statutorily permissible. However,

Mayor Chase indicated in his letter to Logan Robinson that for the FY2005 the total
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1S, filed on November 13, 2012.
("Defendant's MSJ Memo"). There is no affidavit suggesting that these are the only way these funds are used.
44 Viking Const, 149 Idaho at 197;233 P.3d at 128 (2010) (Italics in original).
43
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administrative support fee for the utilities was only $169,541.45

This is contrasted with the

$2,848,891 that was transferred from the utilities to the general fund as part of the return on
equi~y program for the year 2011, as indicated in David Swindell's September 24, 2010

memorandum, 46 and the intended transfer of $3,496,782 for FY20I3 into the general fund from
the "franchise fee" and PILOT programs.47 Swindell further indicated, in his September 24, 20 I 0
memorandum, that the return on equity transfers are "to help fund the activities of the General
Fund."4 1!' FinaJly, in a December 26, 2006 letter to Attorney General Lawrence Wasden, then
Pocatello Mayor Chase explained the City's purpose behind the rate of return as follows:
Charging a rate of return is commonly used by public utilities and private sector
companies, and we feel it is a fairer way to generate revenue for the City. As I am
sure you are well aware, relying on property taxes for revenue will not work in
Pocatello due to the number of property tax exemptions given by the State.
Therefore, it has been my practice as Mayor to move our city away from property
taxes and to a fee based system. The rate of return is an important part of this
plan.49
Therefore, the record at this point creates the inference that not all of the funds
transferred as part of the Return of Equity program are transferred for administrative and
operational costs related to the utility, nor are they exclusively transferred for ''operation,

maintenance, replacement and depreciation, including creating and maintaining reserves" of the
existing water and sewer facilities, but have been used to fund unspecified "activities of the
General Fund" and to "generate revenue" for the city because "property taxes [the ordinary
revenue raising method] will not work." Furthermore, the evidence produced thus far, while

Mayor Chase 2005 Letter.
ld
·47 Swindell Aff. at ,r 9.
48 Swindell Memo.
49 Mayer Roger Chase December 26, 2006 letter to Attorney General Lawrence Wadsen, attached as Exhibit A to
Nathan Olsen's February 13, 2013 affidavit in support of Supplemental Response to Defendant's Motion for
45

46
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disputed, could support the conclusion that the City's calculation of fees to include a percentage
of profit, such as would be generated by a private utility, may be in excess of those costs
contemplated by LC. §50-1033 and may have become a fee imposed ''primarily as a source of
revenue" for the City prohibited by J.C. §50-1028. While a non-governmental utility company
may operate with the intent to generate a profit above and beyond costs of operation, the statutes
and case law referenced above suggest that this is not permitted by a city utility such as the one
at issue here. There is evidence here that a city that also implements a fee system that
intentionally generates a profit percentage above and beyond its costs of operation, maintenance,
and repair of its utility systems, also is operating those systems with the primacy intent to create a
"source of revenue" for the city which is impermissible under Idaho statutory law. so
The Court is aware that in City of Chubbuck v. the City ofPocatello the Idaho Supreme
Court agreed that the City of Pocatello could charge the City of Chubbuck an eleven percent
(11%) "rate of retum.tt However, there is a difference between charging another entity, such as

the City of Chubbuck, a rate of return versus charging city residents and utility customers a rate

of return when the statute granting cities the authority to operate public works provides that the
city must furbish the services "at the lowest possible cost." Furthennore, and more importantly,
the Supreme Court emphasized in· City of Pocatello v. City of Chubbuck that the rate of return
was not imposed 1'primarily as a source of revenue" because there was no evidence that the
revenue was not being used for purposes proscribed by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, which, as

Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintifrs IRCP 37 Motion for Sanctions, filed February 13, .2013. (Mayor
Chase 2006 Letter)
50 The facts of this case are much more complex than Loomis where the City of Hailey put the connection fees in a
separate account, never transferred any of the funds to the general fund, and could account for all expenditures of
those funds to purposes allowed by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. It is the Court's view that the method of
accounting for the colJection and expenditure ofthe connection fees by the City in this case strongly suggests that
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detailed in Loomis and Viking Construction, permits water and sewer revenue to be used for the
maintenance, depreciation and replacement of system components, but not for future expansion
of the system or for city functions other than the sewer and water systems. 51
Therefore, the question of whether private companies charge a rate of return is not
relevant to this analysis. Neither is whether city users are compensated for the rate of return by
the fact that they are not charged a franchise fee for use of the public right of way, another
argument advanced by the City here. The only real question is whether the City is using the
revenues from the coruiection fees for permissible purposes.·As detailed above, it is the Court's
view that use of water and sewer funds "for city functions other than the sewer and water
systems" is not permissible under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. The Court fmds that the
Association has raised a genuine issue of material fact about whether the City is impermissibly
using fees collected from the water and sewer programs. The Association has produced evidence
showing that the City is transferring water and sewer funds into the .General Fund that may
substantially exceed the utilities' administrative costs, and are part of a program that the former
Mayor believed could be implemented to generate revenue for the City in lieu of property
taxes. 52
these fees are being used for general fund expenditures, a po_ssible conclusion buttressed by the City's argument that
''primarily" means that the City can use anything Jess thl:in .S-6% of tho eobtiection fees for general fund purposes.
51 Viking Const, 149 Idaho at 197,233 P.3d at 128. (20.10) (Italics in J>riginaJ}.
52 The City argues, in it's Surreply, that the letter from Mayer Gha$e 10· the Idalto Attorney General could not be
used as an admission that the City was improperly using the funds, since the Mayor alone did not have the power to
bind the City. The Court agrees that Mayor Chase letter to the Attorney General is not conclusive evidence that the
City implemented the policy proposed and explained by Mayer Chase. However, it is certainly evidence that helps
Plaintiff survive a motion for summary judgment. Mayor Chase's 2006 Letter, combined with the admissions by
David Swindell that a substantial amount of money is being transferred from the water and sewer funds to the
general fund, raises a material question of fact. Furthermore, in its Surreply the City argues that this litigation is
about the rate ofretum policy that was adopted in 2011, while Mayor Chase wrote his letter to the Attorney General
in 2006. There is no merit to this argument. The Association has been arguing from the very beginning that this
litigation is about the City's policies towards the implementation of its connection fees that were initially discussed
in 2005 and 2006 and implemented for the FY 2007 and have continued to the present time. The Mayor's view of
this new policy change during the timeframe it was discussed and implemented is relevant to these proceedings.
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The Association argues that it has produced sufficient evidence to permit the Court to
rule as a matter of law in its favor. The Court disagrees. ·Even though the Court will be the
ultimate finder of fact at trial, the Court finds that there exists a genuine issue of material fact
about whether the City is operating the utilities for the primary purpose of revenue raising as is
evidenced by the fact that the City is charging a rate of return and transferring a substantial
amount of money from the water and sewer funds into the general fund. The primary factual
question remaining is whether the City is using those funds for purposes other than to support the
existing water and sewer systems. The evidence at this point is insufficient for the Court to rule
on this issue as a matter of law either way.

b. Is there a genuine "issue of fact tbat fees are being assessed to fund future
capital improvements'?
Plaintiffs also asserts that the City is also impennissibly using the connection fees to
fund future expansions to the water and sewer systems. Both parties agree that the Idaho case

law and the Idaho Revenue Bond Act do not permit connection fees to be collected and reserved
for future expansion or capital improvements of the sewer system. 53 The parties also agree that
the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act ODIFA) is the means "for planning and financing public
facilities needed to serve new growth and development. " 54
While not disagreeing with the parties, the Court notes that the Loomis Court specifically
did not reach the issue of whether, as a matter of law, a capacity or connection fee could be used
to accumulate reserves to pay for future expansion or capital improvements. 55 The Court has not

See Defendant's MSJ Memo, p. 14; Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for Swnmary Judgment and
Motion to Strike, p. 6, filed January 4, 2013.
54 Idaho Code § 67-8202.
ss See Loomis at fu 3. ("Since the precise issue of whether fees may be collected for future expansion of a sewer or
water system is not before us on this appeal, we leave for another day the detennination of that issue.").

53
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identified any Idaho case that has reached this exact issue. Loomis does imply that connection
fees may not be used for future expansion or new construction because such an assessment could
be- a tax rather than a regulation pursuant to the city's proprietary function. 56 What the Court
. does conclude, as noted above, is that connection fees may be used for the operation,
maintenance, replacement. and depreciation of the public works, including a reserve for
replacement of existing structures, and that revenue from the water and sewer systems must be
used for water and sewer system purposes.
As a factual matter, the City argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the
City is using connection fees to fund future expansion. citing the affidavit testimony of David
-Swindell, where he explains that the City's equity-buy in system that implements connection fees
is not designed to expand future capacity to the system. 51 The City also cites the December 2006
Wastewater Rates Report prepared by Red Oak Consulting, where the equity buy-in system is
explained and where it is emphasized that it "is not the cost to provide new service to the new
customer, and when new capacity is needed, all customers will bear the cost." 58
Contrarily, the Association argues that connection fees are, in fact, being used to fund
capital improvement projects, citing the following evidence:

56 See Loomis at 1278, citing toAsson v. City ofBurley, 105 Idaho 432,670 P.2d 839 (1983) C'Comparison of these
earlier cases reveals one clear distinction between those expenses held to be ordinary and necessary and those held
not to be: new construction or the purchase of new equipment or facilities as opposed to repair, partial replacement
or reconditioning of existing facilities"). Also citing to Redman v. City of'Hailey, Blaine County District Court Case
No. 1I855, Memorandum Decision (June 4, 1984) (unreported decision) (district court held that "development fees''
collected for future expansion were unconstitutional).
57 Swindell Aff. at 1 S.
58 Swindell Aff., Exhibit A, City of Pocatello Wastewater Rates, p. 6-1, uSystem Capacity Fees." The Court believes
this is the correct cite because the information on the page listed in the Defendant's brief matches what is in this
exhibit, even though the Defendant refers to it as a June 18, 2010 City of Pocatello Wastewater Utility Financial
Planning Study.
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• A power point slide prepared by the City in 2006 that indicates that
capacity fees are a solution for new growth with the rationalization being
that "growth pays for growth."59

• Slides presented to City Council on Service Level Reports that indicate
plans for future growth to the system. 60
• Work orders and a "Capital Improvement List'' that the Association
alleges show that the City is planning, has started, or is finished with fifty
(50) capital improvement projects in waste management and thirty (30)
water related capital improvement projects in the last seven years.61
• A July 28, 2010 Memorandum from David Swindell that indicates that the
City is bonded for only one water project and four sewer projects. Plaintiff
asserts this is evidence that only five (5) of the above listed 80 projects are
bonded, and therefore, revenue to fund the remaining 75 projects must be
coming from connection fees. 62
• A May 2003 J~U-B report, prepared for the City of Pocatello, entitled
Idaho Facilities Plan for the Wastewater Collection System Update, 2002,

that outlines a 5. 10, 15, and 20 year "Capital Improvement Plan" and
identifies new developments that will require expansion to the then
existing system. 63 Plaintiff alleges that these projects have been completed
or are being completed, and are/were being funded from revenue from the
capacity fees. No evidence has been offered to support this conclusion.

• An August 2006 report entitled "Water System Master Plan and
Development of Water system Model," which also outlines future
expansion to the system and projects to be 1ackled.64 The Association
alleges that these projects have been completed or are being completed
and that they are being paid by the connection fees but they do not offer
evidence as to the completion or the source of funds.
• A statement in David Swindell' s deposition indicating that bond payments
are not made out of the Capital Improvement Fund, but rather, money
from the water and sewer Operation and Maintenance fund is transferred
into the debt service fund, which then pays the bond service. 65

Wood Aff. Ex B.
Swindell Dep, Ex 20 attached to Olsen Affidavit, Exhibit 7.
61 Wood Aft:, Ex. E
62 Swindell Dep, Exhibit 17 attached to Olson Affidavit, Exhibit 7.
63 Wood Affidavit, Exhibit F, Executive Summary, Section 3, and Appendix M.
64 Wood Affidavit, Exhibit H.
6 s Swindell Depo,p. 75: 8-18.
59

60
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Therefore, the Association asserts that there is evidence that capital. improvements are being
funded by the general water and sewer accounts, which is the revenue from both the co1U1ection
fees and the monthly user rates.
The Association is the non-moving party in this proceeding and, as a general rule, the
Court must construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. However, "[w]hen
an action will be tried before the court without a jury. the judge is not constrained to draw
inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment but rather the trial
judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted
evidentiary facts. "66 The evidence before the Court is not in dispute but the arguments are. The
Court concludes that there is no evidence, nor is there any reasonable inference, to show that the
City is using revenue from connection fees to fund future expansion of the water and sewer
systems or to fund impennissibJe capital improvement projects. All the evidence that the
Association points to simply shows that the City is or has been planning upgrades to its systems.
However, there is no evidence that the upgrades were ever completed or if they were completed,
that the projects were funded with revenue collected from the connection fees. There is no
evidence or reasonable inference that the projects that the Association lists were for actual future
expansion rather than repairing and updating the current system. Finally, money transferred from
the water and sewer Operation Maintenance Fund into a fund that pays the debt service is not
evidence that connection fees are being used to fund future expansion or future capital
improvement projects. Loomis clearly holds that "rates and charges ... be sufficient to support the

66 Loomis, at 436, 1274, citing Rillerside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 51S, 650 P.2d657 (1982) and Blackmon v,
Ziifelt, I 08 Idaho 469, 700 P.2d 91 (Ct.App.1985).
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public works project, including the retirement of bond indebtedness and operating costs."67 In
short, on this record it appears to the Court that the Plaintiff's assertions are simply that,
assertions without foundation and based on speculation.
Therefore, because the Court finds that there is no disputed question of fact on this issue,
the Court need not make a detennination whether Idaho statutory law permits such use of funds
for capital.improvements. The Court GRANTS this portion of the City's Motion for Summary
Judgment, finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City is
impennissibly using connection fees to fund future expansion and capital improvements to the
water and sewer systems.
2. Is there a genuine issue of fact that the fees are unreasonable?

The City argues that there are no genuine issues of fact that the connection fees are
unreasonable or arbitrarily imposed because they have hired

Wl

engineering firm to develop a

sound equity buy•in system that is not prohibited by law.
In Schmidt v. Village ofKimberly, 74 Idaho 48, 256 P.2d 515 (1953), the Idaho Supreme
Court held that rates and charges for public works must be reasonable, holding as follows:
[R)egulations and charges shaU not be unreasonable, it being specifically
provided in section 2, § 50-2813, I.C., [now§ 50-1028], that the services are to be
furnished at the lowest possible cost and that the municipality shall not operate
the works primarily as a source ofrevenue. 68
·
The Loomis Court held that connection fees do not need to bear a relationship to the actual cost
of connecting to the system and that the rates and fees imposed by a city will be upheld if they

67

68

Loomis at 443, 1281.
Loomis at 441, 1279, citing Schmidt v. Village ofKimberly, 74 Idaho 48,256 P.2d 515 (1953).
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are "not unreasonable and not arbitrarily imposed" and "produce sufficient revenue ~o support
the system at the lowest possible cost as required by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. "69
In deciding that the equity buy-in methodology of the City of Hailey was a reasonable

method to impose connection fees, the Supreme Court emphasized in Loomis that the City of
Hailey had hired "an engineering ±inn to detennine various methods of ratemaking and adopted
one of those valid methods which it detennined complied with the Act and best met the city's
needs.H70

In Viking Const., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irr. Dist, the Idaho Supreme Court held that there
was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the connection fees for the Irrigation District were
reasonable and not arbitrary. The Viking Const Court explained that while Loomis held that an
equity buy-in system was permissible "it must be based upon some calculation designed to
detennine the value of that portion of the system that the new user will be utilizing. If there is no
attempt to calculate in some manner that value, then the connection fee is not an equity buy-in
regardless of its label."
The City argues that there is no genuine issue of fact that the capacity fees, which it
argues employs an equity buy-in system similar to Loomis, are not unreasonable or arbitrarily
imposed. The City explains that the equity buy-in system that it employs is designed so that a
new customer buys-in to the system "by making a contribution equal to the amount of equity a

Loomis at 442, 1280.
Loomis at 443; 128 I. "The Ordinance drafted after receiving the engineers' report calculates the connection fee by
flfSt determining the gross replacement value of the system by using an engineering cost index to detemtine present
69
70

day replacement cost of the system components. Unfunded depreciation and bond principal are then subtracted from
the gross replacement value to determine the net replacement value of the system for the current year. The final
connection fee is then ultimately determined by dividing the net system replacement value by the number of users
the system can support. The new user is ch_arged the value of that portion of the system capacity that the new user
will utilize at that point in time."
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similar existing customer has in the system."71 The Wastewater R13.tes Final Report explains that
the capacity fees are calculated by 1) detennining existing wastewater system equity; 2)
estimating system capacity; 3) calculating unit equity cost; 4) calculating treatment plant
capacity fee; and 5) calculating collection system capacity fees. 72 The Wastewater Rates Final
Report further explains that 11the fees are dependent on the capacity required to serve a customer
and the unit equity cost of existing facilities expressed as dollars per unit of capacity." The
justification for an equity buy-in system, as explained above, is that new users pay their
proportionate share of facility costs incurred to serve them since old users, through rates and
other assessments have already developed a valuable wastewater system and the new users must
buy-in to the system by making a contribution equal to the amount of equity a similar existing
customer has in the system. 73 The Plaintiff has offered no evidence to refute these statements.
The Loomis Court stated: "The methodology used to determine the value of the system is not
unreasonable, nor is it unreasonable to charge a new user the value of that portion of the system
capacity that the new user will utilize at that point in time." In short, if the methodology is
reasonable the Court will not impose a different view but leaves it to the City's determination.
The Court finds that there is no issue of genuine fact regarding whether the connection
fees through

fill

equity buy-in system have been reasonably imposed. Loomis explained that

Idaho's statutory scheme does not require a new user to 'buy-in' to the system, nor does it

'1

prohibit such a program. 0 The City of Pocatello, after hiring an engineering finn that has created
numerous reports and studies has chosen to develop an. equity buy-in system, where the value of
that portion of the system that the new user will be utilizing has been calculated and the City has
71 December 2006 Waste Water Rates Final Report, attached as Exhibit A to Swindell Affidavit, p. 6-1; Swinde11
Aff. at~ 13.
72 See Section 6.
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set its connection fees so that the user buys its proportionate share. There is nothing in this record
to suggest that this equity buy-in methodology is unreasonable or arbitrary. The Court GRANTS
the City's motion for sumnuuyjudgment on this issue
III. Motion for Relief under I.R.C.P. 37(b)

The Association moves the Court to exclude the City's reliance on any use of evidence
produced by John A. Gallagher and Red Oak Consulting in any of its claims or defenses, and
further requests that default judgment be entered against the City pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 37(b) for failure to comply with the Court's July 31, 2012 Order to Compel. The
Association argues that the City has failed to answer its Request for Production #9, which is a
request for all of the Red Oak Consulting documents in the City's possession, including
contracts, communications, and working papers. The Association contends that it needs these
documents. rather than only the final Red Oak Consulting 2006 and 2010 final reports that the
City has already provided, so that it can determine the methodology used by the City as it relied
upon the recommendation from Red Oak Consulting regarding the capacity fee rates.
The City responds that it has in fact produced all of the Red Oak Consulting documents
that are actually in the City's possession. The City makes the point that Red Oak Consulting is a
third-party witness, and as such, the proper method to obtain the working files of Red Oak would
be by subpoena. The City further argues that the Defendant filed a subpoena. but later withdrew
it in response to the Plaintiffs Motion to Quash due to the Defendant's alleged failure to comply
with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 45.
The Court DENIES the Plaintiff's Rule 37(b) motion for sanctions at this time. Plaintiff
requests sanctions under I.R.C.P. 37(b)(2), which permits a court to impose sanctions if "a
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party ... fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery ..•." The Court finds that the City
has not directly failed to comply with the Court's July 31, 2012 Order on Motion to Compel,

where the Court only directly granted Plaintiff's Motion to Compel with regard to Interrogatory
#6. The present dispute is regarding Request for Production #9. In its Order on Motion to
Compel, the Court did direct the parties to again meet and confer with regard to Plaintiff's
discovery requests, but the Court does not identify. actions on the part of the Defendant that
would merit any sanctions at this point.
However, the Court treats the Plaintiff's Rule 37(b) request as a Motion to Compel
production of all working papers of Red Oak Consulting associated with its work on issues
raised in this case. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 34 requires production of documents "in the
possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served ... " It is clear that
Red Oak Consulting's documents were prepared in work done for the City as the client and,
therefore, all such documents are with the control of the City. In addition, the City has identified
Red Oak employees as expert witnesses in this case. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)
permits the discovery of all supporting documents relied on by an expert witness and "further
discovery" ordered by the Court. Therefore, because any work done by Red Oak was on behalf
of the City, and it appears that the City will rely upon the reports and recommendations of Red

Oak Consulting in its claims and defenses, the Court hereby ORDERS the City to produce all
documents from Red Oak Consulting sought in Request for Production #9.

Finally, the Plaintiff renewed its request for sanctions in it.s February 13, 2013
Supplemental Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of
Plaintiff's IRCP 37 Motion for Sanctions. As part of that filing, Plaintiff placed into the record
new evidence that it had obtained through subpoena to the Idaho State Attorney General's office.
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The Plaintiff argues that it should not have had to obtain the evidence through a third party
subpoena, but that the City should have produced documents as a response to the Plaintiff's
Request for Production # 2, stated as follows:
Please produce a true and correct copy of all correspondence including but not
limited to letters and emails, which has been sent or received by you related to the
facts and circumstances that are the subject matter of litigation.
The documents included in Plaintiff's newest filings, which it received by way of subpoena to
the Attorney General's office, include the following: 1) a December 29, 2006 letter from Mayor
Roger W. Chase to Lawrence G. Wadsen, which was a request for assistance concerning the
City's rate of return policy; 2) a February 6, 2007 response by the Attorney General's office to
Mayor Chase's request; 3) an April 9, 2007 reply to the Attorney General's response, written by
Pocatello City Attorney Dean Tramner; and 4) an April 19, 2007 follow-up to Tramner's reply
by the Attorney General's Office.

In response to the Plaintiffs supplemental filing, the City :filed Defendant's Surreply in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that it has been completely responsive to
Discovery. Regarding the Mayor Chase 2006 Letter, the City contends that it had no relationship
to the subject matter of the current litigation because the rate of retmn policy that is at issue here

was adopted in 2011, while Mayor Chase left office in January 2010. Therefore, since the Mayor
Chase 2006Letter was not relevant, the City argues it was not obligated to produce it pursuant to
the Association's discovery requests.
Before the Plaintiff's supplemental filing, the Court only had the Attorney General's
February 6, 2007 opinion letter as part of the record. The Court has carefully reviewed the above
named docwnents and finds them entirely relevant to the issues of this case and were there an
outstanding order compelling the City to further respond to Request for Production #2, sanctions
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would be imposed here. However, as outlined above, the Court only granted Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel with respect to interrogatory #6. Therefore Defendant did not directly disobey an order
to compel and sanctions under Rule 37 are not appropriate. Indeed, the Association had in its
possession the February 6, 2007 opinion letter from the Attorney General's office, which
referenced Mayor Chase's December 2006 letter to the Attorney General's office, but the
Association chose to issue a third party subpoena rather than to work with the City to obtain the
further emails or file a Motion to Compel concerning this particular correspondence.
Therefore because the City never directly violated any Court order regarding discovery,
the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 37 sanctions.

CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the foregoing, the Court GRANTS, in part, and DENIES, in part, the
Defendant's Motion to Strike the affidavits of Syd Wood and Ed Quinn. The Court GRANTS, in
part, and DENIES, in part, Plaintiffs Motion to Strike the affidavit of David Swindell. The
Court GRANTS, in part, and DENIES, in part, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court finds that there exists a.genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the City is
pennissibly using the funds collecte~ from the water and· sewer systems collection fee, or
whether it is using them for other purposes. and · DENIES the City's Motion for Summary
Judgment on that issue. The Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact about
whether the City is impennissibly using connection fees to fund future expansion of the water
and sewer fund or whether the connection fees have been unreasonably and arbitrarily imposed
through the City's equity buy.in system and GRANTS the City's Motion for Summary Judgment
on those issues. Lastly, the Court DENIES the Defendanfs Motion for Rule 37(b) sanctions but

ORDERS the Defendant to more fully respondto RequestfotPioductionNo; 9.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED March 28, 2013.
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District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15_ day of fXk·v 2013, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of t h ~ g individuals in the manner
indicated.
·
Blake G. Hall
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, PA.
490 memorial Drive
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630

('5U.S. Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

Nathan M. Olsen
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

(l)U.S.Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

DATED this 1f.::i__ day o f * - - · 2013.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

Register No.CV-2011-5228.. QC
)

BUILDING CONTRACTORS,
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST
IDAHO, an Idaho non~profit corporation,

Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)
)

-vs-

)
)
)

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
Municipality,
Defendant.

)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO RECONSIDER AND PLAINTIFF'S
AMENDED MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

)
)
)

This matter is before the Cowt on the City of Pocatello's (Defendant or City) Motion to
Reconsider the Court's March 28, 2013 Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment. The City filed Defendantts Motion for Reconsideration with an

accompanying memorandum on April 22, 2013. The Plaintiff, Building Contractors Association
of Southeast Idaho (Plaintiff or Association), filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Reconsideration on May 6, 2013. On May 9, 2013, the City filed Defendant's Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration ·and also the Second Affidavit of David
CV-2011-5228-0C
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K. Swindell. The Court heard oral argument on this matter on May 13, 2013, and took the City's
Motion to Reconsider under advisement.

Subsequently, on May 28, 2013, Plaintiff filed

Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Sanctions under I.R.C,P, 37(b) and Motion for Reconsideration.
Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider was Amended on August 6, 2013. Subsequent responsive
filings and affidavits were filed, which the Court has also considered. After carefully considering
the motions, memorandums, and oral arguments of the parties, the Court now issues its
Memorandum Decision and· Order on the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and Plaintiff's
Amended Motion for Reconsideration.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1l(a)(2)(B) provides that "[a] motion for reconsideration
of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the entry of final
judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment." The
decision of whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration made pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 1l(a)(2)(B) is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. 1 The party
requesting the motion for reconsideration is permitted to present new facts or law to aid the court
in its reconsideration but is not required to do so.2 However, if new evidence is presented the
burden is on the moving party to bring the new evidence to the courts attention.3

1 Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,560,212 P.3d 982, 990 (2009). In reviewing whether a trial court
abused its discretion, this Court applies a three-part test, which asks whether the district court: (l) correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion; and (3) reached its
decision by an exercise of reason.
2 Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct. App. 2006).
3 Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'/ Bank, 118 Idaho 812,800 P.2d 1026 (1990).
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DISCUSSION

I.

Procedural History
Since the Court's initial decision in this case, there have been a substantial number of

additional submissions to the record. In order to set the basis of the Court's decision on each
party's respective motion to reconsider, the Court wil1 summarize the most substantial
developments in the case.
A.

The City's Motion to Reconsider

In its Motion to Reconsider, the City argues that the Association does not have standing
on what it asserts is the only issue remaining in this matter, which the City characterizes as
"whether the City is using those [rate of return fees] or payment in lieu of taxes funds for

purposes other than to support the existing water and sewer systems."4 The City's position is the
Association does not have standing on the remaining issue because the rate of return or payment
in lieu of taxes (PILOT) is paid by every user of the City's water and sewer systems, and
therefore, is a generalized grievance shared by all taxpayers. Consequently, pursuant to Young v.

City of Ketchum and Miles v. Idaho Power Co., the City argues that the Association does not
have standing because it d.oes not have a unique harm. 5 The City concedes the Association has
standing on the other issues raised and addressed in the Court's Memorandrun Decision and
Order - that no issues of genuine material fact exist as to l) whether the City is impermissibly
using the connection fees to fund future expansion and capital improvement projects for the
Defendant's Memorandwn in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2 tiled April 22, 2013.
s See Youngv. City ofKetchum, 137 ldaho 102, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002) ("But even ifa showing can be made of an
injury in fact, standing may be denied when the asserted hann is a generalized grievance shared by all or a large
class of citizens.;;); Miles v. Idaho Power Co., I 16 Idaho 635,637, 778, P.2d 757, 759 (1989} ("a citizen and
taxpayer may not challenge a governmental enactment where the injury is one suffered by all citizens and taxpayers
alike."); See also Student loan Fund v. Payette County, 125 Idaho 824, 828, 875 P.2d 236, 240 {Ct. App. 1994) (A
concerned citizen who seeks to ensure the government abides by the law does not have standing.)
4
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water and sewer system;

6

and 2) whether the connection fees collected by the City are

reasonably imposed. 7 In sum, the City contends that the Association derives standing in this case
only through the City's assessment and collection of connection fees, but the Association does
not have a unique injury in fact as to how the City uses funds collected through the rate of return
or PILOT fees because every taxpayer who uses the City's water and sewer systems pays the rate
of return and/or PILOT fees.
B.

The Association's Motion and Amended Motion for Reconsideration

Following the hearing on the City's motion for reconsideration the Association filed its

own Motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently amended. Supplemental briefing on
that motion was provided by the Association on September 30, 2013 .8 This supplemental
briefing argues, in relevant part, that if the Court finds the City's assessment of the PILOT fee to
be impermissible, then the Court should also find the City's current user and connection fees
impermissible. The Association argues this based on the City's reliance on the PILOT fee in
calculating the necessary user and connection fees. The Association requests that the Court
invalidate the current rates and require the city to implement a fee rate that is "constitutional and
pennissible" 9
C.

The Court's Memorandum Decision and Or.der

The Association brought this case seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in reference to
the City's connection fee policies, arguing that the City's current policies are an unconstitutional
use of police powers because the fees do not have a proportionate nexus to their regulated use

at p. 28.
Id. at 30.
6 See Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintifrs Amended Motion for Reconsideration.
9 Id. at 4.
6 Id.
7
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and are also contrary to Idaho statutory and case law because they are.in violation of the Idaho
Revenue Bond Act, I.C. § 50-1026, et al. 10 The Association claimed standing in its Complaint
because its members pay both connection and user fees. 11 In its Motion to Reconsider, the City
now distinguishes between the City's assessment and collection of connection and us.er fees and
the City's collection and use of PILOT/Return on Equity/Rate of Return /franchise fees. 12 In
support of its Motion to Reconsider, the City suggests that the Court made this same distinction
in its original Memorandum Decision and Order by :finding that there were no genuine issues of
material fact concerning whether connection fees were being used for future expansion and
whether they were arbitrarily imposed, but that an issue of fact remained as to "whether the City
is using those [rate of return fees] or payment in lieu of taxes funds for purposes other than to
support the existing water and sewer systems." 13 ln support of this distinction, the City has filed
the Third and Fourth Affidavits of David K. Swindell, explaining that the City has adjusted its
accounting procedures and, as of March 2013, connection/capacity fees are held separately from
user fees in separate funds. 14 Mr. Swindell's third affidavit indicates that the entire balance of
connectionJcapacity fees collected since 2007 are held in these accounts. 15 Swindell's fourth

°Complaint, p. 9.

1

Complaint, p. 10, 132.
It appears to the Court that the City does not, in its Motion to Reconsider or in any other memorandum previously
filed, make a distinction between PILOT, franchise, and return on equity/and rate of return fees. See Defendant's
Memorandum in Support of motion for Reconsideration, p. 2 (the City characterizes the remaining issue as to
whether the City is impermissibly using "rate of return fees or payment in lieu of taxes funds"); Id at p.5 ("[T]he
qty's use offtanchisefees from the water and wastewater systems that are assessed to all individuals who live in
Pocatello" is the only remaining issue for trial.); Id at p. 6 ("in this case, the rate of return or PILOT fees are taxes
that are collected from all citizens in Pocatello."); id at p. 7 {"The rate of retum and PILOT fees are designed to
satisfy the same purposes and are synonymous").
13 Defendant's Memorandum In Support ofMotion for Reconsideration, p. 2.
14 See Third Affidavit of David K. Swindell 4:8.
15 Id at4:7.
11

12
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Affidavit indicates that the PILOT fee is charged only to the operating funds, and there is no
relationship between the PILOT fee and the capacity fee fonds. 16
First, the Court makes clear that, in its original decision, it did not deliberately distinguish
between connection fees and PILOT/rate of return/return on equity/franchise fees in the way the

City suggests. Pursuant to the Association's Complaint, the issue before the Court was whether
the City was implementing its co_nnection fee policy, as part ofits operation of its city owned and
operated public utilities, contrary to constitutional, statutory, and case law in Idaho. Therefore, as
stated in its umbrella paragraph relating to the merits of the City's Motion for Summary
Judgment, the Court explained:
Pursuant to Loomis, in making a determination whether connection fees and an
equity buy~in system are statutory permissible, a Court must determine two
things: 1) whether the revenue collected Ji-om connection fees is used for a
permissible purpose under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act and 2} whether the fees
are reasonably and not arbitrarily determined. 17
This is a two part test. 18 The Court found that there was no issue of fact concerning the second
part of test, but that there was an issue of fact concerning the first part of test, i.e., whether
revenue collected from connection fees is impermissibly being used "for purposes other than to
support the existing water and sewer systems." 19 Therefore, since the whole test was whether the

connectionfees were statutorily permissible, the Court answered the first part of the test in terms
Fourth Affidavit of David K. Swindell 2:2.
Memorandum Decision and Orderon Defendant's Motion for SwnmaryJudgment, p. 15-16, issued May 28, 2013
(Memorandum Decision and Order).
18 The Court in fact, divided the first step of the test into two parts - I) whether revenue from the collection fees was
impermissibly being used "for plll'J)oses other than to support the existing water and sewer systems"; and 2) whether
revenue from the connection fees was being impennissibly used to fund future expansion and capital improvements
of the water and sewer systems. Contrary to the City's Memorandum in Suppoi:t of Motion for Reconsideration at
page 4, the Court did not explicitly hold that the "connection/capacity fees were appropriately collected by the City
for repair and replacement of the existing infrastructure." Rather, the Court found that the Association did not meet
its evidentiary burden to show that the connection fees were being used to fund capital improvement projects. See
the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 27·28.
19 Id. at 23.
16 See
17
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of whether the revenue collected from connection fees was being used for a statutory purpose,
rather than whether PILOT/rate of return/return on equity/franchise fees were being used for an
impermissible purpose. As for any distinction that the City wishes to make· between
assessment/collection of fees and the use of fees, it is the Court's view that both the revenue
collected from connection fees and the use of those fees are intertwined in the first part of the
test. Even if the Court finds, as it did, that the City's_methodology of calculating connection fees
.is not arbitrary, the City must also pass the first part of the test - that the fees are not being used
for a statutorily impermissible purpose. If an entity has standing to challenge the second part of
test, as the City concedes the Association did, a logical conclusion is that they have standing to
challenge the first part of the test also. Nonetheless, the Court wilJ analyze below whether the
Association had standing to challenge whether the City was using revenue collected from the
com1ection fees. through the assessment and use of the PILOT fees, for an impennissible.
purpose.
II.

Standing
The City's motion to reconsider has renewed challenges to the Association's standing to

bring this action. The Court will first analyze the Association's standing to challenge the
assessment of PILOT fees with respect to connection fees. Then the Court will analyze the
Association's standing to challenge the assessment of PILOT fees with respect to user fees.
A.

Does the Association have standing to challenge the use of PILOT fees as

applied to the connection fee?
After car~fully reviewing the record, which the Court outlines below, the Court finds
there is substantial evidence to show that the revenue collected from the connection and user
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;

t

fees 20 was comingled and placed into the water and sewer funds accounts, prior to March 2013.
There does not appear to be any evidence as to how the connection fees and user fees could have
been or were separately accounted for, prior to March 2013. After the connection and user fees
were corningled into the water and sewer funds, the evidence supports, and the City concedes,
that the City then transferred money from the water and sewer funds into the General Fund under
transfers that have been called by various names - PILOT/rate of return/return on
equity/franchise fees.21 The City concedes that this PILOT charge is a tax charged to the City's
water and sewer department as if it was operating as a private utility company. Although the
City now argues that PILOT fees have never been assessed to the funds containing
connection/capacity fees, the Court still finds the Association has standing because it is clear that
money paid by c·onnection fee payers was commingled with user fees, from which money was
transferred to pay the PILOT fee, prior to March 2013. The issue of whether the PILOT could
ever be assessed to connection fees remains an issue in this case, which seeks declaratory relief.
Therefore, the Court finds that the Association has standing to challenge whether the revenue
coJlected from co1U1ection fees, and then transferred from the water and sewer accounts to the
General Fund through the use of a PILOT fee, is used for a permissible purpose under the Idaho
Revenue Bond Act.
As noted, the record reflects that prior to March 2013 the connection and user fees were
collectively poured into the water and sewer funds accounts. In his deposition, Swindell
explained that when the building department collected a connection fee as part of a building
User fees are distinguished from connection fees in that user fees are the monthly fees paid by all customers or
users of the water and sewer systems.
21 For purposes of this decision, such programs shall be collectively referred to hereafter as PILOT fees, but
essentially the City is charging its own water and sewer department a rate of return fee as if the department was a
private water and sewer entity.
20
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(

permit, ..then those funds and dollars are credited to the water fund or water pollution control
fund as appropriate." 22 Swindell further explained that connection/capacity fees were channeled
into three funds: I) building permit - designated as Fund 001; 2) water - designated as Fund
031; and 3) wastewater - designated as Fund 032.23 Swindell also explained that the user fees
were also poured into the water and wastewater funds named above. 24 In his first affidavit
Swindell stated: ''the capacity/connection fees are collected and segregated into the appropriate
water and wastewater funds.'' 25 In the letter to Logan Robinson, Mayor Chase names the "Water,
Sewer and Sanitation Funds" as the "enterprise funds." Mayor Chase explains they are called the

"enterprise funds" because the money placed in these funds comes mainly from fees generated
by each of the three public utility enterprises."26

Next, money from the above named funds was transfen-ed into the General fund under a

program that has had various names including, Return on Equity, Rate of Return, PILOT, and

franchise fees. Swindell and Mayor Chase define these terms as follows:
•

Franchise Fee - "A franchise fee is a fee for use of the public right of way
imposed on most utilities for operating within the public right of way within the
City limits. Telephone is exempted by the state constitution. The fee is calculated
as a percentage of gross revenues. For example, electric has a franchise fee of 1%;
natural gas has a franchise fee of 3%; cable has a franchise fee of 5%. 27

22 Deposition of David Swindell., p. 50: 1.12-17, attached at Exhibit 7 to Affidavit of Nathan M. Olsen, filed on
January 4, 2013. (Swindell Depo).
23 Swindell Depo., p. 50: 1.18 - p.52: I. 23. Swindell also explains that the wastewater fund is divided further into the
wastewater collection system and the wastewater treatment plant because the City of Chubbuck has its own
collection system but uses Pocatello's wastewater treatment plant.
24
•
.
Swindell Depo., p. 53: 1.9-18.
25 Affidavit ofDavid K Swindell in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 1 J6, filed on November 13, 2012.
(Swindell Aff.)
26 Mayor Chase August 22, 2005 letter to Logan Robison, p. 2, attached as Exhibit D to Affidavit of Syd Wood,
filed on January 4, 2013. Also attached as Exhibit 18 to Swindell Aff., which is attached as Ex:hibit 7 to Olsen Aff.
(The letter from Mayor Chase in both exhibits sits behind David Swindell's September 29, 2010 Memo.) ("Mayor
Chase 2005 Letter").
27 Swindell Aff. at 14.
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•

Rate of return -"The "rate of return" policy refers to city-owned public utilities
(i.e. water, sewer, etc.) making a transfer to the general fund. 28

•

Return on equity - '"In prior years, the city government described the transfer as a
"rate of return" or "return on equity" as if the taxpayers were the shareholders
(which they are). Fairness and reasonableness was established by comparing the
citfs rate of return on the utility equity at a rate of 6.5% compared to the 11.5 to
13.5% allowed for private companies by the Idaho Utility Commission. The rate
ofreturn is part of the· budget process and the rates are set each year and approved
by the City Council. " 29
Mayor Chase described the Return on Equity as follows: "The City Council has
chosen to make it a City policy to have the "enterprise fundsn pay a rate of return
on each utility equal to 7% of the equity in each business. By way of comparison,
private regulated utilities are allowed between 11.5% and 13 .5% rate of return by
the Idaho Public Utilities commission. This is a policy decision of the City
Council, but it does compensate the taxpayer for the lack of any franchise fee or
other payment for use of the public right of way. The money goes to the General
Fund which the City Council utilizes as a property tax substitution. 30

•

PILOT -"For the past two years, the rates have been re-described as a franchise
fee (% of gross revenues) and a payment-in-lieu of-taxes (PILOT) to make it
directly comparable to private utilities operating in the commwtity such as
Intermountain Gas. The PILOT is calculated on the prior year city property tax
levy rate multiplied by the estimated market value per the most recent financial
plan prepared by an outside consulting engineer."31
Mayor Chase described PILOT in his letter to Logan Robinson as follows: "The
City Council has chosen to make it a City policy to have the "enterprise funds"
make a payment in lieu of taxes to the General fund based on the depreciated
valuation of their physical plants and last year's city property tax levy rate. This
payment is similar to the federal government's payment of PILOT to some local
communities, and is a method to pay something for their use of police, fire and
streets. 32

Swindell Aff. at ,r 6.
Swindell Aff. at 17.
30 Mayor Chase 2005 Letter, p. 3.
31 Swindell Aff. ~ 8.
32 Mayor Cahse 2005 Letter, p. 2.
28
29
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Swindell further explains that the "internal franchise fee" AND "Payment in Lieu of Taxes
(PILOT)" have replaced the "rate of return" or ''return on equity."33 The franchise fee and
PILOT are two different transfers that are taken from the water and wastewater funds. 34 Swindell
explained that ''the combined amounts of FYI 3 franchise fee and PILOT are 13 .8% of planned
revenue for water and 15.5% for sewer." 35
According to Swinde1l's Fourth Affidavit, the City does not charge a PILOT fee to the
connection fees, but only to the user fees charged to customers of the systems. What the
Affidavit does not say is that a PILOT fee has never been charged to connection fees during the
time that both connection and user fees were comingled. However, prior to that Affidavit, it was
clear that all coruiection and user fees were poured into the three "enterprise funds." The City
then had a policy of transferring money from the water and sewer funds into the general fund.
Therefore, the rate of return/return on equity or the PILOT/franchise fee should not · be
characterized so much as a fee collected by the water and sewer funds but as a ''transfer" fee
based on a City policy to transfer water and sewer funds to the general funds. 36 In his memo to
the City Clerk, Swindell explained that for FYll the City planned to transfer $1,585,237 from
the water fund to the general fund "for a return on equity, to help fund the activities of the
General Fund."37 Similarly, in FYI I the City planned to transfer $1,263,654 from the Water
Pollution Control Fund to the "General Fund as a return on equity to help fund the activities of

Swindell Aff. ,r 12.
Swinde11 Aff. ,r 9.
35 Swindell Aff. ,r 11.
36 Swindell Aff. ,r 6; Swindell Depo, p. 80: 1.24-p. 81: 1.10
37 David Swindell September 29, 2010 Memo to City Clerk, attached as Exhibit D to Affidavit of Syd Wood, filed
on January 4, 2013. Also attached as Exhibit 18 to Swindell Aff., which is attached as Exhibit 7 to Olsen Aff.
("Swindell Memo").
33

34
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the General Fund. "38 These transfers did not include additional transfers that were made from the
water and sewer funds (I) into the General Fund to support the Human Resources Department;
(2) into the Emergency Repair fund to build reserves for emergency repair of facilities; and (3)

into the Debt Service Funds, which were each outlined separately from the "return on equity"
transfer.
Based on the foregoing, it appears clear to the Court that revenue collected from both
cormection fees and user fees was being, or could have been, transferred into the General Fund
-pursuant to the PiLOT fee, charged to the water and sewer department ·as a means of transferring
cormection and/or user fees to fund general city expenses. Prior to March 2013, there was no
evidence that it was only the user fees (i.e., the fees that every user of the water and sewer system
pays), that were used to fund the PILOT transfers from the water and sewer funds to the general
fund.

[t

is clear that the colUlection fees (i.e., fees paid only by builders of new construction). and

user fees were comingled into the water and sewer funds, from which the City transferred the

PILOT fee into the General Fund.
David Swindell, in his second affidavit, states that Pocatello residents "pay the monthly
user rate (which includes a pro rata share of the PILOT fee).,,3~ Additionally, Swindell states,
"[b]oth the water and sewer department recover the PILOT fees through the fee charged to all

users of the water and sewer system."40 However, there was nothing in Swindell's statements in
this case definitely stating that the PILOT transfers to the general fund were not derived from
BOTH the user fee AND the connection fee. The Association• s argument that the payers of the
cormection.fees were paying the brunt of the PILOT fee ''taxes" is bolstered by the evidence that
3s Id
39
40

Second Affidavit of David K. Swindell,, S, filed May 9, 2013.
Id. aq/ 4.
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when the City chose to implement this policy, that is, go from a property tax system to a fee
based system to generate revenue for the City, as described in Mayor Chase's 2006 letter to the
Attorney General, 41 the connection fees rose substantially while the user fees remained relatively
the same. 42 However, just as the spike in rates of the connection fees and not the user fees is not
fully definitive that it is the connection fee users only that are paying these "taxes," i.e. PILOT
fees, the fact that the Court has ruled that there is no question of fact whether the City's
methodology and calculation of the connection fees are unreasonably or arbitrarily imposed is
not a definitive determination that it is the only the user fees that were being transferred through
the PILOT fee taxes. What is clear and undisputed at this point is that revenue collected from the
connection fees and user fees collectively were transferred to the General Fund, via the PILOT
fee transfer program, and used to ..help fund the activities of the General Fund."
Because payment of connection fees is not a generalized grievance but a specific harm
alleged by the Association and because the revenue from the connection fees was comingled
with funds used as part of the PILOT fee transfers, the Court finds that the Association has
standing to challenge whether the use. of any PILOT fee assessments to the connection fees are
used for a permissible purpose under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, i.e., whether the City is using
Mayer Roger Chase December 26, 2006 letter to Attorney General Lawrence Wadsen, attached as Exhibit A to
Nathan Olseri 's February 13, 2013 affidavit in support of Supplemental Response to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's IRCP 37 Motion for Sanctions, filed February 13, 2013. (Mayor
Chase 2006 Letter).
42 See Affidavit ofNathan M. Olsen, filed January 4, 2013, Exhibits 1-6. These exhibits are Pocatello City Council
Resolutions from the years 2005 to 2010 that set the rates for user and connection fees for the upcoming year. In
Fiscal Year 2006 the connection fee for a 2-inch connection was $887 (Resolution No. 2006-28 attached as Exhibit
I; Also Resolution 2005-31 attached as Exhibit 4). In Fiscal Year 2007 the same 2-inch connection was assessed
$7,940 (Resolution No. 2006-28 attached as Exhibit I; Also Resolution No. 2006-35 attached as Exhibit 3). Finally
in Fiscal Year 20 I I the same 2-inch connection was assessed $8,260 {Resolution No. 20 IQ..29 attached as Exhibit
6). Jn Comparison, in Fiscal Year 2006 the monthly user fee for a metered, residential, single family in Pocatello
was $19 .00/mo (Resolution NO. 2005-32, attached as Exhibit 5). Whereas in Fiscal Year 2007 the same user fee for
a metered, residential, single family was $19.50/mq (Resolution No. 2007-36, attached as Exhibit 6}. With the same
user fee in Fiscal Year20I I being $21 .50/mo (Resolution No. 2010-30, attached as Exhibit 6).
41
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those funds transferred for purposes other than to ..support the existing water and sewer
systems."
B.

Does the Association have standing to challenge the City's user fee policies?

The Court has detennined the Association has standing to challenge the PILOT fee
transfers that may have been applied to connection fees. If the Court finds the Association
alleged and has standing to challenge the City's user fee policies, then any question related to
whether the Association must prove that it is only the connection fees rather than the user fees
that are actually being taxed as part of the PILOT fee transfers becomes irrelevant. If the
Association has standing to challenge both the City's user fee and connection fee policies, the

Court would then determine whether the PILOT transfers are impermissible taxes on both the
connection fees and the user fees, and therefore, whichever source has funded the PILOT
transfers would become irrelevant.

Restating, to establish standing a litigant must '~allege or demonstrate an injury in fact
and a substantial likelihood the relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. "43 An
injury in fact is a showing of a "distinct palpable injury" and is a "fairly traceable causal

connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct."44
The City asserts, pursuant to Greer v. Lewiston Golf & Country Club and Bopp v. the
City of Sandpoint, that for even a litigant who can prove an injury in fact "standing may still be
denied when the asserted hann is a generalized grievance shared by all or a large class of
citizens." 45 In Greer, the Idaho Supreme Court held that taxpayers and citizens of the city of
Lewiston did not have standing to bring a declaratory action challenging a city ordinance
Id. at 104; 1159.
Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 {1989).
45 Young v. City ofKetchum, l37 Idaho 102, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002).
43

44
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disannexing the Lewiston Golf and Country Club.46 The citizen.plaintiffs claimed that the
disannextion of the golf course would reduce the revenue the City of Lewiston collected in
property taxes, and thereby increase the overall taxes of the rest of the citizens of the city. 47 The

Greer Court held that the citizen-plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not have an
injury peculiar to themselves, but rather the plaintiffs simply alleged_ a generalized grievance
common to all taxpayers of the city. 48 In Bopp v. City of Sandpoint, the Idaho Supreme Court
likewise found that a plaintiff, a citizen of the city of Sandpoint, ·ctid not have standing to
challenge a city ordinance vacating a public right-of-way over a bridge because the citizenplaintiff did not own property adjacent to the bridge, and therefore, whatever injury he suffered
was suffered alike by all citizens and taxpayers of the city of Sandpoint.49 The plaintiff had no
peculiar injury to himself, and therefore, had no standing. so The City alleges that, similar to

Greer and Bopp, all citizens pay the user fees because aI1 citizens are connected to the City's
water and sewer systems, and therefore, the Association's members, as users of the water and
sewer system, do not have a grievance unique from any other citizen.
In opposition to the City's argument, the Association cites to Miles v. Idaho Power Co.
and Brewster v. the City of Pocatello. 51 In Miles, the Idaho Supreme Court held that plaintiffs
challenging Idaho statutes codifying an agreement between Idaho Power and the State, which
subordinated Idaho Power's water rights to thousands of upstream. users, had standing because
they brought their suit as ratepayers and customers of Idaho Power rather than general
46
47

Greer v. Lewiston Golf & Country Club, Inc., 81 Idaho 393,342 P.2d 719 (1959)
Id.

,is Id.

Bopp v. City o/Sandpoint, l lO Idaho 488, 716 P.2d 1260 (1986).
Id.
51 Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, (1989); Btewster v. City of Pocatello, 11S Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765
(1988).
49

SD
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taxpayers. 52 The Miles Court was not concerned with the fact that the ratepayers of Idaho Power
encompassed a very large class, holding, "when the impact of legislation is not felt by the entire
populace, but only a select class of citizens, the standing doctrine should not be evoked to usurp
the right to challenge the alleged denial of constitutional rights in a judicial forum. "53
The Brewster Court also found that a resident of the City of Pocatello had standing to
challenge the legality of a "street maintenance fee. "54 In Brewster, the issue was whether the City
of Pocatello, absent legislation, could "impose a fee on the owners or occupants of property
which abut public streets."55 The Brewster Court held that Pocatello's imposition of a "street

fee'' to all owners or occupants of property that abut public streets was an impennissible

tax

because it was a revenue raisin~ measure to fund the maintenance and repair of streets rather
than a regulatory fee under the city of Pocatello's police power that bore· a reasonable
relationship to the cost of regulating traffic over Pocatello's streets. 56 The Brewster Court
explained that "a fee is charged for a direct public service rendered to the particular consumer
_while a tax is a forced contribution by the public at large to meet public needs."57
The Court finds the Association's standing as to its members' payment of user fees to be .
more closely aligned with the facts set forth in Miles and Brewster. Similar to Miles, where the
Idaho Supreme Court held the plaintiff had standing because he was a ratepayer of Idaho Power,
a private utility, the Association has standing to challenge the City's user fees policies because
its members are ratepayers of the City's water and sewer system, a City•owned utility. Similar to

Id.
Id. at 642, 778 P.2d at 764.
54 I IS Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765.
ss Id. at 504, 768 P.2d at 767.
56 Id at 505, 768 P.2d at 768.
52

53

57

Id.
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a private utility, the City charges monthly rates, i.e., user fees, to those who are customers of the
system. Consequently, the Association members are not chal1enging the City's user fee policies

as taxpayers, and the harm they allege is not a generalized grievance common to all taxpayers.
Only the citizens of Pocatello that connect to the City's water and sewer systems pay user fees.

and consequently are taxed by the PILOT fee transfer policies. As the City explained in David
Swindell's second affidavit, those who do not pay the monthly user fees are disconnected from
the system. Therefore, as users of the water and sewer systems, the Association's members have

a special or peculiar injury not shared by those who do not pay monthly user fees. Their
grievance is not just a tangential complaint of a taxpayer whose taxes are going to be raised if a
golf course is disaruiexed or is disgruntled with the building of a bridge. As explained in Miles,
the fact that Association's members represent a large class is inconsequential so long as their
injury is a special and not a generalized grievance. 58
In Brewster, it also could have been argued, similar to the City's argument here, that an
or nearly all of the citizens of Pocatello paid tlie "street maintenance fee" because nearly every
citizen would own or rent property that abutted a public street.59 Nonetheless, the Brewster Court
held that the plaintiff, as a resident of Pocatello that paid the ~·street maintenance fee," had
standing to chalJenge the fee. 60 Also similar to Brewster, the Court finds below that the City's
PILOT fee policies transferring revenue from connection and user fees are not regulatory fees
permissible under the City's police power because it does not bear a reasonable relationship to
the cost of regulating the water and sewer systems. Rather, this Court has found, similar to
The Court notes here that among the class of citizens who do not pay user fees would be renters of property and
those who own property that is not connected to the water and sewer systems, such as owners of undeveloped land,
or perhaps owners of warehouses and the like.
59 115 ldaho 502, 768 P.2d 765.
60 Id.

58
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Brewster, that the PILOT fee transfers are impermissible taxes because they are used to generate
revenue to meet the needs of the public at large. Certainly, as the resident in Brewster had

standing to challenge such a fee, so do the users of the City's water and sewer systems.
Additionally, the Court finds that the Association, in its Complaint, has properly alleged
standing and pied for relief on the basis of its members' payment of user fees. In Cowit I of its
Complaint, the Association seeks a declaration that the City's policies are a violation of the tax
and police power limitations of the Idaho Constitution. The Association alleged, "[a] real
controversy exists between the City and Builders Ass'n, including its user fee and connection fee
paying members." 6l An identical assertion of standing is made in Count II, seeking a declaration
that the City failed to follow bonding procedures. 62 Also in Count II, the Association alleged that
it "is entitled to a declaration that the City's Connection fee and user fee policy, as it has been

implemented since at least 2005, and as currently constituted, is in violation of Idaho's
Constitution and code with regard to the bonding requirements. " 63 The Court finds that the above
allegations in the Association's Complaint were sufficient to put the City on notice that the
Association was alleging standing on user fees as well as connection fees and was also seeking
relief from the Citfs user fee policy as well as its connection fee policy.
Therefore, the Court finds the Association has standing to challenge the City's user fee
policies, and thus the City's distinction between the user fee funds and connection fees funds
does not defeat the Association's standing to challenge the permissibility of the PILOT fees.

Complaint at, 32.
Complaint at, 40.
61 Complaint at , 42.'
61

62
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III.

Substantive Arguments
The Court finds that there are two remaining substantive issues to be addressed in

response to the parties' motions to reconsider. First. the Court must decide if the assessment of a
· PILOT fee is impermissible, even in light of the fact that the City's accounting methods have
changed. If so, the second issue is the appropriate remedy for that impermissible assessment.
A.

Is the PILOT fee permitted?

The Association, in its Response m Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioned the Court to also reconsider granting summary judgment in the
Association's favor in light of the City's concession that the PILOT and franchise fee transfers
were taxes. At oral argument the City motioned the Court to strike the Association's cross

motion for reconsideration, arguing that it was not timely filed. The Court DENIES the City's
Motion to Strike.
First, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l 1(a)(2XB), a motion to reconsider an
interlocutory order can be filed at any time, so long as it is filed fourteen ( 14) days before the
Court• s final judgment. Second, the City motioned the Court to reconsider granting it summary
judgment. Upon a party's request for swnmary judgment, a district court has the authority to
render summary judgment in favor of any party. moving or non-moving, even if the non-moving
party has not filed its own motion. 64 "The district court may grant summary judgment to a nonmoving party even if the party has not filed its own motion with the court. A motion for
summary judgment allows the court to rule on the issues placed before it as a matter of law; the

64

Sirius LCv. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38, 4()-41, 156 P.3d 539, 541-42 (2007).
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moving party runs the risk that the court will find against it."65 Additionally, since the May 13th
hearing, the Association has filed a Motion to Reconsider and an Amended Motion to
Reconsider. Consequently, the Court will determine whether summary judgment should be
granted to the Association.
A significant development since the Court issued its March 28, 2013 Memorandum
Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is that the City has conceded
that the PILOT fee transfers are taxes. It is also an undisputed fact that revenue from the
connection fees and user fees were poured into and comingled into the water and sewer funds,
from which the P[LOT fee transfers are taken. The Court recognizes that the City now deposits
connection fees and user fees in different accounts and that the PILOT is only drawn from the
user fee fund. However, based on the fact that the City has historically comingled the user and
connection fees into a single account, the Court will also address the permissibility of drawing a
PILOT from both fees.
In Loomis v. City of Hailey, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that while "the Idaho
Constitution permits municipal corporations to impose taxes, such authority is limited by the
taxing power granted by the legislature."66 The Loomis Court also explained that "municipalities
may impose fees _pursuant to its '),olice powers', to enact regulations for furtherance of the public

health, safety or morals," but fees imposed under this "police power" must bear some reasonable
relationship to the cost of enforcing the regulation."67 However, pursuant to Idaho Constitution,
art. 8, §3 and the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, municipalities also have a proprietary function that
F1Aller v. Dave Callister, 150 Idaho 848,851,252 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2011) (quotingHarwoodv. Talbert, 136 ldaho
672,677, 39 P.3d 612,617 (2001}).
M Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437,807 P2d 1272, 1275 (1991) (citingBrewsterv. City ofPocatello,
115 Idaho 503, 768 P.2d 766 (1989)).

65

61

Id.
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permits them to charge rates and fees to "construct and maintain certain public works. "68
Therefore, the Loomis Court explained that when ''rates, fees and charges conform to the
statutory scheme set forth in the Idaho Revenue Bond Act or are imposed pursuant to a valid
police power, the charges are not construed as taxes. However, if rates, fees, and charges are
imposed primarily for revenue raising purposes they are in essence disguised taxes subject to
legislative approval and authority." 69
The above law is applicable to both user fees and connection fees charged by the City.
All '~tes, fees, and charges [must] confonn to the statutory scheme set forth in the Idaho
Revenue Bond Act" and ''if rates, fees, and charges are imposed primarily for revenue raising
purposes they are in essence disguised taxes."70
In an August 22, 2005 letter to Logan Robinson, former City of Pocatello Mayor, Roger
Chase, described the "Return on Equity" program as a "property tax substitution." Additionally,
in a December 26, 2006 letter to Attorney General Lawrence Wasden, Mayor Chase explained
that "charging a rate of return is commonly used by public utilities and private sector companies,
and we feel is fairer way to generate revenue for the City" because "relying on property taxes for
revenue will not work in Pocatello due to the number of property tax exemptions given by the
State," and therefore it has been his "practice as Mayor to move our city away from property
taxes and to a fee based system." Mayor Chase's statements are consistent with Swindell's
memo that the return on equity transfers "help to fund the activities of the General Fund." This is
undisputed evidence that the return on equity or PILOT fee transfers, as they are now called, are
not fees charged pursuant to the police or proprietary functions of the City of Pocatello, but are
68 Jd
69

Id.

at 437, 807 P.2d at 1276.

.

,o Id.

CV-2011-5228-0C
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER
AND PLAINTIFF'S Al\IBNDED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Page 21
173

in fact, "imposed primarily for revenue raising purposes [and] are in essence disguised taxes."
Indeed, as stated above, the City has now conceded that the PILOT fee transfers are taxes. The
PILOT fee transfers/taxes are taken from the water and sewer funds, i.e, the "enterprise funds,"
and as Mayor Chase explained, "money placed in these [enterprise] funds comes mainly from
fees generated by each of the three public utility enterprises."71 Since the PILOT fees are or have
been transferred from revenue collected from ''rates, fees, and charges" of the water and sewer
system, i.e., connection fees and user fees, and are not used for a regulatory purpose nor for
purposes allowed by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, the Court finds, as a matter of law, that the
PILOT fee transfers are impermissible taxes assessed against the user fees, connection fees, or
both - all of which is contrary to Idaho statutory and case law;
Language from the Court's earlier order on summary judgment is relevant here:
[T]here is a difference between charging another entity, such as the City of Chubbuck, a
rate of return versus charging city residents and utility customers a rate of return when
the statute granting cities the authority to operate public works provides that the city must
furbish the services ••at the lowest possible cost." Furthennore, and more importantly, the
Supreme Court emphasized in City ofPocatello v. City of Chubbuck that the rate of return
was not imposed "primarily as a source of revenue" because there was no evidence that
the revenue was not being used for purposes proscribed by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act,
which, as detailed in Loomis and Viking Construction, permits water and sewer revenue
to be used for the maintenance, depreciation and replacement of system components, but
not for future expansion of the system or for city functions other than the sewer and water
systems. 72
The City takes the position that it is acceptable to treat its City-owned utility as if it was a private
utility and then charge a "rate of return" to that City~owned utility as a means of transferring
funds from the water and sewer accounts to the general fund. The Court has and continues to
disagree. To the extent that PILOT fees have, are, or will be charged to the coMection fees
71

72

Mayor Chase 2005 Letter at p. 2.
Memorandum Decision, pp. 22-23.
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being accumulated in the water and sewer accounts the Court finds the connection fees are being
used impermissibly. Additionally, any PILOT fees drawn from user fees are also impermissible
taxes.
B.

Should the entire user/connection fee collection system be stricken?

The Association has requested that the Court find the current rates charged by the City
for user and connection· fees to be unconstitutional and impermissible and to require the City to
. redo the entire collection system. The Court recognized, in its original decision, that:
[R]egulations and charges shall not be unreasonable it being specifically provided in
section 2, § 50-2813, LC., [now§ 50·1028], that the services are to be furnished at the
lowest possible cost and that the municipality shall not operate the works primarily as a
source ofrevenue. 73
Speaking specifically to the issue of connection fees, the Loomis court explained that the
rates and fees established by a city will be upheld as long as they are "not unreasonable and not
arbitrarily- imposed" and "produce sufficient revenue to support the system at the lowest possible
cost as required by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act,"74 The Court elaborated further by explaining
that "merely because the charge represents something more than the actual cost of the actual
physical hook~p does not make the connection fee illegal."75
In its initial decision, the Court analyzed Loomis v. City of Hailey and Viking Const., Inc.
v. Hayden Lake Irr. Dist., and reached the basic conclusion that "it is not for the courts to

determine what methodology the city must use in determining its fees, rates &Pd -'!:b.axses "76
Instead the Loomis court explained that the role of the courts is "limited ... to detennine whether

73
74

75
76

Memorandum Decision, pp. 28 (quoting Schmidt v. Village ofKimberly, 74 Idaho 48, 256 P.2d 515 (1953)).
.
Loomis, at 442,807 P.2d at 1280.

Id.
Id at 443, 807 P.2d at 1281.
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the fees, rates and charges conform to the statutory requirements, are reasonable, and are not
arbitrary. " 77
The Association argues that Mr. Hunter's method for calculating rates is more
appropriate than the method employed by the City in creating the Red Oak report. However, in
the Court's view Mr. Hunter's statements are more a criticism of the Red Oak method than they
are a recommended alternative method. More importantly, although the Red Oak report may
result in higher rates than Mr. Hunter's suggestions, the Court will not dictate to the City ·what
methodology it should employ in calculating its fees. Instead, the Court is limited to evaluating
whether the fees are reasonable, not arbitrary, and confonn to the statutory requirements. 78
Although the Association challenges the Red Oak study, the Court finds that it was a reasonable
methodology, which was not arbitrary or unreasonable.
However, as noted above, it is the Court's determination that any fee which includes a
PILOT component is unreasonable, arbitrary and contrary to statute. To whatever extent the City
has ca]culated a. PILOT fee into its user and connection fees, that portion of the user and
connection fees is impermissible. The Court has already detennined that it is impermissible for
the City to assess the PILOT fee on its own municipal utility companies - here the sewer and
water department. Thus, any portion ofthe user and/or connection fees that are assessed in order
to pay the PILOT fee to the City, do not conform to the statutory requirements ofl.C. § 50-1028
and must be excluded from any fee assessment going forward.

11
18

Id.
Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Court notes that in the last hearing the parties were asked whether additional
discovery was necessary and whether additional evidence would need to be submitted to the
Court, in a trial,· to decide this case. After consideration of the City's fmal submissions, the
Association stated that no additional depositions or discovery was needed and that the final
submission by the Association was its brief. No party has indicated that any further evidence
would need to be submitted to the Court at a trial in order to render a final decision in this case.
Therefore, the Court issues the following conclusions, which resolves this case in its entirety.
The Court finds that the Association has standing to challenge the use of PILOT fees as a
portion of any connection and user fees, concluding that the Association, whose members pay
connection and user fees, have a special and peculiar grievance not shared by all taxpayers. The
Court DENIES the City's Motion to Reconsider the Court's March 28, 2013 Memorandum
Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that the PILOT fee
transfers are impermissible taxes on the water and sewer funds which are derived from the
revenue collected from the connection fees and/or user fees.
The Court GRANTS the Association's Motion to Reconsider, and GRANTS sununary
judgment in favor of the Association, in part. The Court finds that the PILOT fee policy

impennissibly uses revenue collected from the connection and user fees for purposes other than

for the water and sewer system, in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, and therefore, is not

a use of the City's police or proprietary function because it does not bear a reasonable
relationship to the cost of regulating the water and sewer syste~s. but rather, is a revenue raising
measure in violation of LC. § 50-1027.
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Combining this opinion and the Memorandum Decision filed March 28, 2013, the Court
concludes, as a matter of law, the following:
1.

The City's connection and user fees are not arbitrary or unreasonably imposed.

The imposition and collection of the connection and user fees themselves are not
unconstitutional acts or a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act

2.

There is no evidence that the connection fees are being used by the City to fund

future capital improvements in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.

3.

Through the use of the PILOT fee transfer program, or any other transfer program

with a similar intent, such as a rate of return program or a return on equity program, the Court
declares that the City is imposing an impennissible tax to the extent that connection and user fees
are being assessed a PILOT fee for general fund purposes, and such practices must cease and are
hereby enjoined because they are unconstitutional and a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond
Act. This means that connection and user fees must he adjusted to the extent that they include a
charge for the PILOT fee. In addition, no PILOT fee transfers from any water or sewer account
to the general fund are permitted.
However, to the extent that conn~tion and user fees are being transferred from the water
and sewer accounts to the general fund, through any appropriate process, however named, for the
purpose of paying expenses related to the operation, maintenance, replacement, and depreciation
of existing water and sewer systems, including only those general City expenses needed to

operate the water and sewer departments, such as HR, financial, legal and accounting, such
transfers are permitted and are not hereby enjoined.
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Therefore, Judgment is granted to the City, in part, as set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, and the
last sentence of 3 above, and Judgment is granted to the Association, in paii, set fo11h in the first
sentence of paragraph 3 above.
The two decisions now entered in this case resolve all issues in this case. Judgment will
be entered forthwith as set forth herein.

IT IS SO ORDERED,
DATED November 13, 2013.

~

District Judge
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Jf5_ day of \]<'ff , 2013, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the manner
indicated.
Blake G. Hall
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, PA.
490 Memorial Drive
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405·1630

(i) u:s. Mai1
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

Nathan M. Olsen
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 '"E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

(.{U.S. Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
BUILDING CONTRACTORS,
ASSOICATION OF SOUTHEAST
IDAHO, an Idaho non-profit corporation,
Plaintiffs,

)
) CV-2011-5228-0C
)
)
)
)

-vs-

) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST
) FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
Municipality,

)
)
)
)
)

______________
Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's request for costs and attorney fees.
Defendant has objected to Plaintiff's request and Plaintiff challenges the objection as not having

complied with 1.R.C.P. 54(d) and (e).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In any detennination of an award of costs and fees, the threshold question is which party
prevailed. I:R.C.P. 54(e)(l) states: "In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney
fees. which at the discretion of the court may include paralegaJ fees, to the prevailing party or
parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute or contract." [Emphasis
added]. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) governs the prevailing party issue:
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In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs,
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court
in its sound discretion may detennine that a party to an action prevailed in part
and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments
obtained. {Emphasis added by this Court.J

The determination of who is the prevailing party is committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. Rockefeller v. Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 82 P.3d 450 (2003).
The legaI·basis for an award of costs is I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l). Some costs are awarded to a
prevailing party as a matter of right and some costs can be awarded in the discretion of the Court.
Discretionary costs are allowed "upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional
costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse

party." When objections to discretionary costs are made the Court "shall make express findings
as to why such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed." Such costs
may also be disallowed without objection, in the discretion of the Court and upon express
findings. The determination of whether a cost is "exceptional" involves an evaluation both of the
cost itself, i.e., whether it is the kind of cost commonly incurred in the type of litigation at issue,
and whether the case itself is exceptional. City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d
1118 (2006); Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 109 P.3d 161 (2005);

Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 960 P.2d 175 (1998).
The award of attorney fees is governed by I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1), which provides that such an
award is discretionary, to the prevailing party, ''when provided for by any statute or contract."
Whether to award fees and the amount of the fees awarded are matters of discretion, unless it
involves a specific determination of a statute which allows for attorney fees.
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Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60,205 P.3d 1196 (2009); Taylor v. A1aile, 146 Idaho 705, 201 P.3d 1282

(2009); Contreras v. Rubley, 142 Idaho 573, 130 P.3d 1111 (2006).

If fees are awarded, the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, must consider the
factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). Sanders v. Lanliford, 135 Idaho 322, I P.3d 823
(Ct.App.2000); Boe/ v. Stewart Title Co., 137 Idaho 9, 16, 43 P.3d 768, 775 (2002); Brinkman v.
Aids Insurance Co., 115 Idaho 346,351, 766 P.2d 1227, 1232 (1988). The district court must, at

a minimum, provide a record which establishes that the court considered these factors. Building
Concepts, Ltd, v. Pickering, 114 Idaho 640,645, 759 P.2d 931,936 (Ct.App.1988}. A trial court

need not specifically address all of the factors contained inI.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) in writing, so long
as the record clearly indicates that the court considered them all. Brinkman, 115 Idaho at 351,
766 P.2d at 1232. In addition, a court need not blindly accept those attorney fees requested by a
party, and may disalJow those fees that were incurred UlUlecessarily or unreasonably. Craft Wall

ofIdaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker, 108 Idaho 704, 706, 701 P.2d 324, 326 (Ct.App.1985).
FACTS
This case was brought by the Building Contractors Association against the City of
Pocatello, alleging multiple challenges to the legality of the City's use of connection and user
fees regarding the City's sewer and water utilities. The issues in the case were decided on
summary judgment and through motions to reconsider, by agreement of the parties.
Plaintiff prevailed on the issue of whether the City could divert a portion of the funds
collected for connection and user fees for the Water and sewer systems to the City's general fund
through the means of a PILOT fee. 1 The City prevailed on several issues that were also raised
throughout this case. First, the City prevailed on the issue of whether it was unreasonable or
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and Plaintiff's Amended Motion for
Reconsideration, 22-23.
1
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arbitrary to charge a connection: fee when new connections were added to the existing system,
based on an equity buywin system. 2 Second, the City prevailed on the issue of whether the entire
user and co1U1ection fee systems needed to he thrown out and a new evaluation preformed. 3
Third, the City prevailed against Plaintiff's argument that the connection fees constituted an
unconstitutional taking. 4 And fourth, the City prevailed on the issue of whether the connection
fees were being impennissibly used to fund future expansion and capital improvements to the
sewer and water systems. 5
ANALYSIS
The threshold issue in any request for attorney fees and costs is which party prevailed.

Plaintiff argues it is entitled to attorney fees and costs under J.C.§§ 12-121 and/or 12-117. In
order to be awarded attorney fees and costs under either section the party seeking the award must
be the prevailing party.
Idaho Code § 12- I21 allows for the award of attorney fees to a prevailing party if the
court, in its discretion, determine~ that the action was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation. Joyce Livestock Co. v. US., 144 Idaho 1, 156 P.3d 502
(2007); Tolley v. THL Co., 140 Idaho 253, 92 P.3d 503 (2004). Idaho Code§ 12-117 applies to
the award of attorney fees and costs where one of the parties is a municipality. See Hehr v. City

ofMcCall, 155 Idaho 92,305 P.3d 536 (2013):
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse parties a
state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, political subdivision
or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. I.C. § 12-117.
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 30-31.
Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and Plaintiff's Amended Motion for
Reconsideration, 24.
4 Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 15.
5 Id at 28.
2

3 Memorandum
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Under this statute an award of fees and costs is only appropriate where "'the other party
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.'" Ciszek v. Kootenai County Bd Of Com 'rs, 151
Idaho 123,135,254 P.3d 24, 36 (2011) (quoting Burns Holdings, LLC v. Madison County Bd. Of

County Com'rs, 147 Idaho 660,664,214 P.3d 646,650 (2009)).
Plaintiff asserts that it is the prevailing party in this case because the PILOT fee was
declared to be impermissible. Certainly the Court would agree· that the Plaintiff prevailed in part
on that issue. Plaintiff also asserts that successfully defending againsrsome claims, as the City.
has done here, .is an insufficient basis for determining that the City prevailed at all. The Court
disagrees. None of the cases cited hold for that proposition.6 The standard is a discretionary
evaluation of the final result in the case. It would be incongruent to suggest that successfully
defending against many claims cannot be considered in that "result" oriented analysis.
Plaintiff also asserts that it sought the same result with several alternative theories and
because it prevailed on one of the theories it should be the prevailing party. Again, the Court
disagrees. Plaintiff sought multiple types ofrecovery. including asking the Court to eliminate
the connection fee altogether, to declare that the method used to determine the connection fee
was unconstitutional, unreasonable and arbitrary, and to declare that the City used fees in an
inappropriate way through the development of new facilities. The Couit did not grant any of this
relief. Thus, this was not a case where one result, under alternative theories. was sought. In fact,
Plaintiff did not receive a significant portion of what it sought.
While Plaintiff claims that being the prevailing party does not require a "bulls eye," a true
statement as far as it goes, the fact is that this Court is required to evaluate all the claims brought,

6 The Court notes that the successful defense against a contract has been held to support a claim for fees. See
Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Idaho 748, 864 P.2d 194 {Ct.App.1993). However, when a case is successfully defended,
the party doing so certainly prevails.
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the relief sought, and the final result, in detennining whether either party prevailed over the
other.
At best, the Court concludes that the results of this case are mixed, with both sides
prevailing in part: The Idaho appellate courts have held that mixed results, including recovery
of less than the amount sought, can support an award of attorney fees. 7 However, the Court, in
its discretionary consideration of "the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the
relief sought by the respective parties," detennines that both parties here "prevailed in part and
did not prevail in part," and further determines that careful consideration of the outcomes in this
case leads to the conclusion that no fees or costs should be awarded to either party.
Although not necessary to the decision, the Court offers the view that even if a
detennination had been made that the Plaintiff prevailed, no fees would likely have been
awarded because; based at least in part on the analysis above, it cannot be reasonable said that
the City defended this case frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation, as required by LC.
§ 12-121, or that the City acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law as to any of the issues

raised, as required by I.C. § 12-117.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that neither party prevailed in this action, and that
an award of costs and fees to either side should not be given. Plaintiff's request for costs and
fees is DENIED, and Defendant's objection to costs and fees is GRANTED. The Judgment
previously entered will not be amended.

7 Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 112; 203 P.3d 702 (2009) (attorney fee award upheld even though prevailing party
recovered substantially less than the relief sought); Eighteen Mile Ranch, UC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc.,
141 Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 (2005J (award of fees upheld although recovery on counterclaim was less than ten
percent of amount sought}; Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 191 P.3d 1107 (Ct.App.2008); Chadderdon v. King, 104
Idaho 406, 659 P.2d 160 (Ct.App.1983).

CV-2011MS228MOC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
Page6
187

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATEDthisLa.ayof

.J'~

, 2014.

~

District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
BUILDING CONTRACTORS,
A8SOICATION OF SOUTHEAST
IDAHO, an Idaho non-profit corporation,
Plaintiffs,
-vs-

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
Municipality,

______________
Defendants.

)
.) CV-2011.,5228-0C
)
)
)
)

) DECISION ON PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION
) FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff has filed an application for order to show cause, requesting that the Court enter
an order suspending the assessment and collection of connection fees until the City recalculates

the connection fees, as it has the user fees. Plaintiff argues that the record contains sufficient
evidence indicating that the City included the PILOT fee in calculating the necessary connection
fee it would charge. After reviewing the facts in the record, specifically those cited by Plaintiff,
the Court concludes that there is insufficient evidence that the PILOT fee was used in calculating
the connection/capacity fees, and declines to enter the Order to Show Cause.
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DISCUSSION
An application for order to show cause must be supported by a verified complaint or
accompanying affidavit. 1 In order to be granted the application must make a prima facie
showing that there are grounds for the court to issue an order to show cause.2 If the application
is granted, the court will enter an order requesting the opposing party show cause why the
requested order should not be granted. 3
Plaintiff first points to this Court's November 15, 2013 opinion and correctly identifies
the holding that the City may not charge a PILOT fee on either the user or connection fees. 4
Additionally, Plaintiff correctly identifies the Red Oak Study as being the method by which the
coruiection/capacity fees were calculated. 5
In support of its application, Plaintiff cites extensively to an affidavit from Mr. John
Gallagher that

was filed in this case along with an attached report explaining the method used by

Red Oak in calculating both the water and wastewater rates as weU as the connection/capacity
fees. 15 This report indicated that PILOT fees were "elements in the City,s utility budgets that are
funded by revenue from water and wastewater rates.,. 7 That same report makes a distinction
between water and wastewater utility rates and capacity fees. 8 All statements in the report

2 I.R.C.P.
1

Id.

6(c)(2)(A).
.
.

Defendant objects to the Affidavit of Nathan M. Olsen on various grounds, some of which have merit.
Without reviewing each objection in d~tail and making a detailed finding, the Court simply indicates that to the
extent some of the information in Mr. Olsen's affidavit is appropriately considered in ruling on this application, the
Court has done so, as reflected herein. To any other extent, the affidavit has not been considered.
4 See Affidavit ofNathan M. Olsen in Support of Application for Order to Show Cause, 2 (citing November 15,
2013, Mem. Dec. p. 20-26).
·
5 See Affidavit of Nathan M. Olsen in Support of Application for Order to Show Cause, 4 (citing Fee Resolutions
from 2006-2013).
6 Affidavit of John Gallagher in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment.
7 Affidavit of John Gallagher in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex:hibit B.
8 Id. Since this term has been repeatedly referred to throughout this case as the connection fee, to distinguish it from
user fees or rates paid by normal utility customers, the Court hereafter refers to this fee as the "connection fee."
3 Id.
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regarding the PILOT fee indicate that it was used in calculating user rates. 9 Nowhere are PILOT
fees mentioned in the calculation of the connection fees. JO
A supplemental response was filed by Mr. Gallagher on August 15, 2013, detailing
further the process used in calculating user rates and connection fees. 11 This supplemental repo11
makes a very dear distinction between the methods used to calculate user rates and the method
used to calculate connection fees. 12 The rate study information clearly includes a reliance on

PILOT fees in calculating the user rates, 13 but the capacity fee section never mentions a PILOT
fee as part of its calculation of connection fees. 14
In addition to Mr. Gallagher's reports Plaintiff seems to argue that because the Red Oak
study evaluated the necessary rates to balance the overall budget, with and without connection
fees, that the connection fees must necessarily have been calculated with the PILOT charges in
mind and included. Plaintiff cites to the "Cost of Service" section of the 2006 - 2010 Red Oak
studies. There it states: "Total Test year revenue requirements consist of$5.6 million in
operating costs and $4.6 million in capital costs. Revenue adjustments, PILOT and return on
equity make up the difference bringing the total cost of service for 2013 to $11.9." Additionally,
Plaintiff cites to the March 10-l I, 2010 ''Memorandum" of John Gallagher, regarding the
"Financial Planning Work.shop No. I!' The memo states: '"Staffrequested Red Oak develop
financial plans with and without capacity fees so that rate adjustments can be proportionately
determined.n Finally Plaintiff quotes a note from Red Oak to the City dated January 31, 2010,
explaining that Red Oak would '"[design] a rated schedule resulting from cash flows with and

9 Jd.

JO Id.

John A. Gallagher Response to Plaintiff's Documents Submitted on August 5, 2013.
Compare id at I, with ld at 3.
J3 See id at 1-2.
14 See id at 3-5.
Jl

12
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without capacity fees." 15
Plaintiff evaluates all this evidence and reaches the conclusion that ''the City's passed
resolutions indicate that both user and capacity fees were 'adopted' based on the projected •cost
and revenue' provided by Red Oak. Red Oak developed a 'comprehensive financial' plan that
incorporated all of the types of water and user fees to fund the City's budget including PILOT." 16
Although the above facts indicate that the water and wastewater utility rates were set after taking
the connection fee into account, there is nothing in the above cited evidence to indicate that the
PILOT fee was used to calculate the proper connection fee. To the contrary, the evidence in the
case indicates that the connection fee was calculated entirely separate from any consideration of

a PILOT fee.
Mr. Swindell's fourth affidavit claims that PILOT "has zero relationship to the
connection capacity fee." 17 Plaintiff argues the Court should not give substantial weight to Mr.
Swindell's fourth affidavit because the claim regarding PILOT fees was made after-the-fact, it is
conclusory, and it is foundationless. 18
However, Plaintiff has failed to recognize that the reports submitted by Mr. Gallagher,
which Plaintiff cite to as evidence of their position, have also clearly distinguished between
connection fees and water and wastewater user rates. Mr. Gallagher clearly explains that the Red
Oak studies included the PILOT fee in calculating the necessary user rates to meet budgetary
requirements. 19 Mr. Gallagher's report is equally as clear that the PILOT fee was not used in
calculating the connection fee, and that, in fact, budgetary needs were not considered in

Deposition of Dav.id Swindell, Bates No. 2, Exhibit 36.
Affidavit of Nathan Olsen in Support of Application for Order to Show Cause, p. 5.
17 Fourth Affidavit of David K. Swindell.
IS Jd.
19 See John A. Gallagher Response to Plaintiffs Documents Submitted on August 5, 2013, p. 1-3.
i:;

16
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calculating the connection fee. 20 Mr. Gallagher's report states:
The City's capacity fees are based on the system buy-in method. This method is based
on the concept that existing customers, through rates and other assessments, have
developed a valuable water and wastewater system. A new customer must "buy-in'~ to
this system by making a contribution equal to the amount of equity a similar existing
customer has in the system. 21
The report goes on to explain that the value of the existing system "is calculated as the
replacement cost of existing backbone system assets plus the costs of planned capital
improvements."22 Nowhere in this analysis does the PILOT fee come up. Even if the statements
made by Mr. Swindell were to be treated with limited weight, as Plaintiff argues they should be,
the Gallagher report, which Plaintiff relies upon in making its arguments, clearly indicates that
water and wastewater user rates were calculated differently than connection fees, and that the
PILOT was considered only in setting the water and wastewater user rates.
The evidence pointed to by Plaintiff simply does not refute the statement in Mr.
Swindell's fourth affidavit, that there is no connection between capacity fees and PILOT fees. In
fact, reviewing the evidence clearly demonstrates that the PILOT was only assessed to the user
rates. As the City has adjusted the user rates there is no basis for granting Plaintiff's Application
for Order to Show Cause.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Application for Order to Show
Cause.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

John A. Gallagher Response to Plaintiffs Documents Submitted on August S, 2013, p. 4.
Jd.
22 Id.
20
21
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DATEDthis
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District Judge
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
!SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgh@hasattorneys.com
sla@hasattorneys.com
nrs@hasattomeys.com
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFFS' ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE

V.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendant, City of Pocatello, by and through its attorney of record, and
hereby submits this response to Plaintiffs' Order to Show Cause as follows:
ARGUMENT
A.

Background From Pocatello Builders Litigation.

By way of background, it is important for this Court to understand the underlying
litigation that has resulted in the instant litigation. The instant litigation centers on a previously
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adjudicated state law case captioned Building Contractors Association ofSoutheast Idaho v. City
ofPocatello ("Building Contractors Case"), Bannock County Case No. CV-2011-0005228-0C.
The Building Contractors Case centered primarily on the legitimacy of the connection/capacity
fee charged by the City of Pocatello. The Prayer for Relief of the Building Contractors Case
sought the following:
1.
That the Court declare the City's connection fee policy to
be a violation of the Idaho State Constitution and Code as an unauthorized
tax.
2.
That the Court declare the City's connection fee policies to
be a violation of the Idaho State Constitution and Code in regard to
bonding requirements.
3.
That the Court declare the City's connection fee policies to
be a violation of the United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution as a
talcing of private property without just compensation, for which the
Plaintiff is entitled to equitable and legal remedies under U.S.C. 42 §
1983.
4.
That the Plaintiff be provided injunctive relief by cease and
desist of the enforcement and collection of the City's current connection
fees.
5.
That the City be required to repeal all prior connection fee
policies and prepare a new connection fee policy that is valid under Idaho
and U.S. law, and that the Plaintiff and any other interested member of the
public have the opportunity to review and provide input in the
development of such policy.
6.
A declaration by the Court that any proposed fee by the
City to "fund the costs of growth" be implemented according to the strict
provisions of the Idaho Development Fee Impact Act.
7.
That a determination be made of the precise amount of
connection and user fees that have been improperly collected and utilized
since at least 2005.
8.
That Plaintiff be awarded damages in an amount to be
determined by the court at trial for overcharging the amount due it for
search and copying costs of records under Plaintiffs freedom of
information request.
(Complaint, p. 13-14). As is clear from the Prayer for Relief, virtually all of the requested relief
centered on the connection fee. A secondary issue that was raised by the Building Contractors
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was whether the PILOT fee was constitutional. Very little time and attention in briefing and
argument was devoted to this issue by either party.
After extensive briefing on the issue, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and

Order on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and Plaintiff's Amended Motion for
Reconsideration on November 15, 2013. In that order, the Court specifically concluded that the
City had prevailed on a number of issues. Specifically, the Court concluded as follows:
I.
2.
3.

The City connection and user fees are not arbitrary or unreasonably imposed. The
imposition and collection of the connection and user fees themselves are not
unconstitutional acts or a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.
There is no evidence that the connection fees are being used by the City to fund future
capital improvements in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.
Through the use of the PILOT fee transfer program, or any other transfer program
with a similar intent, such as a rate of return program or a return on equity program,
the Court declares that the City is imposing an impermissible tax to the extent that
connection and user fees are being assessed a PILOT fee for general fund purposes,
and such practices must cease and are hereby enjoined because they are
unconstitutional and a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. This means that
connection and user fees must be adjusted to the extent that they include a charge
for the PILOT fee. In addition, no PILOT fee transfers from any water or sewer
account to the general fund are pemiitted.
However, to the extent that connection and user fees are being transferred from the
water and sewer accounts to the general fund, through any appropriate process,
however named, for the purpose of paying expenses related to the operation,
maintenance, replacement, and depreciation of existing water and sewer
systems, including only those general City expenses needed to operate the water and
sewer departments, such as HR, financial, legal and accounting, such transfers are
permitted and are not hereby enjoined.

(Memo Decision and Order On Reconsideration, p. 26 (emphasis added)).
The Court summarized its conclusions in a subsequent Order Denying Plaintiff's Request

for Attorney Fees and Costs. First, the City prevailed on whether it was unreasonable or
arbitrary to charge a connection fee when new connections were added to the existing system,
based on an equity buy-in system. (Order Denying Plaintiffs Requests for Attorney Fees and
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Costs, p. 3-4). Second, the City also prevailed on whether the entire user and connection fee
systems needed to be thrown out and a new evaluation performed. (Id). Next, the City prevailed
against the Plaintiff's argument that the connection fees constituted an unconstitutional taking.
Finally, the City prevailed on the issue of whether the connection fees were being impermissibly
used to fund future expansion and capital improvements to the sewer and water systems.
The "Return on Equity" policy, which no longer exists, referred to city-owned public
utilities (i.e. water, sewer) making a transfer to the general fund. Prior to the Court's holding in
Building Contractors Association ofSoutheast Idaho v. City ofPocatello, the City charged the

city-owned public utilities a fee. The general theory behind the implementation of this fee was
that these public utilities are businesses operated by the public that could and do operate in other
communities as for-profit private enterprises. The utilities were treated commensurately with
privately owned utilities. (Affidavit of Joyce Stroschein ("Stroschein Aff."), 1 4).
In prior years, the City described the transfer as a "rate of return" or "return on equity" as
if the taxpayers were the shareholders (which they are). In approximately 2011, the City redescribed the transfer as a Payment-In-Lieu-Of-Taxes ("PILOT"). The phrase "rate of return,"
"return on equity," or "PILOT" are synonymous. This change made the PILOT directly
comparable to private utilities operating in the community. The PILOT was calculated on the
prior year city property tax levy rate multiplied by the estimated market value per the most recent
financial plan prepared by an outside consulting engineer. The rate of return was part of the
annual budget process and the rates were set each year and approved by the City Council.
(Stroschein Aff., 1 5).
The PILOT fee (rate of return) was a payment in lieu of taxes fee charged directly to the
utility. The fee operated like property taxes assessed to and paid by Idaho Power or
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE - 4
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Interrnountain Gas (except the PILOT fee does not include County or school district taxes). The
PILOT fee would most accurately be described as a cost of doing business for both the water and
sewer departments. Both the water and sewer department recovered the PILOT fees through the
fee charged to all users of the water and sewer system. (Stroschein Aff., ,r 6).
The internal franchise fee / Payment in lieu of Taxes (PILOT), as well as the predecessor
"rate of return" or "return on equity," was designed to be a fair and reasonable tax implemented
to keep Pocatello resident's water and sewer fees and related taxes lower and still provide the
necessary water and sewer services.. The City's water and wastewater utility were financially
self-sufficient with funding for capital and operating requirements derived primarily from rates,
which included the PILOT fee. (Stroschein Aff., ,r 7).
Following the Court's decision in Building Contractors, however, the City immediately
discontinued charging the PILOT fee and therefore each of the Pocatello resident users saw an
immediate decrease in their water and sewer utility bills. On December 19, 2013, the City
lowered utility user fees in compliance with the Building Contractors decision. Pocatello
residents saw an approximately 10% decrease in their monthly water and wastewater bills.
(Stroschein Aff., ,r 9).
The focus of the Connection/Capacity fee is on backbone utility infrastructure that serves
all utility customers with a capacity that was purchased and constructed by ratepayers long ago.
The connection/capacity fee has nothing to do with taxes. The capacity fee is intended to
recover a new connector's proportionate share of the City's wastewater and water backbone
facility costs. A new customer must "buy-in" to the existing system by making a contribution
equal to the amount of equity a similar existing customer has in the system. The
connection/capacity fee is not the cost to provide new service to the new customer. Rather, when
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE - 5
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new capacity is needed, all customers will bear the cost proportionately. The
connection/capacity fee is not used for future expansion. (Stroschein Aff., 1 I 0).
The connection/capacity fee is a fee that is a one-time fee charged. to all new connectors
to a system. The connection/capacity fee was phased in during FY2007 after several years of
increasing numbers of new connections. This fee is intended to recover a new connector's
proportionate share of the City's wastewater backbone facility costs. The connection fee is a
contribution equal to the amount of equity a similar existing customer has in the system. The
connection fe_e is to offset the cost for existing users whose capacity will be diminished by the
new users and will, thus, require replacement of existing infrastructure more regularly.
(Stroschein Aff., 1 11 ).
The connection /capacity fee is a policy choice adopted by the City upon
recommendation of a water and wastewater study provided by Red Oak Consulting. The
connection fee was deemed a fair method of ensuring that new users were providing financial
support for the use of the existing infrastructure. Capacity fees are irrelevant if there are no new
connections. They may be immaterial if new connections are infrequent. But when growth is
more rapid, new connectors can rapidly consume existing capacity; restoring it can cause rates to
increase for existing ratepayers with no compensation for the capacity that they paid for.
Industrial users can consume capacity in bulk amounts with little notice. (Stroschein Aff., 1 12).
Following the Court's decision in Building Contractors, the City made no changes to the
connection/capacity fee. The City has never charged a PILOT to the connection/capacity fee and
the two different fees have no relationship. Based on the Building Contractors decision, the
connection/capacity fee was deemed appropriate and the amount was upheld. Because no
PILOT has ever been collected from the connection/capacity fee it was not improperly collected.
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE - 6.
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Because the fee was declared constitutional and the amounts were correct, the City's collection
of the connection/capacity fee should no serve as a source ofrecovery for the PILOT fee.
(Stroschein Aff., 113).
The water and wastewater departments have money held in four different fund groups.
The first fund group is Fund 31 and 32. Funds 31 and 32 are the operating funds. This fund is
comprised entirely of user fees that are collected by the water and wastewater departments,
respectively. Funds 31 and 32 would be the only location for PILOT fees charged to the water
and wastewater departments. The second fund group is Funds 37 and 38. Funds 37 and 38 are
the connection/capacity fees. This fund is comprised entirely of connection/capacity fees that
have been collected by the City. At no point has the City ever deposited any PILOT fee into
Funds 37 or 38, these funds represent the entirety of the connection/capacity funds collected by
the City since its inception in 2007. The third fund group is Funds 60 and 61. Funds 60 and 61
are the debt service funds for the water and wastewater dep~ents. The debt service funds are
reserves that are set aside to meet the annual debt service payments required by the bond
covenants. At no point has the City ever deposited any PILOT fee into Funds 60 and 61. The
final group is Funds 73 and 74. Funds 73 and 74 are the construction funds. These funds are
where all of the proceeds from the bonds are placed for water and wastewater. Money for
bonded projects will be withdrawn from these funds to pay for approved bonded projects. At no
point has the City ever deposited any PILOT fee into Funds 73 and 74. (Stroschein Aff., ,r 14).
Fund 37 holds the connection/capacity fees for the water department. Fund 38 holds the
connection/capacity fees for the wastewater department ("WPC"). Each of the respective funds
contains all of the connection/capacity fees gathered between 2007 and current. Fund 37 and 38
is dedicated to holding only the connection/capacity fees. There are no other funds that are held
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS~ ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE - 7
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here, including PILOT fees. (Stroschein Aff., 1 16).
Consistent with the FY2014 Budget for the City, the City has determined that the
connection/capacity fees will be used for debt service. As such, the City budgeted approximately
$725,826.00 for debt service for the water department in FY2014. The City intends to use the
remaining funds from Fund 37 for debt service in FY2015. The City has budgeted
approximately $1,384,780.00 for debt service for the wastewater department in FY2014. This
will exhaust nearly all of the funds in Fund 38. Both Fund 37 and 38 have scheduled September
payments and will execute as budgeted.
Fund
03 7-3000-520.95-03
038-0000-520.95-03

Budget
$725,826.00
$1,384,780.00

Year to Date Actual
$553,831.24
$237,961.74

Remaining Budget Balance ·
$171,994.76
$1,146,818.26

(Stroschein Aff., 1 18).
At present, the remaining balance will be $171,994.76 for Fund 37 and $1,146,818.26 for
Fund 38. Using this approach, all of the connection/capacity fees can be accounted for and there
has been no funds transferred to the general funds from the connection/capacity fees. As of June
30, 2014, Fund 37 contained $1,057,908.12 and Fund 38 contained $1,285,169.46. These funds
hold all the case ever received since 2007 for all the capacity fees. The only expenditures are the
year to date transfers noted above for related debt service. For FY2015, the water department is
scheduled to draw on their capacity fee cash for debt service substantially as was done in
FY2014. Because virtually all of the cap~ity funds from Fund 38 will be expended in FY2014,
the wastewater department will rely on operating funds for debt service transfers. (Stroschein
Aff., 'if 19).
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B.

The Claimed Source of Recovery Cannot Be Used Because No PILOT Fees Were
Used To Fund Account 37/38.

The singular issue currently before the Court in the Show Cause Hearing is whether the
funds found in Fund 37/38 can be used as a source ofrecovery for claimed indebtedness, which.
the City adamantly disputes. Mr. Olsen has selectively provided this Court with various rulings
in the Building Contractors case that do not accurately reflect the underlying rulings and
conclusions of that Court. As will be described more fully below, Fund 37 and 38 cannot serve
has an appropriate source for any claimed recovery because they contain no PILOT and are
being used consistent with Idaho law. While Plaintiffs contend that the connection/capacity fee
contained a PILOT fee, it is without merit and contrary to the conclusions of the Court in the

Building Contractors case as well as the affidavit of Joyce Stroschein. Rather, the claims
asserted in Mr. Olsen's affidavit are neither accurate nor consistent with the Court's rulings in
the Building Contractors matter. Olsen's contention that City had impennissibly transferred
monies into Funds 37 and 38 that contained a PILOT is inaccurate. (Olsen Aff.,

,,r 3,4,8, and

10).

Mr. Olsen knew or should have known based on the underlying litigation that Funds 37
and 38 never included a PILOT. Mr. Olsen misleads the Court when he suggests that the City
created Funds 37 and 38 as a "reaction to the court's finding ofliability" in the Building
Contractors case. (Olsen Aff., 'if 8). This statement is false and contrary to the affidavits and
holdings submitted in the Building Contractors matter. In an affidavit by Mr. Swindell, the
fonner City Chief Financial Officer, he stated that Funds 37 and 38 were created in March 2013,
prior to any final adjudication in the Building Contractors matter, in an effort to "increase
transparency of how the connection/capacity fees were spent." (3rd Swindell Aff., ,r 8). At the
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time Fund 37 and 38 had been created, no liability had been assessed. In fact, the Court's
subsequent rulings confirmed that the creation of Funds 37 and 38 were not problematic and the
connection fee was constitutional and did not contain the impermissible PILOT fee. As is more
-fully addressed below, the basis Plaintiffs• Application for Pre-Judgment Writ of Attachment is
fundamentally flawed and inconsistent with the actual ruling in the underlying matter.
Ms. Stroschein, as the interim Chief Financial Officer for the City of Pocatello is
-intimately familiar with all of the taxes and fees collected by the City. Specifically, she testifies
that the purpose of the connection/capacity fee is intended to recover a new connector's
proportionate share of the City's wastewater and water backbone facility costs. (Stroschein Aff.,

1, 10-13 ). This fee was specifically implemented to offset the cost for existing users whose
capacity will be diminished by the new users and will, thus, require replacement of existing
infrastructure more regularly. (Id at , 11 ). The capacity fee is not a tax but a one-time fee
charged to new users tapping into the existing infrastructure. (Id). The Court in Building

Contractors carefully analyzed the facts and concluded that the connection fee was not
unreasonable nor was it arbitrarily imposed because it produced sufficient revenut to support the
system at the lowest possible cost as required by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. (Memorandum
Decision on Reconsideration, pp. 23-24). There was no evidence submitted in the Building

Contractors case to suggest that the connection fee contained a PILOT. In fact, the Court
concluded that the PILOT was specifically transferred out of the water and sewer funds.
(Memorandum Decision on Reconsideration, p. 22). Likewise, Ms. Stroschein specifically states
that the connection/capacity has never included a PILOT.
Conversely, the PILOT was created as a substitute property tax and was designed to be a
fair and reasonable tax implemented to keep Pocatello resident's water and sewer fees and
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related taxes lower and still provide the necessary water and sewer services. (Stroschein Aff., 1
7). The PILOT is an on-going monthly charge that was recuperated from the user fees, whereas
the capacity fee was a one-time fee. Thus, the Court's only criticism of the City's com1ection fee
was if it contained a PILOT. As noted, the com1ection fee has never contained a PILOT and
therefore the fee was not unconstitutional and cannot serve as the basis of a recovery here
because the single issue is Plaintifr s attempt to recover PILOT funds. This position was very
clearly articulated by the Court in Building Contractors, "[t]he City connection and user fees are
not arbitrary or unreasonably imposed. The imposition and collection of the connection and
user fees themselves are not unconstitutional acts or a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond
Act." (Memorandum Decision on Reconsideration, p. 26). The Court ordered the City to adjust

the connection and user fees to the extent that they included a PILOT. As attested to by Ms.
Stroschein, the City had no need to adjust the connection/capacity fee because it never contained
a PILOT. (Stroschein Aff., 11 8, 13). The user fee was, however, adjusted down by
approximately 10% to reflect a new user fee that did not include a PILOT. (Id at 1 9).
Lending further support for a denial of Plaintiffs' request for a writ of attachment on
Funds 37 and 38 comes from the Decision on Plaintiff's Application/or Order to Show Cause in
the Building Contractors case. In that Application for Order to Show Cause, the question was
whether the City should be required to reduce the connection/capacity fee because those fees
included a PILOT fee. The Court reviewed virtually the same evidence presented by Plaintiffs
here and concluded that the connection fee did not include a PILOT fee. The Court not only
relied on the City for this assertion but also concluded that a report from an independent study on
water and wastewater fees made "clear that the PILOT fee was not used in calculating the
com1ection fee, and that, in fact, budgetary needs were not considered in calculating the
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE - 11

206

connection fee." (Decision on Shoe Cause Hearing, pp. 4-5). The Building Contractors Court
unambiguously concluded that "reviewing the evidence clearly demonstrates that the PILOT
was only assessed to the user rates. As the City has adjusted the user rates there is no basis for

granting Plaintiffs Application for Order to Show Cause." (Id at p. 5). The question of whether
Funds 37 and 38 include a PILOT fee has already been definitively addressed in the Building
Contractors case and supports the conclusion that Funds 37 and 38 should not be subjected to a
pre-judgment writ of attachment.
Ultimately, for purposes of the present Show Cause hearing, the Court should deny the
Plaintiffs' requested relief because they are improperly attempting to freeze the City's assets
from Funds 37 and 38. As noted, the Plaintiff should be prevented from attempting to tie up the
City's assets that have no PILOT included in it and have been unequivocally declared to be
constitutional. Should the Court allow the Plaintiffs to freeze funds 37 and 38 the Court would
be condoning a collateral attack on issues that have been fully and properly adjudicated by the
Court. The funds held in Fund 37 and 38 do not, and have never, contain any PILOT and cannot
be used as a source of recovery. The City has already budgeted a significant amount of the cash
held in Fund 37 and 38 for the retirement of debt service, including a substantial payment to the
retirement of debt service in September 2014. Using the connection/capacity fees for the
retirement of debt is appropriate and consistent with the Building Contractors case wherein it
held that "connection and user fees must be adjusted to the extent that they include a charge for
the PILOT fee." In this case, no adjustment was necessary because the connection fee does not
contain a PILOT. (Stroschein Aff., , 8, 13). Conversely, the user fee was adjusted down by
approximately 10% because it did contain a PILOT. (Id at , 9). Freezing these assets would be
an unjust and harsh result given that these Funds do not contain any PILOT. Accordi11:gly, the
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Court should deny Plaintiffs' request for a prejudgment writ of attachment on Funds 37 and 38.
The underlying question of whether the City has even engaged in an unconstitutional
taking of fees dating back to 2007 is highly questionable. There has not even been a showing by
'··

Plaintiff, other than unsubstantiated and conclusory statements, that the City is indebted to the
Plaintiffs. There is no foundation in the record to support this claim and the City vehemently
refutes that it engaged in any unconstitutional taking that would subject it to indebtedness to the
Plaintiffs. Without more, the Plaintiffs' request for a Writ of Attachment must fail until
indebtedness has been definitively established.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant City of Pocatello requests that the Court deny
Plaintiffs' request for a Pre-Judgement Writ of Attachment because there has not even been a
showing of indebtedness and the funds Plaintiffs seek to attach do not contain any of the
impermissible PILOT fees. The City should not be precluded from using funds that were
properly collected and used for proper purposes under Idaho law.
Dated this _:;/!aay of August, 2014.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY

HIIlL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK_, on
beh!lif of itself and all others similarly
ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
situated,
!
and,all others similarly situated,

Case No. CV~2014-1520-0C

ORDER SHORTENING TIME

Plaintiff,

v.
'

I

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho

mu1pcipality.
'

Defendant.
. Based upon the Defendant's Motion· to Shorten Time and good cause appearing therefor;
I

'IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time for the hearing required under Idaho Code
§ 39~6~06 be shortened. and that the. hearing on Defendant's Motion to Quash be held on

Septelflher 8, 201.4, at 2:00 p.m.
'
I

'((

DATED this ..L_ day of September, 2014.

:

.

c::::&@7·~
David C. Nye, District Judge

I
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Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Fax: 529·9732
. Naihan M. Olsen, Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
48 5 "E'' Street

Idaho Falls, TD 83402
Fax.: 524~3391
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
HXLL ANGELL STARNES. LLP
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and Delivery
ax
vernight Mail

-CLERK OF THE COURT

~-A1,,,y/
Deputy

OROERS~ORTENING TIME-2

211

/.,.:-:-'"'\:..

l

>

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK
HILL - VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

Case No:CV-2014-0001520-0C
MINUTE ENTRY

vs.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.

THE PARTIES came before the Court on the 8th day of September, 2014 for an
Order to Show Cause Hearing and Motion to Quash Subpoena.

Nathan Olson and

Michael Gaffney appeared in person on behalf of the Plaintiffs. Blake Hall appeared in
person on behalf of the Defendant. Stephanie Morse was the Court Reporter.
At the outset, the Court heard oral argument from the parties on Defendant's
Motion to Quash Subpoena.
Thereafter, the Court GRANTED Defendant's Motion to Quash Subpoena. The
Court then vacated the hearing on the Order to Show Cause to allow Plaintiffs' counsel to
serve a subpoena on Mr. Swindell and reset the hearing on the Order to Show Cause.
The Court also will inquire of Judge Stephen Dunn as to whether he would be

Case No.: CV-2014-0001520-0C
MINUTE ENTRY
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willing to have this case transferred to him since he had the underlying case. The parties
will have until Friday (September 12, 2014) to let the Court know if they would object to
this transfer.
DATED this

Cf

1·~

day of September, 2014.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Jf)-,h day of September, 2014, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the
manner indicated.
·

D U.S. Mail
D E-Mail: gaffney@beardstclair.com

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY, PA
2105 Coronado St
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495

~and Deliver
ax: (208) 529-9732

Nathan M. Olsen
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 E Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

0U.S.Mail
D E-Mail: nolsen@pmholaw.com
~and Deliver
ax: (208) 524-3391

Blake G. Hall
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1075 Utah Ave, Ste 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

D U.S. Mail

ij

DE-Mail: bgh@hasattorneys.com
Hand Deliver
Fax: (208) 621-3008

Deput

I
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
ISBNo.'s 2434, 7012 & 7484

bgh@hasattomeys.com
sla@hasattomeys.com
nrs@hasattomeys.com
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C
ORDER QUASHING SUBPOENA

Plaintiff,

v.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
This matter came before the Court on September 8, 2014 on Defendant's Motion to
Quash the Subpoena issued to David Swindell. The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and
having heard argument from the parties, hereby quashes the subpoena to David Swindell. The
Court's ruling is as follows:
The subpoena of David Swindell is quashed whether issued in an individual capacity or
in an official capacity. In the event the subpoena was served upon Mr. Swindell in his individual

ORDER Q.UASHING SUBPOENA -1

214

capacity, counsel for the City of Pocatello does not have authority to accept the subpoena on Mr.
Swindell' s behalf and therefore, the subpoena must be quashed. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
45(e)(2) requires personal service on the named individual. Personal service on Mr. Swindell
never occurred. Therefore, the Court finds the subpoena on Mr. Swindell in his individual
capacity is defective and therefore quashed.
In the event the subpoena was served upon Mr. Swindell in his official capacity, Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 45(e)(2) permits service of a subpoena on counsel of a party to an action.
Mr. Swindell is no longer employed by the City of Pocatello and lives in another state; therefore,
counsel for the City of Pocatello does not have authority to accept the subpoena on Mr.
Swindell' s behalf, nor does it have the ability to produce Mr. Swindell. Therefore, the subpoena
of David Swindell is quashed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
-1.,C

DATED this ..f!_ day of September, 2014.

~-:a~:z~
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..,..L.hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this ~ a y of September, 2014, by the method indicated below:
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Fax: 529-9732
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 524-3391
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 621-3008
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Mailing
l j Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail
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[ ] Overnight Mail
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Mailing
Hand Delivery
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK
HILL - VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

Case No:CV-2014-0001520-0C
ORDER TRANSFERRING CASE

VS.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
Based on the agreement by the parties,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter be transferred to the Honorable Stephen
S. Dunn for complete resolution.
DATED this

16~

day of October, 2014.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1'1

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1
day of October, 2014, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing docume~n each of the following individuals in the
manner indicated.

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY, PA
2105 Coronado St
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495

D U.S. Mail
D E-Mail: gaffney(cilbeardstclair.com

Nathan M. Olsen
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 E Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

D U.S. Mail
D E-Mail: nolsen@pmholaw.com

Blake G. Hall
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1075 Utah Ave, Ste 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

ij

Hand Deliver
Fax: (208) 529-9732

~ Hand Deliver

.
Fax: (208) 524-3391

0U.S.Mail
D E-Mail: bgh@hasattorneys.com
~ Hand Deliver
Fax: (208) 621-3008

Deputy
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
Register#CV-2014-01520-0C
HILL-VU MOBILE HOM PARK, on behalf of
)
itself and all others similarly situated, ED QUINN, )
on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, )
)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

-vs-

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho municipality,
Defendants.

ORDER FOR SUBMISSION
OF INFORMATION FOR
SCHEDULING ORDER

)
)
)
)
)

This matter has now been transferred to Judge Stephen S. Dunn for resolution.
The trial dates previously scheduled conflict with Judge Dunn's calendar.
Therefore, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within fourteen (14)
days of the date of this Order:
A) The parties, through their counsel (or the parties themselves if self-represented), shall CONFER

and REACH AGREEMENT on each of the issues listed below.

PLAINTIFF'S counsel (or

Plaintiff, if self-represented) shall submit to the Court the AGREED RESPONSE to each issue
listed below.
B) Issues on which the parties must reach an agreement and submit a response:
(1) Whether motions to add new parties or otherwise amend the pleadings are expected.

Case No. CV-2014-01520-0C
ORDER FOR SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION FOR SCHEDULING ORDER
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(2) Whether an unusual amount of time is needed for trial preparation and/or discovery.
(3) The number of trial days required for trial.
(4) Whether there are any other matters the parties agree would be. helpful to a determination of

the case that should be brought to the attention of the Court prior to entering a Scheduling
Order, and what those matters are.
(5) TWO (2) TRIAL DATES, that comply with the requirements listed below. The trial

date for the case will be the earliest date submitted by agreement of the parties. The reason the
Court asks for two trial dates is so that a backup trial date is available and calendared in the
event the first trial date has to be continued by Motion to and Order of the Court. In the event
an Order continuing the trial setting becomes necessary, the additional trial dates avoids the
need to vacate the trial setting for up to a year. Thus, the parties should plan to try the case on
the first date submitted. Therefore, do not submit less than the TWO trial dates.
•

The two dates must be AGREED to by the parties and must identify the specific day upon
which the trial will begin.

•

Each date submitted must be a TUESDAY. [If the Monday of that week is a holiday, the
date submitted must be a WEDNESDAY].

•

Do not submit trial dates for the third week of any month as that is the Court's criminal
trial week.

•

The first agreed trial date must be a specific day no less than six (6) months and no more
than twelve (12) months from the date of this Order.

•

The second agreed trial date must be a specific day no /es$ than twelve (12) months and no

more than fifteen (15) months from the date of this Order.

Case No. CV-2014-01520-0C
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If the parties agree that Wlusual factors may justify a trial setting schedule which varies in
any way from the requirements of this Order, the parties may submit those factors in the

AGREED RESPONSE and the Court will give serious ·consideration to those factors in
setting the trial date. But the parties must still submit two agreed trial dates that comply
with this Order.
C) Upon receipt of the AGREED RESPONSE the Court will issue a scheduling Order setting the

matter for trial on the agreed dates with deadlines for discovery, disclosure of witnesses, etc.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the parties do not file the AGREED RESPONSE
Ordered herein, within the fourteen (14) days of the date of this ORDER, the Court will set this
matter for trial on dates available to the Court and will not approve stipulations to modify the trial
dates set. The submissions requested in the order are deemed by the Court to constitute the
scheduling conference required by IRCP 16(a). However, if either party wishes a more formal
scheduling conference please contact the Court's clerk and one will be scheduled.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED

"'J¥k.: /l )f:)1,/ .

s~District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Cxc

.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
\
· day of
2014, I
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each ofthe following individuals
in the manner indicated.
Michael D. Gaffney
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

(./U.S. Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

Nathan M. Olsen
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen
485 "E'' Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

(/U.S. Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

Blake G. Hall
Sam L. Angell
Hall Angell Starnes
1075 S Utah Ave., Ste 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

&,U.S. Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF B
Register #CV-2014-01520-0C
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similariy situated,
Plaintiffs,
-vs-

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER SETTING JURY TRIAL

)

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendants.

(1)

)
)
)
)

TRIAL DATE. This matter is set for JURY TRIAL on the 4th day of AUGUST, 2015,

AT THE HOUR OF 9:00 A.M., in Courtroom 301, Bannock County Courthouse, Pocatello,
Idaho. The Court also sets a backup trial date on the 5th day of January, 2016, at the hour of9:00
a.m. The backup trial date will only be used in the event a continuance of the trial date first listed is
necessary. A continuance of the trial date shall occur only upon written Motion or Stipulated
Motion to the Court which clearly states the reasons for the requested continuance and which
includes an acknowledgment and agreement signed by each party that certifies that the Motion to
Continue has been discussed with and agreed to by each party. All deadlines listed below shall
apply to the trial setting first listed above. An Order continuing the trial date to the backup trial date
will not alter the deadlines set forth in this Order, except for good cause shown.
(2) PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(b), trial counsel for the parties (or the
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parties if they are self-represented) are ORDERED to meet and/or confer for the purpose of
preparing a joint Pre-Trial Stipulation, which shall be submitted to the Court at least 21 days prior
to Trial, and shall include:
(A) A statement that all exhibits to be offered at trial have been provided to all other
parties and attaching an Exhibit List of all exhibits to be offered at trial by both parties.
The Exhibit List shall indicate: 1) by whom the exhibit is being offered, 2) a brief
description of the exhibit, 3) whether the parties have stipulated to its admission, and if
not, 4) the legal grounds for any objection. If any exhibit includes a summary of other
documents, such as medical expense records, to be offered pursuant to I.R.E. 1006, the
summary shall be attached to the Stipulation.
(B) A statement whether depositions or any discovery responses will be offered in lieu
of live testimony, and a list of what will actually be offered, the manner in which such
evidence will be presented, and the legal grounds for any objection to any such offer.
(C) A list of the names and addresses of all witnesses which each party intends to call
to testif-J at trial, including anticipated rebuttal or impeachment witnesses. Expert
witnesses shall be identified as such. The Stipulation should also identify whether any
witness' testimony-will be objected to in its entirety and the legal grounds therefore.
(D) A brief non-argumentative summary of the factual nature of the case. The purpose
of the summary is to provide an overview of the case for the jury and is to be included
in pre-proof instructions to the jury, unless found inappropriate by the Court.
(E) A statement that counsel have, in good faith, discussed settlement unsuccessfully
and/or completed mediation unsuccessfully, if mediation was ordered by the Court.
(F) A statement that all pre-trial discovery procedures under I.RC.P. 26 to 37 have
been complied \\1th and all discovery responses supplemented as required by the rules
to reflect facts known to the date of the Stipulation.
(G) A statement of all issues of fact and law which remain to be litigated, listing which
party has the burden of proof as to each issue.
(H) A list of any stipulated admissions of fact, which will avoid unnecessary proof.
(I) A list of any orders requested by the parties which will expedite the trial.
(J) A statement as to whether counsel require more than 30 minutes per party for voir
dire or opening statement and, if so, an explanation of the reason more time is needed.

These submissions will be deemed by the Court to constitute the final pre-trial conference
required by IRCP 16(b). However, if either party wishes a more formal pre-trial conference
the same should be requested in writing at least 60 days prior to trial and one will be
scheduled.
(3)

MOTIONS TO ADD NEW PARTIES OR AMEND PLEADINGS shall be filed no later
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than 60 days after the date of this Order.
(4)

DISCOVERY must be served and completely responded to at least 60 days prior to trial.

This includes supplementation of discoveiy responses required by I.R.C.P. 26(e), unless good cause
is shown for late supplementation. Discovery requests must be responded to in a timely way as
required by the I.R.C.P. The deadlines contained in this Order cannot be used as a basis or reason
for failing to timely respond to or supplement properly served discovery, including requests for
disclosure of witnesses and/or trial exhibits. Discovery disputes will not be heard by the Court
without the written certification required by I.R.C.P. 37(a)(2).
(S)

WITNESS DISCLOSURE. Except as previously disclosed in responses to discovery

requests, Plaintiff shall disclose all fact and expert witnesses no later than 140 days before trial.
Defendants shall disclose their fact and expert witnesses no later than 1OS days before trial.
Rebuttal witnesses shall be disclosed no later than 70 days before trial. Expert witnesses shall be
disclosed in the manner and with the specificity required by I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i). Any objection
to the I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) expert witness disclosure must be filed within 45 days of the
disclosure or is deemed waived. Witnesses not disclosed in responses to discoveiy and/or as
required herein will be excluded at trial, unless allowed by the Court in the interest of justice.
(6)

MOTIONS. DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS, and responses thereto, shall comply in all

respects with 1.R.C.P. 56 and be filed no later than 90 days before trial.

ALL OTHER

MOTIONS, including any Motion in Limine, shall be filed and heard by the Court no later than 30

days before trial. The original of all Motions and supporting submissions shall be filed with the
clerk of the cowt. However, fil!£ (1) duplicate Judge's Copy of all Motions, and any opposition
thereto, together with supporting memorandum, affidavits and documents, shall be
submitted directly to the Court's chambers in Bannock County. · All the duplicate copies
,

must be stamped "Judge's Copy" to avoid confusion with the original pleading. All other

pleadings, notices, etc., should be filed with the Clerk without copies to the Court,s chambers.
ORDER SETTING JURY TRIAL
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STIPULATED MODIFICATIONS. The parties may stipulate to the modification of the

discovery, witness disclosure and motion deadlines stated herein only upon submission of a
· stipulation to the Court and a Court Order modifying the deadlines. No order modifying deadlines
will be granted if it would result in a delay in the trial date, without a formal motion to vacate the
trial, and good cause shm~.
(8)

TRI~ BRIEF~. Trial briefs are encouraged but not required. If submitted, trial briefs

should address substantive factual, legal and/or evidentiary issues the parties believe are likely to
arise during the trial, with appropriate citation to authority. Any trial brief should be exchanged
between the parties and submitted to the clerk of the court, and a duplicate Judge's Copy shall be
submitted to the Court's chambers in Bannock County, no later than 10 days prior to trial.
(9)

PRE-MARKED EXHIBITS, AND AN EXHIBIT LIST IN THE FORM ATTACHED

HERETO, shall be exchanged between the parties and filed with the Court no later than 10 days
prior to trial. Each party shall also lodge with the Court at chambers a duplicate completed exhibit
list plus one complete, duplicate marked set of that party's proposed exhibits for the Court's use
during the trial. Unless otherwise ordered, Plaintiff shall identify exhibits beginning with the
number "1" and the Defendant shall identify exhibits beginning with the letter "A.''
(10)

JURY INSTRUCTIONS. Proposed jury instructions and verdict forms requested by any

party shall be prepared in conformity with I.RC.P. 5i(a), except that they shall be filed with the
Court and exchanged between the parties at least 7 days prior to trial. Except for good cause
shown, proposed jury instructions should conform to the pattern Idaho Jury Instructions (IDJI)
approved by the Idaho Supreme Court. In addition to submitting written proposed instructions that
comply with Rule Sl(a), the parties shall also submit both a clean version and a version with cited
authority by e-mail to the Court's Clerk, in Word format, at least 7 days prior to trial. Certain
"stock" instructions need not be submitted. These will typically include IDJI 1.00, 1.01, 1.03,
1.03.1, 1.05, 1.09, 1.11, 1.13/1.13.l, 1.15.l, 1.17, 1.20.1, and 1.24.1. It is requested that the parties
ORDER SETTING JURY TRIAL
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agree on the basic instruction giving the jury a short, plain statement of the claims, per IDJI 1.07.
(11)

MEDIATION. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(k)(4), the parties are ORDERED to mediate this

matter, and the mediation shall comply with I.R.C.P. 16(k). Mediation must be held no later than
45 days prior to trial.
(12)

TRIAL PROCEDURES. A total of four trial days have been reserved for this trial. If the

parties believe that more trial days will be required, the parties are ORDERED to notify the Court
of this request no less than 60 days prior to trial. On the first day of trial, counsel shall report to the
Court's chambers at 8:30 a.m. for a brief status conference. Unless otherwise ordered, or as
modified during trial as necessary, trial days will begin at 9:00 am. and close at or about 5:00 p.m.,
with a one hour break for lunch.

(13)

HE,&R{NGS QR CO!iFERENCES WITH THE COURT. All meetings, conferences,

and/or hearings with the Court shall be scheduled in advance with the Court's Clerk by calling 208236-7250. No hearing shall be noticed without contacting the Clerk.
(14)

AL'fE~ATE_~IlJ!!GES. Notice is hereby given, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)(G), that an

alternate judge may be assigned to pre:side over the trial of this case, if the current presiding judge is
unavailable. The list of potential alternate judges is: 1) Honorable David C. Nye; 2) Honorable
Robert C. Naftz; 3) Honorable Mitchell W. Brown; 4) Honorable Peter D. McDennott; 5)
Honorable \Villiam H. \VoodJand; 6) Honorable Richard T. St. Clair. If the I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)
disqualification has not previously been exercised, failure to disqualify, without cause, any one of
these alternate judges within ten ( I 0) days of the date of this Order shall constitute a waiver of such
right.
DATED this 19th day of December, 2014.

-

s ~
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

\Cf

~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of
• 2014, I
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals
in the manner indicated.
Michael D. Gaffney
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

(,/U.S. Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

Nathan M. Olsen
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen
485 ''E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

(.{U.S. Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

Blake G. Hall
Sam L. Angell
Hall AngelJ Starnes
1075 S Utah Ave., Ste 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

(_,{U.S. Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

DATED this

\9

day of

C:::::Cc
Deputy Clerk
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Michael D. Gaffney
Beard St. Clair Oafthey PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone: (208) 523~5171
Fax: (208) 529~9732
ISBN: 3558
Nathan M. Olsen
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen
485 "E.. Street, Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 5234650
Fax: (208) 524-3391
ISBN: 7373 ·
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
9F THE STAT'.E OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY

HILL-VU MOBILE HO:ME PARK. on behalf
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED
QUINN. on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated,

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C

Plaintiffs.
AFFIDAVIT OF LOGAN RODINSON

vs.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
) ss.
)
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I, Logan Robinson, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the testimony given in this sworn
statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that it is made on my personal
knowledge, and 1hat I would so testify in open court if called upon to do so.
1.

I am the mac.ager and owner "Hill· Vu Mobile Home Park" - one of the plaintiffs in this

action.
2.

Each yeax the Defendant, City of Pocatello (City). passes a resolution setting monthly

water, wastewater and sanita:ry rates for users of the system (User Fees). An example of such
resolution, Resolution 2010-30, is attached as :Exhibit A.
3.

User Fees collected by the City of Pocatello were dep0sited into three separate accoUnts

for water, wastewater and sanitation.
4.

According to public record provided by the City in its discovery responses (attached as

Exhibit B) , from FY 2007 through FY 2014. the City transferred from the water. sewer and
sanitation fund $28,329,230.41 under·the guise of'(PILOT "and "Return on Equity" programs.

In case CV·20I 1-5228-0C, the Idaho Sixth Judicial Court held in a November 15, 2013,
Memorandum pecision and Order that these programs were an unconstitutional disguised tax.
3.

Since 2007, as a resident and owner of several rental units. I have had to pay substantial

amounts of"User Fees" as set by City Resolution. A significantp0rtion of these fees were
improperly transferred to the general fund and improperly taken and used as a disguised tax.
4.

To my knowledge, any person owning property in the City serviced by water, sewer and

sanitation has had to pay User Fees as set forth by City Resolution.
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According to public records provided by the City in discovery, there are on average over

16,000 ''accounts'' for User Fees in the City. (Exhibit B) As is the case with me, up until
December of 2013, a substantial amount of these User Fees paid by users of the system were
improperly transferred from the water. sewer and sanitation funds to the City's general :fund and
improperly taken and used as a disguised tax..

DATED this _L day of

F&-IJ,.,,,,,., . .2015.

(SEAL)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I ani a duly lkiensed attomey in the State ofidaho, with my office i11

Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the~ day of

F:1?.bru.o..r:'{, 2015 I served a true and COITect

copy of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail. with the cottect
postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with ~ule 5(b). I.R.C.P.
Persons Served:

Method of Service:

Blake G. Hall, Esq.
HALL ANOELL & STARNES, LLP
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 1SO
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

(it.mail ( ; hand ( ) fax ( ) email

FAX: (208) 621-3008
EM.AIL:
bm@hruiattorneya,.oom
•,,
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RESOLUTION NO. 2010-

30

A RESOLUTION OF TI-IB CITY OF POCATELLO, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF
IDAHO, REVISJNG SANITARY SEWER.RATES, SYSTEM CAPACITY FEES,
EXCESSIVE STRENGTH CHARGES, AND OTHER SPECIAL CHARGES PREVIOUSLY
SET BY RESOLUTION NO. 2009-33; PROVIDING FOR SUCH RATES AND FEES TO
BE EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 2010, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30,2011.
WHEREAS, Pocatello Municipal Code Section 13.16.180 authorizes sanitary

sewer rates and plant capacity :fees to be set from time to time by Resolution; and,
~REAS. the City Council retained the engineering firm of Red Oak
Consulthig to prepare a rate study to project revenues and costs for 2011 -2015 and to
recommend necessary sanitary sewer rates thereafter; and
WHEREAS, the City Council has detennined that fees and charges for the
sanitary sewer system as previously set by Resolution No: 2009~33 should be revised for

Fiscal Year 2011 in accordance with that study;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE MAYOR AND
COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF POCATELLO THAT SEWER RATES Al\iD FEES FOR
FISCAL 2011 SHALL BB AS FOLLOWS:

NORMAL STRENGTH RATES
Metered facilities

Residential, single family

Residential multi-family, commercial,
and all others
Monthly service oharge, p~ bill
Volume charge pe.r 1,000 gals.

Inside City

$21.50/mo.

$3.30
$2.93

Outside City

$25.75/mo,

$3.95.

_$3.52

Non"meterecl facilities
All users will be billed a flat monthly charge based on tl1e average annual consumption of
the most comparable metered use at the rates listed above. Billings formulti ..family residential and
commercial uses without summer lines will be a flat monthly rate throughout the year derived by
averaging the gallonage charges, as set herein, for water use during the months ofNovembei· through
April of the previous year.
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CHUBBUCK MUNICIPAL SANITARY SEWER SYSTEM
Monthly service charge, per biU
Vohune charge, per 1,000 gals.
Volume charge, per 1,000 gals.

$3.30
$2.93 South of!w86
$2.25 North ofiw86

INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES (abnormal strengths or volumes, multiple meters, meters larger
than 211 or BODs and/or total suspended solids greater than 200 ppm)
Monthly service charge~ pel' bill
Volume charge, per 1,000 gals
BOD charges, per pound
Total kteldahl nitrogen (TKN). per lb.

Suspended solids, per lb.
Total phosphol'Us (P), per lb.

$3.30
$1.79
$0.184
$1.2685 (on amounts greater
than 35 mg/1)
$0.2548
$5.5461 (on amounts greater
than 7mg/1)
$0.10
amounts greater
100 mg/1)

~':i

Fats, oils, grease1 per lb.
Domestic Septage Disposal

$0.0739

Volume charge, per gallon
SYSTEM CAPACITY FEES
ResidentiaVComme1·cial Users
T1·eatment Plant

·$1,110.00
Sl,110,00
$2,220.00
$3,550.00

3/4 11 water connection
111 water connection
1·11211 water connection
2" water connection
Collection System

$1,170.00

3/411 water connection
111 water connection
1 1/2" water connection
211 water connection

$1,170.00
$2,340.00
$3,740.00

Large Industrfal User Capacity Fee (abnonnal strengths or volumes, multiple meters,
meters larger than 211 or BODs or total suspended solids greater than 200 ppm., or TKN greater
than 35 mg/1, or phosphorus gteater than 7 mg/1

$0.07/gpd.
$322.86/lb/day
$415.00/lb/day
$1,805.30/lb/day
$3,736.33/lb/day
$5.84/gpd

Volume
BOD
TSS
TKN
Phosphorus
Collection system

RESOLUTION
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BE ITFURTHBR RESOLVED 1HAT fees apply to O\lm.ers or occupants of land,
buildings, or premises requirjng sap.itary services, which ru.-e either connected to the sanitary sewer
system or would be required to be connected to said system pursuant to Municipal Code §13. I6. 080,
BE lT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT persons who qualify for BaIU1ook County's
Circuit Breaker Exemption List, and own and occupy a single-family residence, shall receive a 30%
reduction on that portion of their utility bill listed as 11Sewer11 or "Sanitru:y Sewer." Upon receipt of the
Circuit Breaker Exemption List from Bannock County, the City Ut~ty Billing Department shall make

the reduction, which shall remain in effect so long as the applicant meets the requirements set forth
herein.

BE 1T FURTHER RESOLVBD THAT the above fees and rates, shall be
effective from October 1, 2010, through September 30, 2011.
RESOLVED this

Jg 'lb.

day of August, 2010.
CITY OF POCATELLO, a municipal
corporation ofldaho
.

;}?P7.

BRIAN C. BLjili,Mayor

AITEST:
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FY 2006
FY 2007
FV2008
FY2009

Return of Equity Transfers

PILOT Transfers

Date

$
$
$

$

FV2010
FV2011

$

FY2012

$

FV2013
FY2014

$

$

$

477,272.00 $
477,272,00 $
479,053.00 $
493,424.00 $

493,424.00
493,424.00
2,458,812.00
2,265,330.00
206,903.99

$
$
$

3,544,000.00
3,544,000.44
3,349,079.00
3,349,079.00
3,349,079.00
3,349,079.00

$
$

Total Transfers by FY

$
$
$
$

$
$

$
$
$

4,021,272.00
4,021,272.44 .
3,828,132.00
3,842,503.00
3,842,503.00
3,842,503.00
2,458,812.00
2,265,330.00
206,903.99

~To.i.~)i\::~;::t? :·?F~{S ::,,:(·:;::,·.-),:,-1;a44;914,99 :.:·:$ =·.:;·::.·(.:;~-.;..::·,:· '::·'.;~.:20;.ils4;316;44 .;;2$ :;.;t,,,·,:.:, i:k2s;a29,2)~A3
Check Total

$

28,329,231.43

Transfers Since 2011°

$

8,773,548.99

_.=

E)(HIBIT B
Prepared by Joyce Stroschein 9/22/14
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MEMORANDUM FOR: City Clede
FROM: David Swh1dell, Chief Financial Office!'

~
~ /

SUBJECT: BCASEI Question #9 (water & sewer users)
DATE: Ju1y30,2010
1. FOR INFORMATION.
2. Purpose. To provide response to BCASEI Question #9 (watel' & sewer users)
3. Discussion.
a. Question, BCASEI question# 9 is: "number of water and sewer users h1 the system
for each of the last seven years. 1'
b. Answer:

1) Report attached. Utility billing produced records for each month billing cycle per the
attached report.
2) Abbreviations:
CB= Circuit Breaker. Residential accounts entitled to 30% reduction by virtue of being
on the county's "circuit breaker,, property tax reduction program for low income households.

CM ::; Commercial accounts

IN= Industrial accounts
MU= Multi-U1ut accounts
SF= Sing!~ Family'accotmts

SWSF = Sewer, Single Family
SWUM= Sev-.ier, unmetered (customers charged for sewer connection even though not·
connected, by vittue of being close enough to a sewer line and voluntarily electing not to co1111ect
(usually waiting tmtil their septic system reach.es end of useful life, then tliey connect vs.
1·ebuilding the septic)).
· WQ = Winter Quarter (conu11ercial sewer accounts that are charged by sewer volume,
which in tum is estimated based on winter water use)
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WATER/SEWER CONNECTIONS
Water Services
Class Codes

Billing Period

CB

CM

August2002
September 2002
Oct:ober 2002
November 2002
December 2002*

608
598
593
584
462

1,198
1,202
1,200
1~05
929

January 2003
February 2003
March2003
Apri12003
May2003
June2003
July2003
August2003
Sept-ember 2003
October 2003
November 2003
December 2003

625
622
619
617
606
603
595
594

1,194
1,198
1,207
1,212
1,215
1,218
1,228
1,219
1,224

592
584
580

Januazy2004
February 2004
March 2004**
April 2004**"'
May2004
June2004
July2004
August 2004
September 2004***

Waste-Water
Connections

MU

§I

Total

Consumption

SWSF SWUM

WO

1,545
1,543
1,541
1,549
1,115

12.196
12,274
12.211
12,040
8,962

15,555-r
15,625
15,553
15,386
11,476

644,769,000
583,972,000
365,265,000
237,042,000
124,122,000

12,227
12,262
12,230
12,201
10,050

83
83
83
82
44

2,670
2,669
2,675
2,667
1,989

1,569

1,219

8
8
8

1,212
1,199

8

1,567
1,575
1,571
1,571
1.570

15,598
15,705
15,660
15,781
15,713
15,566
15,414

333,272,000
155,778,000
195,355,000
195,117,000
200,061,000
454.186.000
646,796,000
..,. 708,891,000
555,779,000
395,132,000
287~450,000
150,469,000

12,149
11,932
12,217
12,,263
12,276
12,283
12,,339
12,340
12,392
12,346
12,348
12,221

76
74

8

11,889
11,884
11,937
11,983
12,167
12,200
12,297
12.271
12,380
12,323
12,191
12,057

15,842
15,262
15,333
15,384

8

1,800
1,550
1,562
1,564
1,564
1,566

79
79
78
79
79
78
76
77
76

2,673
· . 2,681
2,546
2,705
2,719
2,717
2,728
2,722
2,729
2,716
2,720
2,551

649
648
(;i42

1.209
1,211
1,208

8
8
8

1,576
1,578
1,553

11,999
12,032
12,003

15,441
15,477
15,414

154,939,000
144,389,000
152,558,000

12,330
12,331
9,926

74
74
71

2,720
2,724
1,810

15,124
. 15,129
11,807

637

1,221
1,211
1,220
1,230

8
8

1,585

8

1,578
1,574

12,283
12,335
12,385
12,389

15,734 329,505,000
15,760 366,454,000
15,821 499,209,000
15,826·""547,3~6.000

12,410
12,440
12,458
12,509

15
75
75
76

2,742
2.728
- 2,735

15,227
15,243
15,268

2,751.

15,336

611

633
630
625

IN
8
8
8

8
8
8

8
8
8
8

8

8

1,573

15,565

77

Total
14,980
15,014
14,988
14,950
'12,083

0

I

14,8!>"8
14,687 ·
14,840
15,047
15,074
15,078
15,146
15,141
15,199
15,138
15,145
14,848

r~
'~
f
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Water Semces
Class Codes
Billing Period

CB

CM

October 2004*
November 2004
December 2004

487
627
612

960
1,210
1,206

8

666

1,202
1,203
1,212
1,197
1,218
1,225
1,227
1,228
1,238
1,236
1,232
1,231

8

January 2005
February 2005
March2005
April2005

665

662

663

May2005

661

June 2005
July2005
August2005
September 2005
October 2005
November2005
December 2005

656
655

January 2006*
February 2006
March2006
April 2006
May2006
June2006
July2006*
August2006
September 2006
October 2006
November 2006*
December 2006

646
640
637
629
624
450
675
675
672
670

665
441
656
653
645
427
633

829
1,216
1,221
1,226
1,230
1,243
854
1,266
1,276
1,268
854
1,257

IN
8
8

8

8
8
8
8
8

8
8

8
8

8
8
8

8
8
8
8
8

8
8
8
8
8

lY.IU

Waste-Water
Connections .
SF

Total

1,148
1,599
1,596

9,310
12,434
12,337

11,913
15,878
15,759

1,599
1,597
t599
1,594
1,605
1,593
1,606
1,602
1,627
1,608
1,609
1,619
1,348
1,618
1,619
1,622
1,622
1,630
1,357
1,638
1,641
1,647
1,370
1,640

Consumption

SWSF

SVVUM

290,618,000
210,018,000
137,058,000

9,618
12,641
12,633

12,301
12,253
12,267
12,368
12,490
12,580
12,650
12,695
12,764
12,734
12,574
12,493

15,776
131,025,000
15,726
132,759,000
184,819,000
15,748
15,830
184,597,000
15,982
173,967,000
244,353,000
16,062
492,639,000
16,146
16,179 '610,729,000
556,329,000
16,277
369,946,000
16,223
201,485,000
16,052
155,381,000
15,975

12,329
12,627
12,633
12,697
12,719
12,730
12,777
12,789
12,801
12,801
12,789
12,799

9,478
12,383
12,422
12,468
12,644
12,787
9,802
12,908
12,945
12,861
9,728
12,659

102,123,000
12,113
143,208,000
15,900
185,551,000
15,945
197,155,000
15,996
192,956,000
16,174
436,075,000
16,,333
413,987,000
12,462
16,476 / 609,620,000
597,762,000
16,523
345,204,000
16,429
137,388,000
12,387
138,893,000
16,197

9,609
12,791
12,770
12,835
12,867
12,906
9,716
12,968
12,969
12,966
9,751
12,953

WO

Total

41
75
70

2,054
2,747
2,757

11,713
15,463

66

2,565
2,649
2,753
2,742
2,767
2,766
2,768
2,773
2,785
2,780
2,784
2,785

14,960
15,337
15,447
15,500
15,547
15,557
15,608
15,625
15,648
15,642
15,634
15,645

2,156
2,784
2,776
2,783
2,782
2,795
2,187
2,816
2,831
2,824
2,183
2,824

11,803
15,636
15,607
15,680
15,712
15,764
11,942 .
15,847
15,861
15,850
11,971
15,834

61
61
61
61
61
63
63
62
61
61

61

38
61

61

62
63
63

39
63
61

60
37
57

15,460

()

/~
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Water Services
CJass Codes

Billing Period

CB

~

Januacy 2007
February 2007
March2007
April2007
May2007
June2007
July2007
August2007
September 2007
October 2007
November 2007
December 2007

-702
701

l,241

8

1,251

8
8
8
8

January 2008
February 2008
March2008
April2008
May2008
June2008
July2008
August2008
September 2008
October 2008
November 2008*
December 2008

713
711

699
695
696
688
686
683
679

616
675
664

. 710

709
707
706
704
700
696

689
435
665

1N

MU

Waste-Watel."'

Connections

SF

Total

12,574
12,530
12,525
12,694
12,868
12,976
13,029
13,075

16,168
159,126,000
16,137
140,242,000
16,146
164,546,000
16,327
190,215,000
16,515
230,924,000
457,242,000
16,623
594,794,000
16,685
16,732 ..,.. 633,565,000
16,779
522,373,000
16,664
341,965,000
192,224,000
16,565
15,835 129,461,000

1,289
1,291

8
8
8

1,643
1,647
1,657
1,653
1,661
1,669
1,673
1,675

1,297

8

1,684

13,111

1,295
1,283
1,056

8

1,685
1,687
I,591

13,000
12,912
12,516

1,691
1,687
1,692
1,687
1,694
1,695
1,701
1,694
1,689
1,697

12,768
12,719
12,786
12,822
12,988
13,100

1,257
1,277
1,282

1,282

1,277
1,269
1,276
1,287
1,303

1,309
1,318
1,323
1,322
1,318
880
1,296

January 2009*

544

February 2009

708

1,137
1,285

March2009
April2009
May2009

706
704
704

1,301
. 1,317

1,302

8
8

8

8
8

8
8
8
8

8
8
8

8

880

8

1,695

13,150
13,143
13,213
13,103
9,965
12,867

8

1.310

8,821

8
8

1,704

12,910

1,704'
1,706
1,702

12,919
12,910
13,095

8

8

16,457
16,394
16,472
16,513
16,700
16,818
16,881
16,868 ,1
16,928
16,815
12,698
16,531
11,820
16,615
16,639
16,629
16,826

Consumption

SWSF

SWDM

12,910
12,881
12,971 .
12,951
13,022
13,068
13,088

56

13,116

51
58

13,142
13,106
13,116
13,099
13,114
13,091
13,134
13,166

57
57

58
58
57
58

58
56
56

56
57
57

158,282,000
168,880,000
170,374,000
183,928,000
205,794,000
331,836,000
518,138,000
688,525~000
625,955,000
439,202,000
157,911,000
150.631,000

13,.217
l~,259
13,302
13,304
13,286
9,996
13,232

59
59
58
58
36
58

123,856,000
150,455,000
152,599,000
172,725,000
188,865,000

9,082
13,284
13,275
13,286
13,334

57
57
57
59

13,193

51
59
59

55

WO

Total

2,812
2,825
2,849
2,844
2,858
2,863
2,875

15,778
15,763
15,877
15,853
15,.938
15,988
16,021

2,877

16,050

2,888
2,882
2,889
2,884

· 16,088
16,046
16,061
16,039

2,894
2,883
2,876
2,900
2,912
2,909
2,869
2,922
2,920
2,923
2,256
2,927

16,064
16,031
16,067
16,123
16,164
16,185
16,187
16,283
16,282
16,267
12,288
16,217

2,367
2,899
2,933
2,934
2,935.

11,504
16,240
16,265
16,277
16,328

~

\~J

_,...,:-1.,~
{
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Water Services
· Class Codes
Billing Period

June2009
July2009
August2009
September 2009
October 2009
November 2009
December 2009 *
January2010
February 2010
March2010
April2010
May2010
June20IO

CB

CM

699

I.324
1,330
1,332
1,330
1,327
1,321
858

693
690
689

680
673
546

IN
8

8
8
8
8
8
8

725

1,301

8

724
718
717
715
713

1,299
1,303
1,297
1,316
1,317

8
8

8

8
8

Waste-Water
Connections

MU

SF

Total

1,704
1,703
1,702

13,198
13,215
13,232

1,699

13,285

1,701
1,697
1,116
1,686
1,689
1,689
1,690
1,694
1,696

Consumption

SWSF SWUM

WO

To!!!!

13,340
13,365
13,391
13,403
13,351
13,366
10,703

58
59
58

13,201
13,065
10,432

16,933
327,410,000
16,949 317,684,000
16,964 ~ 557,391,000
17,011
510,497,000
16,917 375,767,000
16,764
170,573,000
114,190,000
12,960

2,940
2,942
2,941
2,953
2,939
2,935
1,925

16,338
16,366
16,390
16,415
16,348
16,359
12,683

12,897
12,877
12,901
12,951
13,115
13,204

154,006,000
16,617
16,597 · 144,745,000
149,281,000
16,619
16,663
172,273,000
190,170,000
16,848
16,938
246,730,000

13,334

58
58
58

2,918
2,920
2,920
2,916
2,923
2,926

16,310

13,320
13,328
13,370
13,384
13,396

59
58
58

55

58
59
59

r)

r

··'·

\~~o:,.:1~·r

16,29a
16,306
16344
16,366
16,381

*No data for one Cycle
**No billing data for Cycle 2; incomplete billing data for Cycle 4
***No data for two or more Cycles
r""""'
,,~
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Cit:y of Pocatello Connection & Capaci'ty Fee History
FY

Line

Decription
WATER PUBLIC WORKS
WATER PUBLIC WORKS
WPC PUBLIC WORKS
WPC PUBLIC WORKS

· 031-3000-338.10-00
031-300H-338.15-00 ·
032-3000-338.10--00
032-3000-338.1!$-00
032-3000-338.16-00
WPC PUBLIC WORKS
032-3000-338.17-00
WPC PUBLIC WORKS

Detail

CONNECTIONS
CAPACITY FEE

fY

2003
68,212.75
59,829.00

89,196.33
68,434.00

4,188.70

5,517.78

2004

FY
2005

105,050.44

86,632.00

CONNECTIONS
CAPACITY FEE

,c,

COLLECTION SYSTEM CAPACITY FEE
TREATMENT PU\NT CAP FEE

* Revised capacity fees introduced 3/4-year@ 75% rate; not a full FY
** YTD as of May 31, 2010
Note: City fiscal year runs 1 Oct·- 30 Sep

Ci'ty of Pocatello Building Permit Fee History

001-0000-312.20-00
001-0500-312.20-00
964-0000-312.20-00

PUBLIC SAFETY
PUBLIC SAFETY
PUBLIC SAFETY

BUILDING PERMITS
BUILDING PERMITS

FY

FY

2003

2004

458,909.87

553,270.19

FY
2005
725,299.34

BU!LOlNG PERMITS

Note 1) Building Permits FY03~FY07 accounted for in General Fund 001-0000
Note 2) Building Permits FY08-FY10 accounted for in General Fund, Building Division 001-0500
Note 3) 2% of Building Penn it revenue dedicated to Fund 964 Building Abatement Fund beginning in FY06

/~

""'~

** YTD as of May 31, 2010
Note: City fiscal year runs 1 Oct - 30 Sep
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FY
2006
145,420.38
109,840.00

FY

2006
982,310.98
19,660.14

FY
2007*
118,632.70
266,259.43

FY
2008
148,627.61
320,867.49

354,666.44

56,280.00
1;1.2,455.15

19,105.00
80,687.SO
178,236.00

74,753.00
130,150.00

FY
2007
849,458.12
17,392.69

FY
2009
92,992.03

FY

FY03-FVlO· YTD

2010YTD**

Grand Totals

31,760.52
127,412.00

799,892.76
1,393,940.36

31,052.00
106,720.00

31,871.48
242,772.50
527,561.15

3,060.00

FY

FY

2008

FY

2009

2010\'TD**

1,342,815.36
27,801.75

1,273,443.91
26,058.36

171,927.93

4,786.54

,,-.,,,,,

iu

FY03-FY10 YTO
Grand Totals

3,569,248.50
2,788,187,20
95,699.48

/~.
·";.~~
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City of Pocatello Capacity Fee History (since current structure adopted January 2007)
FY

Line
031-3000-338.15-00
032-3000-338.16-00
032-3000-338.17-00

Decription
WATER PUBLIC WORKS
WPC PUBLIC WORKS
WPC PUBLIC WORKS

Detail
CAPACITY FEE

2007*
266,259.43

FY

2008
320,867.49

FY

FY

2009

2010YTD**
122,212.00

354,666.44

80,687.50
COLLECTION SYSTEM CAPACITY FEE
56,280.00
75,753.00
30,362.00
TREATMENT PLANT CAP FEE
__
1_12....;.,4_s_s_.s_o_ _
__,:,_ _ _ _130,150.00
__,_ _ _ __91,760.00
195,321.00
Totals by FY
434,994.93
596,875.99
560,569.44
244,334.00

* Capacity fees introduced 3/4-year@ 75% rate; not a full
** YTD as of May 15, 2010

FY

Note: City fiscal year runs 1 Oct - 30 Sep

244
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FY07-FY10 YTD
Grand Totals
1,064,005.36
243,082.50
1,3071:087.86
2,614,175.72

>t-

0

/r""'7'l~
"i.
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City of Pocatello Capacity Fee History (since current structure adopted January 2007)
FY

Line -

031-3000-338.15-00
032-3000-338.16-00
032-3000-338.17-00

Decription
WATER PUBLIC WORKS
WPC PUBLIC WORKS
WPC PUBLIC WORKS

Detail

2007*
- 266,259.43

CAPACITY FEE
COLLECTION SYSTEM CAPACllY FEE
TREATMENT PLANT CAP FEE
Tota Is by FY

56,280.00
112,455.50

FY
2008
320,867.49
80,687.50
195,321.00
596,875.99

FY

2009
354,666.44
75,753.00
130,150.00

Ff
2010YTO**
122,212.00
30,362.00
91,760.00

-----------------------434,994.93
560,569.44
244,334.00

* Capacity fees introduced 3/4-year@ 75% rate; not a full FY
** YTD as of May 15, 2010
Note: City fiscal year runs 1 Oct - 30 Sep

C)
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No: 3558
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: ga:ffney_@beardstclair.com
Nathan M. Olsen, ISB No. 7373
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: CV-2014-1520-0C

vs.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF CLASS CERTIFICATION

Defendant.
Plaintiffs through counsel of record provide the following Memorandum in
Support of Class Certification. This memorandum is supported by the pleadings and the
affidavits of Ed Quinn and Logan Robinson contemporaneously filed herewith.
Additionally, this motion is supported by the -applicable findings of fact and law
contained in its November 15, 2013, "Memorandum Decision" in State of Idaho, Sixth

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CLASS CERTIFICATION 1 247

.,

C·/)·

,,

"i,

-..•

Judicial District Court for Bannock Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C, (2011 Decision) of
which this Court may take judicial notice.

FACTS
I.

Procedural Background

1. Each year the Defendant, City of Pocatello (City), passes a resolution setting
water and sewer connection fees or "System Capacity Fees" (Capacity Fees) which are
paid along with permit fees for new construction. (Ed Quinn Aff. rr 2.) This yearly
resolution also sets monthly water, wastewater and sanitary rates for users of the system
(User Fees). (Logan RobinsonAff. rr 2.)(2011 Dec. p. 13) Capacity Fees and User Fees
haye been deposited in unsegregated accounts for water, sewer and sanitation
respectively. (Id. rr 3.) In March of 2013, the City established a separate account to
deposit the Capacity Fees (for water and sewer respectively). (2011 Decision p.
12)(QuinnAff. rr 3.)
2. Around 2005, the City initiated a policy with regard to the Capacity and User
Fees titled under various names, including "Return on Equity," "Rate of Return,"
"Franchise Fee," and "Payment in Lieu of Taxes" hereafter collectively referred to as
"PILOT." (Idaho Dec. pp. 21-22.)
3. In late 2006, then City Mayor Chase requested an opinion from the Attorney
General for the State ofldaho (IAG) on the legality of the PILOT policy. (Id. p. 13) In an
opinion dated February 6, 2007, the IAG told the City that the policy did not comply with
law, setting forth the statutes and case law supporting such opinion. (Id.) The City
disregarded the opinion and continued with the PILOT policy. (Id. generally)
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4. The Building Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho (BCASEI) filed an
action in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for
Bannock County (Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C) (Idaho Case) challenging the legality of
the City's Capacity Fee and User Fee policies, and seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. (Id.)
5. In a November 15, 2013, Memorandum Decision and Order the Idaho Court held
that the City's PILOT programs, or any other program with a similar intent are
unconstitutional and a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. (Id. pp,,25-36)
7. According to public record, from FY 2007 through FY 2014, the City transferred
from the water, sewer and sanitation fund $28,329,230.41 under the guise of "PILOT
"and "Return on Equity" programs. (Quinn, Robinson Aff.
II.

II

4, Ex. B.)

Class A - Capacity Fee Payers.

1. Since 2007, as a builder, plaintiff Ed Quinn (Quinn) has had to pay Capacity Fees

for new construction in the City as set by City Resolution. (Quinn Aff. II 2) Up until at
least March of 2013, these fees were improperly transferred to the general fund and
improperly taken and used as a disguised tax. (See infra Facts Sec. I.)
2. Any person obtaining a building permit for new construction has to pay Capacity
Fees as set forth by City Resolution. (Quinn Aff. rr 4.)
3. According to a table found in the City's "Comprehensive Annual Financial
Report" for FY 2013, there were 1,374 permits obtained for new construction from 2007
through 2013. (Id. II 5, Ex. C.) As is the case with Quinn, up until March of 2013, the
Capacity Fees paid by these other builders were transferred from the water and sewer to
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the City's general fund and improperly taken and used as a disguised tax. (See infra Facts
Sec.I.)

III.

Class B

1.

Since 2007, as a resident and owner of several rental units, plaintiff Hill-Vu

WN

User Fee Payers

Mobile Home P.ark (Hill Vu) has had to pay substantial amounts of"User Fees" as set by
City Resolution. (See infra Facts Sec. I.) A significant portion of these fees were
improperly transferred to the general fund and improperly taken and used as a disguised
tax. (Id.)
2. Any person owning property in the City serviced by water, sewer and sanitation
has had to pay User Fees as set forth by City Resolution. (Robinson Aff. rr 4)
3. According to public records, there are on average over 16,000 "accounts" for User
Fees in the City. (Id. Ex. B) As is the case with Hill-Vu, up until December of 2013, a
substantial amount of these User Fees paid by users of the system were improperly
transferred from the water, sewer and sanitation funds to the City's general fund and
improperly taken and used as a disguised tax. (See infra Facts Sec. I.)

ARGUMENT
I.

LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING CLASS CERTIFICATION
a. Rule 23's General Requirements for Class Certification
.There are few Idaho state law cases interpreting Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

Those few cases are addressed herein; however, Idaho's rule is congruent with the
federal rule pertaining to class action lawsuits. The Idaho Supreme Court has written
that when asked to interpret a state rule, if the rule's federal counterpart is identical it
will "look to rulings on the scope of the federal rule for additional in interpreting the
Idaho rule. Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328,334,612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (1980)."
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Martin v. Hoblit, 987 P.2d 284, 288 n.3 (Idaho 1999). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure

23(a) is substantively identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). 1
Under Rule 23 there is also an implied requirement that membership in each
Class is ascertainable based on objective criteria. -In the Ninth Circuit, it is enough that
the class definition provides a description of the product purchased and the dates of
purchase. Werdebaugh v. Blue Diamond Growers, No. 12-CV-2724-LHK, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 71575, at *28-29 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2014) (citing McCrary v. The
Elations Co., LLC, No. 13-00242, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8443, at *25 (C.D. Cal. Jan.

13, 2014)) and Guido v. L 'Orea!, USA, Inc., No. CV 11-1067, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
94031, at *53 (C.D. Cal. July l, 2013).
The party seeking class certification bears the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that each of Rule 23's requirements is satisfied.
Armstrong, 298 F.R.D. at 485 (quoting Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551: "Rule 23 grants

courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage.").
See also Amgen v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184; 1194-95 (2013).

Instead, "[m]erits questions may be considered to the extent - but only to the extent that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class
certification are satisfied." Id at 1195.
b. Plaintiffs' Claims Satisfy Rule 23's Policy Considerations

Courts frequently consider the policy considerations underlying Rule 23 when
determining whether a proposed class meets the Rule's requirements. Amchem Prods,
1

There is a wording difference in the rules that does not affect the substantive meaning of the rules. The
Idaho Rule provides that one or more member of a class may sue or be sued on "behalf of all only if ..."
whereas the federal rule states that one or more member of a class may sue or be sued on "behalf of all
members only if. ; .." The inclusion of the word "members" is a wording difference that has no
substantive impact on whether the rules are materially identical.
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Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,617 (1997). The Supreme Court has clarified: "[t]he
policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that
small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action
prosecuting his or her rights." Id (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338,
344 (7th Cir. 1997)). "[W]hen what is small is not the aggregate but the individual claim,
[] that's the type of case in which class action treatment is most needful .... A class
action, like litigation in general, has a deterrent as well as a compensatory objective."
Hughes v. Kore ofInd Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672,677 (7th Cir. 2013) (Posner, J.). Class
actions serve the important function of permitting plaintiffs to vindicate the rights of
individuals and pursue small claims that would be infeasible to pursue individually.
Deposit. Guar. Nat'! Bankv. Roper, 445 U.S. 326,338 (1980).
Moreover, class actions play a particularly important role in the enforcement of
the antitrust laws. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,344 (1979); Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251,266 (1972). Class actions "permit the plaintiffs
to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually" and ensure that
plaintiffs have a right to redress wrongs that would otherwise "have no realistic day in
court if a class action were not available." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,
809 (1985); see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617.
Lastly, class certification will reduce the risk of inconsistent adjudications while
saving "the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially
affecting every [class member] to be litigated in an economical fashion." Gen. Tel. Co.
ofthe Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982)(citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442
U.S. 682, 701 (1979)).
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Plaintiffs' motion satisfies the requirements and policy considerations underlying
Rule 23 and the Proposed Classes should be certified.
II.

THE PROPOSED CLASSES SATISFY THE RULE 23(A)
REQUIREMENTS
"Under Rule 23 (a), the Plaintiffs must show that: (1) the class is so numerous that

joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class." K. w· v. Armstrong, 298 F.R.D. 479,485 (D. Idaho
2014) (Winmill, J.); see also United Steel, Paper & Forestry v. ConocoPhillips, 593 F.3d
802, 806 (9th Cir. 2010). "These four requirements of Rule 23(a) are designed to 'ensure
that the named plaintiffs are appropriate representatives of the class whose claims they
wish to litigate."' Armstrong, 298 F.R.D. at 485 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011)).
In many respects, this case is similar to a recent US Court of Federal Claims
decision Starr International Company, Inc. v. US and American International Group,

Inc., No. 11-779C, March 11, 2014. This decision provides a concise statement of the
prerequisites under Rule 23 for class certification that should be very helpful to the Court
as it reviews this issue, and a complete copy of the opinion is therefore attached and
incorporated herein for the Court's convenience.
The Court of Claims in Starr International Company, Inc. certified two classes
consisting of two types of stockholders of American International Group (AIG). Id. pp.
3-4. The first class identified as the ''Credit Agreement Class" consisted of those who
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held AIG stock before September 16, 2008, (with certain exclusions.) Id. The second
class identified as the "Stock Split Class" consisted ofthose·who held AIG common
stock on June 30, 2009 (with certain exclusions.) Id. The essence of the Plaintiffs'
claims were that ( 1) the "imposition" of a "Credit Agreement" on September 22, 2008 by
which the Government obtained a 79.9% equity in AIG and (2) "the reverse stock split
on June 30, 2009 by which shareholders were denied a separate vote, the Goverrunent
effected a taking or ·illegal exaction of the property of shareholders in violation of the
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution." Id. p. 2.
The Court then conducted an analysis of each of the Rule 23(a) criteria, i.e.
numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, and superiority, to detennine that class
action certification was appropriate for each of the two classes.2 With regard to
"commonality" the Court held that "here, the claims of the members within each putative
class are based on the same exact government· action, either the Credit Agreement or the
reverse stock split" therefore resulting in a "unifying nexus" of the claims. Id. p. 4. The
Court held Plaintiffs claim consisted of the same "factual and legal predicates, and
therefore "share(d) the same characteristics as the claim" of the respective classes,"
meeting the "typicality" requirement. Id. pp. 6-7. The Court also held that the adequacy
requirement was met finding that the "class members do not have interests that are
antagonistic to one another." Id. p. 7. The Court indicated that the class members were
"aligned because all plaintiffs would assert the same legal claim, a taking in
contravention of the Fifth Amendment, arising out of the same government actions." Id.
p. 7. Of further note, the Court rejected the defendants claim that there was "conflict"

2

"The "numerosity" requirement was not challenged by the defendants.
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because of variations in the potential benefits to the respective class members, holding
that "the mere fact that some members within one class may stand to benefit more from
their shareholdings in another class does not create a conflict within the individual
classes." Id. p. 8. Finality with regard to the "superiority" requirement, pursuant to Rule
23(b)(3), the Court weighed "any potential problems with the manageability or fairness
of a class action against the benefits to the system and the individual members likely to
be derived from maintain such an action." Id. p. 8. The Court held that the "cost/benefit
analysis tips decidedly in factor of class certification" in that it "will achieve economies ·
of scale in time, effort and expense." Id. p. 8.
This Court really need look no further than the analysis and authority provided in
Starr International to grant certification in this case. As in Starr International, this case
involves two classes, i.e. connection fee and user fee payers, that were both affected by
the same governmental action, the use of fees out for the so-called impermissible PILOT
program. Both classes have the same legal claim, that such action constitutes a taking in
contravention of the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution. Their interests are
aligned, notwithstanding the fact that some user or connection fee payers would benefit
more than others (i.e. depending on how large of a fee they paid.) Finally, a class
certification in this case would be a much more "superior'' or efficient manner in which
to pursue these claims - in that it would prevent the numerous potential litigants in the
case from having to obtain counsel and inundate the system with hundreds if not
thousands of separate lawsuits.
Nevertheless, a detailed analysis and authority for each one of Rule 23 criteria as
applied to the facts in this case is provided below.
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a. Class Members are Sufficiently Numerous

Rule 23(a)(l) requires that the Proposed Classes be "so numerous thatjoinder of
all members is impractical."3 Here, the class could consist of no less than 1,374
individual connection fee payers (representing the number of permits obtained from 2007
through2012), and no less than 16,000 user payers during that same period. Under the
circumstances, numerosity is presumed and Plaintiffs do not expect Defendants to contest
thatjoinder of hundreds of plaintiffs would be impracticable.4 "The difficulty in joining
as few as 40 class members should raise the presumption that joinder is impracticable,
and the plaintiff whose class is that large or larger should meet the test of Rule 23(a)(l)
on that fact alone." Rafus v. Aspen Realty, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 652, 655 (D. Idaho 2006)
("Bafus"), quoting 1 Newberg on Class Actions,§ 3:5 (4th Ed. 2004).

The implied requirement of ascertainability is also satisfied because the Class is
objectively defined and its members are readily identifiable from Defendants' own
records. See CRT, 2013 WL 5391159 at *2 (noting that a "class definition must also be
precise, objective, and presently ascertainable, meaning that it must be administratively
feasible for the court to determine whether an individual is a member of the class"); Ries
v. Arizona Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 535-36 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

Plaintiffs easily meet the numerosity requirement for class certification.

3

This standard only requires a showing that joinder of all claims would be difficult or inconvenient, not
impossible. Arnone v. Aveiro, 226 F.R.D. 677, 683 (D. Haw. 2005); see also 7A Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1762 (3d ed. 2005) ("'[I]mpracticable' does not mean
'impossible.' The representatives only need to show that it is extremely difficult or inconvenient to join
all the members of the class."').

4

"[N]umerosity is presumed where the plaintiff class contains forty or more members." Redwen v. Sino
Clean Energy, Inc., No. CV 11-3936, 2013 U.S. Dist LEXIS 100275, at *11 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2013);
see also Arnone, 226 F.R.D. at 684 (Generally, a class satisfies numerosity if it is likely to exceed forty
members); Breeden v. Benchmark Lending Grp., Inc., 229 F.R.D. 623, 628-29 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (internal
citations omitted) ("a survey ofrepresentative cases indicates that, generally speaking, classes consisting
of more than 75 members usually satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 23 (a)( I).").
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b. Common questions of law and fact exist in each class

Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there are questions oflaw or fact common to the
Proposed Classes, and, for purposes of this Rule, "even a single question will do."

Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (internal punctuation omitted); Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor
Co., 666 F.3d 581,589 (9th Cir. 2012) ("commonality only requires a single significant
question of law or fact."). "A class action satisfies the commonality requirement when
it has 'the capacity ... to generate common answers' to common questions of law or
fact that are 'apt to drive the resolution of the litigation."' Armstrong, 298 F.R.D. at 486
(quoting Mazza, 666 F.3d at 588). This "common contention, moreover, must be of
such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution - which means that determination
of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the
claims in one stroke." Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2551. Commonality requires the
identification of a common contention, one "of such a nature that it is capable of
classwide resolution - which means that determination of its truth or falsity will
resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke."

Wal- Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) "A class action
satisfies the commonality requirement when it has "'the capacity . . . to generate
common answers to common questions oflaw or fact that are 'apt to drive the
resolution of the litigation."' K. W. ex rel. D. W. v. Armstrong, 298 F.R.D. 479,486 (D.
Idaho 2014), quoting Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581,588 (9th Cir.
2012). "[W]hether class members could actually prevail on the merits of their claims"
is not a proper inquiry in determining the preliminary question ''whether common
questions exist." Stockwell v. City and County ofSan Francisco, 749 F.3d 1107, 1111

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CLASS CERTIFICATION 11 257

0

a

(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 983, n.8 (9th
Cir. 2011)).
In this case, the common questions of law and fact for each of the Proposed
Classes that will be determined on a class wide basis include but is not limited to:
Whether user and connection fees (respectively) transferred to the general fund
under the improper and illegal "PILOT" programs constitute a taking for which the fee
payers are entitled compensation.
At summary judgment and trial, Plaintiffs will demonstrate that in fact user and
connection fees collected and comingled into the same account were impermissibly
transferred into the general revenue account as a disguised tax. Plaintiffs will further
demonstrate that under Idaho precedent, these disguised taxes do constitute an improper
talcing of property under the Idaho and US Constitution and/or constitute unjust
enrichment for which the Plaintiffs are entitled compensation. All of the Plaintiffs (in
the respective classes) will share the same factual and legal bases. "Commonality is
satisfied by 'the existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates' or a
'common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class."'

Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d at 1011, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 1998).
Furthermore, "variation among class members in their motivation for purchasing
the product, the factual circumstances behind their purchase, or the price that they paid
does not defeat the relatively 'minimal' showing required to establish commonality."

Ries v. Arizona Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 537 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing
Hanlon, F.3d at 1020). Accordingly, "[w]here the circumstances of each particular
class member vary but retain a common core of factual or legal issues with the rest of
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the class, commonality exists." Evon v. Law Offices ofSidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015,
1029 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Parsons v. Ryan,
754 F.3d 657,675 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, even though class members may have paid
different amounts for the user and connection fees does not in itself defeat class
certification.
Accordingly, the Proposed Classes satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)'s commonality
requirement.

c. Plaintiffs have claims typical of the classes
Rule 23(a)(3) requires that "the claims or defenses of the representative parties"
be "typical of the claims or defenses of the class." The test of typicality is "whether
other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct
which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members· have been
injured by the same course of conduct." Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 685 (9th Cir.
2014), quoting Hanan v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir.1992).
"Under the rule's permissive standards, representative claims are 'typical' if they are
reasonably coextensive with those of absent class members; they need not be
substantially identical." Id., quoting Hanl.on, 150 F.3d at 1020; see also KW. ex rel.

D. W., 298 F.R.D. at 487.
'"Typicality refers to the nature of the claim ... of the class representative, and
not to the specific facts from which it arose or the relief sought."' Ellis, 657 F.3d at 984.
"Some degree of individuality is to be expected in all cases, but that specificity does not
necessarily defeat typicality." Cifuentes v. Red Robin Int'!, No. C-11-5635-EMC, 2012
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WL 693930, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Lozano v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 734 (9th Cir. 2007).
Furthermore, plaintiffs' claims are "typical" even if they are not "identical."

Armstrong, 298 F.R.D. at 487; Thomas & Thomas Rodmakers, Inc. v. Newport
Adhesives & Composites Inc., 209 F.R.D. 159, 164 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (Differences as to
"the various products purchased and the ... amount of damage sustained by individual
plaintiffs do not negate a finding of typicality, provided the cause of action arises from
a common wrong.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also In re

TFT-LCD I, 267 F.R.D. at 593-94.
As outlined in their respective affidavits, each named class representative was
typical of their respective class, i.e. Ed Quinn as a developer and "connection fee"
payer, and Logan Robinson as a user fee payer. Further, each of these individuals
suffered injury, an improper taking of their property as a result of the Defendant's
conduct.
Thus, both named class representatives and unnamed dass members allege a
common course of unlawful conduct by Defendant directed at all class members arising
from the same legal conspiracy, and based on the identical legal theories. Typicality is
satisfied if the class representative's claims arise from the same course of conduct and
are based on the same legal theory as the other class members' claims." Shoshone-

Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation v. Norton, No. CV-02-009, 2005 WL
2387595, at *2 (D. Idaho Sept. 28, 2005). Accordingly, Rule 23(a)(3)'s typicality
requirement is met.
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d. Plaintiffs and Counsel will adequately represent the class.

Rule 23(a)(4) requires a detennination that the class representative "fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). "To determine
whether the representation meets this standard, we ask two questions: (1) do the
representative plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class
members; and (2) will the representative plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the
action vigorously on behalf of the class?" Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 957 (9th
Cir. 2003).
To satisfy the first requirement "a class representative must not be antagonistic
or have conflicts of interest with other potential class members." Farms v. Calcot, Ltd.,
No. CV-F-07- 0464, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93548, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2010)

(citingAmchem, 521 U.S. at 626). If only one of each of the Proposed Classes'
representatives is adequate, the adequacy of representation is met. Rodriguez v. West

Publ'g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 961 (9th Cir. 2009) ("'[T]he adequacy-of-representation
requirement is satisfied as long as one of the class representatives is an adequate class
representative."') (quoting Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund

v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1162 n.2 (9th Cir.
2001)); see also 1A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure§
1765, at 326 (2005) ("[I]fthere is more than one named representative, it is not
necessary that all the representatives meet the Rule 23(a)(4) standard; as long as one of
the representatives is adequate, the requirement will be met.").
_In this case, the Proposed Classes consist of connection fee and user fee payers
like the Plaintiffs, who were damaged as a consequence of Defendants' wrongful
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conduct. Plaintiffs are all similarly situated and there is no conflict between the
interests of the Proposed Classes and the Plaintiffs. See In re Tableware Antitrust

Litig., 241 F.R.D. 644,649 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("[m]embers of the class were allegedly
overcharged for tableware and have a mutual and coterminous interest in establishing
defendants' liability and recovering damages.").
Under the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4), a class representative must have some
commitment to the case and therefore some minimal knowledge of the case. See, e.g.,

Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc.,
244 F.3d 1152,
1162 (9th Cir. 2001) (A plaintiff must "understand [her] duties and [be]
currently willing and able to perform them. The Rule does not require more.").
However, this is not a high bar. Id Each class representative has more than adequately
represented the interests of the class throughout the course of this litigation, having
conferred with counsel, produced documentation, and propounded discovery. In re

TFT-LCD I, 267 F.R.D. at 595 (Adequacy established where ''the plaintiffs have
searched for products and documents, provided answers to written discovery, given
deposition testimony, and followed the progress of this litigation through
communication with counsel, and have demonstrated their ability to serve as class
representatives."); Garciav. Gordon Trucking, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-0324, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 160052, at *13-14 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2012) (Court found adequacy of
representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) met by four named plaintiffs who acted
vigorously to prosecute action "by providing information and documentation,
responding to written discovery requests ... , and by providing deposition testimony.").
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See also In re Micron Techs. Sec. Litig., 247 F.R.D. 627,632 (D. Idaho 2007) (class

representatives adequate where they showed understanding of the litigation and
received updates about the case.) The class representatives meet the adequacy standard
under Rule 23(a)(4).
The second component of Rule 23(a)(4) addresses the adequacy of counsel. "In
addition, class counsel must be qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the
class action litigation." Farms, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93548, at *12 (citingAmchem,
521 U.S. 626). "The competency of counsel is relevant to whether the class
representative and her counsel will vigorously prosecute the action." Nguyen v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 275 F.R.D. 596, 602

(C.D. Cal. 2011). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g) provides guidance on the appointment
and adequacy of class co·unsel. Farms, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93548, at* 12. "In
determining adequacy of proposed class counsel, a court must consider (i) the work
counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; (ii)
counsel's experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types
of claims asserted in the action; (iii) counsel's knowledge of the applicable law; and (iv)
the resources that counsel will co~it to representing the class."' Marilley v. Bonham,
No. C-11-02418, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33678, at *23-24 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(l)(A)). In addition, the Court may consider "any other
matter pertinent to counsel's ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of
the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(l)(C)(ii); see also In re Cree Inc. Sec. Litig., 219
F.R.D. 369,373 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (designating a firm as lead counsel after finding that
the firm had "extensive experience" with the particular area of litigation (class actions)
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and that "the firm ha[d] sufficient resources to prosecute this action in a thorough and
expeditious manner.").
Here Plaintiffs are represented by two attorneys, from two distinguished firms,
each bringing a particular skill set and/or knowledge of the issue to the table. Mr. Olsen
of Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen is particularly familiar with the facts and issues of this
case, having represented the Plaintiff Building Contractors of Southeast Idaho in the 2011
Idaho Case. Mr. Gaffney, of Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA, provides his substantial and
experience. Mr. Gaffney has for the past thirty years acted as lead counsel on over
hundred civil matters that have gone to trial in both state and federal court. He also has
experience in class action suits. He is currently acting as co-lead counsel representing
Potandon Produce L.L. C., one of twenty five defendants named in Case 4: 1O-md-02186BLW In Re: Fresh and ·Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation pending in the U.S. District
Court for Idaho. This case is the largest agricultural antitrust class action filed in the
State ofldaho and one of the largest filed nationally. The case also comprises two
plaintiffs' classes of potato purchasers nationwide and one opt-out plaintiff. Beard St.
Clair Gaffney PA consists of eighteen attorneys, is one_ of the largest Idaho based firms,
and has a wealth of experience and resources from which the Plaintiffs can draw from to
support the classes.
As such, Plaintiffs' counsel have satisfied the elements of Rule 23(g) and have
clearly "done substantial work in identifying and pursuing Plaintiffs' claims, and ha[ve]
demonstrated knowledge of the applicable law and ability to commit sufficient
resources to represent the class." Marilley, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33678, at *23-24.
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THE PROPOSED CLASS SASTISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS OF
RULE23(b)

Plaintiffs must additionally demonstrate that this action can be maintained under
only one of the subsections of Rule 23(b). Id As to theifproposed Injunction Class,
Plaintiffs must demonstrate satisfaction of Rule 23(b)(2)'s general applicability
requirement to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief. Rule 23(b)(2) requires that the
putative injunctive relief is generally applicable and "appropriate respecting the class as a
whole." Fed. R. Civ. P 23(b)(2). As to their proposed Monetary Relief Classes,
Plaintiffs must meet predominance and superiority requirements under Rule 23(b)(3).
Rule 23(b)(3) "requires that (i) common questions oflaw or fact predominate
(predominance), and (ii) the class action is the superior method for adjudication
(superiority)." Id
Here, at the very least, a class action in this case involve common questions of law
or fact and would be· a far more superior method for adjudication of such claims,
therefore qualifying under Rule 23(b)(3). Without a class action, the Court faces the
possibility of hundreds if not thousands of individual lawsuits filed by connection
and/or fee payers respectively. This would not only be unnecessarily costly to the
potential plaintiffs, each of which would have to retain counsel and pay filing fees, but
it would also inundate the legal system. Such a massive burden on the potential
plaintiffs and the courts is avoided by the pursuit of this class action.
IV.

THE COURT SHOULD APPOINT CLASS COUNSEL

As noted supra, Plaintiffs have been ably represented by counsel who have
devoted considerable time and resources to prosecuting this action vigorously since its
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inception. The firms have overseen the briefing and argument of motions. They are
prepared to serve,

d should be appointed, as counsel to the Classes.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY

HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED
QUINNr on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated,

Case No. CV·2014-1520-0C

Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF ED QUINN

vs.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO

)

) ss.
County of Bonneville

)
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I, Ed Quinn, do· solemnly swear (or affinn) that the testimony given in this sworn
statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that it is made on my personal
knowledge, and that I would so testify in open court if called upon to do so.
1.

I am one of the plaintiffs in this action.

2.

Each year the Defendant, City of Pocatello (City), passes a resolution setting water and

sewer connection fees or "System Capacity Fees" which are paid along with pennit fees for new
construction. An example of such resolution, Resolution 2010-30, is attached as Exhibit A.
3.

Up until March of 2013, System Capacity Fees collected by the City of Pocatello were

deposited into two separate accounts for water and wastewater.
4:

According to public record provided by the City in its discovery responses (attached as

Exhibit B) , from FY 2007 through FY 2014, the City transferred from the water, sewer and
sanitation fund $28,329,230.41 under the guise of"PILOT ..and "Return on Equity" programs.
In case CV-2011-5228-0C, the Idaho Sixth Judicial Court held in a November 15, 2013,

Memorandum. Decision and Order that these programs were an unconstitutional-disguised tax.
3.

Since 2007, as a builder, I have had to pay Capacity Fees for new construction in the City

as set by City Resolution.. These fees were improperly transferred to the general fund and
improperly taken and used as a disguised tax.
4.

To myknowledge, any person obtaining a building permit for new construction has had

to pay Capacity Fees as set forth by City Resolution.
5.

According to a table found in the City's "Comprehensive Annual Financial Report" for

FY 2013, there were 1,374 pennits obtained for new construction from 2007 through 2013
AFFIDAVIT OF ED QUINN.-Page 2
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{attadl1;:d as Exhibit C). As is the case with me,

__.,·'

up until March of 2013 the Capacity Fees paid
1

by these other builders were transfelTed ftom the water and sewer to the City's geJ;J.eml fund and

improperly taken tmd used as a disguised tax.

DATED this

.J.~day ofFebrum:y, 201S.

SUBSCR1BED AND SWORN to be:tbre me this

/sf'~y ofFebruary, 2015.

Notary Public fot.Si,,te,~;, Jdaho
Residing at: -roe"'"" I ,

My Commis-sion~&-pln!-.
-,-:,?..,_/-,...,T,"""Z-U@_....,.....,__
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
· - I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, with my office in
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on theJ3c1ay of February, 2014 I served ~ true and correct copy·of the
foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule S(b), I.R.C.P.
Persons Served:

Method of Service:

Blake G. Hall, Esq.

(0m,ail ( ) hand ( ) fax ( ) email

HALL ANGELL& STARNES, LLP
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
FAX: (208) 621-3008
EMAIL: bgh@hasattomeys.com
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RESOLUTION NO. 2010-

30

A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY OF POCATELLO, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF
IDAHO, REVISING SANITARY SEWER RATES, SYSTEM CAPACITY FEES, .
EXCESSIVE STRENGTH CHARGES, AND OTHER SPECIAL CHARGES PREVIOUSLY
SET BY RESOLUTION NO. 2009-33; PR0V1DING FOR SUCH RATES AND FEES ·TO
BB EFFECTIVE OCTOBER l, 2010, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30~ 2011. ·
WHEREAS, Pocatello Municipal Code Section 13.16.180 autholizes sanitary

sewer rates and. plant capacity fees to be set from time to time
by Resolution; and,
~·
'WHEREAS, the City Council l'etained the engineering firm of Red Oak

Consultlngto prepare a rate study tq project revenues and costs for2011-2015 and to
recommend necessary sanitary sewer rates thereafter; and

WHEREAS, the City Council has determined that fees and charges for the
sanitary sewer system as previously set by Resolution No. 2009-33 should be revised fo1·

Fiscal Year 2011 in- accordance with that study;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE MAYOR AND
COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF POCATELLO THAT SEWER RATES AND FEES FOR
FISCAL 2011 SHALL BE AS FOLLOWS:
NORMAL STRENGTH RATES
Metered facilities

Residential, single family
Residential multi-family> commercial,
and all others
Monthly service charge, per bill
Volume charge per 1,000 gals.

Inside City

$21.50/mo.

$3.30
$2.93

Outs1de City

$2S.7S/mo.

$3.95
$3.52

Non..metered facilities
All users will be billed a flat monthly charge based on the average annual consumption of
the most comparable metered use at the rates listed above. Billings for multi~family residential and
commercial uses with01.1t summer lines will ,be a flat monthly ra~e throughout the year der~ved by
averaging the gallonage charges, as set herem, for water use durmg the months of November through
April of the previous year.

EX~\Bll A.
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CHUBBUCK MUNICIPAL SANITARY SE}YJR SYSTEM
Monthly service charge, per bill
Volume charge, per 1,000 gals.
Volume charge, per 1,000 gals.

$3.30
$2.93 South ofl--86
$2.25 North oflw86

INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES..(abnormal strengths or volumes, multiple meters, meters larger
than 211 or BODs and/or total suspended solids greater than 200 ppm)
Monthly service charge, per bill
Volume charge, per 1,000 gals
BOD chaJ:ges, per pound
Total kteldabl nitrogen (TKN), per lb.
Suspended solids, per lb.
Total phospho1t1s (P), per lb.

Fats, oils, grease, per lb.

$3.30
$1.79
$0.184
$1.2685 (on amounts greater
than 35 mg/1) ·
$0.2548
$5.5461 (on amounts gt·eater
than 7 mg/1)
$0.10 (on amounts greater
than 100 mg/1)

Domestic Septage Disposal·

Volume charge, per gallon

$0.0739

SYSTElv.l CAPACITY FEES

ResidentiaJ/Commercial Users
Treatment Plant
3/411 water connection
111 water coIU1ection
1·11211 water connection
211 water connection

$1,110.00
$1,110.00
$21220.00
$:3.550.00

l_
j

Collection System

3/411 water connection

$1,170..00
$1,170.00

111 water connection
11/2" water connection
211 water connection

$2,340.00
$3.740.00

Large Industrial User Capacity Fee (abnormal strengths or volumes, multiple meters~
meters larger than 211 or B0Ds or total suspended solids greater than 200 ppm, or TKN greater
than 35 mg/1, or phosphorus greater than 7 mg/1

$0.07/gpd

Volume
BOD
TSS

$322.86/lb/day
$415.00/lb/day
$1,805.30/lb/day
$3,736.33/lb/day
$S.84/gpd

TKN

Phosphorus
Collection system

l'tBSOLUTION
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BB IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT fees apply to owners or occupants of land,
,buildings, or premises requiring sanitary services, which are either connected to the sanitary sewer
system or would be required to be connected to said, system pursuant to Municipal Code §13 .16.0~0.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED 1HAT persons wllo qualify for Bannock County's
Circuit Breaker Exemption List, and own and occupy a single-family residence, shall receive a 30%
reduction on that portion of their utility bill listed as 11SeweJ:11 or 0 Sanitary Sewer. 11 Upon receipt of the

-· Circuit Breaker Exemption List from Bannock County, the City Utility Billing Department shall make
the reduction, which shall remain in effect so long as the applicant meets the requirements set forth
herein."
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT the above fees and rates, shall be
effective from October 1, 2010, through September 30, 2011.
RESOLVED. this

[<3 41

day of August, 2010.

CITY OF POCATELLO, a municipal
corporation of Idaho

BRIAN C. BLAD, Mayor
ATIEST:

RESOLUTION

273

0

Oate

Return of Equity Transfers

PILOT Transfers

FY 2006

$

FY i007

$

FY2008
FY2009

$

$

FY2010

s

FY2011

$

FY2012
FY-2013

$
$

FY2014

$

477,272.00
477,272.00
479,053.00
493,424.00
493,424.00
493,424.00
2,458,812.00
2,265,330.00
206,903.99

$

$

Total Transfers by FY

3,544,000.00 $
3,544,000.44 $

4,021,272.00

4,021,272.44

$

3,349,079.00

$

3,828,132.00

$

3,349,079.00 $
3,349,079.00

$

3,349,079.00

3,842,503.00
3,842,503.00
3,842,503.00
2,458,812.00
2,265,330.00
206,903.99

·s

s

s

$
$

$
$
$

$

ef9t~.i~\//·.,,\ ::,-: \{:$ -:-:- :;-. }):,~i7,a44;9i4.99 -;\$ :; ;,.; ::-. ·--·; :·;.:··r:;,?;.:::,zo,4s4;316A4-·/$ :·/.' ;.:·.,;:, :-:::,~2s,-ai9,2131.43 :. '
CheckTotal

Transfers Since 2011

$

28,329,231.43

,$

8,773,548.99

EXHIBl'T B
Prepared by Joyce Stroscheln 9/22/14
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls; Idaho 83404
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
Nathan M. Olsen, ISB No. 7373
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: CV-2014-1520-0C

vs.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D.
GAFFNEY

Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO

)
)ss.

County of Bonneville

)

I, Michael D. Gaffney, having been duly sworn on oath, depose and state:
1. I am co-counsel for Plaintiffs in the above entitled case.
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2. For the past twenty-eight years I have acted as lead counsel on over ninety
civil matters that have gone to trial in both state and federal court.
3. I have substantial experience in class action litigation as I am currently acting
as co-lead counsel representing Potandon Produce L.L.C., one of twenty five defendants
named in Case 4:10-md-02186-BLW In Re: Fresh and Process Potatoes Antitrust
Litigation pending in the U.S. District Court for Idaho. To my knowledge, the case is the
largest agricultural antitrust class action filed in the State of Idaho and one of the largest
filed nationally. The case currently comprises two plaintiffs' classes of potato purchasers
nationwide and one opt-out plaintiff.
4. My biography/experience, as published on the website of Beard St. Clair
Gaffney, PA is attached as Exhibit A.
5. I am a senior partner for Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA. This firm consists of
eighteen attorneys, is one of the largest Idaho based firms, and has a wealth of experience
and resources from which the Plaintiffs can draw from to support the classes in this case.
Attached as Exhibit B is a written description of the overall practice areas, history and
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on February~ 2015, I
served a true and correct copy of the AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY on the
following by the method of delivery designated below:

Blake G. Hall
Sam L. Angell
Hall Angell Starnes
1075 S. UtahAvenue, Ste 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: (208) 621-3008
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 83201
Fax: 20 236- 13

. ~.S. Mail

IQ

Hand-delivered

I!)

Facsimile

~.S.Mail

Q

Hand-delivered

D
"-

Facsimile

Nathan M. Olsen
Of Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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Michael Gaffney is one of the most accomplished trial and appellate lawyers in Idaho.
Representing both plaintiffs and defendants, he has obtained some of the largest verdicts
and settlements in the state on behalf of plaintiffs and defended individuals, companies
and government agencies in some of the most difficult defenses in the state and
surrounding region. Mike has appeared in lawsuits throughout the country representing
Idaho clients. He has handled virtually every type of lawsuit, from simple evictions to
national class actions, in virtually every area of the law, from personal injury to
complicated business lawsuits.
Michael D. Gaffney
gaffney@beardstclair.com
T: (208) 557-5203
F: (208) 529-9732

Mike currently focuses on business litigation, including IP, unfair competition, noncompetition agreements, trade secrets and business torts. He also has extensive
experience in agribusiness, crop loss, LLC dissolution, minority oppression cases,
antitrust and securities, medical and legal malpractice, physician licensure and
privileges, and real estate and construction litigation.
Mike is an approved mediator for state and federal litigation and has completed the
American Health Lawyer's Association Dispute Resolution Services training. He is a
published member of the Idaho Law Review and was recently listed for the seventh
consecutive year in the 2014 Mountain States Super Lawyers in the area of Business
Litigation.
Mike grew up in the Dakotas and served as a U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer from 19741976 in southern Africa. He and his wife Julie are avid golfers, skiers, and dog lovers.

-·-i-·
•=~~

Practice Areas
Business Litigation
Constrnction
Intellectual Property
Medical Malpractice
Trademark & Copyright
Litigation

Education
University of Idaho College of
Law
Juris Doctor 1986
University of Colorado
Psych. Certification 1980
University of South Dakota
MA 1978
Regis College
BS 1974

PREEMINENT"

Michael D. Gaffney

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ._

2013

Employment
•
.

LIPE M!MIER
Mll.UON OOUAII AIM:lc:Ans f'oauM
'nle"lop Tlill ~ In~"'

Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
- 1995 to Present
Quane, Smith, Howard & Hull
- 1986-1995

Associations
Idaho, Wyoming and Oregon State and Federal Bars
U.S. Court of Appeals for 9th and 10th Circuits
Million Dollar Advocates Forum
American Health Lawyers Association
Idaho Supreme Court Evidence Rules Advisory Committee
Mountain States Super Lawyers, 2008- 2014
(Business Litigation)
City Club ofldaho Falls
Idaho Falls Rotary
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Idaho Trial Lawyers Association
Idaho Falls Citizen Review Committee: Planning & Building (2014)
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Our Practice

Beard St. Clair has grown to become one of the more prominent law
ftrms in Idaho. Over the past four decades, we have established our
reputation by providing unmatched quality legal services in a timely
manner. We successfully walk each client-through the legal process
· adding our experience and expertise along the way.
We sel'Ve as yotll' strntegic partner. ltis through our experience of
advising so many businesses and individuals that we have gained an
exceptional understanding of your needs and expectations and are
uniquely poised to provide the most" responsive, efficient, and effective
legal solutions available.

Business Our business lawyers combine'practical experience in the business world
with expertise in legal matters affecting all aspects of business opllfations,
from entity selection and formation througb termination and wind up. We
simplify the law while protecting your business interests, enabling your
plans, and resolving your conflicts. We emphasize businesses need for
clear guidance, staying within budget, and facilitating deal making. We
are numbers oriented and have the ability to deal with complex business
and financial issues, complex controversies, and complex regulations.

Real Estate
We represent developers, investors, lenders, buyers, and sellers involved
in the acquisition, development, financing, sale, and leasing of real estate.
We are experienced in the use of the condominium forms of ownership
and, ii1 particular, office condominiums. We regularly represent clients in
taxation of real estate arid zoning issues. We frequently assist in planning
the structure of and negotiating complex real estate transactiODS, as well
as handling the legal analysis and documentation.

Litigation
Litigation can occur in virtually every area of the law, including business
settings. While many hold themselves out as "trial attorneys," our
Litigation Team brings you experience with real trial time and a
demonstrated ability to litigate complex disputes all the way to verdict
and appeal, if necessary. We approach cases with a team orientation so
that the right attorneya are always current_ on issues and case status. We
have the ability to communicate effectively, maintain professional
relationships with opposing counsel in order to facilitate the best
resolution, and access to state-of-the-art research databases.
http:/lwww.idahofallslaw.com/our-practice.html
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We create plans that enable you to control your property, take care of
yourself and your loved ones, and transfer your property in the way you
want, all at reasonable costs. These plans minimize disputes and
perpetuate positive ideals while meeting goals. We believe you should
review your goals, plans, and objectives regularly with counselingoriented advisors, and learn how to administer yow· affairs in the most
cost effective way. We encourage you to explore all planning options,
avoid ineffective shortcuts and make informed decisions about who will
manage your assets upon disability or death. We believe all steps in the
estate planning process are important and are committed to maintaining
high levels of education and training.
·
Beard St. Clair has received an AV rating from Martindale-Hubbell
which indicates very high to preeminent legal ability and very high

ethical standards as established by confidential opinions from other
·
industry members.

History and Experience
Beard St. Clair has a firm history dating back to the l 960's. Members of
the firm have gone on to be a member of the US House of
Representatives, an Idaho State District Judge, an Idaho Supreme Court
Justice, a United States Magistrate Judge, and a Senator in the Idaho
legislature.
The film has an active litigation practice in federal and state courts and
handles several jury trials per year.
We represent major insurance caniers, banks, manufacturers, hightechnology companies, multi-level sales organizations, and members of
the health care industry. The firm also represents individual clients in a
wide-range of legal planning and problem resolution.
Members of the firm participate in various professional associations and
civic and charitable organizations. The following are representative:
Idaho State Bar; Idaho Trial Lawyers Association; Wealth Counsel;
American Health Lawyers Association; Rotary; Idaho Community.
Foundation; and Eastern Idaho Technical College Foundation.
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REXBURG: (208) 359DRIGGS: (208) 557-5211
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
!SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgh@hasattomeys.com
sla@hasattomeys.com
nrs@hasattomeys.com
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Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

v.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendant, CITY OF POCATELLO, by and through counsel of record,
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP, and hereby moves the Court pursuant to Rule 56, IR.CP for
summary judgment on all claims asserted in Plaintiff's Complaint. This motion is based upon
the record, pleadings, memorandum in support and affidavit in support filed herewith.
Dated this _/.l_ day of March, 2015.
AL~
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FORSUMMARV JUDGMENT -1
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CERTIFICA,.TE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this

/,j day of March, 2015, by the method indicated below:

•

Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Fax: 529-9732
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 524~3391

[)6 Mailing

[ 1 Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ J Overnight Mail
[)(} Mailing
[-] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ 1 Overnight Mail

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT• 2
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
!SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgh@hasattomeys.com
sla@hasattomeys.com
nrs@hasattomeys.com

2015 MAR 16 AM 10: 20
BY~.OEPUTY CLERK

Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDIC,IAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,

Case No. CV-2014;_1520-0C
NOTICE OF HEARING

Plaintiff,
V.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 13th day of April, 2015, at 2:00 p.m., of said day,
or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard in the above court, Defendant will call up for
hearing its Motion for Summary Judgment before the Honorable Stephen S. Dunn.
Dated this .,LJ_ day of March, 2015.

NOTICE OF HEARING -1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this _LJ___ day of March, 2015, by the method indicated below:

Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Fax: 529-9732
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 524-3391

P(] Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery

[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail
[~Mailing

[ J Hand Delivery

[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

IL

NOTICE OF HEARING· 2
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BLAKE 0. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NA1llAN'lt1 STARNES, ESQ,
HA;tt, ,ANGELL STARNES, LLP
107$ "S Utah Avenu~, Suite 1.50
Idaho Falls,, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
F~ (2()3) ·Q21-JOOS
ISJJ No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgh.@hasattomeys.com
;sla@hasattorneys.com
nrs@hasattomeys,com
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2015 I-MR I G A·I 10: 20
BY ___

Attomt,ys for Defendant City of Pocatello

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR :BANNOCK COUNTY

HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
'behalfof itself imd all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,

C~e No. CV-201-4-1520-0C

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STR.OSCHEIN

Plaintiff,

v.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bannock

)
; ss.
)

Joyce A, Stroschein; being first duly swom, deposes and $tatc,s as follows:
1.

That I am over the age of eighteen (18) and am co~petent to testify in this matter. I

make this affidavit based on Il)y own personal knowledge unless otherwise indicated. This
affidavit is made under the penalty of perjury.
S.EC:0ND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN • 1
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2.

I am the current Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") and Treasurer for the City of Pocatello.

I have served in the finance department·ofthe City since October 2001, including City Controller
from 2006-2008 and the Finance Mantiger fr9m 2008-2014. I am knowledgeable regarding the
financial affairs of the City and its adoption of policies related to the Payment-In-Lieu-Of-Taxes
('°PILOT") .component of the user fees, return on equity, and the capacity/co_nnection fees.
I have served as the CFO of the City since August 2014. I am intimately familiar with the

financial affairs of the City and its adoption of policies related to the Payment-In-Lieu--Of-Taxes
("PILOT';) fee, return on equity, and the Cap~city/Connection fees.
3.

On or about August 29, 2014, !submitted an affidavit in this matter addressing the fact

that the capacity fees have never had a PILOT component included in that fee. I in,corporate
herein by reference my prior affidavit. As I ·stated in my prior affidavit, only the user fees for
sanitation, water, and water pollution control contained a PILOT component.
4.

It would be a fallacy to sµggest that the payment of the PILOT component in the user fee

did not result in substantial compensation and benefit to the user fee payer. To the contrary, the
user fee payers received significant benefits in the fo1111 of Cify services. The PILOT ccunponent
was subsequently transferred to the General Fund to help fund City departments and services.
S.

One of the primary benefits received as a result of the PILOT transfer is the City was able

to operate more efficiently ~d use a single department to service other departments. The Water,
Sewer, and Wastewater Sanitation Funds are called "enterprise funds." This means that the water
department, sewer department, and sanitation departments are funded from user fees. That is, the
monthly use:;r fee provides the financial support for these three departments. In order to increase
efficiency and decrease costs, the City allows the water, sewer, and sanitation departments to use
numerous city services rather than require each department to maintain separate services for each
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A, STROSCHEIN-2
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department. That is, the water, sewer, and sanitation departments do not, for examvle, maintain
in-house legal, finance, planning & development, human resources, police, and fire. Although
the City charges all departments except some grant funded departments pay an administrativesupport fee, the fee does not cover the total cost of services for Legal, Finance, Nondepartmental , and Human ResQurce Services btn was intended to help support these activities.
The PILOT transfer provided the monetary support for all General Fund services. So rather than
unnecessarily increase the cost and run the City in an inefficient manner, these services are,
provided to the enterprise departments. Had the water, sewer, and sanitation departments
maintained legal, finance, hwnan resources in-house, there would be an increase in user fees.
For instance, in fiscal year 2013, the City refinanced the 3 Water Pollution Control Facility
loans. This effectively saved $1,708,303 m premium savings. 1bis task was accomplished by
the skills provided in the Finance , Legal, and Mayor '3.Ild Council departments. The efficie:ncy
of the City is a significant benefitthat was received through the payment of the PILOT transfer.
6.

During Fiscal Years 2006.:2014 PILOT transfers were made from the Sanitation, Water,

and Water Pollution Cl;mtrol Funds to the General Fund. The General Fund reports on aetivity
for Mayor and City Council, Finance, City Hall, Building Permits and Licenses, Planning and
Development, Public Engineering, Geographi~ Infonnation Systems,, Human Resources, NonDepartmental, Economic Development, Legal, Police, Fire, Animal Control, Parks, Parks
Administration and Zoo. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a detailed analysis of how these monies
were used during Fiscal Years 2006-2014.
7.

During Fiscal Years 2006-2011 PILOT transfers ranged from $3,821,970 to $4,015,110.

This revenue amount represented 13.2% to 16.1 % of total general fund expenditures. As noted

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A, STROSCHEIN-3
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above, the PILOT transfer paid for, in part, for the legal, finance, human resource, etc. services
provided by the City to the water, sewer, and sanitation departments.
8.

During Fiscal Years 2012.,2013 PILOT transfers ranged from $2,258;983 to $2,452,465.

This revenue amount represented 7.2% to 8.2% of total General Fund expenditures. As with
Fiscal Years 2006~201 l, the PILOT transfer was used to provide various City services to the
water, sewer, and sanitation departments.
9.

In 2014 only one PILOT transfer was made in October of 2013 in the amount of

$206,904 to the General Fund. The remaining budgeted transfers were cancelled as a result of
the Building Con;tractor Association lawsuit. The declaration that the PILOT was impermissible
created a major budget shortfall for the General Fund in Fiscal Year 2014. At the time the
PILOT was declared impermissible, the City was not able to raise taxes to obtain the revenues
needed to complete the budgeted expenditures.
10.

Shortly after the PILOT transfer was discontinued pursuant to the Building Contractors

lawsuit, the City Council mandated that all General Fund departments conduct a 2% budget
holdback resultins in reduced program expenditures. Further, the City Council mandated that

$1,65'.3,310 in General Fund Reserves ~ expended to make up for the PILOT transfer shortfall.
This effectively used all General Fund Reserves. Ultimately, the net impact of the PILOT
transfer belll.g disccmtinued was a reduction in City services of approximately $616,286. Thus, as
a direct result of the PILOT being discontinued, patrons of the City saw a general decrease in the
services provided by the City in llpproximately $616,286.
11.

In Fiscal Year 2015, the City Council has decided to absorb the loss of PILOT transfers

by increasing property taxes. The City had $2,696,886 in allowable additional taxes; $257,972
for new construction, 3% allowable increase of $738,692, and $1,700,222 in foregone taxes. The
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN .4
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City took $2,499,545 of the allowable additional taxes, leaving $197,341 as future foregone
tax.es. Ultitnately, the only way the City can operate the City a.t the same levels it was prior to the
2013 Building Contractors case is to increase property taxes. Conversely, should the City no
increase the tax.es to offset the loss of the PlLOT transfer, City services will inevitably be
reduced.
12.

In sum, the payn1~nt of the PlLOT eomponent of the user fee did not result in a windfall

for the City, nor did those monies sit idly in the City's bank account. Rather, all <>f tbe PILOT
fund transfers were completely exhausted each year to pay for the City services described above.
Likewise, the user fee payers received a substantial benefit in a lower 1.1ser fee because the water,
sewer, and sanitation departments were able to operate mote efficiently and avoided redundant
service, such as legal, financial, human resources, etc.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in and
for said State, this l~'bday ofMarch, 2015.

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN - 5
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following

this

__p_ day of March, 2015, by the method indicated below:

Michael D. G.affney, Esq.
BE.A&P ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, lD 83404
Fax: 529-9732

I ] Qvernigpt Mail

Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.

[ 'j Hand Delivery

PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 524-3391

ff

~~elivery

[ ] Fax
MMailing

I ] Fax

[ j Overnight Mail

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A, STROSCHEIN • 6
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General Fund FY2014 .

Dept./Division
0100
0200
0300
0500
0600
0601
0602
0700
0800
0801
0900
1000
1100
1200
1301

Description
Mayor & City Council
Finance

City Hall
Building
Planning & Development
Public Engineering
Geographic Info Systems
Human Resources
Non-Departmental
Economic Development
Legal Department
Police
Fire
Animal Control
Parks, Admin, Zoo
Total

Budgeted
Expenditures
772,084
851,735
347,974
564,332
1,032,628
633,915
153,186
561,762
1,413,518
75,000
784,544
13,090,763
8,095,956
955,339
2,986,201
32,318,937

%of Total
Budgeted
Expenditures
2%
3%
1%
2%
3%
2%

0%
2%
4%
0%

2%
41%
25%
3%
9%
100% *

$ Effect of

$ Effect of

Budgeted
PILOT
Transfer

Reduced
PILOT
Transfer
4,943
5,453
2,228
3,613
6,611
4,058
981
3,596
9,049
480
5,023
83,806
51,830
6,116
19,117
206,904

59,162

65,266
26,664
43,243
79,127
48,575
11,738
43,046
108,314
5,747
60,117
1,003,105
620,368
73,205
228,823
2,476,500

Potential
Reduction in
Program
Expenditures
54,220
59,813
24,436
39,630
72,516

!~
....,,p

44,517
10,757.
39,450
99,264
5,267
55,095
919,298
568,538
67,089
209,706

2,269,596

C)

*The total budgeted PILOT Transfer of $2,482,847 was discontinued in November 2013 as a result of a court determination.
So only $206,904 was transferred for the year.
The total revenue budgeted for the-General Fund was $32,168,937. The PILOT Transfer was 7.7% of that revenue.
The reduced PILOT Transfer resulted in a 7.1% revenue deficit. City Council authorized to spend $1,653,310 of reserves.
The total expenditures budgeted for the General Fund were $32,318,937. The PILOT Transfer was 7. 7% of those expenditures.
The reduced PILOT Transfer resulted in a 7% deficit to expenditures. City Council mandated 2% budget holdback to program
expenditures to make up the shortfall.
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General Fund FY2013

Dept./Division

0100
0200
0300
0500
0600
0601
0602
0700

0800
0801
0900
1000
1100
1200
1301

Budgeted
Expenditures

Description

Mayor & City Council
Finance
City Hall
Building
Planning & Development
Public Engineering
Geographic Info Systems
Human Resources
Non-Departmental
Economic Development
Legal Department
Police
Fire

Animal Control
Parks, Admin, Zoo
Total

624,070
787,068

%of Total
Budgeted
Expenditures
2%

$ Effect of
PILOT
Transfer

504,092
1,552,914
75,000
773,648
12,725,701
7,642,498

0%
2%
41%
24%

45,055
56,823
25,900
46,171
70,846
44,821
11,117
36,393
112,114
5,415
55,854
918,742
551,756

937,379

3%

67,675

358,748
639,526

981,306
620,821

153,988

2,912,922
31,289,681

3%
1%
2%
3%
2%
0%
2%
5%

9%
100% *

C)

1
-.~JI

210,301
2,258,983

t--..

*The total PILOT Transfer of $2,265,330 has been reduced by funds 050 ($3,703) and 052 ($2,644)
leaving only the utility funds.
The total revenue budgeted for the General Fund was $31,289,681. The PILOT Transfer is 7.2% of that revenue.
The total expenditures budgeted for the General Fund were $31,289,681. The PILOT Transfer is 7.2% of those expenditures.
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General Fund FY2012

Dept./Division

0100
0200
0300
0500
0600
0601
0602
0700
0800
0801
0900
1000
1100
1200
1301

Description

Mayor & City Council
Finance
City Hall
Building
Planning & Development
Public Engineering
Geographic Info Systems
Human Resources
Non-Departmental
Economic Development
Legal Department
Police
Fire
Animal Control
Parks, Admin, Zoo
Total

%of Total

$ Effect of

Budgeted

Budgeted

Expenditures

Expenditures

PILOT
· Transfer
49,909
56,334
33,202
- 56,243
77,664

611,969
690,744
407,106
689,634
952,282
635,450
150,495
481,689
1,557,682
75,000
697,248
12,044,549
7,391,718
875,330
2,810,331
30,071,227

2%
2%
1%
2%
3%

2%

1%
2%
5%

0%
2%
40%
25%
3%
9%
100% *

/:)
~,,,,,.-

51,824
12,274
39,284
127,037
6,117
56,864
982,296
602,833
71,388
229,197
2,452,465

0"'-

;

*The total PILOT Transfer of $2,458,812 has been reduced by funds 050 ($3,703} and 052 ($2,644)
leaving only the utility funds.
The total revenue budgeted for the General Fund was $30,071,227. The PILOT Transfer is 8.2% of that revenue.
The total expenditures budgeted for the General Fund were $30,071,227. The PILOT Transfer is 8.2% of those expenditures.
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General Fund FY2011

Dept./Division

0100
0200
0300
0500
0600
0601
0602
0700
0800
0801
0900
1000
1100
1200
1301

Description
Mayor & City Council
Finance
City Hall
Building
Planning & Development
Public Engineering
Geographic Info Systems
Human Resources
Non-Departmental
Economic· Development

Legal Department
Police
Fire
Animal Control
Parks, Admin, Zoo
Total

Budgeted
Expenditures

681,401
664,686
620,628
620,657
896,248
736,691
144,695
458,650
1,507,166
75,000
706,992
11,576,816
7,146,571
810,977
2,523,129
29,170,307

%of Total
Budgeted
Expenditures
2%

2%
2%
2%
3%
3%
0%
2%
5%
0%
2%
40%
24%
3%
9%
100%, *

$ Effect of
PILOT&
ROE
Transfers

89,610
87,412
81,618
81,622
117,865
96,881
19,029
60,317
198,206
9,863
92,976
1,522,455
939,838
106,651
331,814
3,836,156

l~C)

()

*The total PILOT & ROE (Return of Equity) Transfers of $3,836,156 have been reduced by funds 050 ($3,703)
and 052 ($2,644) leaving only the utility funds.
The total revenue budgeted for the General Fund was $29,170,307. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 13.2% of that revenue.
The total expenditures budgeted for the General Fund were $29,170,307. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 13.2% of those
expenditures.
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General Fund FY2010
$ Effect of

Description
Mayor & City Council
Finance
City Hall
City Clerk
Building
Planning & Development
Public Engineering
Geographic Info Systems
Human Resources
Non-Departmental
Economic Development
Legal Department
Police
Fire
Animal Control
Parks, Admin, Zoo
Total

Dept./Division

0100
0200
0300
0402
0500
0600
0601
0602
0700
0800
0801
0900
1000
1100
1200
1301

Budgeted
Expenditures
663,058

%of Total
Budgeted
Expenditures

643,056
676,216
67,822
704,969
611,950
1,114,323
140,838
404,660
1,577,773
125,000
687,225
11,212,746
7,021;373
777,870
2,360,018

2%
2%
2%
0%
2%
2%
4%
0%
1%
5%
0%
2%
39%
24%
3%
8%
100%

PILOT&
ROE
Transfers

*

88,353
85,688
90,107
9,037
93,938
81,543
148,485
18,767
53,921
210,240
16,656
91,574
1,494,112
935,607
103,652
314,475
3,836,156

0

()

*The total PILOT & ROE (Return of Equity) Transfers of $3,836,156 have been reduced by funds 050 ($3,703)
and 052 ($2,644) leaving only the utility funds.
The total revenue budgeted for the General Fund was $28,788,897. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 13.3% of that revenue.
The total expenditures budgeted for the General Fund were $28,788,897. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 13.3% of those
expenditures.
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General Fund FY2009
$ Effect of

Dept./Division

0100
0200
0300
0402
0500
0600
0601
0602
0700
0800
0801
0900
1000
1100
1200
1301

Description

Mayor & City· Council
Finance
City Hall
City Clerk
Building
Planning & Development
Public Engineering
Geographic Info Systems
Human Resources
Non-Departmental
Economic Development
Legal Department
Police
Fire
Animal Control
Parks, Admin, Zoo
Total

Budgeted

%ofTotal
Budgeted

Expenditures

Expenditures

654,117
639,320
677,385
7,359
690,338
603,415
1,189,532
146,370
407,558
1,577,917
99,000
686,765
11,472,844
7,135,156
772,494
2,410,262
29,169,832

2%
2%
2%
0%
2%
2%
4%
1%
1%
5%
0%
2%
39%
24%
3%
8%
100% *

PILOT&
ROE
Transfers

86,024
84,078
89,084
968
90,787
79,356
156,437
19,249
53,598
207,514
13,020
90,317
1,508,806
938,352
101,592
316,976
3,836,156

()

()

*The total PILOT & ROE (Return of Equity) Transfers of $3,836,156 have been reduced by funds 050 ($3,703}
and 052 ($2,644) leaving only the utility funds.
The total revenue budgeted for the General Fund was $29,100,276. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 13.2% of that revenue.
The total expenditures budgeted for the General Fund were $29,169,832. The PlLOT & ROE Transfers are 13.2% of those
expenditures.
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General Fund FY2008

Dept./Division
0100
0200
0300

0402
0500

Description
Mayor & City Council
Finance
City Hall
City Clerk
Building

0800
0900
1000
1100

Planning & Development
Public Engineering
Geographic Info Systems
Human Resources
Non-Departmental
Legal Department
Police
Fire

1200

Animal Control

1301

Parks, Admin, Zoo

0600
0601
0602
0700

Total

$ Effect of
PILOT &

Budgeted
Expenditures
646,089
607,206
656,301
63,389
484,600

% of Total
Budgeted
Expenditures
2%
2%
2%
0%
2%

698,922
1,106,906
150,297
382,413

2%
4%
1%
1%

1,575,905
661,662
10,905,355
6,797,098

6%
2%
39%
24%

95,115
150,637
20,454
52,042
214,463
90,045
1,484,094
925,007

792,542

3%

107,856

2,555,757
28,084,442

9%
100%

347,809
3,821,970

ROE
Transfers
87,925
82,634
89,315

.....
r""")

,._

8,627
65,948

*

.::'c

'e;.._'1'..I

()

*The total PILOT & ROE (Return of Equity) Transfers of $3,821,970 have been reduced by funds 050 {$3,595)
and 052 ($2,567) leaving only the utility funds.
The total revenue budgeted for the General Fund was $28,084,442. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 13.6% of that revenue.
The total expenditures budgeted for the General Fund were $28,084,442. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 13.6% of those
expenditures.
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General Fund -FY2007 -

Budgeted
Dept./Division
0100
0200

0300
0402
0500
0600
0601
0602
0700
0800
0900
1000
1100
1200
1301

Description
Mayor & City Council
Finance
City Hall
City Clerk
Building

Planning & Development
Public Engineering
Geographic Info Systems
Human Resources
Non-Departmental
Legal Department
Police
Fire

Animal Control
Parks, Admin, Zoo
Total

Expenditures

565,070
515,381
640,672
58,172
416,196
665,015
996,358
128,500
361,218
1,527,309
635,847
10,107,897
6,394,463
724,348
2,383,637
26,120,083

%of Total
Budgeted

$ Effect of
PILOT& ROE

Expenditures
2%
2%
2%
0%
2%

Transfers

3%
4%
0%
1%
6%
2%
39%
24%
3%
9%
100% *

86,861
79,223
98,482
8,942
63,977
102,224
153,158
19,753
55,525
234,774
97,741
1,553,759
982,940
111,345
366,406
4,015,110.44

()

<)

i·. _.}

*The total PILOT & ROE (Return of Equity) Transfers of $825,510.44 have been reduced by funds 050 ($3,595)
and 052 ($2,_567) leaving only the utility funds.
The total revenue budgeted for the General Fund was $26,120,083. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 15.4% of that revenue.
The total expenditures budgeted for the General Fund were $26,120,083. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 15.4% of those
expenditures.
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General Fund FY2006
$ Effect of

Dept./Division
0100
0200
0300
0402
0500
0600
0601
0602
0700

0800
0900
1000
1100
1200
1301

Description
Mayor & City Council
Finance
City Hall
City Clerk
Building

Planning & Development
Public Engineering
Geographic Info Systems
Human Resources
Non-Departmental
Legal Department
Police
Fire
Animal Control
Parks, Admin, Zoo
Total

Budgeted
Expenditures

552,327
449,494
637,680
45,790
465,682
525,137
1,075,887
143,346
323,843
1,458,790
634,737
9,680,416
6,046,413
688,146
2,192,813
24,920,501

%of Total
Budgeted
Expenditures
2%
2%
3%
0%
2%
2%
4%
1%
1%
6%
3%
39%

24%
3%
9%
100% *

PILOT &
ROE
Transfers
88,989
72,421
102,741
7,378
75,029
84,608
173,343

C)

23,095
52,177
235,035
102,267
1,559,677
974,178
110,872
353,299
4,015,110

r~~,::.t;-"
<J
*The total PILOT & ROE (Return of Equity) Transfers of $4,015,110 have been reduced by funds 050 {$3,595)
and 052 ($2,567) leaving only the utility funds.
The total revenue budgeted for the General Fund was $24,920,501. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 16.1% of that revenue.
The total expenditures budgeted for the General Fund were $24,920,501. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 16.1% of those
expenditures.
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ;
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
!SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgh@hasattomeys.com
sla@hasattomeys.com
nrs@hasattomeys.com
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
/

_../J

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendant, City of Pocatello, by and through its attorney of record, and
hereby submits this Memorandum in Support Motion for Summary Judgment as follows:
INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendant City of Pocatello's Motion for Summary Judgment. The
City seeks dismissal of each claim alleged by Plaintiffs. Because Plaintiffs have sought
certification of this matter as a class action, Defendant seeks to have each claim dismissed

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -1
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because there is no legal or factual basis for the claims to proceed. First, any claims associated
with the connection fee containing a PILOT component are misplaced. As the City repeatedly
stated in the underlying litigation that is a precursor to this lawsuit, Building Contractors v. Cit:y
ofPocatello, the connection/capacity fee has never included a.PILOT component. The PILOT

component has only been included in the user fee that was paid by utility customers through their
monthly water and sewer bill. Because the City has never charged a PILOT component in the
connection fee, dismissal of any and all claims associated with the connection/capacity fee is
warranted.
Next, there has never been an unconstitutional taking resulting from the PILOT
component. Generally, the collection of a tax is not considered a valid Fifth Amendment takings
claim and therefore there is no recognized property interest in a tax. Furthermore, there is no
evidence that the collection of tax did not result in just compensation for the utility customers. In
fact, the evidence demonstrates that each utility customer in the City of Pocatello received a
substantial benefit in the form of city services provided. In the aftermath of the Building
Contractors case, the City was required to cut all services within the City by 2% and withdraw

approximately $1,000,000.00 from its reserve account to offset the loss of the PILOT
component. This resulted in services being maintained but the general fund incurred a negative
balance that will be recovered through increased property taxes on land owners within the City.
Third, summary judgment on the takings claim is rendered moot because the Court
concluded in the Building Contractors case that the decision related to the collection of the
PILOT fee was prospective not retroactive. Because the findings in the Building Contractors
case were prospective in application only, and the City immediately ceased collection of the
PILOT, there is not viable cause of action for an unconstitutional taking. Once the PILOT had
DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 2
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been declared improper, the only way there may be a viable claim is if the City continued to
collect the PILOT, which it did not. Accordingly, there is no viable takings clahn and summary
judgment is appropriate.
Finally, the City is hnmune from all state law claims associated with the collection of a
tax pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-904A. Pursuant to § 6-904A the City is immune for any state law
claims that arise out of the collection of a tax or fee absent a showing that the City acted with
malice or criminal intent and with reckless, willful and wanton conduct, which cannot be proven.
In this case, Plaintiff alleges two fees, the capacity and user fee, contained an improper PILOT

component and that the City improperly received a benefit from the Plaintiffs. As previously
stated, there was never a PILOT component to the City's capacity fee. Furthermore, there is no
evidence that the City acted with malice or criminal intent and with reckless, willful and wanton
conduct in the collection of the PILOT fee. Accordingly, smnmary judgment on all state law
claims is warranted.
FACTUAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACT

Defendant recognizes this Court is very familiar with the underlying litigation that
resulted in the instant lawsuit. As such, Defendant provides.a summary of the factual history in
this matter.
The instant litigation centers on a previously adjudicated state law case captioned
Building Contractors Association ofSoutheast Idaho v. City ofPocatello ("Building Contractors

Case"), Bannock County Case No. CV-2011-0005228-0C. The Building Contractors Case
centered primarily on the legitimacy of the connection/capacity fee charged by the City of
Pocatello. A secondary issue that was raised by the Building Contractors was whether the PILOT
fee was constitutional.
DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-3
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After extensive briefing on the issue, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and
Order on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and Plaintiff's Amended Motion for
Reconsideration on November 15, 2013. In that order, the Court specifically concluded that the

City had prevailed on a number of issues. Specifically, the Court concluded as follows:
1.

2.'

3.

The City connection and user fees are not arbitrary or unreasonably imposed. The
imposition and collection of the connection and user fees themselves are not
unconstitutional acts or a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.
There is no evidence that the connection fees are being used by the City to fund future
capital improvements in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.
Through the use of the PILOT_ fee transfer program, or any other transfer program
with a similar intent, such as a rate of return program or a return on equity program,
the Court declares that the City is imposing an impermissible tax to the extent that
connection and user fees are being assessed a PILOT fee for general fund purposes,
and such practices must cease and are hereby enjoined because they are
unconstitutional and a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. This means that
connection and user fees must be adiusted to the extent that they include a charge
for the PILOT fee. In addition, no PILOT fee transfers from any water or sewer
·
account to the general fund are pennitted.
However, to the extent that connection and user fees are being transferred from the
water and sewer accounts to the general fund, through any appropriate process,
however named, for the purpose of paying expenses related to the operation,
maintenance, replacement, and depreciation of existing water and sewer
systems, including only those general City expenses needed to operate the water and
sewer departments, such as HR, financial, legal and accounting, such transfers are
permitted and are not hereby enioined.

(Memo Decision and Order On Reconsideration, p. 26 (emphasis added)).
Consistent with the factual history articulated by the Building Contractors Court, in
approximately 2011, the City re-described the transfer from the enterprise funds as a Paymentfu-Lieu-Of-Taxes ("PILOT"). The PILOT component of the user fee was calculated on the prior
year city property tax levy rate multiplied by the estimated market value per the most recent
financial plan prepared by an outside consulting engineer. The rate ofretum was part of the

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .4
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annual budget process and the rates were set each year and approved by the City Council.
(Stroschein Aff., ,r S previously filed with the Court).
Initially, the PILOT, as well as the predecessor "rate of return" or ''return on equity,"
were designed to be a fair and reasonable tax implemented to keep Pocatello resident's water and
sewer fees and related taxes lower and still provide the necessary water and sewer services. The
City's water and wastewater utility were financially self-sufficient with funding for capital and
operating requirements derived from user fees, which included the PILOT component.
(Stroschein Aff., ,r 7).
Following the Court's decision in Building Contractors, the City immediately
discontinued charging the PILOT fee and therefore each of the Pocatello resident users saw an
immediate decrease in their water and sewer utility bills. On December 19, 2013, the City
lowered utility user fees in compliance with the Building Contractors decision. Pocatello
residents saw an approximately 10% decrease in their monthly water and wastewater bills.
(Stroschein Aff., ,r 9).
Following the Court's decision in Building Contractors, the City made no changes to the
connection/capacity_fee. The City has never charged a PILOT to the connection/capacity fe;e and
the two different fees have no relationship. Based on the Building Contractors decision, the
connection/capacity fee was deemed appropriate and the amount was upheld. Because no
PILOT has ever been collected from the connection/capacity fee it was not improperly collected.
Because the fee was declared constitutional and the amounts were correct, the City's collection
of the connection/capacity fee should no serve as a source of recovery for the PILOT fee.
(Stroschein Aff., ,r 13).

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .5
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At the conclusion of the Building Contractors case, the Plaintiff, represented by the same
counsel, initiated this litigation seeking to have the Court award damages based on three claims
(1) unconstitutional talcing under both the Idaho Constitution and the United States Constitution;

(2) state law unjust enrichment, and (3) state law equitable estoppel and/or equitable tolling.
ARGUMENT
A.

No Connection Fees Were Improperly Comingled With The General Funds And
There Was No PILOT Component To-The Connection Fees.

Plaintiffs seek recovery and claim a taldng based on the City's collection of the
Connection/Capacity Fees. As this Court is aware, the collection of the Connection Fee was fully
and completely analyzed by this Court in the Building Contractors case. Specifically, the Court
concluded that the amount of the Connection Fee was appropriate and that it was not improperly
collected. During the pendency of that litigation, the City created two new accounts, Funds 37
and 38 and placed all of the monies collected for Connection Fees in these two accounts. The
money in Funds 37 and 38 were never spent prior to the resolution of the Building Contractors
case. With respect to the Connection and User Fees, this Court concluded as follows:

4.
5.
6.

The City connection and user fees are not arbitrary or unreasonably imposed. The
imposition and collection of the connection and user fees themselves are not
unconstitutional acts or a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.
There is no evidence that the connection fees are being used by the City to fund future
capital improvements in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.
Through the use of the PILOT fee transfer program, or any other transfer program
with a similar intent, such as a rate of return program or a return on equity program,
the Court declares that the City is imposing an impennissible tax to the extent that
connection and user fees are being assessed a PILOT fee for general fund purposes,
and such practices must cease and are hereby enjoined because they are
unconstitutional and a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. This means that
connection and user fees must be adiusted to the extent that they include a charge
for the PILOT fee. In addition, no PILOT fee transfers from any water or sewer
account .to the general fund are pennitted.

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6
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However, to the extent that connection and user fees are being transferred from the
water and sewer accounts to the general fund, through any appropriate process,
however named, for the purpose of paying expenses related to the operation,
maintenance, replacement, and depreciation of existing water and sewer
systems, including only those general City expenses needed. to operate the water and
sewer departments, such as HR, financial, legal and accounting, such transfers are
permitted and are not hereby enioined.
(Memo Decision and Order On Reconsideration, p. 26 (emphasis added)).
While Plaintiffs contend that the connection/capacity fee contained a PILOT fee, it is
without merit and contrary to the conclusions of this Court in the Building Contractors case (see
generally February 3, 2014 Decision on Plaintiff's Application for Order to Show Cause) as well

as the first affidavit of Joyce Stroschein. Ms. Stroschein, as the Chief Financial Officer for the
City of Pocatello is intimately familiar with all of the taxes and fees collected by the City.
Specifically, she testifies that the purpose of the connection/capacity fee is intended to recover a
new connector's proportionate share of the City's wastewater and water backbone facility costs.
(Stroschein Aff., ,r,r 10-13). This Court, in Building Contractors, carefully analyzed the facts and
concluded that the connection fee was not unreasonable nor was it arbitrarily imposed because it
produced sufficient revenue to support the system at the lowest possible cost as required by the
Idaho Revenue Bond Act. (Memorandum Decision on Reconsideration, pp. 23-24). There was
no evidence submitted in the Building Contractors case to suggest that the connection fee
contained a PILOT. In fact, the Court concluded that the PILOT was specifically transferred out
of the water and sewer funds. (Memorandum Decision on Reconsideration, p. 22 and Decision
on Plaintiff's Application for Order to Show Cause). Likewise, Ms. Stroschein specifically

states that the connection/capacity has never included a PILOT.
There is no, nor will there ever be, any evidence to support an argument that the
Connection/Capacity Fee contained a PILOT component The undisputable evidence from the
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 7
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City is that the Connection Fee never has, nor will in the future, contained a PILOT component.
The PILOT component has nothing to do with the purpose of a connection fee as discussed
above. Accordingly, there is no viability to the claim that the City engaged in any
unconstitutional taking related to the connection/capacity fee. Accordingly, the Court should
dismiss any claims associated with connection/capacity fee.
B.

There Was No Unconstitutional Taking.

Plaintiffs argue that the imposition of the PILOT component of the User Fees a taking
under both the Fifth Amendment and the Idaho Constitution. As is discussed more fully below,
the takings claim under the Idaho Constitution fails pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims Act.
Moreover, the analysis for either a federal or state takings claim would be identical. The Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation. See U.S. Const. amend. V. A Fifth Amendment takings claim
requires a two-step analysis. First, Plaintiffs must establish that it possesses a compensable
property interest. See, e.g.,Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014, 112
S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992); Kaiser Aetna v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 179-180, 100 S.Ct.
383, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979). Plaintiffs must then show that the City took that private property
interest for public use without just compensation. See Short v. U.S., 50 F.3d 994, 1000 (Fed. Cir.
1995).

1.

The PILOT component of the User Fee Is Not A Compensable Property

Interest.

Plaintiffs contend that the PILOT component of the user fee that was collected by the
City is a property interested protected under the Fifth Amendment. This contention is misplaced.
Generally, taxation is not considered to be a taking because the monies paid are not a
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -8
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recognizable protected property interest. See, e.g., United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52,
53, 110 S.Ct. 387, 107 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (holding that a deduction ofa tribunal user fee from a
settlement award is not a taking); Commercial Builders v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872,876 (9th
Cir. 1991) (holding that a purely financial exaction does not constitute a taking); Coleman v.
C.LR., 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that taxes are not takings, unless the Govenunent

tries to "achieve through special taxes what the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids
if done directly."); Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 756 (Fed.Cir. 1990) ("Requiring
money to be spent is not a taking of property"); Commonwealth Edison Co. ·v. United States, 46
Fed. CL 29, 40 (2000) ("Requiring money to be spent is not a taking ofproperty"); Branch v.
United States, 69 F.3d 1571, 1576 (Fed.Cir. 1995) (rejecting the argmnent that a federal statute

constituted a taking, "because the property allegedly taken was money"). In describing why a
takings analysis does not fit an assessment of money, the Federal Circuit, in Branch v. United
States, 69 F.3d 1571 (Fed.Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 810, 117 S.Ct. 55, 136 L.Ed.2d 18

(1996), stressed:
To be sure, analyzing the assessment under the principles of takings law is
awkward. If a particular govennnent action is deemed a taking, it means
that the govenunent may engage in the action but must pay for it.. .. But
because the property allegedly taken in this case was money that leads to
the curious conclusion that the government may take the bank's money as
long as it pays the money back.
Id. at 1575-76.

As is made clear by numerous federal cases addressing the collection of a tax as being a
constitutional taking, Plaintiffs' claim of a constitutional taking fails. In this case, the PILOT
component of the user fee was a tax collected by the City. This Court held that the PILOT
component was an unconstitutional tax and that its collection was inappropriate and must cease.
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -9
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The City complied with this edict and immediately after the Court's order ceased the collection
of this tax, which was a component of the water and sewer user fees. Because this case centers
on the collection of a tax, the guidance from other jurisdictions on whether the collection of a tax
can even be a talcing is persuasive and confirms there is no valid 5th Amendment claim and
summary judgment is appropriate.
2.

The PILOT Component Of The User Fee Was Not Used By The City
Without Just Compensation.

Even if the Court were to conclude that a property interest did exist, the PILOT
component of the User Fee was not used by the City without "just compensation." In fact, the
opposite conclusion results given the significant benefits that were provided to the entire City
population equally through the use of the PILOT component.
Specifically, there is no factual basis to conclude that the PILOT transfer did _not provide
just compensation to the user fee payers. Consistent with the testimony of Joyce Stroschein, the
user fee payers received significant benefits in the form of City services. (2nd Stroschein Aff., ,r
4). One of the primary benefits received as a result of the PILOT transfer is the City was able to
operate more efficiently and use a single department to service other departments. Because the
Water, Sewer, and Wastewater Sanitation Funds are funded through user fees, those user fees
_provide the financial support necessary to operate these three departments. (2nd Stroschein Aff., ,r
5). In order to increase efficiency and decrease costs, the City allows the water, sewer, and
sanitation departments to use numerous city services rather than require each department to
maintain separate services for each department. (Id.). That is, the water, sewer. and sanitation
departments do not, for example, maintain in-house legal, finance, accounting, planning &
development, human resources, etc. (Id.).
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -10
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The efficiency of the City is a significant benefit derived because the enterprise
departments are able leverage the talent and diversity of skills within the City. The combined
services within the City are vital to the water, sewer, and sanitation departments operation. Each
of these departments would be unable to operate at the same cost if the department were forced
to hire its own legal counsel, CPA' s, human resource directors, etc. Thus, rather than
unnecessarily increase the cost to run each department, these services are provided to the
enterprise departments. The tangible benefit provided to the water, sewer, and sanitation
departments through the use of combined services for legal, finance, human resources etc. result
in a decrease in user fees. (Id.). Ms. Stroschein provided an example of the benefit users received
though the PILOT transfer, "in fiscal year 2013, the City refinanced the three Water Pollution
Control Facility loans, effectively saving $1,708,303 in premium savings. (Id.). These savings
were made possible through the skills provided in the Finance, legal, and Mayor and Council
departments. (Id.). Thus, the task of saving nearly $2 million in premiums was made possible
through the efficiencies of the City not duplicating services.
The efficiency of the City is a significant benefit that was received through the payment
of the PILOT transfer. (Id.). Moreover, operation of these departments in this fashion is
appropriate and consistent with the Court's ·findings in the Building Contractors case:
... to the extent that connection and user fees are being transferred from the water
and sewer accounts to the general fund, through any appropriate process, however
named, for the purpose of paying expenses related to the operation, maintenance,
replacement, and depreciation of existing water and sewer systems, including
only those general City expenses needed to operate the water and sewer
departments, such as HR, financial, legal and accounting, such transfers are
permitted and are not hereby enjoined.
(Memo Decision and Order On Reconsideration, p. 26 (emphasis added)). In this case, the use of
the PILOT transfers for these purposes were appropriate and an example of the significant
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benefit and compensation provided by the City to user fee payers.
During Fiscal Years 2006-2014 PILOT transfers were made from the Sanitation, Water,
and Water Pollution Control Funds to the General Fund. (2nd Stroschein Aff., ,r 6). The General
Fund reports on activity for Mayor and City Council, Finance, City Hall, Building Permits and
Licenses, Planning and Development, Public Engineering, Geographic Information Systems,
Human Resources, Non-Departmental, Economic Development, Legal, Police, Fire, Animal
Control, Parks, Parks Admini.stration and Zoo. (2nd Stroschein Aff., ,r 6; Ex. A}. In addition to the
significant benefits provided through efficiently overlapping services in the water, sewer and
sanitation departments, additional benefits and services were provided to general City services.
Proof of the just compensation provided to user fee payers is evident in the aftermath of
the Building Contractors case. In 2014 only one PILOT transfer was made in October of 2013 in
the amount of $206,904 to the General Fund. (2nd Stroschein Aff., ,r 9). The remaining budgeted
transfers were cancelled as a result of the Building Contractor Association lawsuit. (Id.). The
declaration that the PILOT was impermissible created a major budget shortfall for the General
Fund in Fiscal Year 2014. (Id.). At the.time the PILOT was declared impermissible, the City was
not able to raise taxes to obtain the revenues needed to complete the budgeted expenditures. (Id.).
Shortly after the PILOT transfer was discontinued, the City Council mandated that all General
Fund departments conduct a 2% budget holdback resulting in reduced program expenditures. (2nd
Stroschein Aff., ,r 10). Further, the City Council mandated that $1,000,000 in General Fund
Reserves be expended to make up for the PILOT transfer shortfall. (Id.). Ultimately, the net
impact of the PILOT transfer being discontinued was a reduction in City services of
approximately $1,269,896. (Id.). Thus, as a direct result of the PILOT being discontinued,
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patrons of the City saw a general decrease in the services provided by the City in approximately
$1,269,896. (Id.).
In Fiscal Year 2015, the City Council decided to absorb the loss of PILOT transfers by

increasing property taxes. (2nd Stroschein Aff., ,r 11 ). The City had $2,696,886 in allowable
additional taxes; $257,972 for new construction, 3% allowable increase of $738,692, and
$1,700,222 in foregone taxes. (Id.). The City took $2,499,545 of the allowable additional tax.es,

leaving $197,341 as future foregone tax.es. (Id.). Ultimately, the only way the City could operate
the City at the same levels it was prior to the 2013 Building Contractors case is to increase
property taxes. Conversely, should the City decline increase property tax.es to offset the loss of
the PILOT transfer, City services will inevitably be reduced dramatically. (Id.).
To argue that the PILOT transfer did not provide just compensation to the user fee payers
is disingenuous. The PILOT transfer did hot result in a windfall for the City, nor did the PILOT
transfers sit idly in the City's bank account. (2nd Stroschein Aff., ,r 12). All of the PILOT
transfers were completely exhausted each year to pay for the City services described above. (Id.).
Ultimately, the user fee payers received just compensation in the form of lower user fee because
the water, sewer, and sanitation departments were able to operate more efficiently and avoided
redundant service, such as legal, financial, accounting, human resources, etc. (Id.). Because just
compensation was provided in the form of lower user fees and improved City services there is no
viable unconstitutional takings claim and summary judgment is appropriate.
C.

There Is No Evidence The Court's Ruling In Building Contractors v. City of

Pocatello Was Retroactive.
Plaintiffs rely heavily on the findings and conclusions of this. Court in the Building
Contractors litigation. With respect to the PILOT component of the User Fees, this Court
DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -13
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concluded as follows:
1.
2.
3.

The City connection and user fees are not arbitrary or unreasonably imposed. The
imposition and collection of the connection and user fees themselves are not
unconstitutional acts or a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.
There is no evidence that the connection fees are being used by the City to fund future
capital improvements in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.
Through the use of the PILOT fee transfer program, or any other transfer program
with a similar intent, such as a rate of return program or a return on equity program,
the Court declares that the City is imposing an impermissible tax to the extent that ·
connection and user fees are being assessed a PILOT fee for general fund purposes,
and such practices must cease and are hereby enjoined because they are
unconstitutional and a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. This means that
connection and user fees must be adiusted to the extent that they include a charge
for the PILOT fee. In addition, no PILOT fee transfers from any water or sewer
account to the general fund are pennitted.
However, to the extent that connection and user fees are being transferred from the
water and sewer accounts to the general fund, through any appropriate process,
however named, for the purpose of paying expenses related to the operation,
maintenance, replacement, and depreciation of existing water and sewer
systems, including only those general City expenses needed to operate the water and
sewer departments, such as HR, financial, legal and accounting, such transfers are
permitted and are not hereby enioined.

(Nov. 15, 2013 Memo Decision and Order On Reconsideration, p. 26 (emphasis added)). The
Court fmmd fault with the City's collection of the PILOT component of the user fee and enjoined
future collection of the PILOT.

The numerous decisions and orders in the Building Contractors case make no mention
that the invalidation of the PILOT would be applied retroactively. Rather, the Court held that the
conclusions and orders would be prospective only. In the November 13, 2013 Memorandum
Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and Plaintiff's Amended Motion/or
Reconsideration, this Court analyzed the permissibility of the PILOT component of a fee. The
Court concluded first that the PILOT component of the fee did not comply with the statutory
requirement of Idaho Code § 50-1028. However, the Court went on to hold that the application
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of the holding was prospective rather than retroactive, "[t]hus, any portion of the user and/or
connection fees that are assessed in order to pay the PILOT fee to the City, do not conform to the
statutory requirements ofI.C. § 50-1028 and must be excluded from any fee assessment going
forward." (Nov. 13, 2013 Decision, p. 24 (emphasis added)). Inasmuch as the Court's decision

was prospective only, the instant matter is rendered moot because the City immediately complied
with this Court's directive and ceased collection of the PILOT. Following the Court's decision in
Building Contractors, however, the City immediately discontinued charging the PILOT fee and
therefore each of the Pocatello resident users saw an immediate decrease in their water and sewer
utility bills. On December 19, 2013, the City lowered utility user fees in compliance with the
Building Contractors decision. Pocatello residents saw an approximately 10% decrease in their
monthly water and wastewater bills. (Stroschein Aff., ,r 9).
hnportantly, whether there was an unconstitutional talcing from the PILOT component
and/or the connection fee was previously addressed in the Building Contractors litigation. This
Court will recall that an unconstitutional takings claim was advanced in that litigation and given
the inability to present any evidence on that issue, summary judgment on that claim was granted.
In the Building Contractors case, the Complaint alleged the City's connection fee policies and

user fees constituted a violation of the United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution as a
talcing of private property without just compensation and asked the Court to grant Plaintiff
appropriate equitable and legal remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Plaintiff failed to present
evidence to support this claim and summary judgment was granted. (28 March 2013
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 14-15).
This finding was reiterated by the Court in the January 10, 2014 Order Denying Plaintiff's
Request for Attorney Fees and Costs, "the City prevailed against Plaintiff's argument that the
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -15
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connection fees constituted an unconstitutional taking." (January 10, 2014 Orde~_Denying

Plaintiff's Request/or Attorney Fees and Costs, p. 4).
Moreover, there has never been any pronouncement from the Idaho Supreme Court that
the PILOT component of the user fee, or its equivalent, is unconstitutional. The present case
seeks to recover damages associated with a tax that was declared unconstitutional months before
the same attorney handling the prior lawsuit initiated this lawsuit. Retroactive application to past
and pending cases, even to the case in which the decision was announced is not mandatory and is
left to the sound discretion of the court. BHA Investments Inc. v. City a/Boise, 141 Idaho 168
173, 108 P.3d 315,320 (2004). When considering whether to apply a case retroactively, the
Court should weigh three factors: (1) the purpose of the decision; (2) the reliance on the prior
law; and (3) the effect upon the administration of justice if the decision is applied retroactively.
Id. (citing Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19,523 P.2d 1365 (1974)). The Court should balance

the first factor against the second and third factor to determine whether to limit retroactive
application of the decision. Id. (citing Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606,570 P.2d 284 (1977)).
In this case, the purpose of the initial Building Contractors case was, inter alia, to

determine, as a matter of first impression, whether the City of Pocatello had improperly included
a PILOT component into the user fee. The PILOT component was then transferred to the general
fund to fund the activities of the City. When the City initiated the PILOT component, it did so in
reliance on City ofChubbuck v. City ofPocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 899 P.2d 411 (1995). In the
City of Chubbuck case, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that a rate of return on allocated

cost of service may be charged because the Revenue Bond Act permits the collection of
revenues. The City acted consistent with this prior precedent related to the appropriate use of a
rate of return in City o/Chubbuckv. City ofPocatello, 127 Idaho 198,899 P.2d 411 (1995).
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Ultimately, this Court disagreed with the City's interpretation of City of Chubbuck,
distinguishing the present case from City of Chubbuck on the basis that the City ofChubbuck
only permitted rate of returns to be charged to another entity and not city residents or utility
customers.
The Court's conclusion was a matter of first impression in Idaho and not clearly
articulated in City of Chubbuck. Prior to the Building Contractors case, the City believed it was
in compliance with City of Chubbuck This is evidenced by Mr. Swindell's affidavits, wherein he
identified and set forth the underlying rationale and analysis behind the PILOT fee. (1 81 Swindell
Aff., iMf 6-12). The City reviewed applicable law and attempted to create a fee structure that it
believed complied with existing law. While this Court ultimately disagreed with the PILOT
fee's use, the fact that the City was attempting to create a legitimate and legal fee structure that
complied with existing law, despite there being no governing precedent on the subject. The City
relied on existing law, which further favors a conclusion that Building Contractors was not to be
retroactively applied.
Finally, the administration ofjustice will not be served should the Court apply the
Building Contractors case retroactively and allow Plaintiffs' to recover the previously expended
PILOT component of the user fee. The fees that were collected have long since been exhausted
in the operation of the City. The PILOT fee was transferred to the general fund and fully
expended. Generally speaking, if the PILOT were not collected, city services would have been
cut. If this matter is permitted to retroactively apply Building Contractors each property owner
within the City will be adversely affected because they will be required to bear an increased
property tax. Thus, while a renter who paid the user fees for water and sewer would receive some
benefit, each of the property owners within the City who paid user fees for water and sewer
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -17
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would be adversely affected. Moreover, the application of the how much ofa recovery each
utility customer would be entitled to is a difficult and tim(rconsuming question. That is, the
PILOT fee would be different for residential versus commercial users. Users who used more
water would have paid higher PILOT fees. Ultimately, there would be a significant increase in
the number of cases resulting from the detennination regarding the Building Contractors
retroactivity. To retroactively apply the Building Contractors case would thwart the
administration of justice because the City would be forced to expend significant financial and
human resources (likely in the form of a receiver appointed by the Court to analyze each user
within the City) to determine the amount of PILOT component would be returned to each user.
Furthermore, each property owner within the City would be forced to shoulder a large increase in
their property taxes to sustain a damage award given the PILOT component was exhausted by
the City for its annual operation.
Ultimately, there is no legal or factual support for a conclusion that the Building
Contractors case should be applied retroactively. Because the Court did not find that the
Building Contractors case was rel;roactive, the Court should dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice
because the City immediately ceased collection of the PILOT component of the user fee in the
aftermath of the Building Contractors matter.
D.

The City Is Immune From State Law Claims Associated With The Collection Of
Taxes.

Plaintiffs make three state law claims that arise out of the collection of a tax: (1)
unconstitutional taldng under the Idaho Constitution, (2) unjust enriclnnent, and (3) equitable
·estoppel and/or equitable tolling. The City is immune from these claims pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 6-904A. Idaho provides that a governmental entity can be immune from certain tortious
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -18
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conduct. In order to determine whether immunity under the Idaho Tort Claims Act is applicable,
the Court must determine:
... whether tort recovery is allowed under the laws ofldaho; and,
if so, whether an exception to liability found in the tort claims act
shields the alleged misconduct from liability; and, if no exception
applies, whether the merits of the claim as presented for
consideration on the motion for summary judgment entitle the
moving party to dismissal.
Harris v. State Dep't ofHealth & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298 n. 1, 847 P .2d 1156, 1159 n. 1

(1992). A governmental entity is subject to liability for money damages arising out of certain
conduct and those of its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment to the
extent a private party would be liable, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 6-903. However, a
governmental entity may qualify for immunity under one of the exceptions to government
liability provided in the Tort Claims Act. For the immunity to be applicable, the conduct must
fall within the definition of a "claim" within the meaning of the Act The word "claim" as used
in § 6-904A must be interpreted in accordance with the definition of the ITCA § 6-902, which

provides that "claim''
... means any written demand to recover money damages from a
governmental entity or its employee which any person is legally
entitled to recover under this act as compensation for the negligent
or otherwise wrongful act or omission of a governmental entity or
its employee when acting within the course or scope of his
employment.
LC. § 6-902(7). The term "claim," as used in the ITCA, describes claims for damages arising
from a wrongful act or omission. In alleging the three state law claims resulting from an alleged
tax, Plaintiff has alleged wrongful conduct that could subject a governmental entity to liability
and they seek recovery of money damages.
A review of the exceptions to liability reveals that Idaho Code § 6-904A(l) provides
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inununity that is applicable here. Section 6-904A states in relevant part as follows:

A. govern.mental entity and its employees while acting within the
course and scope of their employment and without malice or
criminal intent and without reckless, willful and wanton conduct as
defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any
claim which:
1. Arises out of the assessment or collecdon of any tax or fee.
I.C. § 6-904A(l) (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff contends that the collection of a "tax or fee"
was inappropriate and seeks damages as a result of the tax. Pursuant to § 6-904A the City is
inunune for any state law claims that arise out of the collection of a tax or fee.
In this case, Plaintiff alleges two fees, the capacity and user fee, contained an improper

PILOT component and that the City improperly received a benefit from the Plaintiffs. As is
discussed more fully above, there was never a PILOT component in the capacity fee so there
could never have been an unjust enrichment. However, it cannot be disputed that the state law
taking, unjust emichment and equitable estoppel/equitable tolling claims all fail because the City
is inunune. The PILOT component of the User Fee was a tax collected exclusively as part of the
User Fees. Following the Court's decision in Building Contractors, however, the City
immediately discontinued charging the PILOT fee, resulting in each of the Pocatello resident
users seeing an immediate decrease in their water and sewer utility bills. On December 19,
2013, the City lowered utility user fees in compliance with the Building Contractors decision.
Pocatello residents saw an approximately 10% decrease in their monthly water and wastewater
bills. (Stroschein Aff., ,r 9).
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the City acted with malice or criminal intent and
with reckless, willful and wanton conduct in the collection of the PILOT fee. Rather, it is clear
that the City believed that it had the authority to collect the PILOT fee pursuant to City of
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Chubbuckv. City ofPocatello, 127 Idaho 198,899 P.2d 411 {1995). In other words, and as

discussed above, there was a good faith belief by the City that it was permitted to collect the fee.
Accordingly, there is no basis for the state law unconstitutional taking, unjust enrichment or the
equitable estoppel/equitable tolling claims and summary judgment on each of these state law
claims is warranted.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant City of Pocatello respectfully requests that this Court
grant its Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims and dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint with
prejudice.

Dated this .l'J_ day of March, 2015.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
this

I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
day of March, 2015, by the method indicated below:

-l.3-

Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Fax: 529-9732
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 524-3391

b<]" Mailing

[ '1

_

Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

[)d"Mailing

C'J Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
21 OS Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Telephone: (208) 523-S 171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
Nathan M. Olsen, ISB No. 7373
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: CV-2014-1520-0C

vs.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D.
GAFFNEY

Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO

)
)ss.

County of Bonneville

)

I, Michael D. Gaffney. having been duly sworn on oat~ depose and state;
1. I am co-counsel for Plaintiffs in the above-entitled case.
2. I am competent to testify and do so through personal knowledge.
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3. Plaintiffs are requesting, at minimum, additional time to prepare their response

to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment orto continue the hearing set for April 13,
2015 to May I8, 2015.
4. The schedules of Plaintiffs' counsel have been such that there has not been
adequate time to prepare briefing and affidavits. Co..cotn1sel for Plaintiffs, Nathan Olsen,
had a family trip to California planned many weeks in advance of receiving the summary
judgment motion for the week of March 21-28, 2015.

5. I have been occupied with nwnerous post-trial motions and pre-appellate
preparations related to ajury trial I recently completed in Blaine County, Idaho on
February 27, 2015.
6. Additionally, Plaintiffs' coW1se1 has not had adequate time to prepare for and
take the deposition of Joyce A. Stroschein, the City of Pocatello Chief Financial Officer.

Ms. Stroschein's affidavit submitted in support of Defendant's summary judgme_nt
motion contains nine summary spreadsheets to 'Which additional discovery is needed to
adequately respond to the dispositive motion.
7. Mr. Olsen has been in contact with defense counsel, Nathan Starnes to request
additional time to respond to the motion for summary judgment. Mr. Starnes indicated to

Mr. Olsen that it was his preference to have both the summary judgment and the
Plaintiffs, motion for class certification heard on the same day.
8. My assistant has been in contact with Karla, Judge Dunn's clerk to find a

mutually workable date for the hearings. The date that appears to be mutually available
is May· 18, 2015, however, at this point I am awaiting confinnation from Mr. Starnes that
this date is acceptable for hearing both pending motions.
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plaintiffs' response to the summary judgment motion and to attempt to find a workable
alternative date to meet the needs of defense counsel. Plaintiffs further submit that there
is no prejudice to the defendant under the court's cUITent scheduling order that would be
caused by moving the hearing date to May 18, 2015.
The plaintiffs respectfully request that the court either move the hearing date to
May 18, 2015 or alternatively allow the plaintiffs until April 6, 2015 to file a responsive
brief: affidavits and deposition excerpts.

IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE RULING ON Tms MOTION. COUNSEL WAIVES

ORALARGU

. ey
eard . air Gaffney PA
Attorney or Plaintiffs
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I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofidaho and on March 27, 2015, I
served a true and correct copy of the MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME AND
TO CONTINUE HEARING, I.R.C.P. 56(c) on the following by the method of delivery
designated below:

Blake G. Hall

D

U.S. Mail

Nathan R. Starnes
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QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated,

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C
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I, Nathan M. Olsen, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the testimony given in this sworn
statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing· but the truth, that it is made on my personal
knowledge, and that I would so testify in open court if called upon to do so.
1.

I am co-counsel representing the Plaintiffs in this matter.

2.

I am also the attorney that represented the plaintiff, Building Contractors

Association of Southeast Idaho (Builders Association), in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial
District in and for the State of Idaho in Bannoc~ County, Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C (Building

Contractors' case).
3.

Exhibit A attached is a true and correct copy of this Court's Memorandum

Decision and Order on City's Motion to Reconsider and Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for
Reconsideration entered in the Building Contractors' case on November 15, 2013.
4.

Exhibit B attached is a true and correct copy of a public document prepared and

submitted by the City of Pocatello in response to the Plaintiffs' written discovery req1J.ests which
from the total amount of PILOT and Return of Equity Fees collected and used by the City since
FY 2006, the total amount being $28,329,231.43.
5.

Exhibit C attached are true and correct portions of the deposition testimony and

exhibits of David Swindell taken on December 14, 2012.
6.

Exhibit D attached is a true and correct copy of the affidavit and report of David

L. Hunter submitted to the Court in the Building Contractors' case on May 24, 2013. Mr.
Hunter has also been disclosed as an expert for the plaintiffs in this case.
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7.

At no point during the Building Contractors' case did the City ever disclose Joyce

A. Stroschein as a person with knowledge or authority on issues pursuant to that case, including

the policies, budgeting, expenditures and collections regarding PILOT fees.

DATED this 1st day of April, 2015.
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I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed a 'mey n the State ofldaho, with my office in
, 2015 I served atrue and correct

Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the_/_ day of

copy of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct
postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule 5(b), I.R.C.P.
Persons Served:
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP .
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 150.
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

Mfilhoz
( ) man.

. hand (, fax ( ) email

FAX: {208) 621-3008
EMAIL: bgb@hasattorneys.com
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BANNOCK CBUN n··
rL!:FH\ Of TH£ cou1n

2013NOV 15 AM 9: 2~
BY----~·---·---lJfPtffY G[EIU( ·

IN THE DISTlUCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

. STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
Register No.Cy~201 l-5228~oc

_

BUILDING CONTRACTORS,
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST
IDAHO, an Idaho_ non-pmfit corporation,
Plaintiff,

CITY OF POCATELLO) ~n Idaho
Municipality,

Defendant.

.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND .
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO RECONSIDER AND PL/\lNTIFF'S
MiIBNDED MOTION FOR
RECONSIDER:ATION

This matter is before the Court on the Gity of PocateUo,s (Defendant or City) Motion to
Reconsider the Court,s March· 281 2013 Memorandum Decision and Orde1· on Defendant's
Motion fo1· Summary Judgment. The City filed Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration with on
accompanying me~orandum on April 22, 2013. The Plaintiff, Building Contractors Association
of Southeast Idaho (Plaintiff 01· Association),_ filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion fol' Reconsideration on May 61 2013. On May 9, 20i3, the City filed Defendant's Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion fol' Reconsideration ·aud also the Second Affidavit of David
CVM201 l d5228-0C
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ONDEFENDAN'rS MOTION TO RECONSIDER·
AND PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION FOR.RECONSIDERATION .
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K. Swindell. The Court heard 01·al argmnent ot1 this matter on May 13, 2013, and took the Citts

, Motion to Reconsider under adviseme11t. Subsequently, on May 28, 2013, Plaintiff filed
Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Sanctions under I.R.C.P, 37(b) and Motion for Reconsideration.

Plaintiff's Motioi1 to ~econside~· was Amended on August 6J 2013. Subsequent responsive
filings and affidavits were filed) which the Comt has also considered. After carefully considering

the motions, memo!'andums, and oral arguments of the parties; the Court now issues its
Memorandum Decision and Order on the Defendant's Motlon for Reconsideration and Plaintiff's
Amended Motion for Reconsideration.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
'

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1l{a)(2)(B) provides that H[a] motion for reconsideration

of any interlocutory orders of the trial comt may be made at m1y time before the entry of final
judgment but not later than fomteen (14) days after the entry of the fi11al judgme11t, 11 The
decision of whethe1· to grnnt 01· deny a motion fol' reconslde1-ation made pt1rsuantto Idaho Rule of

Civil Procedul'e l l(a)(2)(B) is left to the sollnd discretion of the· trial coul't, 1 . The party
requesting the motion fol' reconsideration is permitted to present riew facts or law to aid the co111·t
t ._

..

. ...

in its 1·econsideration but is not required to do so.2 However, if new evidence is presented the

burden is on the moving party to bring the n~v evidence to the courts attention., .

...
v. Porfneil[Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, S60, 212 P.3d 982, 990 {2009). In reviewing whether a trial court
abused its discretion, this Court applies a three~part test, which asks whethe.r the disll'ict court: (1) correctly
.
perceived the issue as one of discl'etlon; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion; and (3) reached its
decision by an e.xercise of reason.
·
.
:i. Joh11so11 v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 4681 147 P.3d 100 (Ct. App. 2006). .
3 Coem· d'Alene Mining Co. l', First Nat'/ Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 800 P.2d 1021i (1990).
1 11011

..
! ...
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DISCUSSION

I.

Pl'oceduml History
Since the Court's initial decision in thl~ case, there have been a substantial number of

additional submissions to the record. In Ol'det· to set the basis of the Court's decision on each

pmiy' s respective motion to reconsider, the Cout1 will summadze the most substantial
developments ht the case:
A.

The City's Motion to Reconsider

In_ its Motion to Reconsider, the City argues that the Association does not _have standing

.

.

on what it asserts is the only issue remaining in this matter, which the City chat·act~rizes as
11

whethel' the City is using those [rate of return fees] or payment in lieu of taxes funds for

purposes otl1er than to support the existing water au~ sewel' systems.114 The Citt s position is the
Association does not have standing on th.e remaining issue because the rate of return 01· payment
in lieu of taxes (PILOT) is paid by every usel' of the Cityts water and sewet· systems, and·
therefore, is a generalized gl'ievauce shared by all taxpayers. Conseq\iently, pul'suant to "ro11ng v.

City of Ketchum and Miles v. Id~ho Power Co., the City argues that the Association does not
have standing because it does not have a unique ham1.5 The City concedes the Association has

standing on the othe1· issues raised and addressed in the Court's Memorandum Decision and
Order - that no issues of genuine material fact exist as to 1) whether the City is impermissibly
using
. the connection fees to fund future expansion and capital improven1ent projects for. the
4 Defendant's Memorandum Jn Support of Motion forlleco11sideration 1 p. 2 tlled April 22, 2013,
·
s See Youilgv. qtJ ofKetclmn,, 137 Idaho 102, 44 P.3d IJS7 (2002) r•But evcn.ifashowlng~an be made ofan.
Injury_ In fact, standing may be, dented lVh11n the as.setted J1cmri is ?-SCneralizedgrlevance share.d by all or a large
eh1ss of citizens."); Miles v. ldallo Power Co., 116 Idaho 6351 637, 778, P.2d 157, 159 (1989) ("a citizen and
tax.payer may not challenge a governmentafenactment wliere the injmy Is one suffered by all citlze11s and taxpayers
alike.''); See also S111denl Lo«11 Funrf v. Payeue Col/Illy, l2S Idaho 824, 828, 87S P.2d 236,240 (Ct, App. 1994) (A
concerned c1tb:en who seeks to ensure the government abides by the Jaw does not have standing,)
CV-201 l~S228"0C
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and 2) whethet· the connection fees collected by the City al'e

reasonably imposed. 7 In sum, the City contends that the Association derives standing in this case:

only through the Citis assessmet~t and collection of connection fees, but the Association does
not have a unique injul'y i.n fact as to how the City uses funds collected through the rate of return
01· PILOT fees

because every taxpayer who uses the City's water and s_ewer systems pays the rate

of retum and/or PILOT fees.

B.

TJte Association's Motion and Amended Motion for Reconsideration

Following the headng on the City's motion for reconsideration the Association fl.led its
own Motion fol' Reconsiderationt which was subsequently amended. Supplemental bdefiug on
'·,

that motion was provided by the A.'3sociation on September 30J 2013.3 This supplemental
briefing argues) in relevant paii, that if the ~otirt finds the City's assessment of the PILOT fee to
be impenn"issiblet the11 the Comt shoilld also find the City's current user and connection fees

impermissible. The Association argues this based on the Cityts reliance on the PILOT fee in
calculating the riecess-ary user and connection fee~. The Association requests that the Court

invalidate the cm·1·ent rates and require the city to implement a fee rate that is '1constitutional and .
permissible119
C.

The Com·t's Memo1·andum Decision and 01·der

The Association brought this case seeking declaratQry and h\functlve relief in reference to
the Clty's connection fee policies, arguing that the City's cmrent policies are an unconstitu~iollal
use of police powers because the fees do not have a proportionate nexus to tbefr regulated use

at p. 28,
Id. at 30.
: See. Supplemental Memorandum in Support o!Plaintifrs Amended Motion for Reoonsideratio11.
Id. at 4,
GId.
7
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. and are also contrary to Idaho stah1tory and case law because they are in violation of the Idaho
Revenue Bond Act, I.C. § 50-1026, et at. 10 The Association claimed standing in its Complaint
be~ause its members pay both. connection and usei· fees. 11 In its Motion to Rec~nsidel', the City
now distinguishes between the City's assess,izent and collection of connecUon and user fees and
the City's collection and use of PILOT/Retum on Equity/Rate of .Return /franchise Jees. 12 In
support of its Motion to Reconsidel', the City suggests that the Court made this same distinction
in its original Memoi·andum Decisio11 and Order by finding that there were no genuine issues of

material fact con?eming whether connection fees were being used for fut\1re expansion and
whether they were arbitrarily imposed, but that an issue of fact remained as to "wllethe1· the· City .
is using those [rate of return fees] or payment in lieu of laxes fimds for purposes other than to

support the ex.isting watet· n~d sew!r systems>'13 In support oftltis distinction, the City has filed
the Third and Fourth Affidavits of David K. Swindell, explaining that the City has adj1.1sted its
accounting procedures and, as of March 20 l_ 3, coru1ection/capacity fees are held separately from
user fees in separate funds. 14 Mi·. Swindell's third affidavit indicates that the entire balance of

co1mection/oapacity fees collected sin~e 2007 nre held in these acco1.mts. 15 Swindelfts fourth

°Complaint, p. 9,

1

11 Complaint, p. 10, 132.
12 Uappears to tile Court that the City does not, Jn its

Motion to Reconsider or in any other memorandum previously
flied, make n distinction between P1LOTi franchise, and return on eqltlty/ru1d rate ofl'eturn fee3, See Defendant's
Memorandun1 In Support of motion for Reconsi~eration, p. 2 {the City clu1raclerlzes !Ito remaining issue as to
wbe!her the City is impermissibly using 11rate of return fees or paymellt in lieu of taxes funds"): Id nt p.S ("[T]he
Cityts use ofji'at1cJ1/sefees from the water and wastewater systems that are messed to alt individuals who live in
Pocatello" is the only remaining issue .for ttJal.); Id. at p. <, {"in this case, the rate of return or PILOT fees are taxes
that are collected from all citizens in Poeatello. 11); Id. at p. 7 eTlic rate of return and PILOT fees are designed lo
satisfy the same purposes and are sy110,1ymous11).
•
13 Defendant's Memorandtun In Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2.
u See Third Affidavit of David K. Swindell 4:8.
15 Jd at 4:7.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEF.Ei'IDANT)S MOTION TO RECONSIDER·
AND PLAINTIFF1 S AMENDED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Page5
340

(~

'

._._,.,.

'

Affidavit indicates that the PJLOT fee is charged only to the opernting fonds, and there is no

relationship between the PJLOT fee and the capaclty fee ftmds. 16
First, the Court makes cleal' that, in its original decision, it did not deliberately distinguish
between com1ection fees and PILOT/rate of ret1milreturu on equity/franchise fe~s in_ the way the

City suggests. Pursuant to 1he AssociationJs Complaint, the issue before the Coint was whether
the City was implementing its co_1mectlonfee policy, as palt of its operation of its city owned and
operated public utilities, contl'ary to constittttionnl, statutory, and case law in Idaho. Therefore, as

stated in its umbrella paragraph relating to the medts of the City's Motion for Summary
Judgment, the Comt ex.plained:
Pursttant to Loomis, in making a determination whether conneal/on fee.fl and an
equity buy-in system are stallltory permissible, a Court 1m1st determine two
things: 1) whethe1: the revenue collected from connection fees is used for a
permissible purpose under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act and 2) whethel' the fees
at·e reasonably and not arbitrnrily determined. 17

This is a two part test. 18 The Court found that there was no issue of fact ci;mcerning the second

part of test, but that there was

ai1

issue of fact conceming the first part of test, i.e., whether

revenue collected from connection fees is imperniissibly being \lsed Hfor p\ltposes other than to
support the existing wate~ an~ sewe1· systenis." 19 Therefore, since the whole test was whether the .

connectlonfees were statutodly pel'missible, the Court answered the first prot of the test in tern1s
Fourth Affidavit of David K. Swhtdell 2:2.
Decision and Order on Det'endant'& Motlon fur Summary Judgment, p. IS-16, issued May 28, 2013
iMemorandum Decision and Order).
.
· 8 The Court in fuct, dlvlded t!te first step of 1110 test into two parts -1) wb.etl1cr r~vormc frorn the collection fees was
impermlssibly beittg used "for purposes other than to support the existing water and sower systems"; and 2) whether
revenue from the connection fees was being lmtlermissibly used to fund f\1ture expnnslon and capital Improvements
of the waler and sewer systems. Contrary to the City's Memorandum In Support ofMotion for Reconsideration at
page 4J lhe Court did not explicitly hold tllat the 0 connectlon/capacity fees were appropriately collected by the City
for repair and replacement of the existing infrastructure." Rather, the Court fon11d that the Association did not meet
its evldentiary burden to show that the connection fees were being used 10 fund capilat lmp1·ovement projects. See
the Court's Memorandum Decision and Otder, p. 27~28,
16 See

17 Memorandum

19 !d.

at 23,
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of whethe1· the revenue collected fi'Oln connection fees was being used for a statutm·y pmpose,
rather than whethel' P1LOT/rate of retum/reti.m1 on eqnlty/fhmchi~e fees were being 1.1sed for an
impetmissible pur1,ose. As for any distinction that the City wishes to make between
assessment/co1Iectiou of fees mtd the use of fees, it is the Court's view that both the revenue _
collected from connection fees and the use of those fees are intertwined in the first part of the
'" test. Even if the Court finds, a..~ it did, tliat the City's methodology of calculating connection fees

is not mbitrm·y, the City must also pass the first part of the test - that the fees are not being i1sed
for a statutorily impem1issible purpose. If an entity has standing to challenge the seco11d pal't of
test, as the City concedes the Association did; a logical conclusion. is t11at they have standing to
challenge the first pait of tho test also. Nonetheless, the Court will analyze below whethet· the

Association bad ~tanding to challenge whether the City was using revenue collected from the
connection fees, thl'Ough the assessment and use of U1e PILOT fees, for ijn impem1issible
purpose.

II.

Standing
_The City's motion

to reconsidet· has xenewed challenges to the Association's standing to

bring this action. The <:oul't will first ~nalyze the Association's standing to e:hallenge the
assesstne11t of PILOT fees with l'espect to co1mection fees. Then the Com't will analyze t!1e
Association's standing to challenge the assessment of PILOT fees with respect to user fees.

A,

Does tlte Association have stamljug to challenge the use of ~!LOT fees as

applied to the connection fee?
After car~fuUy reviewing the recol'd, wh.ich the Court.outlines below, the Court finds

there is substantial evidence to show that the 1·eveime collected from the co1111ection and ·user
CV-2011-5228-0C
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fees 20 was comingled and placed into the water and sewer ftmds accounts, p1fo1· to March 2013.
The,:e does not appear to be any evidence as to how the .connection fees and user fees could have .

been or we1·e separately accounted for, prior ~o March 2013. After the connection and user fees
were comingled into the watel' and sewer funds, the evidence supports~ and_ the City concedesj
that the City the11 transfen·ed money from the wa1el' and sewer funds into the General Fu11d under
transfel'S that have been called· by val'ious names ~ PILOT/rate of return/return on.
equity/franchise fees. 21 The City concedes that this PILOT charge is a tax chiwged to the City's
water and sewer depa1·tme11t as if it was operating as a. pl'ivate utility company. Although the

City now al'g\1es that PILOT fees have never been assessed to the funds containing
connectlon/capacity fees) the Comt still finds the Association ha.~ standing because it is elem· that
money p~id by connection fee pnyel's was commingled with use1· fees, fl·om which money was
transferred to pay 1he PILOT fee, prior to March 2013. The issue of whethe1· the PILOT could
evel' be assessed to co1111ection fees 1·einains an issue in this cas6> which seeks declaratory relief.

Therefore, the Court finds that the Association has standing to challenge whether the l'evenue
collected from connection fees 1 and then transferred from the water and .sewer accounts to the
General Fund through the use of a PILOT fee, is t1sed for a pemtissible PU1'POSe unde1· the Idaho
Revenue Bond Act.

As noted, the record reflects that prior to March 2013 the connection and usei- fees were
collectlvely poured into the wate1· and sewer funds accounts.

I11

h!s depositton1 Swindell

explained that when the building department collected a connection fee as pat·t of a building
from co1mectlo11 fees in that user tees are the monthly fees paid by all customers or
usot·s of111e water and sewer systems,
·
11 For pm·poses of this decision, such programs shall bo collectively referred to hereafter as PILOT fees, bu_t
essentially the City is charging its own wnte1· aitd sewer department a rate oft-etum fee as if the department was a
privat~ water and sewer entity.
20 User fees are distinguished
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permit, '·then those f\mds and dollars are credited to the wate1· fund or water pollution control
ii.mg as appropriate/'22 Swindell ful'ther e."<plained that eoru1ection/capacity fees wel'e cha1u1ele_~
Into tluee fonds: 1) building permit - designated as Fund 001; 2) watel' - designated as F,md

031; and 3) w~stewatel' - designated as Fund 032.23 SwindeH also explained that the uset· fees
wel'e also poured into the water and wastewater funds named above.2'' Ill bis fil'st affidavit

Swindell stated: "the c::apacity/connecti~n fees are collected and segregated into the appl'opriate
water and wastewater funds.'125 In the letter to Logan Robinson, Mayor Chase names the 11Water.t
Sewe1· a11d Sanitation Funds'> as the "enterprise ftmds.,. Mayor Chase explains they are called the
"enterprise funds,, because the nione~ p~aced in these funds comes mainly from fees generated
by each or the three public utility enterprises, ,,26

Next, money from the above named funds was 1l'ansferred into the Genet-al fond under a
program that has had various names including, Return on Equity, Rate of Return, PILOT, and

franchise fees. Swindell and Mayor Chase define these terms as follows:
• Franchise Fee - c,A franchise fee is a fee for use of the public right of way
imposed on most utilities for operating within the p\tblic 1ight of way within the
City limits. Telephone is exempted by the state constitution. The fee is calculated
as a percentage of gross revenues. For example, el~tric has a .franchise fee of l %;
natural gas Juts a franchise fee of 3%; cable has a franchise fee of 5%.21

21 Deposition of David Swindell •• p. 50: l.12°17, 1\ttached at E:xhibft7 to Affidavit ofNathau M. Olsen, filed on
January 4, 2013. (Swindell Depo).
v Swlndell Depo., p. SO: 1.18-p,52: I. 23. Swlndell also explains that the wastewater fund is divided further Into the
wastewater collectlon system and the wnstewntertreatment plant because tl1e.City. of Chubbuck hns its own
·collection system but uses Pocatello 1s wastewater treatment plant.
·
14 Swindell Depo., p. 53: 1.9-18.
·
.
~s Affidavit ofDavid K Swindell in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 1 16, filed on November 13, 2012.
{Swindell Aff.)
·
. ·
• 6 Mayor Chase August 221 2005 letter to Logan Robison, p. 2, nUached as Exhibit D to Affidavit of Syd Wood,
filed on Jamiary 4, 2013. Also attached ns 8;d1ibit 18 lo Swindell Aff.1 which is attached as ExhllJit 7 to Olsen Aft
(The letter from Mayor Chase In botlt exhibits sits behi11d Dnvld Swindell's September 29, 20 l OMemo.) ("Mayor.
Chase 200S Letter"),
27 Swhtdell Aft. at 'i 4.
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• R~te of return -"The "t·ate of return" pollcy refers to city-owned Jmblic utilities
(i.e. water, sewer, etc.) making a transfer to the general fimd. 28
• Retllrn on em1ity - '~In prior years, the city government described the transfel' as a
111·ate of returu0 or "return on equity'' as if the taxpayers were the shareholders
(wI1ich they are), Fairness and reasonableness was established by comparing the
city's rate :of return on the utility equity at a rate of 6.5% compared to the 11.5 to
13.5% allowed fo1· private companies by the Idaho Utility Commission. The 1·ate
of retum is part of the budget process and the rates are set each year and appl'oved
by the City CotJncil."29

Mayor Chase described the Return on Equity as follows: ~'The City Council has
chosen to make it a City policy to have the ''enterprise fundsu pay a rate of return
on each utility equal to 7% of the equity in each business. By way of comparison,
private reglilated utiHties are allowed between 11.5% and 13.5% rate of re tum by
the Idaho Public UtiHties commission. This is a policy decision of the City
Council, but It does compensate the ~axpayer for the lack of any franchise fee 01·
other payment for use of the public right of way. The money goes to the General
Fund which the City Council utilizes as a property tax substitution.30
•

PILOT -''For the past two years, the rates have been re·desoribed as a franchise
fee(% of gross revenues) and a paymentMin•lieu of-taxes (PILOT) to make it
directly comparable to private utilities operating in the community such as
Intermou11tain Oas. The PILOT ls calculated on the prior year city properly tax
levy 1:ate .multipli~d by the estimated market value per the most recent financial
plan pl'epal'ed by an outside consulting engineer. ,m
.

Mayoi· Chase described PILOT in his letter to Logan Robinson as follows: "The
City ·council has chosen to make it a City policy to have the "entel'prise ftmds"
make a payment in. lieu of taKes to the Genernl fund based on the depreciated
valuation of theil' physical plants and last year's city property tax levy rate. This
payment is simila1· to the federal ·gove1'nment1s payment of PILOT to some local
coni,muuities, and is a method to pay something for their use of police, fil'e and
streeta.32

.

Swindell Aff. at f 6.
Aff.11t f7.
30 Mnyor Chase.2005 Letter, p. 3.
31 Swindell Aft 18,
32 Mayor Cahse2005 Letter, p. 2.
2'

· 29 Swindell
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Swindell further explains that the "internal franchise fee,, AND "P!iyme~t in Lieu of Taxes
(PII:.OTY, have replaced the 11mte of return" or ''return on equity!'33 The fra;1ch.ise fee and
PILOT are two differen.t transfers that a1·e taken from the water and wnstewatel' fuuds. 34 Swindell

exp]ained that 11 the combined amounts of FY13 franchise fee a11d PILOT are 13.8% of planned

revenue for wate1· and 15.5% for sewei·."15
According to Swi11dell 1s Fom1h Affidavit_. the City does not charge a PILOT fee to the
connection fees, but only to the user fees charged to customel's of the systems. What the
Affidavit does not say is that nPILOT fee 11:as never bee-n charged to connection fees during the

time that both connection and user fees were comingled. However, prior to that Affida-vit) ~t was
clear that all connec!lon nnd user fees were poured into the three ccenterprise i\mds.11 The City
thel'I. had a policy of tnmsferring money from .the water nnd sewer fonds into the genet'al fond.
Therefol'e) tlto rate of return/return on equity or the PILOT/franchise fee should 11ot be
cl~at·actel'ized so much as a fee collected by the wate1· and sewel· funds but as a i~transfer" fee
.

.

based on a City policy to transfer watel' and sewer funds to the general funds. 36 In bis memo to
the City Clerk, Swh1dell explained that for FYl 1 the City plam1ed to transfer $1,585,237 from
the wate1· fund to the general fund "fo1• a return on equity, to help fund th~ activities of the

Ge11erar Fund."37 Similarly, in FYl 1 the City pla1med to transfer $1,263,654 from the Water
PollutiQll Contt·o! Fund to the e1oeneral Fund as a return on equhy to help fund the activities of

f 12.
Swi11dell Aff. ~ 9.
35 Swindell Aff.11 l.
·
36 Swindell Aff. j 6; SwindellDepo, p. 80: l.24-p. 8I: I.IO
37 David Swindell September 29, 2010 Memo to City Clerk, attached as Exhibit D to Affidavit of Syd Wood, filed
on January 4; 2013. Also attached as Exhibit 18 to Swindell Aff., which Is attached as Exhibit 7 to Olsen Aff.
C'Swindell Memo"). .
33 Swindell Aff.

34
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the General Fund. 1133 These transfers did not include additional tmusfers that were made from the
wate1· and sewe1· funds (1) into the Geneml Fund to Sllj)port the Human Resources Depal'iment;
(2) into the Emergency Repair fund to build reserves for emergency repair of facilities; and (3)

into the Debt Service Funds, which were each outlined separately from the ":retum on equity"
tmnsfet·.
Based on the foregoing, it appears cleat· to the Court that revenue collected froin both
connection fees and user fees was being, or could have been, transferred into the General Fund

pllL'suant to the PILOT fee) charged to the water a11d sewei· department as a means of transferring
connection and/or ·use1· fees to fund gene1·al city expenses. Prior to March 2013, there was 110
evidence that it was only the uset· fees (i.e., the fees that eve,y user of the wate1· and sewer system
pays), that wei·e used to fund the PILOT transfers from. the water and sewer funds to the general
fm1d. It is cleat' that the connection fees (i.e., fees paid only by builders of new constmction) and

user fees wel'e comingled into the watet' and sewer funds, from which the City tra11sfel'l'ed .the
PILOT fee into the Genernl Fund.
David Swindell, it~ his second affidavit, states that Pocatello residents ~'pay the monthly
use~· i-ate (which includes a pro 1·ata share of the PILOT fee).,iJ~ Additi~ally, SwindeU states)
'1[b]oth·the water and sewer depal'tment recover the PILOT fees through the fee charged to all

users of the waler and sewer system.'~40 However, there was nothing in SwindelPs statements in
this case de.finitely stating that the PI~OT transfers to the ge11e1-al fond were not derived from
BOTH. the use!' fee AND the connection fee. The Association's argument that the payers of the .
-cotmection fees wel'e paying th.e brunt of the PILOT fee "taxes" is bolst~red by the evidence that.
la Id.
39

Second Affidavit o!Davld K.Swi11dell115, filed May9, 20 l3.
at 14,

·IO Id
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when the City chose to implement this policy, that is, go from n property tax system to a fee
· ~ased system to generate revenue fol' the City, as described in Mayol' Chase's 2006 letter to 1he
· Attomey Gen.er~l,41 the comtection fees rose substantially while the usei· fees l'emaine.d relatively
the same. 42 Howevcr,just a.s the spike in mtes of the c:oru1ectio11 fees and not tne user fees is not
fully definitive that it is the connection fee users only that al'e paying these 11ta:<:es," i.e. PILOT
fees, the fact that the Court has ruled that 1hel'e is no question of fact whether the City's

·methodology and calculation of the co~ection fees are \weasonably' 01· arbitrarily imposed is
not a definitive determination that it is the only the user fees that were being transferred through
the PILOT fee taxes. What is clear and 1..mdisputed at this point is that revenue collected from the
cormection fees and user fees collectively were transfened to the General Fund, vla the PILOT
fee transfel' prowam, and used to 'ihelp fund the activities of the General Fund.n_

Because payment of co1mectton fees is not a genernlized grievance but n specific harm
.

'

alleged by the Association .and because the 1-evenue from the connectio11 fees was comingled
with funds used as part of the PILOT fee transfel's, the Court finds that the Association has

standing to challenge whether the use of any PILOT fee assessments to the coru1ectio11 fees are
t1sed for a permissible purpose under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, i.e., whether the City is using
.

.

Mayer Roger Chase Dcccmbel' 26, 2006 letter to Attorney General Lawrence Wadsen, attached as Exhibit A to
Nnthan Olsen's February 13, 2013 affidavit in support of Supplemental Response to Defcndnnl's Motion for
Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's IRCP 37 Motion for Snn0tio11s, filed February 13, 2013. {Mayor
Chase 2006 Leiter).
.
·
·
" 1 See Affidavit ofNathat1 M. Olsen,. filed January 4, 2013, Exhibits 1·6. These exhibits are Pocatello Cjty Council
Resolutions from the years 2005 to 20 lOthat set the rates for usel' and conueclion fees for the upcoming yeai·. lt1 ·
Fiscal Year 2006 the comtectlon fee for a '2.·lnch co1mectio11 was $887 (Resomtion No. 2006-28 attached as Exltlbit
1; Also Resolution 2005-31 attached as E.·d1.lbit 4). In Flscal Year 2007 the same 2-lnch coru1eetion was assessed
$7,940 (Resolution No. 2006-28 attached as Exhibit l; Also Resolution No. 2006-3S·attached as Exhibit 3). Finally
in Fiscal Year 20 l I lbesmne 2·htoh connectiou ,ws assessed $8,260 (Resolution No.2010-29 attached as Exhibit .
6). ln Comparison~ In Fiscal Year 2006 the monthly user fee for a metered, reslde11tlal, single lhmily In Pocatello
was $19.00/mo (Resolution NO. '200S-32, attached as Exhibit S). Whereas In Fis<:al Year 2007 n1e same user fee for
a metered, residential, single family was $19,50/mo (Resolution No. 2007-36, attached as B:dllbit 6), With the same
user fee in Fiscal Year2011 be.ing$21.SO/mo (Resolution No. 2010·30, attached as Bxhiblt6),
~t
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those funds transferred for pmposes othex than to ••support the existing water and sewer
systems."
B.

Does the Association have standing to cllalle11gc tlie CUis uae1· fee policies?·

The Court has detem1ined the Association lias standing t? challenge the PILOT fee
transfers that may have been applied to cotlnection fees. If the Com·t finds the Association
alleged and has standing to cballeuge the City's user fee policies, then any question 1·elnted to
whether the Association must prove that it is only the connection fees rather than the usel' fees
that are actually being ta:{ed as part of the PILOT fee transfers becomes irrelevant. If the

Association has standing to challenge both the City's user fee a11d connection fee policies, the
CouL1 wmdd then determine whethel' the PILOT transfers are impel'missible tax.es on both the

connection fees and the user fees~ and thel'efore. whichever sou1'C~ has funded the PILOT

transfers wol.lld become irrelevant.
Rest1:1,ting, to establish standin_g a litigant must nallege or demonstrate an inj1.u1 in fact

and a substantial likelihood the relief 1-equested will prevent or redress the claimed htj\.tty/.43 An
i1tju1·y in fact is a showing of a "distinct palpable injury" arid is a lifairly traceable causal

coµnection between the clalmed injury a11d the challenged conduot."44

The City asserts, pursuant to Greer v. Le1viston Golf & Country Club an9, Bopp v. the
City ofSandpoint, that for even a litigant who can pl'ove an i1tjUL')' in fact 11standh1g may still be

denied when the ass'?11ed hal'm is a generalized grievance shat·ed by all or a lat·ge class of
citizens/' 45 In G1'ee1·, the Idaho Supreme Cou11 held U1at ta:<payers and citizens of the city of
Lewiston did not have standing to bring a declaratory actio11 challenging a city ordinance
43

Id. at l 04; 1lS9.

-

44 la-Jiles v. Idaho Powe,· C().,
45 Ymmg v. City ofKetclmm,

l 16 Idaho 6:lS, 6391 778 P.2d 7S7, 761 {1989).
137 Idaho 102, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002).
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dismmexing the Lewiston Golf and Country Ch.ib.46 The citizen-plaintiffs claimed that the
disaMextion of the golf coul'Se would !'educe the revenue the City of Lewiston collected in
property taxes1 and thereby increase the overall taxes of the rest of the cltizens of the city.'" The

Greer Court held that the citizen-plaintiffs. did not bave standing because they did not have an
htjmy pec1.1liar to themselves, but l'ather the plaintiffs simply alleged a generalized grievance

common to all taxpayers of the city.4~ In Bopp v. Cit)' of Sandpoint, the Idaho Supreme Cou1t
likewise fou11d that a pluintiff) a citizen of the city of Sandpoint> did not have standing to
challenge a city ordiim11ce vacating a p1ibHc right-of-way over a bridge beca\1se the citizen-

plaintiff did not own property adjacent to the bridge,. and therefore, whatever injury he s1.1ffered
was suffel'ed alike by all citizens nnd taxpayers of the city of Sandpoint.49 The plaititiff had 110
peculiar injury to himself, aud therefore, had no standing.so _The City alleges that, similar to

. Greer and Bopp 1 all citize11s pay the use! fees ~ecause all citizens a1·e coru1ected to the City's
watcl' and sewe1· systems, and the1·efme, the Associatio11•s members, as users of the water and

sewer system, d~ not have a gl'ievance unique from any o~er citizen.
In opposition to the City's argument1 the Association cites to .Miles v. Idaho Power Co.
and Brewster v. the City of Pocatel!o.51 In Miles, the Id~ho Sl1preme Court held that plaintiffs
challenging Idaho statutes codifying an agreement betwee11 Idaho Power and the State, w~ich
subordinated Idaho Power's water rights to thousands of upstream users, had standing be~ause
they hl'ought. theil' suit as ,·ate.payers and custome1's of Idaho Power
46 GreeJ'

41 Jd.

1~~e1·

than genel'al

v. Lewiston Golf & Co1mJ1y Clt1b, Inc., 81 ldaho 393,342 P.2d 719 (19S9}
.

48 Id.

4'
'0

Bopp v. CJty o/Sa11dpolt1t, 110 ldabo 488, 716 P.2d 1260 (1986).
id.

si Miles v. ldnllo Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, (1989); Bre111ste1· v. City ofPocatello, l 1S Idaho S021 768 P.2d 765
(1988).
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taxpayers.s 2 The ivliles Com1 was not concerned wlth the fact that the ratepayers of Idaho Power
encompassed a ~ery large class, holding, "when the impact of legislation is ·not felt by the entire

populace, but only a select class of citizens, the standing doctl'ine should not be evoked to usurp
the l'ight to challenge the alleged de11ial of constitutional rights in a judicial fo1·um. "53
The Bre1vsler Comt also found that a resident of th~ City of Pocatello had standing to
challenge the legality of a ccstreet maintenance fee. nS4 In Brewster, the issue was whethel' the City

of Pocatello, absent legislation, could uimpose a fee on the ·owners or occupants of property

which abut public stl'eets.''55 The Brewster Coi.Jrt held that Pocatello's imposltion of a "street
fee'' to all owners or occupants of p1'operty that abut p~blic streets was an impermissib_le tax
because it was a revenue raising measure 10 fund the maintenance aud repair of streets rather
thm1 a l'egu!atory fee undel' the city of Pocatello1~ police power that bore a reasonable

relationship to the cost .of reg\llatit1g traffic over Pocatello's streets.56 · The Bl'e\rster Court
explained that "a fee is charged fo1· a direct public service rendered to the pru.1icular consumer

wJ1ile a tax is a forced coutdbution by the public at large to meet public needs.''57
The Com·t finds the.Association,s standing as to its members 1 payment of user fees to be
more closely aligne.d with th.e facts set forth in lvliles and &•ewster. Similar to Miles, where the
Idaho Supreme Court held the plaintiff had standing because he was a ratepaye1· ofldaho Powel',
a pl'ivate utilltyt the Association has standlng to challenge the Citfs user fees policies becat1se
its 111e.mbe1"s are 1'atepayers of the City's water and sewer system} a. City-owned utility, Similar to

Jd.
Id. at 6421 778 P.2d at 764.
54 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765.
"Id atS04. 768P.2dat767,
j 6 Jd at sos~ 768P.'2dat768:
$2

$J

57

Id.
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a private utility, the City charges monthly rates, i.e., user fees, to those who are custome1·s of the
system. Consequently, the Association members are 11ot challenging the Citts use1· fee policies
as faxpayers, and the harm they allege is not n generalized grievance common to all taxpayel'S,

.

.

Only the citizens of Pocatello that connect to the City's water and sewer.systems pay user fees,
and co11seque11tly are taxed by the PILOT fee transfer policies. As the City explained in David
Swindell's second affidavit, those who do not pay the mol1thly user fees nre disconnected from
the system. The1·efore, as users of the watet· and sewer systems, the Association)s members have

a special or peculiar injUl'y not shared by those who do not pay monthly

\tset·

fees. Theil'

gl'ievance Is not just a tangential complaint of a taxpayer whose truces are going to be .raised. if a
'

golf course is disannexed or is disgruntled with the building of a bridge. As explained in 1'1/liles,
the fact that Association's members rep1·esen,t a large class is inconsequential so long as their
injury is a special and not a generalized grievance.-ss
In Brewster. it also could have been argued, similar to the City's argument he1·e, tl1at all

or nearly all of the citizens of Pocatello paid the "street mainte11ance fee,, because nearly every
citizen would own or rent prope1iy that abutted a pi1bUc street.s9 Nonetheless, the BJ'ewsre,· Cou11

held that the plaintiff, as a resident of Pocatello that paid the· "street maintenance fee," had
standing to challenge the fee. 60 Also similar to Brew:rte,-. the Court finds below that the City>s
Plf:,OT fee policies trnnsferdng 1·evenu~ frotn connection and user fees are not regulatory fees
permissible under the City's police power because it does not beat· a reasonable relationship to
the cost of regulating the wate1· and sewer systems. Rather, this Cotu1 has found, sitnilar to
s3 The Court notes here that among the class of citizi:ns who do not pay user fees would bo renters of property and
those who own property that is not connected to the water and sewer systems, such as O\Vltera of undeveloped land;
or perhaps ow11ers of warehouses and the like.
59 11 s Idaho S02, 768 P.2d 165.
60 Id.
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Brewster. that the PILOT fee transfers are impermissible taxes because they aL-e ttsed to generate
l'evenue to meet the. needs of the public at large, Certainly, as the resident in Brewster had

standing to challenge such a fee, so do the users of the City's wa.ter and sewer systems.
Additionally1 the Coul't finds that the Association, in its Complaint, has properly alleged

standing and pied fol' 1'elief on the basis of its members' payment of user fees. In Count I of its
Complaint1 the Association seeks a declamtion that tbe Citts policies are a violation of the tax
and police pow~l' limitations of the Idaho· Constitution. The Association alleged, 11[a] real
controve1·sy exists between the City and Builders Ass'n, including its user fee and connection fee
paying membets. 1161 An identical assertion of standing is made in Count IL ·seeking a declaration
that the City failed to follow bonding pl'ocedures.62 Also in Count II, the Association alleged that
it His entitled to a declaration tha1 thf? Ciiy's Connection fee and ttser fee policy, as it has been
implemented since at least 2005, and as ctu·rently constituted, is in violation of Idaho1s

Constitution a11d code with l'egard to the bonding req~irements.n63 The Court fillds that the above

allegations in the Association's Complaint were sufficient to pl1t the City on notice th~t the
Association was ~lleging standing on. user fees as well as connection fees and was also seeking
relief from the City's user fee policy as well as its connection fee policy.
Therefore, the Court·finds the Association has standing to challenge the City's user fee
policies, and thus the Citfs distinction between the user fee fonds and connection fees funds
does not defeat the Association's standing to challenge the permissibility of the PILOT.fees.

61

Complaint at, 32.

62 Complaint at 140.
63 Complaint at 42.'

f
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Substantive Arguments
The Court finds that there are two remaining substantive issues to be addl'essed in

.

.

response to the parties' motions to reconsider. First, U1e·Comt must decide if the assessment of a
.

.

PILOT fee is impel'missiblc, even in l~ght of the fact that the City's accounting methods have
changed. If so, the second Issue Is the approp1•iate remeqy for that impermissible assessment,
A.

Is the PILOT fee pei·mitted?

The Association, in its Response

i11

Opposition to Defendant's Motion for

Reconsideration, petitioned the Court to also reconsider granting summary judgme11t ill. the
Association's· favor in light of the City's concession that the PILOT and .franchise fee transfers

were taxes. At ornl argument the City motioned the Couit to strike the Association's cross
motion for reconsideration, ~rguing that it was not t~mely filed. The Comt DENIES the City's

Motion to Strike.
Ffrst1 p'lu'Suant to Idaho Rule of _Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B), a motion to reco11sider an

interlocutory order can be filed at any time, so long as it is filed fourteen (14) days before the
Court1s final judgment. Second, the City motioned the Court to reconsider granting it summary

'

judgment. Upon a pa1'ty's request for summary j1.,dgment, a district coutt has the authority to

render summary judgment· ht favor of any pruty, moving· or non-moving1 even if the no11-1noving
party has ·not filed its own motion.64 1<The district comt may grant summary judgment to a non-

moving party even if the party has not filed its own motion with the court. A motion fol' .
s1.1mma1-y judgment allows the court to rule on the issues placed before it as a matter of law; the

&1 Slrh1s LC. v.

. ,, .

..

Erickso11, 144 Idaho 38, 4o-41, 1So P.3d S39, 541-42 (2007),

CV-2011-5228-0C
.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER .
AND PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Page 19
354

()

moving patty l'UllS the risk that the com1 wlll find against it. 1,6S Additionally, slnce the May 13th
l1earing, tbe Associatio11 has filed a Motion to Reconsider and an Amended Motion to
Rec~nsider. Consequently, the Court will determine w~ether summary judgment should be

granted to the Association.
A significant .development since the Court . issued its Miwch 28, 2013 Memorandl1m.
.

Decision and Ordel' on Defendant I s Motion for Summai.-y Judgment is that the City has conceded
that the PILOT fee transfe1·s are taxes. It is also an undisputed fact that revenue from the

connection fees and use1· fees were poured into and comingled into the water and sewer funds,
from which the PILOT fee transfers are taken. The Court recognizes that the City now deposits
connection fees and ·user fees in different accounts and that the PILOT is only drawn from the
use1· ftie fui1d. How~ver, bnsed on the fact that the City has hislorical.ly comingled the use1· and
connection fees into a single account, the Coul't wm also address the permissibility of drawing a

PILOT from both fees.
In Loomis v. City of Hailey, the Idaho Supreme Com1 explained that while nthe Idaho
Constitution permits municipal corporations to impose taxes, such authority is limited by the

taxing power granted by the legislatul'e,,, 66 The Loomis Court also explained that "municipalities

may impose fees _purs1.1ant to its "police powers', to enact regulations for fbrtherance of the public
health, safety or morals.U but fees imposed under this "police power" must bear some l'easonable.
relationship to the cost of enfol'cing tbe regulatfon,,,67 However1 pursua11t to Idaho Constitution,
ai·t. 8, §3 ond the Idaho Reve11ue Bond Act, munteipalities also bave a proprietaey function that
tis Fuller v. Dave Callis1e1•, l 50 Idaho 8481 85 I, '2S2 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2011) (quoting Hal'woodv. Talbel'/, 136 ldaho
672,677, 39 P,3d612, 617 (2001)),
·
.
66 Loomls-v. City ofHalley, 119 ldaha 434, 4371 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991) (citing8rews1e1•11. City ofPacalel/01
11S ldalio 503, 768 P.2d 766 {1989)).
67 Id.
.
.
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pel'mits them to charge rates and fees to 1'construct and maintain certain public works.1168
Therefore, the Loomi.r Court explained that when '1rat~s, fees and chai:ges ca11fo1·m to the
statutory schetrte set f01th in the Idaho Revenue Bond Act or are imposed purs1.1a11t to a valid
police power, the charges are not construed as taxes. However, if rntes, fees, and charges at'e
imposed pl'imal'ily for revenue raising purposes they are in essence disguised taxes subject to
legislative approval and authol'lty. 1169
The ~bove law is applicable to both l.lSer fees and connection fees charged by the _City.
All urates, fees) and chai·ges [must} conform to the statutory scheme set _forth in the Idaho
Revenue Bond Act,, and ' 1if rates> fees, and charges al'e imposed prlmadly for revenue raising
purposes they are in essence disgujsed taxes.1 170
In an. Aitgust 22, 2005 letter to Logan Robinson1 fo1me1· City of Pocatello May01•, Roger
Chase, described the ·~Return on Equity" program as a ' 1property tax substitution/' Additionally,
inn December 26, 2qo6 letter to Attomey General Lawrence Wasden, Mayor Chase explained
that 11charging a rate of return is commonly used by public utilities and private sector companies,
and we feel is fail'er way to generate revenue for the City" because 41relying on property taxes for
revenue will not work in. Pocatell~ due to the numbet· of property tax exemptions given by the
Statet. and therefore it has been his 11practice as Mayor to move our city away from property
tax.es and to a fee based system/' Mayor Chase1s statements are consistent with Swindell's

men10 that the return on equity transfers c'help to ftmd the activities of the G~neral Fund.» This is
U11disputed evidence that the return on equity 01· PILOT fee transfe_rs, as they are now called, are

not fees charged pursuant to the police or propl'ietarr ftuictions of the City of Pocatello, but are
,s l<l. at 437, 807 P.2d at 1276.
~9 ld.
10

Id.
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iu fact> (!imposed primarily for revenue raising purposes [andJ are in ·esse1tce disguised tnxes/ 1
Indeed, as stated above, the City has now co11ceded th&t the PILOT fee tl'ansfers are taxes. The
PILOT fee transfers/taxes are taken from the wate1· and sewet· funds, Le, the "enterprise fundsJ ,,
and as Mayor Chase explained, ~imoney placed in these [enterprise] fund$ com.es mainly from
fees generated by each of the thl·ee public. utility enterpl'ises.u71 Since the PILOT fees are or have
been transferred from revenue collected from "ratest fees, and charges" of th.e water aud sewer
system, i.e., connectio11 fees and user fees, and are not used for a regulato1y purpose nor fo1·
pt111)oses allowed by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, the Cmu't finds, as a matfe1· of law~ that the
PILOT fee transfers al'e impermissible taxes assessed against the user fees, connection fees,

01·

both - all ofwhlch is contrary to Idaho statutory and case Jaw.
Language from the Court's earlier order on summary judgment is relevant here:

·,

[T]here is a diffel'ence betwee11 charging another entityt suclt as the City of Chubbuck, a
rate of return versus charging city residents and utility customers a rate of .return when
the statute granting cities the authority to operate public WOL'ks provides that the city must
furbish the services (lat t~e lowest possible cost." Furthenn.ore, and mol'e importantly, the
Supreme Court emphasized in City ofPocatello v. Ci/)' ofChubbuck that the rate of 1·etut·11
was not imposed ~fprimarily as a source of revenue,, because there was no evidence 1hat
the revenue was not being 1.1sed for pm·poses pl·oscribed by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act,
which, as detailed in Loomis and Viking Construction, pennits \valet· and sewe1· revenue
· to be used for the maintenance, depi:e~iation and replacement of ~yste111 components, but
. not for future expa11sion of the system or for city functions other thaii the sewel' a11d water
systems. 72

·

.

The City takes the position that i1 is acceptable-to.treat Its Clty-owned utility as if it was a private

utility and .then charge a "rate of return" to that City-owned utility as a means of transfel'dng
- fhnds from the water and sewer ·accounts to· the general fond, The Coul't has and continues to
disagree, To the extent that PILOT fees havef are, or will be charged to the connection fees
· 11 Mayor Chase 200S

Letter at p. 2.

12 Memorandum Decision, pp. 22-23.
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being accumulated in the water and sewel' accounts the Court finds the connection fees are being
used impermissibly. Additionall.y, any PILOT fees drawn from user fees are also impermissible
ta:<es.

D,

Should the entire user/com1ectio1l fee collection system be stricken?

The Association has requested that the Court find the curl'ent rntes charged by the City
for user and connection fees to be unconstitutional and impermfasible and to require the City to
redo the entire collection system. the Court l'ecognized, in its original decision, that:
[R]egulations and charges shaU uot be unreasonable it being specifically provided in
section 2, ~ 50-2813, I.C., [uow § S071028], that the services are to be furnished ·at the
lowest possible cost and that the municipality shall not operate the works primarily as a
source ofrevenue. 13 .
·
.

Speaking speolfically to the issue of connection fees, the Loomis cou1t explained that the
mtes and fees established b;Y a city will be upheld as long as they are "not unreasonable and not
arbitral'ily imposed" and 11produce sufficient reven\le to suppoli the system at the lowest possible
· cost as required by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.,,74 The Court elaborated furthel' by explaining
that '"merely because the charge represents something more than the actual cost of the actual
physical hookup does not make the comiection fee illegal.''75

In its initial decision, the Court analyzed Loomis v. City of Hailey and Viking Const.> Inc.
v. Hayden Lake h'J'. Dist., a~d reached the basic conclusion that "it is not for the courts to

determine what me1hodology the city must use in determining its fe~s, rates· and charges."16
lilstead the Loomis· court explained that-the role of the courfs is "limited .•• to dete1·mine whether

Memorandum Decision, pp. 28 (quoting Schmidt v. Vil/age ofKimberly, 14 Idaho 48, 2S6·P.2d SIS (1953}),
Loomis, at 4421 807 P.2d ftt 1280.
1$ ld.
14 Jd. at 443, 801 P.2d at l:281.
73

14
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the fees~ rates and charges conform to the statutory_ requirements, are l'easonable, and t\t'e uot

arbiti·m·y, n 77
The Association m·gues that Mr. Hunter's· method for calculating. rates· is' more

appropl'iate than the method employed by the City in creating tl1e Red Ouk report. H~wever, in
the Court's view M1·. Hunter•s statements are more a criticism of the Red Oak method than they
al'e a recommended alternative method. More importantly, although the Red Oak report may

result in higher rates than Mr. Hunter's suggestions, the Court will not dictate to the City what
methodology it should employ in calc:mlating its fees. Instead, the Coul't is limited t~ evaltmti11g

~vhether the .fees are reasonablei n~t arbitrary) and conform to the statutory 1·equil'ements?8
Although the Association challenges ~he Red Oak study, the Court finds tbat it was a reasonable
methodology, which was not arbitrary or unreasonable.

Howeve1·, as noted above, it is the _Cotn·t1s determination that any fee which includes a
PILOT component is unl'easonable, al'bi1rm·y and contrary to statute. '.fo whatever ex.tent the City
has calculated· a. PILOT fee into its user and connection fees, that po1tion of the user and
connection fees is impermissible. The Co\lrt has already detennined that it is impermissible for
the City to assess the PILOT fee on its own municipal utility comp~nies - here th~ sewer a11d
water department. Thus,_ any po1·tion of the user and/or connection fees that are assessed in 01·det·
to pay the PILOT fee to the City, do not confonn to the statutory requirements ofI.C. § 50-1028
aud must be excluded ft·om any fee assessment goiiJ.g forwa1·d.

n id.
78 id.
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CONCLUSION.

The Court notes that in the Jast headng the parties were asked whether additional
discove1·y was necessm·y and whether additional evidence would need to be submitted to th~
Com't, in a trial; to decide this case. After· consideration of tile City's final submissions, the

Association stated that no additional depositions or discovery was needed and that the final
submission by the Association was its bdef. No party has indicated that any further evidence
would need to be submitted to the Cout't at a tdal in order to render a fmal decision in this case.
Therefow, the Court issues the foI1owi11g conclusions, which resolves this case in its entirety.
The Court finds that the Association has standing to challenge the use of PILOT fees as a
portion of any coru1ectlon and user fees, concluding that the Association, whose membets ~ay
co11nectio11 and user fees, have a special and peculiar grievance net shared by all taxpayers •. The
Cowt DENIES the Cityls Motion to Reconsider the Coures March 28, 2013 Mentorandum
Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that the PILOT fee·
transfers ai·e impermissible taxes on the wate1· and sewer f\mds which are derived from the
revemie collected from the connection fees and/or uset· fees.
The Court GRANTS the Association,s Motion to Reconsider, and GRANTS summary
judgment in favor of the Association. in pal1. The Court finds thnt the PILOT fee policy

imperm~ssibly ·llses revenue collected from the connection and 11ser fees for pmposes other than
for the water and sewer system, in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Aot, and thei·efore, is not
a t1se of the Cit,Ss police or proprietary function because it does not bear a reasonable
relatio11ship to the cost of reglllating the water and sewer systems, but rather, is a revenl1e raising
measure in violation ofl.C. § 50-1027.
CV-2011-5228-0C
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Combinh1g this opfoion and the Memorandum Decision filed Mal'c)t 28, 2013, the Court
concludes, as a matter of law, the following:

1.

The City's connection and user fees are not arbitrary or tmrea1:>on11bly .imposed.

The imposition az1d collection of the connection and . user fees themselves ·ore not
unconstitutional acts or a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.
2.

There is no evidence that the connection fees are being used by the City to fond

futtll'e capital improvements in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.
3.

Through the use of the PILOT fee transfe.i· progmm 1 or any other transfer prog1'am

with a similar intent, such as a rnte of retttrJ:1 program or a retum on equity program, the Co\lrt
declares that the City is imposing an impermissible tax to the exten~ that com1ection and user fees
are being assessed a PILOT fee for ge11eral fi.md purposes, and ·such practices must.cease and are

hereby enjoined because they are unconstitutional and a violatio~ of the I~aho Revenue Bond
Act. This means that coMection and user fees must be adJusted to the extent that they include a

cluu·ge for the PILOT fee, In addition, no PILOT fee tl'ansfers from any water or sewer account
to the gene!'al fund aJe permitted.

However, to the extent that conn~ction and user fees are being tra11sferred from the water
and sewer accounts to the general fundJ through any appropriate process, howeve1· named, for the
purpose of paying expenses related to the operation, m~nt~nanceJ 1·eplacement, and depreciation
of existing water and sewer sys~emss including only those general City e.xpenses needed to
operate the water .and sewer depm·tments, such as HR, financial, legal and accol.lnting, such
transfel's are pe1·mitted and· are not hereby enjoined.
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Therefore) Judgment is granted to the City, in pmt:.as set fotih in paragraphs 1, 2, and the
last sentence of 3 above, and Judgme11t is granted to the Asf!ocintion, in pal"t, set forth in the first

aente_nce ofpa1'.agl'aph 3 above,
The two decisions now entered in this case resolve alt issues in this case. Judgrne11t will
be entered forth,vith as set forth hel'ein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED Novenibei· 13, 2013.

~

.

District Judge ·
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the lf5 day of. \JGN ,2013, 1sel'ved a trne and.
correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the manne1·
indicated.

BlakeG. HuU
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A.
490 Meinodal_Drive
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Palls, Idaho 83405~1630
Nathan M. Olsen ·.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

· DATED this JS_ day of

... (.i) U.S. Mail

.
( ) Overnight Delivery
.( )Ha.nd Deliver
( ) Facsimile

(/)~.s.

Mail
( ) Overn[ght Delivery
( ) Hand Delive.r
( ) Facsimile

fx\{ .2013.

.,
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PILOT Transfers

Date

$
$
$

477,272.00
477,272.00
479,053.00'
493,424.00
493,424.00
493,424.00

Return of Equity Transfers

$
$

FY2006
f'y 2007
FY 2008
FY2009
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012

$
$
$

FY2013
FY2014

$

$
$
$
2,458,812.00 $
2,265,330.00 $

$

206,903.99 $

$

Total Transfers by FY

3,544,000.00 $
3,544,000.44 $
3,349,079.00 $
3,349,079.00 $
3,349,079.00 $
3,349,079.00 . $

$

$
$
$

4,021,272.00
4,021,272.44
3,828,132.00
3,842,503.00
3,842,503.00
3,842,so~.oo

2,458,812.00
2,265,330.00
206,903.99

~tA~~)i;~}i\\J:;,~;~/;;;\rs.·?\;;)f\r)).Wt;9.t4;99://$?t:i'U.0~'~':?'.'1=i"1~!::\2o)is4;31s:¥1~·~f'.!$.:<{·ff:,f~.s;$~.9.~ta+i'4,f:f ·
Check Total

·

Transfers Since 2011

Prepared by Joyce Stroscheln 9/22/14

$

28,329,231.43 ·

$

8,773,548.99
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1
2

3

4

s
s
7

s
9
10

I

11
12
13
14
15

16
11

1s
10

20
21

I
I
I

I
I

22
23

24
25

1
2
3

4

s
s
7

s
B
11

12
13

I.

I
I
I

1

Q. Next I have a Pocatello Comprehensive Annual

2 Financial Report For Fiscal Year Ended September 30,
3

4
5

s
7

s
. ·s
10
11
12

13
14

1s
16
17
lB
19

20

21
22
23

24
25

2011.
A. That's a public document and it is also
available on the Internet.
Q. May I keep this document?
A. You may.
Q. Then the next document here is an FY2013
budget book. Is this also a public document?
A. It is available to the public. It ls not
published on the Internet. It's a working document
primarily for city staff. But you can have that copy.
Q. · Thank you. Next I have a Wastewatf!r Utility
Financial Planning Study dated June 18, 2010. Now, I
believe this has been-provided before in discovery.
A. I believe so.
Q. So I won't ask for another copy of that. Next
we have a Water Utility Financial Planning Study, and I
believe this has also been provided.
A. Yes.
Q. A_nd then we haYe a December 2006 wastewater
rates, prepared by Red Oak Consulting, final report and
that's been provided before in discovery?
A. Yes.
Q. And then we have the final report water· rates
Page 13

Page 11

10

I-

indicating the revenue in FY2012 in the water pollution
control fund for tl1e collection system capacity fee, the
receipts for that year were $68,617.
And then finally I have a run that I did this
morning, the capacity fee in the water system for the
year is $119,990. I thought you would be interested to
know what the last year's revenue was in these three
accounts.
Q. Thank you very much.
A. This next sheet, I'll just go through these,
these are. Exhibit X and Exhibit Y, which is from the
FY13 fee resolution passed by.the city council in August
of 2012, effective 1 October -2012, that lists the system
capacity fees for both the water deparbnent and th~
w_ater pollution control department ¢at are effective in
the current fiscal year.
MR. OLSEN: I would like'to mark these account
balance inquiries and these 2013 department fees as an
exhibit.
·
.
MR. HALL: Why don't \~e make a copy of those
so I can have a copy, you can hive a c;opy, and ,~e can
mark a copy as an exhibit. What we could do is I will
see if we can't get somebody here to make us copies
while you are continuing the deposition and when they
come hack, we can be more confidently prepared to

Page 1~

14

15
lij
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

discuss them.
·
MR. OLSEN: I would like if possible to mark .
them as an exhibit now just so the record is dear on
what we are referring to.
MR. HALL: That's fine, I don't care.
MR. OLSEN: So we can mark them as exhibits
and then have them copied. I want to have a clear
record.
MR. HALL: Sure.
MR. OLSEN: So we will mark these as Exhibits
Nos. 2 and 3,
(Deposition Exhibit Nos. 2 and 3 marked
for identification.)
-(Discussion off the record.)
MR. OLSEN: Let's go back on the record.
Q. (By Mr. Olsen.) We are going to move through
the remainder of the documents that were brought to
today's deposition. One appears to be a service level
report entitled FYll Inputs and Outputs.
Now, Mr. Swindell, is this a public document?

A. It is.
Q. Can I have a co@mitment that I will get a copy
of this?
A. You can have that one. I have another one for
you out in the hallway. It's published on the Internet. ·

208-345-9611

1
2
3

4
5

s
7
B

again prepared by Red Oak Consulting, December of 2006,
and that's been provided in discovery?
A. Yes.
Q. T~en we have a December of 2002 Po~atello,
Idaho Water Rates that was prepared it looks like a
firm called Black & Veatch, V-E-A-T-C-H, and I don't
believe that this has been provided for in clisco".ery.
May ~ keep this copy?
A; You may not, you can make a copy. it's my only
copy.
Q. Can I have a commitment that you will make a
copy of this?

by

9
10
11
12
13
A. Yes.
14
Q. All well as the following document is
15 Pocatello, Idaho, Wastewater Rates dated December of
16

11
18

19
20
21
22
23
24.

25

2002.
A. I do believe you got both of those.
Q. I'm not positive, but just to be safe I would
like a copy of these.
A. We will make you a copy.
Q. Thank you. l will set them aside for
reference at this point.
Then I have also a Table WVl'l. City of
Pocatello, I~aho, Wastewater Utility Capital Improvement
Fund Cash Flow Analysis dated 9/15/200~. it's six pages.
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I would like to go ahead and mark this as an exhibit an~
get a copy of this.
·A. If you like. I don't know what it is. It was
3
,i just Inserted in the book.
MR. H}\LL: We pulled it out of one of those
5
6 books so it needs to go back into the book. We'll make
7 a copy of that book for you, and you would get a copy of
s · that document as well.
MR. OLSEN: Well, it's a separate sheet,
!l
10 separate group of papers. I would rather just make it
11 its own exhibit, so .let's go ahead and mark this as
12 Exhibit No. 4.
{Deposition Exhibit No. 4 marked for
13
14 identification.)
A. I have·no idea what that is.
15
(Discussion off t!ie record.)
16
MR.
OLSEN: If we could hand the witness what
17
has
been
marked
as Exhibit No. 4.
18
Q·.
(By
Mr.
Olsen.)
Let me ask you fust, Mr.
19
2D Swindell, this was brought with you today. Prior to
2l this moment have you seen this document before?
22 . A. · I'm sure I have seen it ~efore years ago.
23 It's dated 2005. It was just an insert into the
24 financial plans that I gave you. I really don't know
25 what·it is or why it was in there, whether these are
1
2

Page lei

data on there, where would Mr. Gallagher ha)•e gotten. the
z data to put together this analysis?
A. 1can't speculate. He is a consultant. He
3
4 uses his own systems for making the best estimates for a
5 financial plan. That would obviously include the prior
6 year records of the city, and he had access to those as
1 a consultant normally does in all of these financial
8 plans.
Q. Would·you be qualifl.ed to lriterpret some of
9
10 the lines on this analysis?
A. I'll try.
11
Q. The first line of that indicates that there is
12
13 a beginning balance. Do you kn~w what that might be in
14 reference to?
A Well, when he created these tables: he divided
15
1a the assets of the utility into a couple offunds that
17 were useful for him and this is his capital Improvement
18 fund. And he said if you started with 4,731,000 and
19 had these sources into it and had these expenses, here
20 ls kind of how the fund would operate over the next,
21 what, five years.
Q. So the document is created in 2005 so these
22
23 are' estimates for -A. Right, this is all a projection, draft for
24
25 discussion purposes only, and it has a time date on Jt
1

Page 1S

1
2
3
4

5
6

7
8
9
10
II

12
13
14
15

16
17
18

19
20
21
22

23
2i!
25

corrected tables, obsolete tables. It says Draft-For
Discussion Purpose Only. I presume they were working
papers associated with the development of one of the
financial plans.
Q. Would this have been a document created by the
City of Pocatello?
MR. .HA.LL: If you know.
A. Actually I do know and it was not created by
the- City of Pocatello. This was created by our
consultant, John.Gallagher working for either Black &
Veatch or Red Oak Consulting.
Q. Do you know in particular who would have
created this document over at either Black & Veatch or
Red Oak Consulting?
A. John Gallagher.
Q. Is Black & Veatch associated with Red Oak
Consulting?
A. No. But it's the same consultant.
Q. Same consultant, okay. Was John Gallagher
part of Black & Veatch at one time?
A. Correct.
Q. And then he moved over to Red Oak Consulting?
A. Correct.
Q. So as we look at this document it indicates
it's a capital improvement fund cash flow analysis. The

. 208-345-9611

Page 17

l of 9/15/2005, 10:31 a.m.
Q. So as we look down the line numbers, 2 would
2
3

4
5

6

7
8
9
10

11
12
.13
14
15

16
17
13
19

20
21

2Z
23
Z4
25

be, again, estimated transfers to operating fund ftom
'0~ through 2010; correct?·
A. Yes.
Q.. What is he referring to by indicating
operating fund?
A. That's what he divided the utility fund into,
is one fund that would pay for operating and how are we
going to pay for the capital ·improvements the
wasteV'trater utility.
Q. So operating fund would be separate from the
capital improvements.
A. In his analysis.
Q. And grants and contributions, any idea what
that would be in referenc,e to?
. A. I don't; I don't think he did either since
they are all zero.
Q. That would be the same case with the bond
proceeds, state loan proceeds?
A. Yes.
Q. Let's go to Interest income. What would that
be in reference to? Again, referring to Line 6 on the
first page of Exhibit No. 4.
A Pooled interest income owed to the wastewater
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Q. And It appears that there are 35 lines here
2 and they ali represent various types of operation and
3 maintenance expenses?
1

Page 24

have budgeted for parks, got it.
2
Q. Thankyou, Mr. Swindi,11.
3
1am going to ask you a little bit about your .
4 backgro~nd. Where were you born?
s
A. I was born in Kearney, Nebraska.
6
Q. Were you raised· in Nebraska?
1

A. Yes.
Q, That are projected.
6
A; Projected. And that's also true in the nei1
1
A. No.
7 fewpages.
a Q. So ifwe look at Page 5, we are continuing-·
8
Q. Where were you raised?
9
A. That's operations and maintenance for the lift
9
A. Riverton, Wyoming.
10 station (?perations and operations and maintenance for
10
Q. Where did you graduate from high school?
11 the sludge reuse operation, And the lasf page is
11
A. Riverton, Wyoming.
12
-Q. And I am assuming you have an edncation beyond
12 operations and maintenance expense for the laboratory
13 and pretreatment division. The total ls 3,4{2,000. Do
13 high school. Where did you go to school?
14
A. I am a graduate of the United States Military
14 you see that?
15 Academy at West Point, New York.
1s
Q. Yes.
. lli
Q. Did you serve some time in the military?
1a
A. That links back, should link back to this
A. I did.
11 schedule on Line 14 on Table WW3, what is the operation i7
18 and maintenance expense for the utility. That's Just ·
a
Q. ~fow many years?
19
A. 22 years and three months.
19 the detail that feeds that line.
20
Q. When did you graduate from West Point?
20
Q: I see. So it's Line 14 on Page 3 of this
21
A. July 6, 1979 -:· correction, June 6, 1979.
21 document that's breaking down in fairly specific detail
22
Q. What degree did you earn there?
22 the operation and maintenance, ihe projected operation
23
A. Bachelor of science.
23 and maintenance expenses,
24
Q. [11 what?
24
A &-actly.
.
25
A. No major; no majors were offered.
· 25
Q. And there Is a total of 92 lines t.'1ere. If we
4

5

Page 23

1

turn back to the front of this exhibit, Page 1 of

z Exhibit No. 4, it appears then this is a table created
just for the wastewater utility.
4
A. Yes.
5
Q. Presumably would Mr. Gallagher ~ave also
s prepared a similar document for the water?
7 • A. He did. They are indicated in the books that
B youhave.
9
Q. They would be somewhere in the books.
10
A This is just a separate sheet that was
11 inserted in there. 1 really don't know why it was
12 there. It looks like it was a draft for discussion
13 purposes at 10:31 a.m. on the 15th of September 2005.
14
Q. Understood. There was a tablet·15
A. . That's just my portfolio. I just brought it
16 in so I wouldn't drop all that stuff.
11
Q. Is there anything in there?
18
A, Blank sheet (indicating), last month's cash
19 report, last month's payroll and material claims, budget
20 execution report, stuff I always keep with me, always
21 goes with me. I brought my wallet, do you want to look
22 at that? These documents are all public, by the way,
23 this is on the Internet, that's on the Internet, so is
24 ·that one {indicating). It's just the normal stuff that
25 I keep with me in case the mayor asks me how much we
3

.... ",..,,

... JI T"
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'1

M
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M

l

z

Q. And then how many ·-

A:

The curriculum I should note is basically
engineering. I did my conce!lt:ration in economics and
4 engineering.
5
Q.- You mentioned you served in the military after
6 that?
3

7
A. Idid.
8
Q. Forhowlong?
9
A. 22 years and three months.
10
Q. And have you obtained any additional degrees
11 since your West Point?
1Z
A. Ihave.
13
Q. In what?
14
A. I have a master's in public administration
15 from Princeton University.
16
Q. When did you earn that?
17
A. In June of1988.
18
Q. Whatelse?
19
A. I am a graduate of the United States Army
20 Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth,
21 Kansas.

Q. When did yon earn that degree?
A. June of 1992.
24
Q. After that have you earned any other degrees
25 or cectificates?
22
23
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1

A. I am a certified operations research and

l and so on and so forth.
2
Q. I am assuming if someone were to try to

z systems analyst, United States Army at Fort Lee,
3 _Yirginia. Thai was actually earned in 1987.
Q. Can you say that again, a certified ·5
A. Operations research and systems analyst.
6
Q. Can you tell me more abqut what -7
A. it's a three-month school, we called it ranger
8 school for mathematiciaps.
9
Q. So what do you learn as part of that .
Jo three-month program?
11
A. It was an army ~ourse designed to prepare
12 analysts on· the anny staff to use various mathematical
13 techniques to analyze operational problems.
14
Q. Anyother-15
A. I am a certified government financial manager.
1s
Q. When did you earn that and where?
11
A. It's from the Association of Government
18 Accountants and I believe I completed my examinations in
19 2004.
20
Q, Any other certificates or degrees?
21
A. Those are the big ones.
22
Q. What would be the small ones?
23
A. Graduate of the U.S. Army Basic Field
24 · Artillery Officers Course, Fort Sill, 01..-Jahoma. United
25 States Army Field Artillery Aavanced Officers Course at
4

I
I
I
1.

I
I
I'
I

I
,.

r

3 contact the association, they would have a curriculum ••
4
A Yes, there is a study manual for each one o.f
5 those, it's about three inches thick for each.
6
· Q. Let's talk about your employment. I think you .
7 mentioned •· I know you mentioned t11at you were in the
a army for 22 years -.s
A. 22 years and three months.
10
Q. That was a full-time occupation for you?
11
A. Yes.
lZ
Q. So that would have been from '79 through about
13 '91. '92?
14
A. 2001.

1s

Q. Sorry.
Hi
A: I retired in 2001 and assumed duty here as the
17 chief financial officer in August of that year.
111
Q. Let me ask you, then, what is your cturent

position now?
. A. I am the chieff'lnancial officer of the City
of Pocatello.
22
Q. You mentioned that's the position that you
2J have held -24
A. Since August of 2001.
25
Q. It hasn't changed during that period?
19

20
21

Page 27
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A. -No.

4

Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The United States Army Tack Fire
Operations Officer Course at Fott Sill, Oklahoma.
Q. Before you go any further, do all of these you
are about to provide me relate to some type of army

4

s

training?

s

A. No.

s

Q. Do you do any consulting?

1

2
3

6

1

a
9
10
11

12

I
I
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13
14
1516
11
18
19

20
21
22
23

24
25

A. Generally, yes.
Q. Back to this government management certificate
that you obtained in 2004, can you tell me a little bit
more about what that involved?
A. It's a certification program offered by the
Association of Government Accountants. I ~tood for
three exams, .one in Ogden, one down in Salt Lake City,
one in Boise, each about four hours in length, covering
three broad topics.
Q. · Which are?
A. · One is -· the first set of exams deals with
governmantal budgeting and the theory of public
enterprises. Pretty similar to the content of any NPA
course.
The second one was a course •• it was a test
and examination on governmental accounting.
Q. And the third?
A. And the third was a col.U'se on operations
·
research and systems analysis. Utilizing mathematics to
analyze real world problems and statistlcal techniques

208-345-9611
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3
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Q. Letmejust double check. Any other
'·
employment besides the military and now working fo·r the
City of Pocatello?

A. I am a member of the PortneufMedical Center
Joint Venture Board.
Q. Tell me about that.
·
A. It's an unpaid position. I serve on the board
of directors of the hospital.
Q. So who hired you when you went to work for the
City of Pocatello? I know the city did, but who was
the~A. This posltlon was recommended hy Mayor
Anderson and was approved in a public vote by the city
council. It's an appointment by the council.
Q. Is it an at wm posltion or are you under
contract?
A. It's an at will position with the provisions
that are common to appointed officers in the State of
Idaho. I was appointed by the council. I can only be
removed by the council.
Q. So it's at the will of the council.
A. Right.
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i:'age 34

1 sure what you are referring to.
2
Q, Well, for instance, do you have operating

I·
I·

I.
~

I
~,_.·

I
I

I
I
I

you can see from the picture there, I am usually there
for that. That's my mug (indicating). And I can't read
3 the other mug,.whether that was Justin
not. He is
4 our water superintendent. That's kind of the digest
5 version of those briefings. I can find the water
G department for you, it's under the environmental health
1

2

instructions for each of these?
A. We have our internal ·control documents.
s Q. Can you tell me a little more about what those
6 are?
1
A. Those are the documents that establish how
a bills are paid and how money is disbursed and what
9 reports are issued and when they are issued.
10 · Q. Do you have formal procedures in place for how
11 these divisions report to you?
A. That's part.of the human resources division of
12
13 the city in terms of annual performance reviews. people
14 on probation, those things, we foll~w the same st~dard
1s procedures. They are really not procedures established
16 by the financial department, they are procedures
11 followed by the financial department ju~t as they are in
18 other ~Hy departments.
Ill
Q. Well, let me be a little more specific. Do
20 yciu have any procedw-es for instance in how the
21 treasurer's office reports to you of their activities?
22
A. We have certain established reports that are
23 required to be put out on a timely basis, the cash
24 report for the city and there are certain reports that
25 the treasury has ·to provide to accounting to make sure
3
4

I

l?age 36'

1

s
9

10

u
12
13

14
1s
16
11

1s
19
20
21
22.
23
24
· 25

or

section.
·
Q. Maybe if you could··
A. It just summarizes kind of what the water
department does during the year,
Q. So this serviq, level report that you -A. This (indicating) is the latest version.
MR. OLSEN: The witness has handed me the
service level report referenced earlier, FYll
P.age SS-32.
Q. Is this service report for all of the
departmei:its in the city?
A. Yes, all the departments that have any
employees in them.
Q, And so there would be more specific reports
coming from each of the departments,:this is a digest of
those.
A. Correct..
Q. And are the specific reports available on the
web?

Page 3S

that the checkbook balances.
Q. How often are those 'reports generated?
3
A. Monthly.
,r
Q. They are required to report to you monthly?
5
A. Yes.
6
Q. Let's turn to Page 2 ofExhibit No. 5. I'll
7 represent to you, :Mr. Swindell, that this is another
8 document'we pulled off the web for the water department.
9 It talks about the mission of the water department.
10 What I want to direct your attention to is there is a
11 paragraph, the flfst paragraph where it starts with
12 every year the city departments, do you see where I'm
13 at?
A Yes.
14.
Q. They are required to present a performance
15
16 report, service level report, and actually these service
17 levelreports, are they the same thing that you provided
18 tome-19
A What you have got there is a summary of those
20 reports. The actual report delivered by the water
21 department every year is a little mare expansive than
22 that, there are more slides. That's a digest version
23 (indicating) so you can have it in one aggregation:
24
If you want the slides, they are also
25 available on the Internet as well as the video. And as
1
2
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A. They are.

Q. And just on the City of Pocatello's site?
In fact on this sheet that you provided
me (indicating), if you were to click on that one you
would get the slides MR.HALL: Let the record reflect that the
-witness is pointing to Page 2 of Exhibit No. 5. Under
the paragraph counseljust quoted there is a little
camera icon that says service level video report and
below that a service level pelf repor.t and those are the
items be just pointed to.
A So you get the slides that he used and you get
to watch the video.
Q. The video report, that's the report-A. That's his verbal presentation and he talks
you through the slides.
Q. Thank you, that's helpful. Then let's go back
to that paragraph and there is a new sentence there on
Page 2 of Exhibit No. 5, it says, "Under the supervision
of the chief financial officer, the departments discuss
their mission, financial inputs, workload outputs,
measure of efficiency and eff~ctiveness . . . results
and issues and concerns for the future," so -MR HALL: YOU left out the portion that
was in parentheses.
A. Yes.
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1

Q. Yes, "(including comparisons to other cities

z and industry noons), results in their issues and
3

concerns for the future.'' And I am assuming this

4 happens:

A. Yes.
Q. Tell me the procedures for how this occurs.
A. Well, I'm not sure wh~t exactly you are
8 looking for. I'll glve you as much detail as I can and
9 you tell me what you wan~ ••
10
Q. Let me break it down, it was too vague of a
11 question, I'm sorry.
12
When does the chief of the water department 13 what is his name again?
14
A. Justin Armstrong is the current water
1s superint~mdent.
16
Q_. ·When does Mr. Armstrong came to you to discuss
11 these items mentioned there?
1B
A. The development of each year's service level
19 report typically begins in December. We have the final
20 numbers usually from the previous fiscal year wilich
21 ended 30 September. You don't really get final numbers
22 until November because you have October payables, that
23 stuff that you bought in September but didn't get the
24 bill for·until October, and so on and so forth.
25
Q. What is your fiscal year?
5

6
7

:=

'·

.•

•i

1 little ·- and in some cases a little more -- trying to
2 put the numbers into context.
3
I also provide, by that time I usually have
4 the report from the International City Managers
5 Association which gives us some comp arables and we work
6 those. Into the briefings. Then we establish a briefing
7 schedule. The council nonnally receives these briefings
8 in a series of three study sessions typically Jn March.
9 We will begin at 9:00 a.m. and ·go until 2:00 p.m. with a
10 break for lWlch.
11
Some of those sessions wlll lnvolve physical
12 tours. Last year for example they did tour part of the
13 water department. In the prior year they went.out to
H the wastewater plant. We had a couple of council
15 mem.bers who had never been there.
16
And we ~omplete those brlefmgs, and we get
17 those done prlor to the departments building their
18 budgets. The concept there is before we talk about what
19 you need for next year, let'.s review what you have done
zo with last year's money and what your issues and concerns
21 are.
22
23
24

25

Q. So you deal with last year's money and then at
some point you meet with them about budgeting the
upcoming year.

A. Right..

Page 39

1

.!

A. · Our fiscal year starts 1 October and ends 30

z September.

'

3

Q. You start meeting with Mr. Armstrong and this

4 is in regard to the se1Vice level reports ••
s . A. Right. What we do is I do a data pull going
6

•,:

1

s
9

10
11
12
13

14
15
16
11

18
19
20
21
22
23

24
25

back five years and lt also has the next _budgeted year,
because now the budget for FY, the next fiscal year was
adopted the previous August. So we have all of those
numbers, and we provide those numbers to the
departments.
For example, this
ljust got the·· we do
this by groups. I have divided the city into service
level groups. The water and sewer department are part
of the environmental health group. Yesterday we did our
first grouping, we completed the financial extractions
for the parks department;Iibrary, other cultural,
recreational, educational activities. And I will
provide those to the departments over the next couple of
weeks so they will see what their numbers finally turn
out to _be, and give them their tasking to develop their
service level reports.
The departments will normally give me a draft
in late January and we will go over the draft. Usually
the modifications to that draft usually involve making·
it shorter and more concise, a little better for TV, a

year
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Q. In that regard, let's mark Exhibit No. 6.
(Deposition Exhibit No. 6 marked for
identification.)
Q. This Exhibit No. 6, Mr. Swindell, I willjust
represent to you is somethi.ng that we obtained in
discovery from the city water deparbnent, actually from
Mr. Armstrong, and it's a spread sheet with project
numbers and project names. Our understanding is •• we
inspected these records over at the water department ••
and just tell me if I am wrong, ls that this ls a
.
typical sheet that Mr. Armstrong reviews with you as the
CFO when they are working on putting their budget
together for the following year; is that an acctu"ate
assessment?
·
A. I don't know. It's an internal document that
he created.
Q. So I guess I should ask you, have you seen
this document before?
A. I don't recall I .ha.ve.
Q. Well, then, when you sit down with Mr.
Armstrong to go over budgeting for the upcoming year, do
you go over specific projects with him that the water
department wants to complete?
A The big ones, not every project, though.
Q. So when Mr. Armstrong is helping you put your
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1 budget together, do you ask him for an itemization of
2: the things that you would need to go to the city
3 council, for instance, to have that budget approved for

the water department? ·
A. Right. He is going to make his own entries
6 into the computer and they are reviewed by the council
7 once they are pul in, with the detail that's ·contained
8 in-that big green book that you have got.
Q. You mentioned you are the point man to go to·
9
the
council to get the budget approved; is that correct?
10
I have overall lead for that project.
A.
11
So
Q. before you go to the council to ask for
12
budget
approval, do you review ~ll ~f their
13
recommendations
made by each of the dep9!fments7
14.
·
MR
HALL:
I am going to object to the extent
15
16 you are assuming that none of the department folks
17 appeared before the council on their own budgets.
MR. OLSEN: That's not what I'm asking. I am
18
19 -asking what his. involvement in that process is.
MR. HALL: Why don't you restate your
20
21 question, then, so we can understand it.
A. Let me describe it as best I can. The
22
23 departments put In their budget request and that ls done
24 after they have provided their.service level hriefmg to
25 the council.
4

5
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Q. You schedule it Do you sit down with them
1
2 before they go to the council to 1eview what they are
3

4
5
6

7
8
9

10
11
12
13

14
15

16
17

18
19
20
21

22
23

24
25

going to present to the council?
A. In most cases but not all. It depends on what
the issues are.
Q. So they are making their presentation, you are
there to help supervise, and then the next step is that
you said there is another session after that? What
happens in between the two sessions, the initial
presentation of the budget and the next session?
A. I'm not sure I understand the question. Let
me try to explain the sequence.
We have a service level briefing a~d a
process. Departments then build their budgets, they put
them into the computer. We analyze them in finance and
then we help the departments prepare a budget briefing.
We go to the council and explain what we really want for
the next fiscal year and what it will take to do that.
And then the third step is the council starts
to make declsiol'!-~· because what will" typically happe~ ls
is once we exceed what the cowicil is willing to pay for
in taxes and fees, certain things will have to be scaled
back. Th~ council sometimes has their own priority -·
and mostly this doesn't impact util!.ties, but it can.
Mostly it's in the tax supported funds where there is

l?age: 43

And in the utilities case, it's also done with
z a fair amount of fidelity to the five-year financial
3 plans that you have been provided with. Those arejust
4 plans, deviation is to be expected but still that's. your
5 touchstone, because that's the projec~on on the rates.
The council then reviews each budget request
6
7 and we go through a budget briefing with each
·s department. I prepare some of the slides for that, and
. 9 it discusses the major capital projects, for example,
IO for the water department that are proposed for the next
11 fiscal year. And then the superintendent and I will
12 brief th~t to the city council in another televised
13 session. So we are there together.
The city doesn't _have a budgeting ·process that
14
exists
just
in my office or in the mayor's office where
15
lfi we line out things and put things in, it's all done in a
17 committee of the whole with the council.
Q. (By Mr. Olsen.) Ijustwant to get the order
18
19 of things and break that down.
20
A Okay.
Q. So you are indicating that the departments go
21
22 directly to the council and present their proposed
23 budget.
24
A. Under my supervision, I schedule the briefings
and
I am there with them.
25
1
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1 morejudgment involved about service llfe-2
3

4

5
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Q. So essentially it's a legislative process.
A. Exactly. "f'.hen they generally make those
decisions in June. We try to have a budget that's
workable for public notlflcation and publication by mid
July, antl then we go through a public hearing process
and then the council -- that public hearh1g is usually
held on the third Thursday of August. And then we allow
two more weeks for more.cards and letters to come in -Q. You have your public input going on.
A. And the council is scheduled to adopt the
budget and the fee i:esolutions, which for the utilities
are one of the more important things, at the second
Thursday in August.
· Q. And so wben·do these budgets typically get
approved?"
A~ Typically they approved at the secona
Thursday in August to take effect on 1 October.
Q. So back on Exhibit No. 5, we have spent some
time going .through the water department on this third
page there having to do with the wastewater; do you see
that? Let me see the exhibit.
A. I might have two copies of the water -MR. HALL: That's what I have, too.
A. Bµt there is an equivalent page for the

are
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1 wastewater department.
Q. So itlooks like Ijust printed the same ~ne
2
3 twice. But there would be a similar procedure for the

4 wastewater.
A. Right.
5
Q.
I tliink you might have told me, who is the
6
manager
of the wastewater?
7
A.
Jon
Herrick is the superintendent. And just
8
9 to clarify, in case I misspeak or speak in code that you
10 don't understand, when we talk wastewater, we mean
11 sewer, as most citizens would understand it And then
12 the city financial system, that is called the water
13 pollution control fuijd,
Q. Understood.
14
A. And we sometimes abbreviate that WPC, but it's
15
16 au sewer.
Q. I want to talk to you a little more about yo~
17
finance
procedures, particularly the tracking offunds,
18
accounting
procedures, and I think we might have already
19
discussed
that,
but let me get into some more detail on
20
that.
How
do
you
as the CFO track funds that come in
21
22 and out of the city?
A. We have a general management budgeting and
23
24 accounting system, it's a computer software system.
Q. What's the name of that software?
25

Page 48

l

the accounting activity in an account labeled 520, which

2 is transfers.

Q. So if I am understanding this correctly, the
4 software and then I guess essentially the process used
5 by the city. they break down the budget categories into
8 funds and they number those funds like in this case it's
7 Fund 31?
A. Correct.
8
Q. And that's further broke down into accounts as
9
10 a part of that fund?
A. Right
11
Q. You handed me earlier this FY2013 budget book
lZ
13 and I also brought with me the FY2010 -14 , A. Luckyyou.
Q. Exciting reading. But I presume that these
15
16 reports are generated off this accounting system?"
A. Yes. In fact these reports you just handed me
17
18 in Exhibit No. 7 are just e,,.'tractions out cif those
19 books.
Q. Right, the one I handed you would be an
20
extraction
out ofthe·FY20l0 budget book?
21
A. Right.
22
Q. Let's break this down a little further and
23
24 talk about what happens when a developer comes in and·
25 pays a building permit fee, a connectton fee. Describe
3
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I
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
fl

10

11

A. The software is from a company calied HTE
SW1Gard. They are a well known software provider in the
public sector. And it has various modules to it and the
city has purchased a number of those modules, including
the accounting module, which we affectionally refer to
as GMBA. which stands for general management budgeting.
and accounting.
Q. So everything gets inputted into this -·
A. That's the ~ity's general ledger.
Q; And from that you generate reports?

A. Yes.

Q. Let's tµrn then to the neA1 exhibit that I
12.
13 have before you, we Vlrfll call this No. 7.
(Deposition Exhibit No. 7 marked for
H
15 identificatlon.)
Q. I ,vould represent to you this is material that ·
16
17 the association obtained In a public information request
18 and we will go over that in more detail later, but let
19 me ask you first, do~s this document look familiar to

20 you?
A. It's a report out of the GMBA accounting
21
22 program. This one is just a data extraction for fiscal
23 year 2010 asking the computer to detail the expenditures
24 in a select set o( accounts, This set of accounts is
25 Fund 31, which is the water fund, and it's asking for
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1 to me the process for haw that's collected and then

z where that goes.
A. Toe payment.will be made at the window at the

3

4 building department typically when they take out their
.5 building permit or within six months, I think they have
6 six months to pay.· And then those fund:; that are

7 collected that evening, there is a -· the building
8 department I\UlS their OWJI ledger and they have another
9 roCJdule of the same computer program and that's where the
10 payment is !l,ctually recorded. We call that a·subsidiary
11 ledger. It works the same way as the utility billing
12
13

14

15
16

17
13

19
20
21
22

23
24
25

module.
When you and I pay our water bill, for.
example, utility billing can say that the Swindell
family paid today and they paid $46.06 and then they
will upload that summary data, how much money was going
to ,vater, sewer for the day, and In what categories.
And then that is uploaded into fhe general ledger.
So I can tell you from tl'!e city's general
ledger how much money we collected from a utility
·customer that day and for the month and so on. But I
can't tell you which families paid. For that level of
detail you need to go to utility billing and say when ·
did Svl'indell pay his utility bill and they have the
customer detai1.
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So the building department works the same way.
1
They
have
a subsidiary ledger, they credit the builder
2

Page 52

1 shared with Chubbuck.

A. Correct.
Q.
Now, you mentioned earlier that the softwar~
by
paying
the
capacity
fee
on
the
specific
address.
And
3
3
breaks
these
dmvn into fund numbers. Can you tell me
then
they
make
up
the
deposit,
they
bring
the
deposit
to
4
4
the
fund
number
for the building permit?
finance,
and
then
we-·
the
subsidiary
ledger
uploads
to
5
5
A.
That
is
Fund
1, Department Division 0500.
6
6 the general ledger and we say, hmmm, there should be X
Q. And I can fmd that In the budget book?
7
7 dollars in the deposit today, does it marry up, does
8
A.. Yes. So fund is 001: the department is
8 treasury meet accounting and agree with it, do you
9 OS: and the division is· 00, so it's 001-0500.
9 balance in that regard, and we then take the money to
Q. So then can you recall, this isn't a memory
IO
LO the bank and we credit the appropriate line items in the
11 test but I can look it up, b!!t if you can recall, what
i1 appropriate funds for the dollars that are receipted.
In the building department's case, you will
12 is the fund number for water?
12
typically
have
a
building
permit
line
that
gets
credited
A. That is Fund 31, 031.
13'
13
to
the
building
department
and
If
they
credited,
they
Q. And then what is the fund number for
14
14
'
15
collected
a
capacity
fee
foi
water
or
wastewater,
then
wastewater?
15
A. The wastewater fund is Fund 32, 032. °It's a
16
16 those funds and dollars are credited to the water fund
or
water
pollution
control.
fund
as
appropriate.
three
digit number.
17
17
Q.
So
the
permit,
tell
me
if
I
am
right,
is
Q. 031 and 032.
18
18
A. Right.
19
19 broken down into three lines, one is the building permit
Q. And is there like a fund number for collection
20
20 itself·A. Right, that would be typical;
21 .system and wastewater or is that dealt with in the
21
Q. And then the second one would be the water and
22 account level? You mentioned earlier that there were
22
Z3 accounts underneath the fund.
23 then the third one would.be the wastewater.
A. Rlght. Wastewater typically has actually two .
A. Yes, there are departments and divisions
24
Z4
ZS components because we have divided the capacity fee for ZS within the wastewater fund, and Jon has departments and
2

the
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I wastewater into two parts.

1 dh/isions for administration, for lift stations, for

z

z sludge reuse -

3

4
5
6

7
·g
9

10

11
12

I
I

Page. S3.

13
14
15

16
17
18
19

2D
21
22
23
24
25

Q. And those two components are?
A. The first one is the collection system, and

the second one is the wastewater treatment' plant. The
reason for. that complication is because we share the
wastewater treatment plant with the City of Chubbuck and
therefore when they have a connection, Chubbuck. collects
the treatment plant capacity fee for us and then remits
that monthly to the city with an accounting
docwnentation as to what addresses and so on. But they
have their own collection system of lift stations and
backbone sewer pipes and we don't have anything to do
with that.
MR. HALL: We have been going for about an
hour and a half, so let's take a break.
(Recess taken from 10:50 to 11:00 a.m.)
MR. OLSEN: Back on the record.
Q. Let me just continue down this track, Mr.
Swindell, with regard to, we were talking about the
inputs, the connection or capacity fees, and yoi.tju~t
mentioned that you do a separate llne for wastewater
because you share that with the City of Chubbuck?
A. Correct, it's split into two components.
Q. And the collection system is solely the City
of Pocatello, there is no collection system that's

208-345-9611
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&

3
4

5
6
7

s
9

10
11
12
13

14
15
16

Q. What I am talking about, again, is we arejust
talking about input$, We will get to outputs in a
minute.
A. The input is not dedicated by division. The
revenue comes In and there is no department division for
that, it just goes to tbe fund.
Q. And it is my understanding that there of
course ar~ these user fees that are charged for ·
wastewater and also for water. Do the user fees for
water also go into 031?
A. Water goes to Fund 31, correct.
Q. And the wastewater user fees -· and these are
paid by the pa~ons to the system; right? .

A. Yes.

17

Q. And that goes to 032?

18

A. Correct.

MR. OLSEN: Let's get the next exhibit out, I
19
20 guess we are on No. 8.
(Deposition Exhibit No. 8 marked for
21
22 · identification.)
· Q. · I'll represent to you that this is another
document
obtained through the public request from the
24
association
entitled Cash Handling Procedures. Is this
25

23

M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, -INC.

800-234-9611
375

r)

()
.•..... ..... ........... ·--

·- .. ,.-·

-·

,

... .--,.- --......-

-----.. ---

Page 17 (Pages 62-65)
David K. Swindell 12/14/2012
Page 62

l

that have been Ms. Johnson?
A. Yes, that's her job as the city clerk, ta have
3 overall lead on the. project with all the rest of the
4 city staff in support.
Q. So when It came to the finance department, you
5
6 handled that aspect of it?
A. Correct.
7
Q. And, as you mentioned, there were some
8
9 requests that were specific to the departments. What
10 i.J)volvement did you have or oversight did you have with
11 regard·to the departments ln complying with this
12 request?
A. Generally just as it related to their
13
14 financial data. There were ofuei' requests for
15 engineering documents and plans and contract documents;
lfl and generally those resided either L, the departments or
17 with engineering.
Q. Go to the last page of this exhibit and just.
18
rip
out that last page, that's a fax to me from somebody
19
20 in the association.
MR. HALL: It's already been marked and it's
2.1
22 part of the exhibit and I am not going to consent to it .
23 being modified.
MR. OLSEN: Really?
24
MR. HALL: Yes.
25

Page 64.
I

request, tasks t~e.department to provide the

I

I

2

2 information, the department provides the info:cmation,
3 prepares the response, the clerk logs it out. But this
4 is Just what I gave to the city clerk to give to Ms.
5

6

1

s
9

LO

Ll

12
13
14

15
18
17
18
19

20

21
22
23

Z4
i5

Thompson to iµiswer her request.
Q. And so just briefly if we go over this, and we
have gotten this to some extent during today's
deposition -MR. HALL: Counsel, before you start with .
that, this particular document makes reference to a
number of attachments and what you had marked does not
include any of those attaclunents.
MR. OLSEN: ~hat's where I am going.
Q. Ifwe look down to, as your counsel mentioned,
D on Question 1, there is reference to four pdf files
that are the transactionjournals for the four
funds FY03 through '09 and then there is four items
listed there and the page numbers. Are you there?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall providing those documents as
attached.to this letter?
A. Yes. They were on a computer disk. Jerry
Higgins did the computer extraction and these were just
lists of every expense transaction in those funds for
those years.

Page ~3
'

Page 65

. Q. And let me just back up. On B it refers to
attached
spread sheets. Do you recall providing a
2
already
-been
marked
as
part
of
the
exhibit
that
you
put
3
spread
sheet
that had the total amount of fees collected
3
4
in
the
last
seven
years?
into
evidence
and
I
am
not
going
to
consent
to
having
it
4
A. Yes. And I believe that refers to the
5
5 withdrawn.
MR. OLSEN: Honestly, okay. ·
.6
6 capacity fees.
A. I agree it's innocuous. Please give me a call
Q. Yes. And then in C there is a spread sheet
7
7
8 referenced with regard tq funds that were d~posited in
8 to discuss. Sure.
Q. -All right Let's go to the next-9 the city's main bank account at Wells Fargo Bank. Do
9
A. But I've got a sharp attorney.
10 you rec~ll providing those documents?
10
A. Yes.
Q. Let's go to the next exhibit here, that will
11
11
Q. And then on E there is an item there, formal
12
12 be No, 10.
(Deposition ExhibitNo. 10 marked for
13 or informal memoranda or communications providing
13 '
14. . instruction or guidance. Do you recall providing those?
14 identification.)
A. Yes, the budget book.
Q. This is a two-page letter, it appears to be
15
15
Q. These have to do ,vith communications..
16
16 signed by you and I just want to verify that first
A. Yes, that's my signature..
A. F?
17
17
Q. I am sorry, we are on E. Take a look at E.
Q. Now, it doesn't appear that there is a date on
18
18
19 Do you recall providing cop1es of communications,
19 this letter, unless I am missing something here. But it
20 informal communications and memoranda ••
20 appears to be, and tell me if I am wrong, a letter that
A. What I provided was as on Page 2, my answer
you
wrote
to
the
Building
Contractor
Association,
this
21
21
was
the document guiding all the funds of the city is
Randi
Thompson.
22
22
A. Right. This.material and response was
23 the budget and then I provided the budget book the same
23
24 one you have for FYlO.
24 provided to the city clerk. She should have dated it
Q. And then if we turn to G on this, the second
2.5.
25 because the process is, again, the clerk gets the
l

MR. OLSEN: It's fairly innocuous but -MR. HALL: It probably is innocuous but it's

?flA-14~-9611

M

&

1

2

M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, .INC.

376

800-234-9611

()

I

Page 18 (Pages 66-69)
David K. Swindell 12/14/2012
Page 66

'i-

1 page, it refers to I think the acronym is a CAFR,
2 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, and do you recall
3 providing those reports? Again, this ls, as I recall, a

4- part of a disk.
A. Yes.
5
Q. Tell me a little bit more about what a CAFR
6
1 is.

i

B
9

10
11

I
i
i
I-

CJ

12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19
io

21

zz
23

24
25
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1
A. Yes.
2
Q. And did you prepare thls document?
3
A. I did.·
4
Q. And thete is nothing after that, although if
5 we look down where it says answer, that is wlth regard
6

A. !"will refer to the document that I gave you
when we started this deposition, which I believe is that
one right there (indicating), And I am not sure how you
marked that one, which exhibit.
Q. I haven't marked it.
A. That's the most current Comprehensive Annual
Financial Report for the city, that's as of Sept~mber
30, 2011. We are obviously right now working on the one
that ends 30 September 2012. And I provided your
association with hard copies of a couple versions and
the other versipns on disk in pdf format The annual
report serves the same purpose of any annual report you
might get from any major corporation, such as .General
Motors or General Electric.
Q, So on Subcategory H referencing contracts for
external reports in 2006 and 2010, are these in
reference to the Red Oak Consulting reports?
A. Yes.

to the service level reports and are those the same

7 things that we have been discussing earlier today?
A. No, that's our annual financial report.
8
9

That's the CAFR, that's one of the documents that were

10 discussed today, but thafs not the service level
11 report. That's the Comprehensive Annual Financial

12 Report (indicating). In other ,vords, not that one, that
13 one (indicating).
Q. If we· look down where it says information
14
15 regarding maintenance and operations on this memorandum
18 that you prepared --

A. I'm not sure we are on the same ••
MR. HALL: What document are you on, what page
are you on?
Q. It should say - .
A. BCASEI Question No. 8, Federal Stimulus
zz Documents ••
23 ·
Q. No, we are out of order here.
24
MR. HALL: The one that's been marked as
25 Exhibit No. l ~. is the one that Mr. Swinde~ just made
17
18
19
20
21

Page ~'I

·1-

1
2
3

I·

I
II
I

4
5
6

1
8
9

10
11

12
- 13
14
15
16

17
18

10

I
'

I
D

20
21
22

23
24
25

Q, Let's go to the next document.
(Deposit1011 Exhibit No. 11 marked for
identification.}
Q. I just want to verify two things with you on
this document. I will represent to you that this was
part of
response on the public information request.
But first it's an indication it's a memorandum for the
city clerk and it's from David Swindell, Chief Financial
Officer. Is that your signature next to that?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you prepare this document?

the

A. I did.
Q. And if you could look briefly at the pages·
following this document, let me know if those documents
were generated by you and as a part of this memorandum
or as attachments to this memorandum.
A. Yes.
Q. J.,et's go to the next exhibit.
(Deposition Exhibit No. 12 marked for
identification.)
Q. This is another memorandum that was provided
as part of the response to our public r(!corcls request
and I would again ask you the same question, is that
your signature where it ~ays from David Swindell, Chief
Financial Officer?

208-_34 5-9611
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1 reference to.

z
3

4
5
6
1
8
9
10
11

17.
13
14
15
16
17
18
l!l

20
21
22
23
24
25

Q. {ByMr. Olsen.) All I wanted to ·do wis verify
with you that you prepared this memorandum and that the
sheets behind it are sometb.lng that you prepared as
attachments .ro that memorandum.
A. Yes, my memorandum, extractions from our
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report and federal grant
summaries e_xtracted from the federal government website
for.the stimulus grants.
MR. OLSEN: Let's mark the next one Exhibit
No.13.
(Deposition Exhibit No." 13 marked for
identification.)
Q. Okay, I'll just confirm with you, memorandum
prepared and signed by you m response to the public
records request?
A. Yes.
Q. And now I'll go back to my previous question
on the answer where it says B, it says information ·
regarding maintenance and operations, we are referring
to service level reports
that's what we were
discussing earlier?
A. Correct.
MR. OLSEN: Let's go ahead and mark No. 14.
(Deposition Exhibit No. 14. marked for

and
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- (

1

identification.)

1
2
3

Q. This looks like it's another similar
2
3 memoqmdwn, it says BCASCI Question No. 57

_.,

-'I

A. Correct. This was to answer questions about

5 expenditures and operations within the city's building
6 department.
7 . Q. And that's your signature there?

8
9

10
ll

12
13
14
15
16
,;
•.

17
18

19
20

.,

21
22
23
24

25
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A. Yes.
Q. Under the From category.
A. Right.
Q. Move to the next.
(Deposition Exhibit No. 15 marked for
identification.)
Q.. I have handed you another memorandum, subject
line BCASEI Question No: 9. Is that your slgnature as
well on the From line?
A. Yes.
Q. And you prepared this document?
A. I oversaw preparation of this document. I
tasked ~ to my utility billing director who did the
data extractions and then we reviewed it together and I
signed it -out.
Q. So ifwe look at the following pages where it
says Water/Sewer Connections, is this the attachment
that breaks 1;1.own those connections?

4
5
6
7
8

9
ID
11.
12
13
14
-15
16

17
18

19
20
21

2Z
23

24.
25

from Ms. Moore, but it is part of the exhibit so we will
treat it that way. This appears to be a summary of the
City of Pocatello connection and capacity fee history,
and the perrnif fee history from 2003 through 2010.
.,
Let me ask you, does this document look
familiar to you?
A. Yes, I believe I prepared this document.
Q. As I thlnk about it, the Initial letter that I
referred to, I think it was Exhibit No. 10, this was
this letter that you prepared. I don't know if you want
to look at that again. But under B of that it says the
total amount of fees collected in the last seven years
and it says see spread sheet attached, and this is in
reference to that.
A I believe so.
· Q. And today you have given us the 2012 numbers,
so we wouldjustneed to getthe 2011 numbers.
Let's go ahead and mark the next one.
(Deposition Exhibit No. 17 marked for
identification.)
Q. I'll again represent to you this is another
document provided in response to the public records
request. It indicates it's from David Swindell. That's
your signature?

A: Itis.
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A. I believe it is.

Page 73
1

Q. And did you prepa_re this document?

:t-.ffi. OLSEN: Let's mark the next as Exhibit

2

No. 16.
.{Deposition Exhibit No. 16 was marked for
identification.)
A. Just so you know, some of that infocmation you
got from me at the beginning are just more recent
updates to the ,$ame figures.
Q. Which I am glad you brought, so I appreciate
you thinking ahead for me.
A. This spread sheet goes out to FYlO and what I
gave you was FY12.
Q. So we would probably need FYll, I suppose.
A. I can get it for you, if you want.
Q.. This docwnent is a little "different in that H·
indicates it's from Joyce Moore. Do you )glow who Joyce
Moore is?
A. Joyce Moore is an employee in the city's
utility billlng department. She is a senior customer
service representative.
Q.
you recall reviewing this document before
it was sent to the association?

3

A. !did.
Q. And then if

Do

A I do not.
Q. Let's turn to the next page on that. I am not

25 sure that this is necessarily associated with this note

208-345-9611

M

&

we could take a minute and take a

attachments to that. There 'is
s the memorandum from Justin Armstrong.
4 look at the referenced

&
1

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Yes.

And also Jon Herrick, WPC department?
Right.
9
And then there i§ a Tab C that says Detailed
10 notes on all funds -11
A. It's an extraction from our Comprepensive
12 · Annual Financial Report.
13
Q. But you are the one that put Tab C there and
14 attached it as part of this -15
A. That's correct.
16
Q, And also on Tab D.
17
A. Correct.
18
Q. L!;!t's go back to the front of this document,
19 the first page. Now, in the memorandum there is
20 reference to the debt financed projects for water and
21 sewer, and I want to point you first to Section 1(a)
22 with regard to the water. Now, in there it describes .
23 the purpose of the bonds and then it goes on to say that
as of June 20, 2010. there is 6.8 million and change
25 remained in the loan proceeds project account (Fund

s

2,
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1

073), and you probably have answered this earlier, so

the Fund 073 is a separate fund where these proceeds are
3 kept?
2

I
I

(·

[.
11r
,·

l

4

A. Co.rrect.

Q. And then how are these funds administered once
6 they are kept there?
7
A. When you borrow money to _appropriately account
s for the purposes of the funds'for which you.borrowed the
9 money on a tax exempt status under IRS rules, you put
10 that money into a capital projects fund. That way it's
i 1 easier to ans\ver questions about were the proceeds of
12 the bonds used for the purposes for which the bonds were
13 authorized both in the election and are they atax
14 exempt purpose authorized by the IRS, so you are trying
15 to service two purposes there.
16
So the actual proceeds from the loan go into a
11 · separate fund; we established it as Fund 73. And then
18 in addition we needed to have a debt service reserve
1s that was part of the bond covenants and we put those
20 dollars into Fund 61.
·
2.1
Q. So 61 is the reserve and 73 -·
22
A. Is the project construction account.
23
Q. T/;le project construction account.
5

24
25

[

[.
(.

I
I
I

reserve fund from which you will maintain the debt
pay the debt
service as it becomes due In future years.
And then the parent account, Ftind 31, has to
fund the debt service account to make its payments and
to maintain the reserve.
Q. So the bond payments that come out of the
operations and maintenance -A. Ultimately, yes.
Q. -- of either the water fund or the
wastewater •A. The wastewater fund works the same way.
Q. How often are payments made on these·bonds?
. A. Generally these are semiannual payments.
There is an interest payment and then there is an
interest and principal payment.
Q.. Twica a year?

3

4
5

s
7
B

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19

A Twice a year.
Q. And what are the dates?

A. Right.

Q. Are funds withdrawn from that Fund 73 to go

2s prepared?

20
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towards the bonded projects?.
A. Correct.
3
Q. That's something that would be reflected in
. 4 the budget book?
s A. Correct.
s Q. And then the debt service fund, you said
1 that's actually a reserve account?
s A. Right. It typically equals one year of debt
9 service, although sometimes the covenants of the bond
10 can be a little different than that. And you ·are just
11 required to hold those as a reserve, and that's just a
12 part of the loan condition. So what ·actually happens,
13 then, is when a bond payment is due, the operating fund,
14 bl this case the water fWJd, Fund 31, will transfer the
15 money into the debtservice reserve fund. The debt
16_ · service reserve fund makes the bond payment and the
11 residual balance is what the debt service r~serve
18 requirement was.
19
Q. So the payment would come out of the, you said
20 the operations and maintenance fund?
21
A. Yes, you can view it as a family of funds.
22 When you take on debt, water actually expanded and now.
23 the water enterprise really has three funds. It has its
24 parent fund and then it has a fund where the bond
25 proceeds reside, and then it has the debt service
1

[

1

2 s.ervice reserve and from which you will

A. I don't recall offhand.
Q. That would be reflected in the budget book.
22
A. Yes.
23
Q. We will get into this in more detail later,
24 but I presume there is an amortization schedule that is

2

(

Page 76
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.A. Yes.
Q. And that sets out the payments for over how .
3 many years the bond 4
A. Right. I believe that was a 20-year bond.
s Q. So this first one 9.5 million issued in '08,
s it'~ got a pay-off date of 2028?
1 . A. That would be correct.
8
Q. -Do you know wha_t the semiannual payment is for
g this particular bond?
·
10
A. I would say there would be an interest payment
11 and an h!terest and principal payment. I believe the
12 total is a little less than the 961 that was initial
13 reserve and I think it dropped down. It's actually
14 761,000, I think it's around three quarters of a million
15 dollars.
16
Q. And that's the total annual payment?
11
A. Right.
ts
Q. Do you recall If that amotmt changes from yeas
19 to year or is it the same all the way through?
20.
A. It is materially the same every year, a little
21 different, a thousand bucks or so; it depends on how the
22 bonds were sold and marketed what the final schedule
z3 turned out to be. I have the final schedule In a book
24 on my desk if you need that.
zs
Q. What's the label for that, again?
1

2
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I

A. We call it the bond book. It's actually a
book on tllat bond prepared by our bond attorney for that
3 transactlon. .
4.
Q, And Imay request that, but I'll hold off for
5 now.
6
MR. OLSEN: Let's go ahead and mark the next
7 exhibit.
g
{Depo~ition Exhibit No. 18 marked for
9 identification.)
10
Q. I'll just again ask you to confrrm that first
11 of all that's your signatu~e and that you prepared this
12 in response to the information request made by the

Page 80

you prepared and then also the attachment to that
memorandum?
A. I'm nqt sure that is an attachment to this
memorandum.
s . Q. Do you recall providlng us a copy 9f that
s letter to Mr. Robinson?
7
A.
must have.
Ii
.- MR. HALL: The question he asked you is
9 whether you recall providing him with a copy of that.
. 10
A. I don't know. I believe someone in the city
11 must have provided this to you, It ebviously is
12 something that came out of the mayor's office. All I
13 can really say for sure what I did is my memorandum.
13 association.
14
Q. · Understood. Part of what we are doing is, as
14
A Yes.
15 your counsei mentioned, is figure out what you recall
15
MR. HALL: You are talking about the first
111 and what your process was.
1s page of the exhibit or the entire exhibit?
11
This is in reference to this return on equity
17
MR. OLSEN: Well, there is a three-page
ia question that we asked about, it's a line item in the
18 memorandum and then there is an attachment -19 ·
MR. HALL: Three-page memorandum? I only have 19 budget, I think it's also been called an enterprise
20 · funds account. Ara there any other terms that you use
20 two pages.
21 for it?
21
MR. OLSEN: May I see the exhibit.
22
A. My deposition~22
(Exhibit No. 18 handed to Mr. Olsen.)
23
Q. Your affidavit1
23
{Pause in proceedings.)
24.
A. I am sorry, my affidavit explains and provides
24
MR OLSEN: Let's go off the record.
25 kind of an update on this and the language did change a
25
{Discussion off the record.)
1
2
3
4

2

Page
l
2
3

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
.!
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11

12
13
14

15
16

17
18
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20

21
22
23
24
25
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MR. OLSEN: Back on the record.
1 little bit subsequent to this: Mayor Chase referred to
Q. So you have confirmed, Mr. Swindell, that this
2 those transfers·as a return on equity. That was a
is a _memorandum prepared by you of three pages, and
3 transfer from the city owned utility to the general
attach1;d with that is an August 22, 2005, Jetter to
4 fund. Mayor Blad wanted to describe it differently and
Logan Robinson and also I'll represent to you ·that the
5 have it more on an accounting basis si~ilar to what we
·ctraft on this handwritten language'ls the way-it came to
6 do with privately owned utilities like Intermountain
us as patt of the information request.
1 Gas, so you will see it reflected in the new budget
MR. HALL: Mine doesn't have any so I'm not
8 books and in my affidavit. as a payment in lieu of taxes
sure what you mean..
9 and a franchise fee. The amounts and the concept are ·
MR. OLSEN: Well, that's the exhibit.
10 simJlar.
MR. HALL: The copy you gave me is just
Q. The concepts, regardless of what they ..
11
different.
12 apparently they have been referred to in different ways
MR. OLSEN: lgave you a slightly different
13 over the years, is something that goes throµgh the
copy. lfyou want to go and make a copy of the actual
14 budget process and gets approved by the council?
A. Yes.
exhibit to keep your record straight, I'd be hapPy -·
15
MR. HALL: That's okay. I just want to verify
Q. When do you recall this first being
16
that the docwnent is the same document. You seemed to · 17 implemented, this fund transfer program?
A. I'm going to say 200 3, but it might be 2004.
be acting like this letter was attached to this
18
memorandum. There is a fairly significant change lri
Q. How would we be able to find out exactly when
19
dates.
20 this program started?
MR. OLSEN: This is the way it came to us.
A. The program existed well prior to my arrival
Zl
MR. HALL: Okay, fine.
Z2 but to be labeled as a return on equity and to be
Q. (By Mr. Olsen.) Now that we hopefully have
Z3 specified that way was something that I was part of and
gotten that straightened out, Mr. Swindell, does that
24 I believe we got that in the '04 budget !hat was built
appear to be a true and correct copy ofthe·memorandum 25 in '03.
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Q.

I am assuming at some point you made a
presentation
or there was a presentation made at a city
2
council
meeting
with regard to this program?
3
Right.
A
4
Q. Would that be reflected in the minutes,
5
6 presumably?
A. Presumably. I don't know.
1
Q. But it was discussed at the council -8
A. Right. Us been -9
Q. And approved as part of the budget.
)0
A Yes, it's part of the budget process.
11
Q.. Let me Just talk about your involvement with
lZ
13 it You said you recall it being a program initiated
14 prior to your arrival but that you -- I think you
15 mentioned you were the one who first called it a return
16 on equity?
A. Right, I wanted to formalize it and have it
17
reflected
in the city accounts in a formal fashion.
18
Q.
How
did you for,!11alize it?
19
A.
As
you
see here. This part of the exhibit
20
(indicating)
that's
in capital letters, that's just an
21
extraction
of
the
budget
book.
22
So
you
formalize9
it by putting it into the
Q.
23
24 budget.
A. Right.
25
I

.Page 84

I :Yith regard to ExhibifNo.18. We are actually on
2 Exhibit No. 18. This is back to this return on equity

program. It's my understanding that the city's attorney
·is Dean Tranmer; is that right? _
A. Dean Tranmer is the city attorney, yes;
Q. Have you ever sought a legal opinion from Mr.
Tranmer or anybody in the legal department with regard
to the legality of this program?
A. Yes.
9
MR HALL: Objection, that seeks to intervene
10
in
the
attorney-client
privHege betWeen him and the
11
3
4
5
6
1
8

12 dty.
13
14
15

16
17
18
19
20
21

2Z
23
24

25

MR. OLSEN: Not in this case, becaus_e we are
talking about •• this is not tn relation to the case.
Well, let me ask a different question.
Q. A~ the time that you got involved and got tlrls
process formalized, did you ever seek a legal opinion
from Mr. Tranmer or anybody _in the legal department with
regard to the legality of this program?
MR. HALL: Same objection. Yoa are asking to.
seek information in violation of the attorney-client
privilege, between the-city attorney and his client, the
city offi:cials. He is not going to answer, it's a
violation of~he attorney-client privilege.
MR. OLSEN: I want him to tell me.
Page as

Page Bl

1

2
3

4

5

6
7
8

9

10
11

12
13
14

15

Q, And just for the record, you are referencing
midway down the document the all caps letters that have
amounts _to the right ofit, probably the key one there
is ~vhere it says TO 00!-0000-393.99-00 Return on Equity?
A. Yes.
Q. And FY!l, that was $1,585,237?
A. Yes.
Q, Well, let's go ahead and turn to this le!t;er
dated -- this is Page 4 of this particular exhibit,
August 22, 2005, letter to :Mr. Robinson. Do you recall
anything about this letter, did you review it?
A. I recall having some input into this letter.
The mayor asked for some information, but I didn't
actually draft this letter. But I am sure he got these
numbers from me.
Q. Thank you.
MR. HALL: Before we go on to the n~t
exhibit. It's noon. So should we take our lunch break

16
17
18
19 now?

20
21
22

23
24
25

2

3

4

5
6
7
8

9
10

11
12

13
14
15
16
17

18

19

MR. OLSEN: It sounds good.
(Lunch recess taken from 12:01 p.m. to
1:00 p.m.)
MR. OLSEN: Back on the record after lunch in
the deposition of Mr. David Swindell.
Q. I wanted to ask you o~e more brief question

208-345-9611

.1

.

20
21
22
23

24
25

MR. HALL: He is not the one who is going to
tell you.
Q. Mr. SWindell, are you going to follow the
advke of your attomey and not answer this question?
MR. HALL: I am instructing him not to answer.
Please proceed.·
MR. .OLSEN: I want a yes or no from him.
MR. HALL: He is not going to answer.
MR. OLSEN: I want a yes or no from Mr.
Swindell.
MR. HALL: You can want it the rest of your
life. I am instructing hfui not to answer.
Q. (By Mr. Olsen.) Are you going to answer the
question?
A.. My attorney has instructed my not to answer.
MR HALL: He is following his attorney's
instructions.
MR. OLSEN: That's all I am looking for. And
I will certainly be asking the.courtto compel that
because I think it's not protected by the privilege in
this instance. So I would urge counsel to reconsider.
AnYV11ay, moving OIL
Let's go ahead and mark the next exhibit as
No.19.
(Deposition Exhibit No.19 marked for
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A. Not on this report. That would be in the
annual financial reporf; the details, the ending cash
3 balance in each fund.
4
Q. And that's not ill the budget book, right,
s because the budget book -6
A. No, the budget book is ju~t a plan of revenue
? and a plan of expenditures.
a
Q. So that's in the financial report. I believe
s you provided us financial reports with our FOIA request
10 and I will just double check.
·
u
A. Right, and you have the most current one that
12 I provided you this morning.
13
Q. Let's go back lo that first VI/PC report that
14 you were looking at earlier.
1s
A. Okay.
16
Q. Now I want you to go to Page 3 of that report.
11 Now we have this Analysis of Inputs and what I really
18 need from you isjustifyou could please ~plain to me
19 this chart.
20
A. It relates to this table (indii;ating).
21
Q. Whenyou say this table, the Measures of
22 Inputs?
23
A. The Measures of Inputs table. It is a graph
24 of the total, and the real dollars in FY04. There are
25 two line~ on.the Analysis of Inputs chart, and if it
1
2

Page 9G

1

2
3
4

s
6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18

Is
20
21
22
23

24
25

Q. The upper line is?
A. Yes. So, for example, FY08 actual 6,927,000,
you will see the top part of that graph is just kissing
7 million bucks.
Q. I see. So I was actually incorrect earlier.
So what does the 6,206,125 represent?
A. That is the deflated real purchasing power,
that's what $6,927,000 is worth in FY04 purchasing
p_ower, which is the initial number on the chart. It's
reiilly only worth 6.106,000 if you deflate it according
to the Consumer Price Index.
Q. So is what you are suggesting here -- you are
trying to track the increases from a CPI context -A. Correct.
Q. -- and how-·
A. It's a way to express to the council, all
right, the chart went up, expenses went up, is it
because of inflation or is it b.ecause of other things.
This one demonstrates it ain'tjust ilJflation, it went" .
up because of other things.
·
Q. It's because the government is printing more
dollars and they are not worth what they used to be.
A. That's all that is. Well, yot.i get it, you
widerstand,
Q. That may be all the questions I have because

Page 95

Page 97

were in color you would see the difference, they are on 1 as I look, it looks like you have similar th'ings going
2 on when we are looking at water. Yes, that's all the
2 different lines .
3
questions I have on that exhibit.
.3
The way I do these charts for the council is I
4
I think this next one may be a repeat of one I
4 want them to focus on the real inputs which strips out
$ already went over with you, so I am not going to ask you
5 the effects of inflation. If you look at the Measures
6 any questions about that.
e ot Inputs chart it's easier to explain. Let explain
7
MR HALL: Are you g?ing to mark this one
1 to you that table and then the chart is just a chart of
8 not?
s those numbers.
9
· Q. I am going to go back to this first ·chart you
9
MR OLSEN: No.
10
A. Did I answer your question on the real
10 were looking at. So, yes, if you could -- it looks to
11 me on that lower line, let's go back to the Analysis of
11 purchasing power graph adequately?
12
Q. Yes.
12 Inputs, the first number on that lower line is
13 4,892,397, and that was on the measures of inputs the
1:i
MR OLSEN: Mark this, please.
14 total actually spent on those three areas in '04; am I
14
(Deposition Exhibit No. 21 marked for
15 identification.}
1s reading that correctly?
16
Q. I am going to hand you Exhibit No. 21, and I
1s
A. Yes.
17
Q. And that's reflected. And then ifwe follow
17 don't know how much time we will spend on it as it
1s that line, those various numbers then reflect the actual
18 predates your time.
19 spent thro),lgh 2008.
19
This is a study that the association obtained
20
A. Okay.
20 from Black & Veatch and I think you said earlier that
21
Q. So what I am trying to figure out is 21 Mr. Gallagher was part of Black & Veatch before he went
22 explain better to me what that upper line is, then.
22 to Red Oak Consulting?
23
· A. I am pointing to the upper line on the chart.
23
A. Yes.
24 The upper line is simply a graph of the totals that are
24
Q. And this is a wastewater rate study done back
25 here (indicating).
25 in '97. My question to you is have you ever seen or
1

me
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revie,;.,ed this report before?
A. I think I am going to say no.
3
Q. Let's put it away, then.
4
· A.. It was before my Ume and I think the only
5 relevant thing here is that Mr. Gallagher, I have been
6 told, has done the financial analysis for the City of
1 Pocatello since I believe 1986, and this is obviously
s one of his reports when he was with Black & Veatch. No,
9 I have not had a copy of that
10
Q: So we will now move on to what we will mark as
u Exhibit No. 22.
12
(Deposition Exhibit No. 22 marked for
13 identification.)
14
Q. I'll represent to you that this appears to be
is another report done by Black & Veatch, Mr. Gallagher,
16 and I have the same question, have you ever reviewed
11 this report.
18 .
A. I can't recall.
19
Q. And I'll just note, too, earlier you gave me a
20 Black & Veatch report that we need to make sure -21
A. Right, from 2002, and those are the earliest
22 reports that I have that I have worked with during my
23 tenure with the city.
24
Q. Can we get somebody to copy these while we are
25 waiting?
1

2

f.

l

1 review?

A. We review the methodology by which he
calculated these things. We provided
the valuations .
4 and the status of our systems. We are responsible for
s the inputs to some of his calculations obviously, and in
6 the end it's a policy recommendation that the council is
7 responsible for.
B
Q. But ultimately Gallagher and Red Oak, they are
9 the ones who do the calculations.
10
A. Yes.
11
Q. And it's based on inpu~ that you have given
12 him.
13
A. Right.
14
MR. OLSEN: Let's go ahead and mark the next
15 exhibit.
16
(Deposition Exhibit No. 23 marked for
17 identification.)
111
Q. Now, I'll represent to you that this is a ·
19. resolution entered into by the city on the 16th of
20 August of 2001. You'll have to refresh my memory. Were
21 you employed at the time that this resolution passed?
22
A. Actually, no.
23
Q. Do you know who the prior CFO was?
24
A. My understanding the position was vacant. Ron
25 ·Timpson three years ear~er was at a position where he
2

hlm

3

Page 99

l

MR. HALL:· Off the record.
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l

(Discussion off the record.)
.
MR.
OLSEN: Back on the record.
3
Q.
Now,
as you look through these reports and
4
also
in
reviewing
your affidavit, which we will get to
5
s in a minute, there is a lot of discussion about the ·
1 system buy-in ~ethod that is being used as basis to
8 determine capacity fees. Can you describe to me in your
9 own words what you understand the system buy~in method
JO to be?
LI
A. It's a calculation of the capacity fee based
12 upon ~ buy-in method. My understanding of that is that
13 over the years the rate payers have built a system, paid
14. fo~ it, it has some residual capacity, they pay for it,
15 and then when a new connector comes on the system, ·they
16. absorb part of that capacity. The capacity fee is an
17 equity contribution that is calculated to be an .
lB equivalent contribution as to what the-rate payers are
19 estimated to have made over the years "to the backbone
20 system.
21
Q. Aie those calculations that you make as a CFO?
22
A. No, John Gallagher makes those as our
23 consultant. We review them, we are responsible for
24 them.
25
Q. When you say you review them, what do you

.2

a

I.
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2
3

4
5

6

1
8

9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19

20
2.1

22
23
24.
25

did most ofmy duties. He passed away.
Q. Durlng the time that the position was vacant,
do :¥OU know who handled your responsibilities?
A. My understanding was a budget committee from
the mayor, the city treasurer, the HR director and the
IT director, IT being our lingo for information
teclmology.
Q. HR, IT director, treasurer.
A. Right.
Q. That was for about, did you say three years?
A. Three years. I was actually employed by the
city I believe on the 20th of August. They passed the
budget a .week prior. This must have been part of that.
But it's a standard fee resolution. What are your
questions on it?
Q. ·Go down to the fourth. and fifth paragraph, it
indicates, it says, "VVlrereas, a local builders'
association later took issue with the amount of the
plant capaclty fees and the engineering study itself and
persuaded th_e city council to review the plant capacity
fees: and
"Whereas, the city subsequently established a
committee to provide recommendations regarding a number
of city fees and the city council approved those
recommendations in regard to sewer capacity f~es."
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design ls executed on the ground according to their
2 plans, and you hire -- we even hired Keller to open the
3 bids and manage the bidding. So that's what all that
4 is.
s
MR. OLSEN: Let's take a short·break and then
6 we will close to done.
7
(Recess taken from 2:16 to 2:30 p.m.)
s
MR. OLSEN: Back on the record. Let's mark
9 the next exhibit.
10
(Deposition Exhibit No. 32 marked for
11 identification.)
12
Q, l'lljust represent to you this is a copy of
13 an affidavit that we received in our office in support
14. of the summary judgment motion. Ijust want you to
1s confirm that it's a true and correct copy.
16
A. ·It appears to be.
11
Q: An~ that that's your signature on the last
18 page•
19
A. It is.
.20
Q. If you would turn to Page 2 of that. Paragraph
21 No. 5, there is reference to an impact fee governed by
22. the code under 67-8201. And ljust need to confirm with
23 you, does the city have an impact fee in place right
z4 now?

Page 1.24.
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·25

3
4

A. Yes.
Q. You are indicating here that the city ls

relying on Red Oak. Now. you mentioned earlier that Red
Oak had access to your files here in the city?

5

A. Yes.

6

Q. In what way?

·

7
A. They had access to all of the financial
s records of the city, the status reports on the
9 utilities, anything that we had that would assist them
1o in building a financial plan, and anything that would
11 assist them in a fair and proper calcula~on of the
12 capacir;y fees.
13
Q. Let's move on to the next exhibit here.
i4
(Deposition Exhibit No. 33 marked for ·
15 identification.)
16
Q. I'll represent to you that these were
17 . responses to some discovery requests that Mr. Hall's
18 office provided to us. My question to you is first of
19 all have you ever reviewed these responses before, or 20 tWs document?
21
A. I don't believe I have. I haven't seen this
22. document.
23
Q. Were you Involved, do you recall -- I'm not
24 asking you to divulge any attorney-client
25 communications, but do you recall being requested to·

A. No.
Page 123

Q. If you would turn to the following page, it
1
2 starts with -- I guess it continues v1ith Paragraph 6 and
3 on the following page there is reference to •· well,
4 Paragraph 5 talks about this buy-in. equity buy-in that
5

we discussed earlier and then on the last sentence of

6 that it indicates that in coming up with this equity
1
8

9
10
11

12
13
14

15
16

17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25

bu;fin formula, that you relied on a City of Pocatello
wastewater utility financial planning study prepared by
Red Oak Consulting?
A Yes.
Q. And I think you said earlier that they are the
ones that did the calculations -·
A. Right those studies right there (indicating).
Q. And you discussed earlier what your
involvement was in that process?
A. Yes.
Q. And then Jet's look at Paragraph 14, these
aren't paginated so we will just have to go by
paragraph.. Are you with me there?
A. Yes.
Q. The first part of that indicates that it's a
policy choice adopted by the city upon recommendation of
a water and wastewater study provided by Red Oak·
Consulting. So this is just a reaffirmation of what you
said earlfer.

208-345-9611

Paee 12s

1 assist in responding to this discovery?
A. I don't think specifically, it was never
2
3

r.ela1ed to me.

I get requests for information from

4 departments, including my legal department, at various
5 times, but••
Q. You don't recall being involved in preparing a
6
. · 1 . response to or providing information?
8
9

10

11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
2S

A. Not specifically other than -- obviously there
are a lot of documents here that we have already gone
through and our legal department bas those and provided
access to our attorneys in this case.
Q. If you could turn to Page 12 of this response.
Now, if you look at Request For Production No. 9, that
request is for any and all information with regard to
.
these 2006 and 2010 reports that we alluded to earlier
with Red Oak Consulting. And it suggests tl!at we
provide all documents in defendant's possession
pertaining to these reports and its relationship with
this consultant, including but not limited to contracts,
internal or external communications, working papers,
meeting minutes or notes, and formal or informal
internal or external memorandums.
A. l am not sure ·· you are on No. 9?
Q. Yes. If you want to take a minute just to
review what Ijust read.
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MR. HAJ,.L: He was reading the question up here
(indicating).
3
THE WITNESS: Oh, I was reading the response. 4
Q. Take a minute and review that, if you would.
s A. (Witness complies.) Okay.
6
Q. Po you recall anyone ever coming into your
7 office and saying please give me all the files to Red
s Oak Consulting?
ll
A. No. I mean I remember taU<lng a little bit.
10 abot.1.t this with our attorneys, but the volumes of
11 information -12
MR. HALL: _That's okay, yciu have answered
13 adequately by simply saying you have talked to your
14 attorneys about this issue.
15
Q. I don't. want you to share with me what the
16 conversation was.
11
A. The only real thing I know is in the end the
18 final products.
19
Q. I'lljust say in the responses we got the
20 final products, we got these reports, !Jut yve don't
21 have w~ll. in this request we didn't get any of~
22 other information.
23MR. OLSEN: Let's mark the next two exhibits.
24
(Deposition Exhibit Nos. 34 and 35 marked
is for identification.)
1

2

P•

Page 128

1
Q. Do you know if he has received any response
z from them?
3
A. I don't know.
4
MR. HALL: I was going to object because you
s were going to get into the attorney-client privilege but
6 he already answered and said he didn't know, so I guess
7 we don't need to worry about it.
8
Q. Let's look at 34, and this is some
9 correspondence going back and forth between Mr. Hall's
10 office and I, and I presume-- well, let me just ask
11 for the record. Have you reviewed any of this
12 correspondence be£ore?

13
14
15
16

I7
13
19

20
·21_

22
23

24
25

A. ·No.
Q. I do want to turn your attention to, go to the
last page of this particular exhibft, the December 7
letter. If you go down about the fourth sentence where
it starts "If you review," are you there with me now? .
A. -okay.
Q. "If you review your discovery requests, you
asked that the city provide any documents in its ,
possession. The city has provided all documents in the
city's possession related to Red Oak Consulting and the
2006 and 2010 rate studies."
,·
My question to you is to. your knowledge has
the city provided all the documents with regard to Red

Page 12?

1
2
3

4
5

s
7

s
9
10
11
12
13

14
15
16

17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
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Q. Let's start with No. 35, Mr. Swindell. rll
just represent to you that these are supplemental
responses. If you could turn to Page 13. So we are
back to this Response to Request fa( Production No. 9,
and we received a supplemental response, this vvas in
September of this year, ·wherein it states that the
defendant has not identified additional documents in its
possession responsive to this request and then it goes
on to say that defendant is inquiring with Red Oak
Consulting.
·
• Do you know if there has been inquiries made
to Red Oak Consulting pursuant to this response to
obtain records?
MR. HALL: I instruct you not to speculate.
What you know, you know.
A. I know they made contact. I don't know what
-the results of !hose inquiries were.
Q. Who has made contact?
A. I believe Kirk Bybee did.
Q. Who is Kirk Bybee?
A. He's a deputy city attorney for the City of
Pocatello.
Q. To your understanding, Mr. Bybee has made
contact with Red Oak with regard to this?
A. -Yes.

208-345-9611
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· 1

Oak in its possession?

MR. HALL: If you know. Since you weren't
involved in the r~ponses.to discovery, you probably
4 don't know what was produced and what wasn't -5
Q. I am just asking what you know.
6
A. I knov,v my office has provided anything that
7 has been requested of ~e firiance department.
s
MR. HALL: That's fine.
g
A. I believe we h~ve provided everything, but
10 I-11
Q. Did you review it before it went out, w_ould it
12 go through you, something like that -2

3

13

A. - Yes.

(Deposition Exhibit No. 36 marked for
identification.)
.
Q. I'll represent to you, Mr. Swindell. that
these are, what.I have handed you is Exhibit No. 36, is
18 about l 90 pages of e-mails that were provided -- these
19 were not provided in djscovery, however, they were
20 provided as part of that initial public records request.
H

15
10
11

A. Okay.
In 2010. And first I want to ask you some
23 questions and then there are some things we need to
24 point out before we go any further. If you look at
2s Page 1 -- and I have put a Bates number on the
21
22

I

I

i
I
I
I
I
j
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I
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I
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Page 132
1
2
3

right-hand corner so that we can know what page we are

referencing. Do you see that where it says 00017
A. Yes, you call that a Bates nwnber?
4
Q. Yes.
s
A You have your lingo and I have mine. We each
6 learned something.
1
Q. Who is Janene Orr?
8
A. Janene Orr was an employee of the water
9 deparlm.ent, she was the princip~l administrative
10 assistant to the water superintendent and also provided
11 administrative support to Greg Lanning, the director of ·
12 pub lit works. She recently retired:
13
Q. When did she retire? ·
14
A. Within the last two months: I can'.t give you
15 the exact date.
16
Q. Do you know if she is still in town?
11
A. I don't know, but I think she is still in the
1a local area.
Q. And then Greg Lanning, I think we have alluded
19
20 to him briefly, but tel1 me a little bit more about Greg
21 Lanning.
. 22
A. He grew up in Wyoming ••
Q.
I am sorry, let me get more specific.
23
A..
We did have that relationship, because we bath
24
zs grew up there.

1

A. He was the principal on the financial

2 planning.
3

Q. If you would turn the page. We have another

4 e-mail dated January 31, this is Bates No. 2, 2010, at

s 3:50, one more name to .ask you about, Randy Allen, \'ilho
6 is that?
7
A. Randy Allen ls the superintendent of the
s sanitation department. By way of explanation, when we
9 do these financial plans for i.vater and waste1.vater, we
10 also do the same sanitation department as ,veil. They · ·
11 are not nearly as complicated but we get it done on the
12 cheap that-way.
13
Q. Turn the page, Bates No. 3, Jon Herrick, again
14 looking at the To: Subject: on an e-mail sent onJanuary
1s 27, Jon Herrick you mentioned earlier, he is the
16 wastewater ••
11
A. The wastewater superintendent.
18.
Q. And Justin Armstrong is the water
19 superintendent
20
A. Correct.
21
Q. And let me Just ask you, on these e-mails,
22 when it's referring to Dave Swindell, am I to presume
23 that's you?
24.
A. That would be me.
as
Q. There is also reference in these e-mails to a
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Q. Did you know him in grade school?
A. l\Io, we didn't grow up in the same city, he
grew up in Casper, I grew up n Riverton.
4
Q. When did you first meet him?
5
A. When I assumed duties here.
s
Q. He was working here at the time?
7
A. Yes..
·s
Q. What was his position?
9
A. He was the director of public works.
10
Q. Vyas he director of public works when you came
11 to work here?
12
A. Yes.
13
Q. And he retired as the director of public
14 works?
15 . A. Yes, to take anotherjob,justrealrecently
16 .wlth ~e State of Wyoming.
. 17 · Q. !{we. go down a little furtherin the page,
1.~ ~ere is from a Tod4 Cristiano.
1
2
3

I
I
I

I
I
I
I

10 ·.. ;·A· Yes.
2q · ·. ', Do you know who he is?
i°(·:;~'.-'--~· ~ do,·r have met Todd. Todd is an employee

o: .

}h~t ,~orked.for John Gallagher, the consultant.
23 ..:-::· i:· Q:_:-: S_q.~e is part ot Red Oak Consulting?
22·
· 2~

:.;-:;:·.J.\:)~~a~tly.

is ;' ./;:. 8:)~~ . ~en John Gallagher's name is there. ·
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1
2
3

4.

s
6

1

s
9
10
11
12

13
14

15
16
11

13
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Cody Berg. Is he with Red Oak Cons~ltlng?
A. He was. He was an assistant to Johp just like
Toddwas..
Q. Do you know if he is still there?
A. I don't know. He was new at the last time we
did the study.
· Q. But you don't know if he is tp.ere still?
A. I don't know.
Q. Go to Bates No. 35-.

A. Okay.
Q. There is another name there, Darcy Taylor.
This is a February 10, 2010, e-mail.

A. Yes.
·Q, Who is Darcy Taylor?
A. Darcy Taylor is the senior paralegal in the
city's legal department. Her office is about 30 feet,
and lam motioning about 2:00.
Q. Thanks for putting that on the record.
·A. That was probably not very helpful, I am
sorry. That's who she is.
·
Q. Tum to 176.

A. Okay.
Q. There is a June 4, 2010, e-mail. Have we
discussed Greg Lanning yet?
A. You asked me a little bit about what 1 knew
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1 about him and I kind of made -a joke that we both grew up
z in Wyoming and then got off on other topics. What was
3 your question?
4
Q. I am sorry, we did taJk about him. Tammy Roy
5 in the cc.
a A. I do not know who that is. I presume that's
7 someone in John Gallagher's office but I donot know.
8
Q. How about Debbie Brady?
9
A. Debbie Brady is the administrative assistant
10 in the sanitation department. She works for Randy
11 Allen.
12
_ Q. Go to 180. This is a July 13, 2010, e~mail
JS from a Cindi Chacon, C-H-A-C-0-N. Who is that?
14
A. Cindi Chacon is the senior administrative
15 assistant in the water pollution control department.
16 She is a-direct report to Jon Herrick.
17
Q. Here is my concern about these e-mails, and
1a this probap]y more direded to Mr. Hall. if you look
19 through these e-mails, for instance. on Bates Stamp 171,
20 and at leas( several dozen other places, there are
21 .attachm~nts referenced in the e-mail and many of them
22 appear to have girect correlation to the work that was
23 being performed by Red Oak Consulting, and these
24 documents we do not have.
25
. I guess my fllst question to you, Mr.

is
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A. Yes..
Q. Is that something that can be found online?
A. Probably not onliµe but there is policy on
e-mail retention from the IT department.
s Q. That will be something that we will certainly
6 follow up with Mr. Hall.
7
A. We will get that
B
Q. Clearly there are a lot of files pertainlllg to
9 Red Oak, if you look through these e-mails and you look
10 at the numerous attachments, and there is reference to
11 me~tings. I am assuming when you have a meeting, are
12 ·there notes kept of the meeting?
13
A. Generally, yes, that would be one of Todd's
14 jobs, Todd Crlstiano. When you do these kind of
15 studies, as you know-- welL maybe you don't know. But
16 there are physical meetings, they travel to Pocatello a
17 couple chimes. Those meetings we brought stacks· and
18 stacks of information, some of which was useful, some of
19 which wasn't. Then there are conference calls and there
20 are drafts sent hack and forth, proposed slides and so
21 on and so forth, all to arrive at a product
2z (Indicating), and these are the products.
23 · Q. And that's what we need to get. Because the
24 product is one thing but the work that leads up to a
25 product Is something that we hav? requested··
1
2
3
4

Page lJS

1 Swindell, is are these e-mails still kept somewhe.e in a
2

s
4
5
6

1

a
9
10
11
12

13
14

file electronically?
A. Probably not at tlus point. I would have to
ask my director of information technology how far back
the tapes go, but there is a date certain wher.e it's
deleted and then they are lio longer available. The
attachments, like on 171 that you mentioned here, water
report, Pocatello markups -Q. 'I don't want you to get into that -A. Normally what you do is you download the file
because you don't want it sitting in your e-mail because
your e-mail box will become too full and those documents
are··
Q. So would these have been printed off at some
pomt?
A. I don't know; I print a lot of mine. I
probably received this and I probably printed it. l'm
sure I don't have lt anymore.
• Q. There is a policy in place for .deleting
e-mail?

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
A. Yes.
22
Q. Is it a written policy?
23
A. Yes, it's part of the records retention policy
24 of the-city.
25
Q. Can that be found anywhere?

208-345-9611
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1
A. I'm not sure it's all available but we will
z provide you with what -.
3
MR HALL: We can follow up. _You said you
4 have had Exhibit 36 since before you filed the lawsuit
5 as a result of your public records request.
6
. MR. OLSEN: Right.
7
Q. One more thing I want to point out in Bates
8 No. 35, Exhibit No. 36, Bates No. 35, if you look at the
9 attachment there it refers to the Red Oak.contract. I
10 presume you have that in your records still. or do you
n know at this point?
12_
A. I don't know. I presume we do. There was a
13 contract that had to be approved by the city council, so
14 I am sure we have a copy of that It basically details
15 the fee schedule and what the deliverables look like,
16 like any consulting contract would.
17
MR. OLSEN: Here is what I am going to
18 propose, Mr. Hall, until we check in to see what is in
19 the attachments on these, I don't want to inquire any
20 further with Mr. Swindell because I don't think that,
21 without having these attachments which are referenced in
22 detail in the e-mails, that I can adequately examine
23 him. So I
going to propose that the city go back to
24 its records, check its e-mails'. We got these in •• our
25 records request was in 201 ~. so they were at least there

am
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reliance upon Red Oak if we can't get compliance. Vve
would prefer not to do that, but, anyway, I will put
3 that in a letter to you and you can respond accordingly.
4
MR. HALL: We will have him read and sign the
s deposition.
6
(Witness.excused at 3:10 p.m.)
7
{Sign~ture requested.)

1 available then.
~

·I.
I
I

1

z

But, in any case, I want to ~eep the
3 deposition open to allow us to first of all obtain the
4 file on this and these documents referred ta, and I ·
5 would just request that the defendant go through each
6 one of these e-mails and find the attachments to them
7 and anything else that happens to be in his file.
s including •• I would note that there were numerous
9 meetings held, as you ·referenced, so I would presume
10 there should be some notes on that. I will ask that for
11 not only the 2010 study, because these are pertaining to
1z the 2010 study, but also anything that you would have 1n
13 your file for 2006. And if the answer ls that you don't
14 have anything, that It's all been discarded, I need to
1s know the answer to that. And I need some clarification
l6 on that. ·
17
And also would remake my request that. again,
18 because of the close working relationship With the city
19 and this f'mn, that you also, as you agreed to do in
20 your supplemental response, go to Red Oak and get those
21 files, follow up w1th Mr. Bybee or whatever the case may
22 be.
23
Sa that is my request on the record and you
24 can feel free to respond ~o that if you want to.
2s
MR. HALL: You have had the eamalls that are

2

8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25
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I
I
1.
I_

I
I_

contained in Exitibit No. 36 for over hvo years. I don't
see anywhere in your request for discovery to us where
3 you have asked us to do what you are now· asking us to
4 do, so feel free to send me _a letter with what specific
5 requests you have. As we talked about earlier, we will
a review them and make a determination as to whether they
7 are timely arid appropriate, and respond accordingly.
s
With regard to leaving the deposition open, we
9 will not consent to that.. We have already been in front
10 of the judge on this matter because we are pa,st the time
11 frame for discovery to have been completed in this case.
12 The court gave you until today to complete the
13 deposition of Mr. Swindell, that was the court's order.
14 So we are not going to agree to something differeJ').t than
15 what the court ordered in tll1s case. And of course we
16 have a motion for summary judgment pending with time
17 frames already set forth for responses, and we Intend to
18 comply with those.
19
MR. OLSEN: Thank you. In response to that I
20 just want to say that, first of all, I don't think we
21 have had those e-mails for two years. But, in any case,
22 the attachments and the documents referenced in the
23 e-mails have cettainly been reql!ested numerous times.
24
And the other thing that we may consider is
25 just moving to strike Mr. Swlndell's affidavit and also
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CERTIFICATE OF DAVID K. SWINDELL

.I. DAVID K. SWINDELL, being first duly swam. depose
4 and say: That I am the witness named in the foregoing
5 deposition; that I have read said deposition and know
B the contents thereof; that the questions contained
3

7

s
9
10

11

therein were propounded to me: and that the answers
therein C:Ontained are true and correct, except for any
changes that I may have listed on the Change Sheet
attached hereto.
DATED this_ day of
, _ _,
CHANGES ON ERRATA SHEET YES_ NO_

12
13
14
15
. DAVID K. S\Nil\iDELL
16
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this_ day
17 of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _•
18
19

20
21
2Z

NAME OF NOTARY PUELIC
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR _ _ _ __
RESIDING AT _ _ _ _ _ __

23

MY CD1v!MISSION EXPIRES _ _ __

24
ZS
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doparlrnent·s day,10..ia, acti~ilies. Their responsibila>11s inelu<Sa, 1eopond.rig to ,;uslomor
,nqulrie,, prep111ing, 1mplomenling and ltack,ng lhe deparlment·s capital and ope,aling lllldg'1s:
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ledoral, 11111& and local rll.es and fegulati<>~; enlorong dep11111'11erll slendards and
spacil1<:ations; and mai,illg $Ure rna1 !ho waler is safe IO <lllnk.
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1s a Safe Pla~e.

•.

.

.

.

Wiare kids eel help !asl
SpCl'!$or8'd 17/ lhll aarnox:k
Co1111ly Y.iu1h Fll\lndallon.

AIRPORT
ENGIIIEERING
MAYOR'S OFFICE
STREl!.H TRAFFIC
ANIW.LCONTflOL
FINAl'ICE
PARKS & RECREATION
TRANSPORTAilON
BUILDING &INSPECTION
FIRE
PLANNING
UTILIITYBILLING.
CEMETERY
HUMAN RESOURCES POLICE
VISION 12
CITY CLERK
LEGAL
SAtllTATION
WATER
INFORMATION TECBt-Kll.OGY LIBRARY
SCIENCE & ENVIRONIAENT WATER POLLUTION CONTROt
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OFFICE OF 'l'H! MAYOR
911 North 7th .l\w!nlm
P.O. Box4169
PU(atella, ldr.ho 83205-

fl.RIAN C. BLAD
Mayor

Pocatello Cily Couadl:

ROGEn BRAY
STEVE BROV•tN
CRAIG COOPER

(208) 23'1-6163
Fax: (208) 234-6297
www.pocatello.us

RON ffiASUR!i

GARYMOORE
EVA JOHNSON NYE

Ms. Randi Thomson
Building Contractor Association of South East Idaho
770 E. Chubbuck Road
Chubbuck. lD 83102
RE: [nformation Request
Dear Ms. Thomson:

The attached material is provided in response to your information request.
Question l) Water. Se,:ver connection and building fees in the last seven years.
ANS: Spreadsheet attached.
a._ \Vere ,.vate1, sewer and building permif fees eac;h placed in separate and-segregated accounts?
'ANS: \.\later fees were placed in the. water fund 031, sewer fees were placed in the Water
J>o tlution Coi1trol Fund 032, and bui.lding permit_ fees. were placed in the General Fund 001.

The1:i ',s .iid separ;itiori'°~}' ;e'gre1iatf6;1' h~yoj1J ·tl1~ ·,rlU·1~f f~~el:'.
b. Total amount of fees collected in the last seven years
ANS: see spreadsheet attached.

c. Information regarding accounts where the fees were deposited. Total deposits made in those

accoi.mts. ·
.
ANS; Tota]s per spreadsheet attached. The. fees were attributed to the account lines listed,
receipte_d to the fonds as described and dep,osited in the city's main bank account at Wells FargCl

Bmk

·

cl. Record or ledgers or financial spreadsheets ~videncing withdrawals from the re~pective
accounts, including amou11ts withdrawn. where those funds were allocated, for what purpose.
ANS: attached is a computer disk (City of Pocatello Ae-count Activity Years 2003 - 2009)

containing four pdf files that are the transaction journals for the four funds FY03-FY09, listing
every expense transaction in these fonds:
1) General Fund, 7,674 pages
2) Water Fund, 926 pages
.
3) Water Pollution Control (sewer), 910 pages
4) Property Abatement Fund 964, 3 pages
e. Formal or informal mem.oranda or communications providing instrnction or guidance for th:;:
1nanagement of such funds.
l:Z~•-~---.
i! .I\ I. . •

I
j
'I'
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ANS: The d(icmne.nt gtdding all the funds of lhe- city is the budget. The FY 10 budget book is
provided.
·
I'. Formal and/or inforinal memoranda or communications.\Vith regard to oversight procedures or

internal auditing procedures.
ANS: Tbere are no special internal c.ontrol doc-tunents for these accounts except for a specific
cash handling prOl:edure in Che building department (provided). The.re are mimerous formal and
informal memorancl.r regarding oversight of dly accounts ra11ging from purchase policy to citywide cash receipting procedures, etc. These are available if you want them; we were unable to
define your n;quest fu1iher.
g. Any external audits performed mi the respective. accounts.
ANS: The Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) is audited and includes Che general
fund, water fund, WPC fund and Propel"ty Abatement Fund. A disk withthese reports in·pdf
formal is provided FY2005 thm FY2009 ("City of Pocatello CAFR
·
2005/2006/2007/2009/2009"). PY2003 and FY2004 are provided in bard copy.

h. Any intemal or external reports prepared in regard to the respective accounts.
ANS: The city contracted for external reports on the Water Fund and Water Pollution Control
Fund in December, 2006 which analyzed the capacity fees in those two funds. Hard copi_es are
provided. In ~une, 2010, those reports were updated. The. final reports for the 2010 ·update are
1:irovicled h1 pdf forma.t on the attached disk ("20 IO Rate Study'').
Sincerely,
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MEMORANDUM FOR: City Clerk

.

.
.-/

FROM: David Swindell~ ChiefFinru1cial Officer

\

,.,-;;?

"'2J::-f"~-·-•····.'~r.;;,:,>"''

·

SUBJECT: BCASEI request of September 24, 2010
DATE: Sep1cmber 29, 2010

l. FOR INFORMATION .
. 2. Pu~·pose. To pl'Oviderespqnse to BCASE1 request item #3
3. Discussion.

a. Request: l'page 19 ofthe."FY2010 Budget Book" identifies ''transfers1' made of the
Water Fund, Water Pollution a11d Control Fund and General. Please provide info11nation
regarding these transfers from 2002w2010, including a specific breakdown of where the funds
were transfer·red, how such funds were utilized and by what authoiity the transfel's were made.
Please provide ·all records pertaining to these ti·ansfers. ''
·
b. "T1·:msfers'1 nre-shi.fts of dollars from one fund to another; they are authorized by the
City Counc.il in the budget similar to any other expendihll'e, even though the money stays withi.J1
the city.

c. Water Fund, The transfei·s for FYI 1 are planned per the.attached adopted FY11
budget worksheet. They .are similar to the transfers for FY 10 and previous years.
TXFR EMPLOYEES REC COUNCIL 001-0700w393.99-00
TXFR TO O16-0000-393 .99-00 FOR Rrv.tERG REPAIR FUND
TO 001-0000-393.99-00 RETURN ON EQUITY ·
TO 061-6801 -393.99-00 FOR DEBT SERVICE PYMT FOR

600
20000
1585237
728138

THE WATER BOND
The $600 is transferred to the general fund, Human Resources Deparbnent (001-0700) to support
y~arly activity of the employees recreation cotmcil for Water Department Employees (Christmas
Party, Summer Thailk:-You BBQ, etc).
·
The $20,000 is t~ansferred to Fund 016, Emergency Repair to help fund a contingency .:fiµld for
emergency repair of facHities (HVAC unit going out, etc.).
·
The $1,585,237 is ll'ansferred to the General F1md (001) for a return 011 equity~ to help fnnd the

activities of the General Fund. Records in the finance department include a draft of a letter sent
to a citizen in 2005 that explains the origins of the transfer (draft attached). Finance also has a
draft of information provided to Moodi s investment service during the examination ai1d rating

,~
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of the 2008 Wafer Bond. Transfers in the Water Fund are discussed i11 pages 2-3 of this
document (attached).

TI1e $728, l 38 is transferred to Fun<l 061 (Water Debt Service Fund) to fund debt service
payments on the Water FLJnd debt.

v,

An additional trnnsfer of $1,311 is made to Fund 952 (Retirement Severance), based on Vz of 1%
of annunJ wages in the water admin division. The transfer saves up funds to pay for water
department employees who retire with accumulated sick leave and vacation payouts. Ftmd 952
helps fund what would o!herwise be an unfunded lump sum requirement. Similar transfers are
made from the Water Transmission Division (031-3008, $7,825) and the Water P111iflcatio11
Dh1sion (031-3009, $1,509). ·
d. '\Vater Pollution Control Fund. 111e tl'ansfers fol' FYI 1 are planned per the attached
adopted FYl I budget worksheet. They ai·e similar to the transfers fot FYlO-and previous years.

TRANSfoER TO 001.0700.393.99-00 REC COUNCIL
TO 001-0000-393.99-00 RETURN ON EQUITY
TRANSFERTO 016-0000-393.99-00 FOREMERREPAIR
TRANSFER TO 060-6100-393.99-00 STATE LOAN 1897w01
TRANSFER TO 060-6200-393.99-00 STATE LOAN 1898-09
TRANSFER TO 060-6300-393.99w00 STATE LOAN 1899-01
TRANSFER TO 060-6400-393.99-00 BOND BANK 2004A

600
1263654

'.40000
365824
438695
822726·
267516

These transfers follow a similar patl:em to the Water Fund, previously discussed.
$600 is tt'ansferred to the General Fund, Human Resomces Department (001-0700), to help fond
the yearly activities of the emJ)loyee recreation council for Water Pollution Centro!. emp]oyees.
$1 ~263,654 is transferred to the General Fund as a return on equity to help fund the activilies of
the General Fund.
·
·

TI1e $20,000 is transferred to Fund 016, Emergency Repair to help fond a contingency fond for
emergency repair of facilities (HVAC U11it going out1· etc.).

Follr 1ransfers are made to four divisions \,1thin Fund 60 (WPC Debt Service Fund) to fund debt
annual debt service payments on four debt is.sues.
Additional transfers are made to Fund 952 (Retirement Severance), based on !h of 1% of annual
wages in the_ WPC divisions. 11le transfer saves up f"Ul)ds to pay for water department employees
who l'etire with accumulated sick leave and vacation payouts. Fund 952 helps fund what would .

otherwise be an unfunded lump sum requir~ent. The Fund 952 transfer amo1.mts are $3,221
(Operations & Mah1tenance); $1,520 (Lift Stations}; $1,009 (Sludge Re-Use); and $736
(Laboratory & Pre-Treatment).
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e. General Fund. The general.fond transfers for FYl 1 are provided per the attached printout.
In general, they include transfers· to Fund 952 for retirement severnnte in all departments, similar
to that discussed above. Some departments have transfers to Fund 078 (Capital Savings)· to save
up for vehicles or other capital expenses. Since general fund departments have no fund of their
own, this provides a mechanism for a department to save for a lump sum expense in a futme
year. Activities with tl1eir own funds (i.e. Water) don't need this, since tl1ey can build fut~d
balance within their fond. The city hall division (001-0300) and non-departmental division (001¥
0800) has. additional transfers for governmental debt sei-vicc (Fund 59)-to pay for the city hall,
library and Ross Park Pool debt service payments.
f. Transfer Records 2002-2010. Printouts oftran.-,fers from the Water Fund, Water Pollt11ion
Control Fund and General Fund 2002-2010 are provided.
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August 221 2005

Logan Robinson
4530 Sonth 5111
Pocatello TD 83204
De:,u- Mr. Robinson:
In response to your letter of August 9, 2005 1 here are t11e answers to your questions:
Question #1: "Number of signatures required on a referendum petition on the water
raise proposal and the reference from which you derive the figure. n
ANSWER: Pocatello Code 1.30.020 States: Ntnnber Of Petitioners Required: To
enact an ordinance or to repeal an ordinance by referendum, the petitions must bear a
number of qualified signatures equal to t\venty percent (20%) of the total number ·of
electors who cnst votes at the last general election in the city, or such other number of
signatt1res as may be provided by Idaho Cooe.~• At the November 2003 General Electio11
8,972 people voted. In case you ru-e not :::w::re, Pocatello water rates are enac.ted nsing a
resolution not an ordinance. Therefore, you may want to check with en attorney to see if
a referendum can be us~d to change water rates.
Question #2: ."Copies of the letters sent in during the public comment period."
ANSWER: The 6 letters that were received by the City during the hudget hearing
and proposed rate increase hearing are enclosed.

Question #3: "Amount of money the proposed new raise would generate."
ANSWER: During the regular meeting of August 18, 2005, the Council approved
a water rate resolution reflecting a 3% increase hi. rates. Interpolating from the rate st:udy
indicates that this would incl'ease revenues $260,471 dl,l!'ing FY06. The actual increases
in revenue will depend upon weather, the demonstrated impact of higher rates on sales
volume, and growth in the number of customers. The rate ·study. has generally
overestimated revenue generation in the past and Finance would estimate $230,000
(about 11 o/o less than the rate study).
·
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Robinson

August 221 2005
Page2
Question #4: "Amounf of mone)•-thc city truces out of ea.ch of the following fim.ds for the
so called ''enterprise. funds, 11 (Water fund, Sewer Ftmd, Snnitntion F~md).
ANSWER: The \Vater, Sewer, and Sanitation Funds are the 1'ente11,rise funds".
They are called the henterprise funds" because the money placed i11 these fonds comes
mainly from the fees generated by each of the three public 1tt.iiity enterprises. I wiil
assume there was a lypographical error in your fourth question and the word ''for" should
be "or". There are four components to the internal transfers from each utility. They are:
1) Administrative Su1>port Fee. This fee compensates the General Fund for payroll
nnd lmmM resources st1ppol't and for finance and accounting services. For departments
housed ii1 city hall, there is a rent component to pay for custodial services and utilities.
The human resm1rces component is based on the number of employees. The finance
component is based on the nun1ber of finance transactions for the previous fiscal yeal'.
The city hall fonnula is based on square footage occupied within city hall. This same
formula is used for each department in the city (i.e. everyone pays the administrative fee,
it is not unique to the utilities). If the utilities were independent, they would have to hire
a contractor lo do this or add theh' own staff, software and facilities to obtain these
services within the t1tility. For FY05 the annual administrathre support fees fo.r the
utilities are:
Fnnd 030 S:rnifatfon: HR component (39 employees)
Finance component (251 pages of transactions)
City Hall rent component (0 square feet)
Total:

$19,842
$33,109
$0

$52,951

HR component (44 employees)
Finance component (237 pages of transactions)
City Hall rent component (1,300 square feet)
Total:

$22,386
$31,263
$19,111

Fund 032 Water Pollution ContJ.·ol: HR component {26 employees)
Finance component (232 pages of transactions)
City Ha1l rent component (0 square feet)
Total:

$13,228
$30,603

F1md 031 Water:

$72~759

$0
$43,831

2) Payment In Lieu ofTnxes (PILOT). The City Council has_ chosen to ma.'<e it a City
policy to have _the "enterprise fi.mds,, make a payment in 1ie1.1 of taxes to the General Ftmd
based on the depreciated valuation· of their-physical plants and last year, s city property
tax levy rate. This paym!;nt is similar to the federal govenunenfs payment of PILOT to
some local communities~ and is a method to pay something for their use _of police, fire
and streets. If they were. private'lltilities, they would be making a payment based on
their market value, not their depreciated physical asset value. Since it is based 011
depreciated assets, the amount varies by utility. For FY05 the PILOT is:
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Robinson
August 221 2005
Page 3
Fund 030 Sanitation
Ftmd 031 Water
Fund 032 Water Pollution Control

$16,059
$151,967
$18.0,178

3) Return on Equhy (ROE). The CHy Council has also chosen to make it a City policy
to have the ccenterprise funds" pay a rate of return on each 11tility equal to 7% of the
eq·uity in each business. By way of comparison, private regulated utilities are allowed
between 11.5% and 13.5% rate of rehtrn hy the Idaho Public Ulilities Commission. This
is a policy decision of the City Council, but it docs compensate the taxpayer for the lack
of.any franchise fee or olhel' payment for use of the public right of way, The money goes
· to the General Fund which the City Council utilizes as a propeliy tax substitution. The
dollar amount beh1g transferred as a return on equity payment has not been changed
since tlle Fiscnl Year 2003 Budget (while the inflatio1i rate has increased at about.3% per
year). Since it is a percentage of equityt the amount varies with the equity in each
"enterprise" (equity= assets - liabilities). For FY05 the ROE is:

Fund 030 Sanitation
Fund 03 l Water
Fund 032 Water Po-Jhltion Control

$529,300
$I,677t500

$1.337,200

4) Other transfers. There are some other nonHg~neral fund transfers invoMng the
"entcl]Jrise fonds" that"are not addressed here involving the purchase of centralized
services. For exrunple:
o foe! costs (from the utilities to Fund 003, Street). The "enterprise fundsn
reimburse their own fuel costs lo the sireel department. which purchases foel
in bulk and maintains afueling site for all the City Departments.
o billit1g costs (from the utilities to Fimd 052, Utility Billing). The "enterprise.
funds'' transfer money to Ut_ility Billing ta pay for their billing operations,
Technically, these are also monies the city transfers from the "enterprise funds'\ but
based on pl'ior contacts with you, as well as your recent letter, it appeared to me that these
were not the focus of the infom1ation request We can provide further information
regarding these cost reimbursement type of transfers if I am mistaken in that regar·d. ·
Sincerely,

Roger W. Chase
Mayor
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Nathan M. Olsen

Moss HALL & OLSEN
485 "E'.' Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-46SO
PETERSEN

Fax:(208)524-3391
r··; ~ -· ...
\)
j,
.. ·~·: .: :. ·'
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I1'l THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT·
O:F THE" STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY

BUJLDING CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST IDAHO,
· an Idaho non·p~ofit corporation,

CaseNo. CV-2011-05228-0C
Ali'FJDAVIT OF

Plah1tiff,

DAYID L, BUN'l'ER

. vs.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
1m111ici1>alityt ·
Defendant,

STATEOFlDAHO

County of Bai mock

)
) ss.
)

I, Dnvid L. Hunte1·i do solemnly swear (01· affirm) that the testimony givell in this swom
statement is the tmtll, the whole hulh, and nothing but the tt'Ulh, that it is made 011 my personal
knowledge1 and that I would so testify bl open courl ir called \1po11 to do so.
1.

Attached is 14Exhibk l 11 a true nnd conect copy of n repo1·t l have prepared as Plaintiffs
expert in the above descl'ibed matter.
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Attached as "Exhibit 2" is n true and correct copy of my Curricuh1m Vitae which includes
my background & qualifications, os wet! ns my experience as an expert witness in lcgul
proceedings.
DATED this 24 dayofMay, 2013.

~1lL.flu11tcr_
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 24 day of May, 2013.
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CERTIFICATa' OF SERVICE
l J1ereby certify that lam a duly licensed attorney i~ the State ofidflho> with my office in
Idaho ~alls, Idaho, nm! that on tht"lA!
--.--- day of Mny, 2013, I served. n tmc nnd correct copy of
I

"the foregoing document 011 the peI'sons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage
thereon, or by causing the snme to be delivered in. accordance with Rule 5(b), I.R.C.P.

Persons Serve<!:

Method of Service:

Blake G. Hall, Esq.

( ) mail

j/5 hand

( ) fax ( ) email

NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A.

490 Memodal Drive
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630
FAX: {208) 523-7254
BMAIL: bghall@nliptlnw.1101

Honomble·s1ephen S. Dtmn
Bannock County Courthouse
.624 E. Center, Room 220

( )'mail ( ) hand ( ) fax ( ) email
(Judg~~r _Chmnbers Cop;~f..
, .., ,\

Pocatello, Idaho 83201
FA..X: (208) 236-7208
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Nathan M. Olsen
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DAV1D L. HUNTER Cl1A, PLLC

CerlUl~1i; 111n110, cauro,nla anti lawn

C<11·tljlu<f J>11b/ic Acc111111tm1/
2Hi Norlh8tll

Mcuili~r

PO Box l24J
Pocatello, ID 832IM,12•13
Plio1111: 208,:?3l-•l212
Ji'Jllil

Amefloan lnalilll!oof
~artlfiad Public Aecounl~nl,

1114'10 Sci;~!y O/ Ol'A':11
lw1a SIX!ely of Cl'A'11

20!!-233-3575 ·

UIOII AGsotra11on or OP/1'6

E-mull: dlllcp11@11wcsl1.1trlre.ne1

May 1 '1, 2013

Hat:ha11 Olsen
1'.l:l:omey at L.iw
PetersM I Moss & Hall
41!5 E Sb·:eet
Id.iho Falls,. ID 834.02
Rli:1

BCJ\SEI

Idaho sixth Judicial District foi: Ba1mock Cou11ty

case No. cv-2011-os22a~oc
D0a1· J.lr, Olsen 1

Yo\l l1ave aslted that: :r p:i:epare ~m ;.malyaia of various documents for the
p,1i-pose of providing an op.inion 1:egat"<ling the imple111entnti(Jn ol! the
C.ll:y of Pocatello (iast:.ewater llates and CapE1c.lty Feeis imd t:he Watei·

Ral:es and Capacity Faea as provided by Redoak Consulting a11d lt:s
predecesaor Black & Veatch Cornmll:ing.

You have pt·ovided n1e with the following documents for review in my
analyais1
D0cu111e11ts identified as Bates Nos. 4568 to d.834
Doou111ents identified aa Bat.es Nos. 4664 l:o 5190
Oocmments identified as Bates woa. 5200 to 5324

Discover)' Exhibits 2 l:o 4 Bates ~los. 88 l:.o •107

Emails
lb:hibt l:s 004 / 0211 022 / 026 / 02?
Hunt:ei· Report

RateStudy 05; OGi 07; On; 09
RatestudyFieldsizes

SUMMARY OF Oi!NION
l, There is a lack of complete dal:a in the information provicled

which 1:equired reverse type mathematical computations to am\lyze
the data, The missing ot: incomplete data included but was not:
limited to the detailed COlllputal:iona in COl,nputing the ltOE and the
PILOT pel;centages; lists of. clatailect assets and comp:ds.lng l:l1e.
sy1.1tems1 reaonclliation 1•,orkshnota hel!ween the oonsultant' s
reporl:s and the illdependent zmditor• a 1·eports1 detailed
co1111nitationn on l:eplaaement value a11d deprec:l.ntecl value of system
assets.

l
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2. Findillgs and

Conchtsiona:

a. '.!'he RecloaJt Study uaes t:he concept of Ret:.urn on 11:guit.y (ROE)
and Paymant ill i:..ieu of Taxei. (PILOT} to inflate and ove:ratate
the operating and maint:e11a1\Ce {OM} fees of the 1taatev1ater and·
WateL· Syoteme fo1.• t.he P.m:poue of funding the General fund of.
the City of Pocatello.
b, •rhe RedOak stucly, by defining replacement value to be fair
market value, results in nn inflated and overstated value of
the Wastewater and tlater systems in the camp\\tations qf 1:he
capacity fee to (rhargo new 1.uu~r1,1 of the respectiv1;1 aystema.
c, 'l'he RedOak Study, uses mathematical presentatlonl'J ancl
accounting comtept:a that a1·e not adequately docuntenl!ed,
explained,- and disclosed which result in erroneoua eonchtt.dons
and financ:l.11.l resulta for dete'l."ntining the OM fees and the
-Capacity fees of the Wastewater and the l•lat::eLA ay11i:e11te.
d. The minapplioat.ion of account;i.ng pdnoiplee relating to
ac:coiml:ing 1uethodr; and transactions >:ela~ing t.o l:be ROlil mid
the P!J.OT concept may have resulted 1n a 1llisapplicat.io11 of
Generally Acr:epted Accounting Principles (Oil.AP} which ·n1ay have
been requiL·ed l:o be reported in the independent nocount:.roit
certified annual aL1dit repo1·t: as a .disclosure, modified
report, or finding.
OVlilRVII!lW

The City of Pocatello commissioned Blaok « Veach consulting to prepare
an analyaio of the Waste.water Rnten and the tlal:er Ral:aa with the
initial Repo,:t (in my 1·eview) issued on August 1!1, 1997, SuhsC3quent;.
updflted Repo>:l:.s were lsstu.<1d on December 2l, 2.002: December 12, 200G;
·and June 18, 2010.
'l'h.e illit.ial 19!>7 repOl:'I:. !:.hat baa bean provicled covers the 1'1a11t~ !·ls.tei:
system only whi1e the subseq\,ellt >::eporta also include. a sepa:rate 1·eport
on !•later Rates.
The purpose of the Studies a1ul reports was l:o examine the service rates
for ntonthl)' service, ;:is well as tile determi1'lation of capacity fees to
be cliarged for lHH·I customers utilidn9 the respective oyntem:l. I
prepared a response t:o tlle 1~97 Study t:.llat:. waa 1?ent to tho r,tayo-:i;f fJ
office and .f!o the Pocatello City council tllat was dated Nay 18 1 1991l,
S\lbsequent p1:esentntio1,e to the City Council resnltecl in l;l1a fees (or
increases) reoommendM by t:he l!'.l!J7 St:uay not being i~lemented or being
modified by the council. In reviewing the subsequ1,mt Stud.f.es of 2002,
200G and 2010, they have followed the fundamental approach of the 1997

Study.
Tbe Studiea all hnve a fundamental J.'.ll'.eaentation manner that is divided
into eimila:i: cbaptera. 11hile there ia some varianoe between repol~l:s,
the t11pical ohapteL·s a1·e identified as an Executive Summary, Op81.'at:i.ng
Fund, capital Reaerve 1 Cost of Service, Service Rates, and Capaaity
Feel'!.

·

To navigate tbe info>.'roatio11 in the reports, :it :l.s necessary to
underst:ancl some basic concepts of a !'later Syflt:em and a Waste 11al:ei·
Syste1n,
ThP.re are two basic comr,ionents to a system, which nl"c t:he
Operal!ion and Maintenance 11·eferred t:o as t:he O&t4) and the capit,,l
Asset (which is the delivery, collection, storage and other fixed
2
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mrneta of t:he system) , l'litliin the O&M portion of tlie nyetem fall tbe
daily operal:ion and the associated costs, Wlthin the Ca)?il:al asset
portion of the 6yste1n fall the improve1nant:, remodel, and expanuion
costs.

·

My foa,1s and op1nion adtlreases accounting ii;sues and economic: baueIJ
which call into question 1:he renulta and. conc:lnaions of the Sl!udi~s.
My approach will be to adch-ess each component: (O&M} and (Capital 1lsaet)
sepai:ately. l'lhile the lqa,tei· and the waste tlat:.er Rystams are sepairat:e
,me! distinct, !:hey do share t.he common bond t.hat the studies were
prepai·ed by the name oonimltant and the proi:ientation is substantially
1:he same in l:heory. · As such, my comments wJ.l;!. generally appiy to both
Systems, ancl ~,here needed, some specific oomniants being made,

couunento on Generally Mcepl:ed Accounting Princil)les· (01\AP) relating l:o
governments and municipalities need l:o be made. There is a distinction
betwe.en Gov.e:rnment,;il versus Bnl:erpriae Fund Accounting, 'l'hia
pi:-eiie11tation is not designed to be an education i11 a.ccounting
pdnciples, b\lt :r:atbeJ.' to point out: that OMP require$ local
governments l:o use the eflt.erpi:ise fund type t:o account fo:t' "buuinena·
type activities· - actlvit:ies simibr to those fo,ind in the p:civa.te
sector. Business l:yi,e activities i nolude tiervioe~ pr:l.m,u:ily funded
t:h1.·o,19h \lsei- chaxgea. 'i'he l'l111,;tewater Syatem and the l'Jate1: Sysl:ei11 mee~

theGe criteria.
In t.he informal:.ioi1 pi:ese11ted for my revieti was the City of Pocatello,
Idaho, comprehensive Annual J,•,i.nanoial Report: with Atl<l:lted Government
Wide Financial Statementa for the Fiscal .Year Ended September JO, 2000
(hereafter cal.'led the ANMlJ1l.L REPORT) • In the AHNOAL REPORT audited
finanaial st:al~en1ent:.a define- and i·eJ:erence and report the Wastewater
System and the \'later system i1s Enterprise Funda and use the Entetprine
·Fund acc:ountJ.ng for. theil: repo_rl:ing. l believe tl1at pi:esentation mode
is fl oorrec I: presenl:a I: ion me l:bocl,

one of. tl1e feat\li:es and requiremonts of an 2nterprise Fund la tho goal
to be ~elf-sustaillins, WbJ.le funding o:r support from tlle general
governmental funds of 1:he municipality are aJ.l(>Wed it generally
lll:::i.l:l.zes use1· fees u basis !;or it.a flu.molal needs. At times, an
Enterprise Fund niuy 1·eceive special 9ranta from ot:he,: governmimtal
entities. Tile inflow of c~sh fl.'am other f11nd1a h usually not
recommemled because distributing !:he cash from an Enl:erp:dse Fu11d la
often prohibited or seve1.·ely restricted. Usually the User fean
9enerated by the lilnterp1.·ise F1md are to be used for the maintenance and
operations· wi!:h ao111etimaa a portion of ouch fees allocated to re$ai"Ve11
fo.r major repairs Ol' improvements. Capital eXpP,ndittll:'88 are fl'8(j\lently
i,a.id to,~ by special grants h•om othei· governmental agencina, capital
reael.--ves (as previously mentioned), bond iss,1eo, and special
m.1scssments.

DISCUSSION OE' WASTEWATER SYSTEM
OPERATIONS AND MAINrENANCE
.-The first- inf.or.mation preeented for my l'eview was t:he 1997 repol"t,

was for

a

period of five years until the year 2002.

It

Each study

theroaHer pt·esente<l projeotiona nnd recommendations for the subsequent:
3
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five years. 'l'he !!\teat report dated June 10 1 2010 project:a f:l.na11aial
data f.ot the yea,;s i!Oll to 201S.

The mune:dcal conclusions of any proposal, projection 01.· stt1dy at·e.
sensitive to the assumptions 111a.de. In the Bl:\1diea prepared by !ledOak,
l )lave l'elld the asin1mpt.ious and \•rill not: ·opine on their validity,
i'hose assumpt:ionn are listed in Sectlol\ l. 3 of the ?.010 S\:ucly (and
similar sections of 1:he previous Studies). Suffice it to say that if.
ally of. the pi·ojected increaaes are erroneous or unrear.,onable t:l1en l:he
suggested ral:e increaf.les would likewise be in error.
Rach of the Studies allocal:.es a pm:Hon of tl1e Service Revenue t:.o be
t1·a"sfei:i-e<l to a. ca1,ital I111provemenl! Fund. 'l'lle 1997 and the 2002
studies each imlical:a that it: ls the cm:rent policy l:o eommit lOt of
the Service Fee revemte to tha c.i.pital :Cmprove111ent UUnd. In the 2002
Study the projections for the years 2003 - 200'.I - 2005 list additional
amounts beyo1\d the 10% t:o bs funded to the capital Irnpt:ovement Reserve.
The 2006 81:.udy recl11c:ea tl1e: amount projected to be t:i:anofe1·red to the
capital Improvement Fund to au annual amount of$ ~ao,ooo wh;ich
\·epresents less than 8% of the Service Fee revenue. The. 2010 m:udy
uses that: )'ear (:1010} as a ba:;:e ye~n.· ancl inclicnteo a total of 23% of·
the Set·vice Fee revenue was or should be transferred to the capital
Impr-ovement. Fund. The 2010 Sl:\ldy furthe._• projects !::he amount .of
tranafei:a fol.' the yeaxa aoll to 2015 t:o be in the -range from n to 18%
of $Qrvice Fee r.P.venues.
'l'he 2010 Study outlines in C'hapte-r 3 l::l1e parainel:e.1:s of the Capital
Improvement F\tl'lcl. '!'here is n reco111111endal:.ion to maintain a balance :in
1:he funcl of 211: of fixecl assets with the x:estLltant amount of reserve to
be appxo:dmately $1. l million. 'l'his would suggest that the fixea asoet
halanca of tha ioaste !·later system to be app1.·oxima!:ely $55 million.
However, a teview 01: 1:.he AMJ:nJAL REPORT indicates the n~I: fixod ,nssets
of the sysl:ern to be $•l l 111ill i.on. The infoi:mation is inconclusive as to
t.he difference and what i1nproveme11ts may have been macle in the two

years between 2000 and 2010,
'l'he im1>01.·tancc of the ~hcuaaion· on capital. Improvement reserves is tha
tact 1:hs.t ::lt h~1;1 an impact. 011 the resultant fees. By its nnture i I:
gives tha implicat:ion that a 1:1orti.011 of the user Fees are being ael:
aaide l:o pay for items of capital na.t:ure l:Ju1t do not oaour on a regular
daily basis. rf the proposed amounts are in fact bHing eet aside t.l1en
the cash fo available fm: l:l1ose expenditu~es, If the l.Jl.'Oposed amounts
o1re nol: being aet aside t:.han the c..-:illeoted fees a>:e being
disproportionately allor.al:ed to the operation and 1nainl!enance aa
.
c>ppose.cl to the cnpital portions ot the system· unlens t.he end proj eated
fee st1:ncti1re.. ie cl1angecl, XI\ other. words, if the e11d fee
recommendat.io)\ .is by example t1el:. at_ $"100 with a 1,rojectecl allocat.i.011 of
10% 01· $10 to the cap:l.1.:al reserve and that resarva is not actually eel:.
aside, tllen the Oparntione and Maintenance port.ion ·Bystem bas been
1nib1lidizecl hy the Capital Improvement !JOl't:ion· of the operation leav:l.ng
qpeu the problemo foi· the capital expenditur~s when they actually ooc\lr
i11 tl1e future. Further, if t:l\c model and the proposal is the bas is tor
establiai1i1tg fees and t,he model is not follol'led, then t:he actual
decisions may be misleading to l!he users imd patrons who have been told
tha study was the basis f.m.· the establishment or change in th1;1 User

Fees,
4
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n necond item in the studies commencing in 2002. ia a line item with the
title of "ttel:llTO on Equity•1 (ROE) and 0 Payment in··Liem-of-Taxes
(PlI,O'i'). 'l'he a1:ummption given in Election l. 3 of the 2010 study is the
City of Pocnte..llo is to be paid 12. D!/i of the Study Period Reve11ue
Reqn.irement:n for the tuie of the City's asset:n and right-of-waye and
l. 8% for the PILOT.
These amounta wt1Jn1 compt1l:etl as $1,263 1 654 for
each year of the projected period 2011 to 2015 for the ROE ,incl t:be
amotillt: of $185, 0651 f:o1· the PII..OT. I ·am unable to determi na 1mppo:rt of
bow these oomputat::lons were l.ll."l."ived al:, and if. these feea ar.e based
upon Revenue, why they do ·not aha11ge each yeal: na Revenue changes. 'the
:l.002 Study liut:s a 1,e1.·ccntage for 1:hese r.hargei:; at 17-1 and-3%-, but. uses
constant~ dollar amount p1·ojecl:ed fo1· the yeat·a i'!003 to 200? of
$1,337 1 200 for the ROE and a V11J.·lable amount of app~oximate.ly $180 1 000
t:o $203,000 f.or the PILOT. 'l'be 2006 study lists
pe1·c,entage. at lG,8%
and '.3.G%, bnl: 111~es a. constant clolla1• amount of $1;337 1 200 for tl1e ROE
a.nd a val'iable amount of uppl:ox:imately $203 1 000 to $3°'1 1 000 f.or the
} 1 en1.·s "200B t.o 2010,
In review of the AMIWAL REPORT (FYB 9-30~08) ! am
unable to determine if: this fee or a portion thereof, was actually pd(l
to tl1e City of Pocatello.

a

The Capital Improvement portion of the projections, tllr. ROE portion of
the projections, and PILOT portions of. tha pxoject:ions oomhine to egmtl
fl:om a lo\'/ of 28%- to a high of nea.?."ly •12\ of the waatewater syatem
1:evenue.

CONCLUSION~ OPF.RATIONS AND MaI~~ENANCE
The first guefJt.i<>n to be a.akecl is wllet:be1.· these two il!emu are actually
being funded with cash. Deoause l:be a111oun1:s cannot be tr.aced to an
actual funding (in any amount) it: would appear that t:he ef.f.ect of the
b,1dge_t line ite111 is used for the purpose of. raising the OM foe wit:houl:
adequately fitnding the futm:e capital improvement: needs of t:be ayetern.
l'lith i·espect to t:he ROE and t.he · PILOT fee, becauRe there are no deta:l.ln
pi·ov:lded an l:o tllirJ computation and .authority of qbarge and
reasonableness, it. can only be ooncluded thnl: it is a device t.o inflate
the OM f.eu,! lf otmh ROE and PIJ..OT fee is then paid in full or in pa~t
to the City of. Pocatello the r.esult can only be concluded 1:he pur:poae
ia for extracl:ing Waste\'1al:er ):'evennea fo1· t.be Oerteral Operation of the
City of. Pocac.eUo. J.l.e a result of these issttes there is a high
·probability the Operations and Maintenance Fees are ove1.·stat:ed in tile
2010 study and those that precede(] it:,

CAPACITY li'EJ!:

'l"lle capacity fee if.i a charge tl1e i·Jaatevrater system asaasses ne~, uaer1.1
for 1:he eq\lity the existing uaen have inwml:ed in 1;he system, 'l'he
process :ls often refe1.·red to as-the "buy-in" method. 'l'his is discuoaec1
in detail in Chapter 6 of the 2010 St\1dy. There are -t..wo major
conrponenl:i; used to determine the chin:ge. The numerator ;lif tl)e ayr;tem
etJllil:y Eincl the denorninatox is the mullbet of system users. If either or.
these amounts are in erro-r the resultant chai·ge is in error.
~'ha 2010 study defines !:fol equity of exist.f.ng usera as the replacement
co.st in current dollars of tl1e syst.em witho,11: regard to depreciation.
This definition llttggeats tbat the value of a 50 yea:r old antiquated
syatem at the end of itn useful life l1a.s !:he same eq11ity aa a br1md new
5.
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system built in t:he current: year with a remaining SO year life. Most.
lmsine11aes would dispute rmch .i compc:n:iaon when pui·obasi119 a capll:al
as!iJet. As a result a new user may pay a premi\1111 pr.ice for an old.
antiquated system 011 one day and be forced t:o pay full prlirn aga..ln on
the second day t•1hen it bl:eaks nnd is required to be replaced.
The 2010 St;udy, as well MJ the other studies, appem.·11 to be t1:yll1g ta
define net: eouity as the fair marlcet value lass debt. 'l'hey then use
1:he rcplc1cement coa I: in today's dolla1·s as the starting value and then
subtract the debt for their co111putation. _This definition of fair
market val\le .i.s cont:ra1:y t:o dl b\leinesa definitions and appraisal
definitions that indicate the fair 11\tu:ket value is generally betweell a
willing buyer and a willing aellex, neitlier party unduly influenced to
act. Further, all known· bualmrns appraianl 111odels !:hat uee a potential
repJ.aoeme-nt c:oet: a11 a component to establisb value, take int:o
conaidet·al:ion the «se and the wear and tear of the respective asaet
being valued. 'l'he 2.0lD study also uses an lnflationa,:y factor for the
futm:e period t:o provide for highe1· replacement costs, but again
1dl:hout accounting fo1· the rednct:ion in value d\le to .age and wear.

1'his anomaly c<1n be somewhat: mitigated if an adeq\1a.te capital
replaccn1ent 1-,aaerve ie in place front the existing users eciual to l:he
amount of. depi:eoiation taken on the acquisition oost of the system.
'l'his concapl: is 1·e£erenced u a depl:eciation · resei-ve and is sometimes
used as a means to pxovide the cash needed for capital improvement o:i.·
replaceR1ent when fixed as sees reach tbe end of their useful lif.e. The
actual fonding o.f 1mch a .1:!l~erve is -!I management: iseue and a budgeting
issue, howeve1· 1 the Btudy i.s flawed unless it det:er1nine2 and taken· inl:o
conoidei:at:.ion 1~hat: management hall done 01· as an alternative p:rovides a
companion schedule as to the ef.fect:a if n reererve ia being established
or not, which illllst.:rates the difference 01· effect .of the managemant
decision.
The second component of tl1e capacity fee is the equivalent· users, This
becomes the denominato>: of tho e~10.t;ion in clatel"mining the value of the
"ec1uity" for the buy~in, '!'be 2010 study has tnblea that allow the
projected gallons pei: clay flm, over tl1e pe1•iod 2 011 l:.o 2015, The St\l<lY
i;ug9este that for eacli year of. t.he period that approximately l~O new
u~era will co111e into t:lle system of which 110 will be in Chubb\1cJ; north
of_ :r: 8G and 80 will lni in Pocatello ~nd Chubbuck sot\tll of l RG,
r
have t10t clet:ern1ined if these inci:eases are 1:eal:l.stic, but point to the
issue th$ n11111ber chose11 has an effect on the outcome of the final
capa.c.i.ty fee charge.

CONCLUSION - CAFAClTY..E!!l!
The equity b11y~in method fol" A new u:se): i8 a f.rague11tly used method l;o
determine t.he aosl: fo1· a new usei: to begi11 using t:t1e existing
1'1aatewater Syatem. I do not dispute that concept. The issue that: ie
called into question is the oomputat:l.on of tl1e "fair val\\e" of the
system being used to oornput:e the "equity" and I find that the n1et:hod
\lsed by the 2010 St:mly l1t113 a high probability of overlftating that value
which reanll:s in the oha:q1e fo,: hook"t1J.? to be overstated. Furtber,
tba t the number. of proj ect:ed new \1Ge1:s I if in error, could cause the
fo1;1 to be ove1·stated or \mderstal:.ed depending on the dire,;,t:.J.on of the
error. If l:he inc:reaae is too high of a number tl1en the rea11lt:ant fee
6
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is unde:i:sl:nl:ed.
oversl:ate,l.

If the inc.:-ease is !:oo low tl1en l:.he reaultanl: f.ee ia

DISCUSSION OF WATER §_!,~T~
OP.EBATIONS AND MAINTENANCE
The· 2010 Water systetn st:,1d}' follo~1s the same format, theory amt
p1·esental:ion as thnl: of the ~lnstet1ater Study. As a ,:e$Ult, nll of the
same issues ancl concerns and ar9umen_ts are raised, It ia noted the
ffrst study nvl'l.ila.ble for my tevie,1 011 the l'later System ia that of
2002.

The m1me.rical conolua;ions of any proposal, projection or study are
acnaitive to· the assumptions made, In 1:he studies pi-epa~·ed by Rcdoalt I
have read the assumptions and will uol: opine on their validity. Those
,rnsumpl:ious at'e Hated in Section 1,3 of the 2010 Study (and similar
FJections of the previous StutU.es} , Suffice it to say that .if nny of
the projected inoreanes are e1:roneouv or \mr.easohable then 1:11e
silggestecl rate inc:reeises would like\•JiBe be in erl."or.
llach of tbe S1:udiea allocates a portion of the Service Revenue l:o he
transferred to a Capital Improvement Fnnd. The ?.002 study ind.icates
that it 1a tl1e curre111: policy to commit 1ot .of tl1e Se1:vfoe Fee ).'evenue
to l:he Capital Improvement. Fund. In the 2002 st:1idy the p.rojecl!ione for
tl1e years 2003 - 2004
2005 li1:1t otddil:ional ai.nounta beyond the 10% t:o
be funded l:o the capital Improvement Reserve. ':!'he 2006 study .r.~rl\1cea
the amount projected to be transferred to the capital ltnprovement llund
to reduce t:be annual amount to f 00. Tha 2010 Study uses that yeai(2010) as a base year with no transfer to the Capital Improvement Fttnd
for the year OT' l:lle 2011 year. In 2012, there is apvroxim«tii!ly 1% of
R~vll!nues to the Capital I111provement Fund. '!'he 2010 stucty further
·
pi·ojecl:s the amount of transfers for the yetu:11 2llt3 to 2015 to be in
the ra1\ge fl:om 20%- to 2!1.% of se:nrice Pee revenues. 'l'he assumptions
indicate 1:hese tra11sfe'l:'s a1:e required, but I was unable to locat;e nny
comment that .indicates further dincussion on such a ntatedal n111.t!:er.
The 2010 St\1dy does not oho\•1 any recommendal:ion to mainl~ain a- Capital
rinpravemenr. FUlld,
¥

Tl1e im1~ortance of the discussion on Capital Improvement reserveu ls the
fact t:liat it han all impact 011 !:he resultant. fees, ny :I.ts na.ture it

9lves the implication 'that a portion of the Usei: Fees are heiug set
aslde to pay for itema of. capi~al nature that QO not OCl'!Ur on a regular
daily lwda. If the proposei1 am1;1nnts are in fact being set aside t11en
tl1e cnah is available r.or those e:-tpenclitm:e&, lf !:ha propoaed amounts
axa 11ot bein9 set aside then the ·collected fees ar!ll being
d.itlp:i:opol:'tionately allocated to the Operation and Mainl:.enanoe as
opposed to the capital portions of the system unleSR the end projected
fee struct:t1re is changed. l11 other wo1·ds, if the end fee
reao111menclatiol1 is by ox:.impla set. at $100 with a pra:leoted allocation of
10%- or $10 to the capital .reserve al\d that; rei:ierve is not acl:.ually set
aside, 1:hen the operations and Maint:enru1ce portion system has been
tnibe.idized by tll& capital Improvement portion of the operation le11ving
open l:he proble111s for the capital expenditurea wlien they nol!ually occur
in the future, · Further., if the model and c11e proposal is the basis for
ent.abliehing fees and the modal ;I.a not -followed, then the actual
7
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decisions may Im misleading to tl1e usel."n and pal:rons who have been l:old
the Study was the basis for l:.l!e eeta:blishment 01.· change in the TJ/Jer

Fcea,
A second !!:em in the studies eohlmenoing in 2002 is a line item wil:h the
title of. "Rel:.m:n 011 Equ:i.t:y" IRO!i!) an<l "Payment ·i11-Lieu"of-Taxas
(PILO'J'), 'rhe assumption given h1 Section 1,3 of t:he 2010 St:udy ia the
city of Pocatello is 1.:0 b1:1 paid 13 ,ot of L:lle study Period Revenue
Req\1 iJ:eme11ts for the uae of the . Cit:y i a asael:a and right-of ~11,aye and
2 • .31 foi: the pn.o'.!.',
These 111Rountr.i were aomput.ecl as $1,585,23? for
eaah year of. t1le p1·ojeoter! period ao11 to 2015 for the ROE and variable
au1ount of app1:o:ximal:ely $1.5ll,OOO to $300,000 for the ·P:moT. r am
t1nable to determine m.1pport of hot11 these computat:tons wei·e arrived at,
&!ld. if. 1:he ROB is based upon Revem1a, why !t doea not~ change each year
as .Revenue changes. 'l'be 2002 Bt:1.1dy_does not liat a percent.age f.or
t11cse charges bu_!: useo constant rloJ.la1: a111ount proj eotecl for the yea1:a
2003 to 200·1 of $1,677, soo fo1· the ltO'B and a variable nmount of.
a1>p1•oximate1y .$150, 000 l:o $110, ooo for the Pir.oT. The ::.1006 study does
not give a percentage, but. \11!81.l a constant dollar amo\tnt of $1,677 1 500
f.or the ROE and a variable amount of apprm:imal:.ely $190,000 to $:l H, ooo
f.ol'I t.ha years 2000 to 2010,

In review of tho 1\HHUAL REPORT (FYE .51~30~
01: a poxtion thereof, \o/llB
;i.ct\Ially paid t:o the City of l'ocatello.

o~l l am unable to determine if t:h.ls !ee

The capit.d Impl.·ovement poi·tion of the project1011s,· tho ROI!: portio1) of
the projections, and PILOT. portionu of. the pro:Jecl:iono combine to equal
froDl a low of 19f1 to a high of neai-ly dOt. of !:he Hater System revenue,

CONCLUS IOM - Ol?ElU\11':CONS AND Mi\.lN'-'lilNANCE
•rhe first question ta be asked is whether these t:wo itums are ·actually
being funded with cash, Because tha amounti; cnnnot be traced l!Q a1i
act\1al .fonding (il1 any antounc) it would appear that t:.he effect of the
budget line it.em .is ttned for the purpose of 1·ai1:ling the OM fee l'litlloltt
~decJuately fundlng the fut1u:-e ca11il:al improvement: needs of !::he sy1,1tem.
t!Hh respec:r. t:o the ROB and the PILO'l' fee, because t:he1.·e a1·e no clet:aile
provided as t:o this computat.;lon ai:ld authoril:y of cbai·ge and
reasonableness, it can. only be coneludod that lt is a device l:o illflat.e
the Ot,t .fee, If such ROE and PILOT fee is t:he11 paid in full 01· ill pal."t:
t.o tlle City of Pocal:ello the :i:eaull:. can only be cpncluded 1:.he purpose
ls fol· extracting Water revenues for tllo General Operation of the City
of Pocatello. Ae a 1·ermll: of theae. ianues thel'e ia a. high probability
the Operations and Ma.tntenance Fees are overat:ated in the 2010 study
aud those thnl: 1,receded it.
CAPACI!l':C li'EE

'!'he capacity fee is a charge t:be Wastewater System aaacssea new users
foi: the equity the-exist::ing user.a have invested in the syatem.
The
proceas 'is often refer.red to as the ~·Jmy~in" method. This ia discussed
in detail in Chapte1: 6 of tl1e 2010 · study. Tb!!l."e are l!l'TO major
componen~a used to determine l:he charge. The numerat:or is the sy11tem
equ.il!y and the denominatol.· iii the munber of system usera. If eit:her. of:
t:}Hn1e

nmounts ai·e in error the resultant charge is in er:ror.
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The 2010 Sl:udy defines t:l1e equity of existing uaerfl as clle replacement
coal: in. cm:re11t dollal:s of tbe syste111 wit:lloUt regard l:o dep,:eciatio11,
This definition sng9ests thnt tlle Vttluc of a SO year old antiquated
t,i}•stem at tl1e e11d of its usef:ul l_ife has 1:he same equity as n bt·an.d new
syat.e111 lmil I: in the ourrnrit yeai· with R remaining 5 o yl)ar life. Mos I:
businesnes would dhipute such a comparison when pm·cbaaing a capital
asfh'lt., I\S a t-a1rnlt· a new user may pay n p1.·emium pi"iae foi: an olcl
antiquated .syate111 on one dPy aud be forced to pay full price again on
t.be second day when it ln:eaks and is reguired to be ropla.ced,

'i'he 2010 St:udy, as tile well as the other ntt1diea, appea1· to he trying
to define net eg11:i t:y as !:.he fail.· mttrket val.u, lGsa debt, They then use.
the 1·$place111ant c()i)t i11 t:oday• a dollars as the starl:.ing value illld then
subl:l:'Mt the de.ht for their co111putation, This definition of fair
market value is contrary to nll bm-.inesa definitions Rnrl appraisal
defill!tions that .indicate the F.ai>: ·market. value is generally between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither party unduly influenced t.o
act. Further, all known buainess appi:aisal modela that: uoe a potenHal
replaceine11t cost as a component to establi11h value, take into
cons.i.deration the age and the weai: and t:ear of the respective asset
being valued. The 2 010 Study al130 uses nn inflatio11a1y factor for 1:he
future period to provide for higher 1:eplacement oosta, hut again
wH.J1out ac.counting for the reduction in value due to age and wear.
This anomaly can be somewhat mltigat!ed. if an 1:tdequate capital
upla-ce111en.t rese1·vc is in place f1·om the existing uaer.e eqtial to the
nmount of deprec:l.ai;.!011 taken on t:he acqulsil:.ion cost! of the ays1:e111.
'l'hia concept is 1:eferencecl as a deprecriation reserve aml .i.a aometimes
used as a 111eun.s to provide the cash neecled for capital improvemenl:. or
replac:e111ent when fixed anaets reach the end of their useful life. The
actual. f,mding of. such a reserve ia a 1nauage1nent issue and a budgel:ing
issue, however 1 1:he Sl:lldy ia nawed _unleas it de·termines and takes into
consideration whul:. 111ana.9e1nent has done or as an nltexnative pro,ticles a
companion achedule ae to !:he effects if a 1·esel.-ve ia being established
ol:' not, which ill,1al:l.'"al:es 1:he difference or e:Efeal: of 1:he management:
decit.ion.
The second co111ponent of tile capacity fee ia the equivalent users. 'l'his
becomes tbe denoniinatol:' of the equation ln clete1"n1irdll9 tbe -value of l!he
"equity'' f.or l;be b\ly-.ln. The ::lOlO study baa tables that show t.he
projected gallona per day flow ove.1· 1:.he period 2011 to 2015. The Study
ouggests that. for each year of the 1,eriod · t:hat ap11rcximately 190 ne,~
uaera wU.l come inl:o the system of which 110 w.lll be in Chubbttok north
of I 86 and ao will be ill 'Pocatello and Cliubbuck aouth of I 86,
I
have not determined if these inc:t·eases are realistio 1 but point to the
issue l:be mtmber chosen has an effect on the outcome of the fi11al
cai)aoil!y fee chm:ge.

CONCLUSION - CAP.AC!TY FEE
'l'l1e eguil:y buy.. in metho<l fc)l: a new u1;1er is a frequently u11ed method to
determine t:he cost fo1.· 11 new uaer to begin ttBing 1:he existing

~lastewai:.el' System.

I do not diflput.e that concept.

'J.'he issue that is

called .iuto question ia the c0111p1.11:ation of the "fair value" of the
ayotem b~ing ui;ed to compute t.he "ecruil:y" and I find that the met:llod
used by 1:he ao10 Stt~dy ltas a high probability of QVerst:.nting that value
9
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which i:elilults in the oh111:9e for l1ook-11p to be overstated, Further,· ·
that t:be nun1be:r of: p:r;o;!ected new usen, if in error, ooul<l c&.\u1e the
f.ee to be overatated or understated depending on the direction
the
$n°ol', If the increaae is l::oo hlgh of a nuntber than l:be resultant: fee
.ls m1ders1:ated, If the inci:o.ase is t:oo low then the i:es11ltant fee is
ovei·st.ated.

of

E'INAI, S"Q'MMARIZEl) COMCLUSION OD' WASTEWATER 2\ND WAT.ER S'l'l!!)Y l~POR~S
l, The 2010 Si:udy X'eports for both

the l'la.stewater and the l·Jatet

systems. irne accounting and projections teohn1ques that have 1:he
effect of ovorat:at:ing 1:lle charges for the Service Fae J:nd the ·
capaoity Pee. 1\ nignificant beneficiary of these overst:al:en1ente

ap1)ears to he (~he city of Pocatello for ita general operat.l.onal
needt.1 with 1·eapeot to l:.lle ROE and PILOT charges in the Snrvioe
portion of the studies, Fu>:ther, tl1e Capaoi l!y Fee overetateU1e11t
tends to have new users eubsidiz:l.ng the Service portion of the
syutems.

2. If the City of Pocata_llo chooses not to implement: l:he Stt1d}' in
full \:lithout: identifying t.he changP-s nncl follmting the
computnl:ions to concluaion then !:he r.e1rnlt:a.1it fees do nol:· have
l'l~oriomk basis.
ln 1:ha fitst: insl:nnce., the full fee as proposed is oventat.l'ld ae a
In the oecoud instance,
the .fees bt':come arhil:. rary due to the 1>olitical proceae,

J;esult of flawed parameteu in !:he Studies,

l'lhile the 20l o Redoalc atudy is not required to he presented in
accordance with Generally i1ccept:od J\cooun.1:.ing Principles (OAAPl the
adoption of. the study (becaur;e of the conaept:s ;i.·elated l:a the ROE and
the PUOT J:eee) by the City of Pocatello, may result: in a departure
from GAAP l!llat is regui>:ed to be J:eported in the ammal ce:rt.:\fled audit
report pt·epared by l:be independi!nt certif$.ed public ncmountant: so as t:o
not malte the annual audH mial.eadi11g to its users, such dJ.solosure may
have boen l'eq\1:h;ecl to be repo1•ted in l:be auditor• :s opinion report,
footnotes to the :financial stal:.ements·, 01: a finding of gtiestionable
contu under Gove;1:mnental At1dltin9 standards.

Very truly yours,

~~~~~
~ i d L. Hunter
Cei:tifi&d Public Accountant
OL11:vls
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Attached as 0 Exhiblt 2'' is a t111e nncl correct copy of my C11n·icuhun Vitae which incluqes

my bnr.kgl'mmd & quul ificalions, ns well ns my experience as an expe1t witness in legal
J>rocecdiugs.
DATRD Ibis 2il dnyof May, 2013.

,..d

L. Hunler

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 24 dny of May, 2013.

APFIDAVIT OF DA YID L. BUNTER.- Pago 2
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Dm1id L, limiter

Certffierl Public Accom1t1mt
P.O. Box 1243
Pocn.tello, JD 83204 .

-

.,. ,•

......... , ..... .

Telephone (208) 232-4272 .Facsimile (208) 233-3575
E-Mail !llb.9pa@qwe.'lloffice.net
CURRlCULUM VITAE
PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMBNT·
2004 - Present
1983-2003

1981-1983
· 1976 • 1981
1974-1976

Selfemployed CcJ"/f/ied 1'11hlic Acco,mtrmt (David L. Httnter CPA, PLl.C)
Cerlified Public Accou11t(mf {Ilnglosi;m, Hnnler & Ca1>oll PA, CPA 's, Pocatello1 JD)
Cerl{fied Public Accotmtant (John A. Eng1Bso11 & Associates, CPA 's, Pocatello, ID)
Certified Public Accou11/r1111 (Ilnglo:,011. Jones & Dnrton. CPA 's, l'ocalello, ID)
Stq{f,-lccmmumt (Grnf & Company PC, CPA's, J:airfield, IA)

PROFESSIONAL UCENSING
Cerlitied Public Accountant - Slnle of ldnho
Certi fled Pnblic Accountnnt - Slate of Cnli fomla
Corlified Pnblic Acco\11\tilllt - Slate of Jown (non-active tic,mse)

EDUCATION
Unfl'fmiO• ofIowa- Bachelors ofBusiness Administration (1974)
LaM 11·ee Co111m1111i1y ScJiooll· - High School Diploma (1968}

PROJlESSIONAL EDUCATION AND COURSEWORK
Certified Public Accountants Exam (] 977)
Certified Vnlue Analyst Exam (200'.l)
Ammnl continuing ed11cntlo11 as required by Jclalio, Iowa and California Slate Boards of Aecou11tnucy.
Subject matter includes: auditing; financial slntemenlsj taxation ofindlviduals1 pnrfnerships, fiducinrics,
corpomtious; embezzlement and fi·aud investigation; other related tax and accou11th1g subject molter.

PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
American I11stilute of Certified Public Accountants
Ida Ito Society of Cert! lied Public Accoun1n111s
Iowa Society of Certified Public Aceotintnnts
Pocatello Es!nle 1~1a1111ing Council
Utnh Society ofC011ified Public Accountants

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Cortifled audit expedonco ns pl'ojccl manager nnd ten111111ombcr involving audits of:
o ·state Chartered Savings Bm1ks
o
School Districts
o
Cities, Counties and Municipalities
o
Watei' 011d Sewer Districts
o
Not fo1· Profit Organizations
oPost Secondary Private Scliools
o
Privalely Ow11ecl Business in Health Care and Mmmracluring
o
Title nud Escrow Companies
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Financial and hwation experience in:
" Personal nnd business income tn:mtion, including 1i1ulti-slate·appJications
o Payroll, sales nnd excise taxation, inclucl ing m11lti·state applications
o Fiduciary taxatiou, includi11g estates and tmsts
o
Business formation, dissolulio11 and reorg1mizalion
o
Ilankmptcy planning and aclmiuistration
o'l'axpayer·andit representation before slate agencies ofidabo Smle Tax Commission and California
Fmnchise Tax Board
o · TOXJ>nyer nudil reJ>i"esenta!io11 before the Internal Revenue Service including:
o Personal, business and estate audits, employment taxes
o Appeals and appellate divisions .
o United Slates Tax Court
Litigation support ex})edence:
" Embezzlement and fraud
0
ausiness vnlunlion
., JJankruplcy
o Persoiinl iltiury and wrongful death claims
o Divorce proceedings . ·
(I
Contract dispntos and damage claims
.o Parent infi'inge.menls
o
F..state J>roceedings
While Jllost cnses ore settled oul of court, I have been involved in lbc discovery process as well as prepared
wrirten reports 1md opinions rogni·ding n number ofcnscs involving lite abo\le subject ma1te1·s.

PROFESSIONAL PROGRAMS AND PRESENTATIONS
Accounting leclure presentations nt ldnbo Stnlo University evening and oxlonded courses
Pocatello Esiate Planning Council

LEADERSHIP AND PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS HELD
Director, Southcm Idaho Chnptcl' ofCerlllied Public Accountanls
Pl'esidenl, Southern Idaho Clmp!cr ofCettifiecl Public Accounlnnts
Member, Co11timting Educa!lon Committee for ldaho Society of Certified P11blic Accountants
President, Pocatello Estate Platming Council

E...XPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY
Testimony givcm in Fedeml Ba11krnptcy court, Idaho District; Federal District Com\ Idaho District and
Magistrate Courts
Depositions given .for cases involving bankmptcles, business disi>ntes 11ncl valuations, eslates and lmsts, and
personal j1\jury claims
1980
1983
1986
l 990
2006

200?

2008:
200S

Federal District Court in the Case ofDonnld BlockweJI
Fodera! Bnnkrnptcy Court in lhe Case of MeMn nnd Diane Fuuk
Deposition in the Case of the Estate ofMarla Downing
Sixth Dlsll'ict COtil't ofldaho in Bannock County in the Divorce of Glee Miclmelson
Sixth Dislrict Court of Idaho in Rmmock County in !he Case No. CV-200S-2526DR
involving fbe divorce of Glee Michaelson. I testified. for the plaintiff.
My deposilion was taken on March 7, 2007 nnd eominlled on July IO, 200? in reference to
Case No. CV 06-,10473, Adversary Cnse No. 06-8099 in !he U.S. naukruptoy Co,11·1, District
of Idaho.
My deposition was taken on Mm·ch 11. 2008 in reference 10 Case No. CV 06-0513-E-IUB, i11
!he United States District Coul't for the District ofIdaho.
My deposition wns taken on September 16, 2008 in reference to JAMS Cnsc No, l•l1000,JS7l
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C)
2012

M)' testimony was gh•en on Feb111ruy28, 20I2 in the United States District Com1 forlhe
District ofldaho in connection with Civil Action No. CV-09-229-E-BL\V. l 1es1ificd for the
Plaintiff
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Michael D: Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com

n,,• ~ F'n - \
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Nathan M. Olsen, ISB No. 7373
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: CV-2014-1520-0C

vs.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO CITY'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Ci .

The plaintiffs submit this memorandum in opposition to the City's motion for
summary judgment.
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DISPUTED FACTS
The Court is familiar with the facts underlying this lawsuit. This lawsuit
comprises a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based upon an unlawful and unconstitutional taking
asserted by two class plaintiffs, those persons or entities improperly charged a Payment in
Lieu of Taxes (PILOT) or its precursor component of connection/capacity fees and those
persons or entities improperly charged the same component fee as part of a user fee for
water and sewage utilities by the defendant, City of Pocatello.
The plaintiffs, rather than going into an extensive factual rendition, for purposes
of this response, challenge certain factual assertions made in the Defendant's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (hereafter "defendant's
brief'), Factual History and Statement of Fact [sic].
First, the plaintiffs dispute the assertion on page 7 in the defendant's brief
characterizing the PILOT charge, as well as the precursor charges designated "rate of
return" or "return on equity," as a tax. The connection/capacity fee and the user fee were
both designated "fees" thus any component of those fees carries the same designation.
Second, the plaintiffs dispute the assertion on page 7 of the defendant's brief that
"the City inunediately discontinued charging the PILOT fee" following the Court's
issuance of its decision in the Building Contractors lawsuit in 2013. Spreadsheets
provided by the city and referenced below suggest that these fees were being collected
into 2014. _
Third, the plaintiffs dispute the assertion on page 7 of the defendant's brief that
"the City has never charged a PILOT to the connection/capacity fee and the two different
fees have no relationship." This assertion is contrary to an extensive analysis done by this
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Court in the Building Contractors case and is unsupported by any documentation
provided by the City, again, as discussed in detail below.
ARGUMENT
1. The City is collaterally estopped from asserting that (1) no connection fees
were improperly comingled with the General Fund and (2) there was no PILOT
component to the connection/capacity fees.

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars relitigation of an issue previously
determined when:
( 1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the
issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in
the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually
decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits
in the prior litigation; and (S) the party against whom the issue is asserted
was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation. 1
All five elements of collateral estoppel are present in this case barring the City from
relitigating the issues addressed in Section A of its brief. The Motion for Summary
Judgment based upon Section A of the City's brief should be denied summarily under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Section A of the City's brief attempts to relitigate the issues of whether the
PILOT fee was a component of connection/ capacity fee and whether the PILOT fee was
comingled with the City's' General Fund, thus making the fee unconstitutional and
violative of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, LC. §§50-1001, et seq. The Court has already ,
definitively addressed both these issues at length in its Memorandum Decision and Order
on City's Motion to Reconsider and Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Reconsideration,

1 Stoddard,

147 Idaho at 191,207 P.3d at 167 (quoting Rodriguez 11. Dep't of Corr., 136 Idaho 90, 92, 29
P.3d 401,403 (2001))
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filed November 15, 2013 in the case Building Contractors Association ofSoutheast Idaho
v. City ofPocatello, Register Number CV - 2011 - 5228 - OC, Sixth Judicial District of

the State of Idaho, Bannock County (hereafter "Memorandum Decision"). In fact, the
City, referring to that case as the Building Contractors case quotes extensively from the
Memorandum Decision in Section A of its memorandum.
The City fails, however, to address the conclusions found beginning on page 7 of
the Court's decision and continuing through page 12 and in passim throughout the
decision, that (1) that there was never "any evidence as to how the connection fees and
user fees could have been separately accounted for prior to March 2013" and (2) "[a]fter
the connection and user fees were co-mingled into. the water and sewer funds, the
evidence supports, and the city concedes, that the city then transferred money from the
water and sewer funds into the general fund under transfers had been called by various
names. "2 In essence, the Court held that this "comingling" of the funds provided a right
for the Builders Association (on behalf of the connection fee payers) to challenge the
"use" of such funds, regardless of how they were assessed.3 In other words, in the end,
the Court held that the "use" of connection fees for the PILOT was in itself a component
of the connection fee that, again, could be challenged.
These conclusions were derived from the Court's extensive review of a number of
different sources of information which are resubmitted contemporaneously in this case as
attachments to the Affidavit of Nathan M. Olsen In Opposition to City's Motion for

2

Olsen Aff. Ex. A., consisting of the CV-2011-5228 Nov. 13, 2013, Memorandum Decision, p. 8
(emphasis added)

3

Id. p. 13
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Sununary Judgment. Since the City has raised this issue in the instant case, the plaintiffs
feel it serves economy and efficiency by quoting the findings of the Court at length:
As noted, the record reflects that prior to March 2013 the connection and user fees
were collectively poured into the water and sewer funds accounts. In his
deposition, Swindell explained that when the building department collected a
connection fee as part of a building permit, 'then those funds and dollars are
credited to the water fund or water pollution control fund as appropriate.'
Swindell further explained that connection/capacity fees were channeled into
three funds: 1) building permit-designated as fund 001; 2) water-designated as
fund 031; and 3) wastewater - designated as fund 032.Swindell also explained
that the user fees were poured into the water and wastewater funds named above
in his first affidavit Swindell stated: "the capacity/connection fees are collected in
segregated into the appropriate water and wastewater fwids." In the letter to
Logan Robinson, Mayor Chase names the "Water, Sewer and Sanitation Funds"
as the "enterprise funds." Mayor Chase explains they are called the ''enterprise
funds" because the money placed in these funds comes mainly from fees
generated by each of the three public utility ent~rprises.
Next, money from the above named funds was transferred into the general fund
under a program that has had various names including, Return on Equity, Rate of
Return, PILOT, and franchise fees.

***
Swindell further explains that the "internal franchise fee" AND "Payment In Lieu
Of Taxes (PILOT)" have replaced the "rate of return" or "return on equity." The
franchise fee and PILOT are two different transfers that are taken from the water
and wastewater funds. Swindell explained that "the combined amounts of FY 13
franchise fee and PILOT are 13.8% of planned revenue for water and 15.5% for
sewer."
According to Swindell's Fourth Affidavit, the City does not charge a PILOT fee to
connection fees, but only to the user fees charged to the customers of the systems.
What the Affidavit does not say is that PILOT fee has never been charged to
connection fees during the time that both connection and user fees were coM
mingled. However, prior to that Affidavit, it was clear that all connection and user
fees were poured into the three "enterprise funds." The City then had a policy of
transferring money from the water and sewer funds into the general fund.
Therefore, the rate of return/return on equity or the PILOT/franchise fee should
not be characterized so much as a fee collected by the water and sewer funds but a
"transfer" fee based on a City policy to transfer water and sewer funds to the
general funds. .In his memo to the City Clerk, Swindell explained that for FY 11
the City plan to transfer $1,585,237 from the water fund to the general fund "for a
return on equity, to help fund the activities of the General Fund." Similarly, in FY
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11 the City plan to transfer $1,263,654 from the Water Pollution Control Fund to
the "General Fund is a return on equity to help fund the activities of the General
Fund." These transfers did not include additional transfers that were made from
the water and sewer funds (1) into the General Fund to support the Human
Resources Department; (2) into the Emergency Repair Fund to build reserves for
emergency repair of facilities; and (3) into the Debt Service Funds, which were
each outlined separately from the "return on equity11 transfer.
Based upon the foregoing, it appears clear to the Court that revenue collected
from both connection fees and user fees was being, or could have been,
transferred into the General Fund pursuant to the PILOT fee, charge to the water
and sewer department as a means of transferring connection and/or user fees to
fund general city expenses .. It is clear that the connection fees (i.e., fees paid only
by builders of new construction) and user fees were co-mingled into the water and
sewer funds, from which the City transferred the PILOT fees into the General
Fund.

***
What is clear and undisputed at this point is that revenue collected from the
connection fees and user fees collectively were transferred to the General Fund,
via the PILOT the transfer program, and used to "help fund the activities of the
General Fund. "4
As this Court pointed out, Swindell attempted to take the position in his Fourth
Affidavit that a PILOT has never been charged to connection fees during the time that
both connection and user fees were co-mingled. This is the same position that the City
takes in this case in Section A of its memorandum. To that end, the City submits the
Second Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein and incorporates the Affidavit of Joyce A.
Stroschein filed on or about August 29, 2014. Ms. Stroschein states a number of times in
both affidavits that the city has never charged a PILOT component to the
connections/capacity fee. 5 Among the various attachments to the Stroschein affidavits,
there are no source documents that support these statements. Exhibit A to Ms.

4

Id. pp. 7-13. Footnotes omitted.

5

Stroschein Aff. 1 8 and Second Stroschein Aff. 13.
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Stroschein's second affidavit merely demonstrates that there were PILOT transfers to the
General Fund From FY 2006 Through FY 2014. 6 As noted in plaintiffs Motion to Strike,
Exhibit A to the. Second Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein appears to be spreadsheets
created specifically for this lawsuit (without reference to primary source documents)
merely showing the effects of the lost revenue to the General Fund resulting from the
Court's injunction prohibiting any further transfers of PILOT charges.
Again, regardless of Ms. Stroschein's testimony attempting to resurrect an issue
already adjudicated, the Court in the Builders Case has already found and decided that
the transfers of comingled funds into the general fund were, in effect, "a charge" to both
the user and connection fee payers. As well established in the record, at least until March
of 2013, connection fees can be traced directly to the general fund for PILOT vis-a-vis
the comingled water and user funds.
Finally, there is additional, ancillary evidence that leads to the same conclusion
that the Court did not cite, but which bolsters the Court's prior ruling. First, Swindell
testified that moneys collected for both the connection/capacity and user fees were
deposited and co-mingled into two unsegregated accounts with water fees going into the
"Water Fund," and sewer fees going into the "Water Pollution Control Fund."7 Further,
and equally important is how the funds were viewed by Swindell, the water and sewer
department heads and the Pocatello City Council. Each year Swindell obtained from both
the Water and Sewer Departments a proposed budget outlining their desired needs for the

6

See also Olsen Aff. Ex. B

7

Olsen Aff. Ex. C, consisting of Dec. 14, 2012, Dave Swindell Dep. 53:47:16-25, 47-53:1-18, 63:7-25, 64,
Ex. IO
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upcoming year. 8 With the assistance and supervision of Mr. Swindell, the department
heads presented their proposed budget to the City Counsel for approval.9 The pre-PILOT
fees (before they were "redescribed" as PILOT fees)1° out of the water & sewer funds
explicitly were explicitly earmarked to fund the General Fund in the budget:
A) The so called "Return on Equity" or "Enterprise Funds" program
which transfers significant sums into the City's general fund to "help
furid the activities of the General Fund.'' 11
This program was "formalized" by Swindell and approved by the City Counsel
after he became employed as the City's CFO in 2001. 12 The purpose of this program as
described by the City Mayor in 2005 was to allow for a "rate of return" or profit on each
utility "equal to 7% of the equity in each business." 13 This ''money goes to the General
Fund which the City Council utilizes as a property tax substitution." 14 Since at least 2005,
the City has transferred substantial amounts of the water and sewer funds into the City's
general revenue fund under this program, with $2,848,891 transferred in 2011 alone and
at least $17,952,136 from 2005 through 2011. 15 16
The second piece of ancillary evidence that supports the Court Memorandum
Decision comes through the plaintiffs' identified expert, David Hunter, CPA, in his report
8 Id.
9

35:6-25, 36-46, Ex. 5, 6, 24

Id.

10

Stroschein Aff. ~ 5.

u Olsen Aff. Ex. C, consisting of Swindell Dep. Ex. 18
12 Id.

79-83:1-15, Ex. 18

13

Id., Ex. 18

14

Id. (emphasis added)

is

Id.

16

See, January 4, 2013, Plffs Res. To Def.'s Mot For SJ and MTS, in CV-2011-5228 at p. 4 (emphasis
added).This point is remarkably consistent with Joyce Stroschein's affidavit testimony bemoaning the
lost revenue to the City that led to imposition ofa property tax increase in 2015. Second Stroschein Aff.
111.
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submitted to the Court on May 24, 2013. 17 After analyzing the City's records and
testimony, Mr. Hunter indicates in his "Final Summarized Conclusion" that the "capacity
fees" determined by the City were "overstated" and that:
[A] significant beneficiary of these overstatements appears to be the City of
Pocatello for its general operational needs with respect to the ROE and PILOT
charges in the Service portion of the Studies. 18
Again the City never refuted Mr. Hunter's analysis and opinion on this point. In
essence, the fact that both user and connection fees were impermissibly transferred for
use under the PILOT program is a well-settled fact already determined by this Court,
which the City cannot and has not refuted.
Thus, the City improperly took PILOT fees from both user and connection fee
payers. The City never appealed or sought reconsideration of the Memorandum Decision
and should therefore be collaterally estopped from taking a contrary position in the
current lawsuit.
2. At most, the Affidavits of Joyce A. Stroschein create an issue of fact whether
PILOT charges were applicable to connections/capacity fees and transferred to the
General Fund.

The City submits, along with its brief, the Second Affidavit of Joyce A.
Stroschein and incorporates by reference a prior affidavit filed by Stroschein on or about
August 29, 2014. Although Stroschein apparently is the current CFO for the City of
Pocatello; she did not hold that position at the relevant times pertinent to t?is lawsuit
insofar as she identifies herself in both affidavits as the City's Finance Manager from

17

Olsen Aff. Ex. D, consisting of the affidavit and report of David L. Hunter in CV-2011-5228.

18

Id. Hunter Aff. Ex. 1, p. 10 (emphasis added)
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2008 -2014. 19 The CFO and IRCP 30(b)(6) designated City representative during the
Building Contractors litigation was David Swindell, whose testimony was referenced

extensively by the Court in the Building Contractors case and is cited in the prior section
;

of this brief. At all times relevant, there is no evidence that Stroschein had speaking
authority as a IRCP 30(b)( 6) witness to discuss the PILOT fee policy of the City.
Regardless of her authority to speak on behalf of the City about the PILOT fee
program, in her first affidavit at ,r 8, Stroschein states that the City "has never charged a
PILOT component to the connection/capacity fee." She reiterates this statement in ,r 3 of
her second affidavit. The City virtually ignores the Court's prior findings in attempting to
resurrect this "undisputed factual" issue.
What is problematic about Stroschein's affidavit testimony is threefold. First,
despite the fact that she submits exhibits to both affidavits, none of those exhibits present
data either in the form of source material (i.e. ledgers, invoices, QuickBook or Excel
entries) or secondary summary spreadsheets that reflect or support her conclusory
statements related to PILOT charges vis-a-vis the connection/capacity fees. Second, she
parses her testimony in such a way as to ignore the pre-PILOT Jee return on equity and
rate of return charges that the Court earlier concluded were unquestionably being

°

transferred to the City's General Fund as discussed in the previous section.2 Finally,
Stroschein' s affidavit testimony completely contradicts the prior testimony of Swindell
and the various discussions of the water and sewer department budgeting process, again

19

Stroschein Aff. 1 1 and Second Stroschein Aff. 1 2

20

In fact, noting that in 2011 the City "redescribed" the rate of return and return of equity fees as PILOT
fess, Stroschein carefully avoids submitting affidavit language to the effect that rate of return fees and
return of equity fees were not a component of connection/capacity fees. Stroschein Aff. 15.
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discussed above21 in which Swindell, Mayor Chase, the department heads and the
Pocatello City Council discussed at length pertaining the use of the impermissible fees,
i.e. franchise fees, PILOT fees, return on equity fees and rate of return fees, to fund nonwater and sewer functions through the General Fund and, even more inappropriately, to
provide an alternative to increase property taxes to replenish the General Fund. 22
At the swnmary judgment stage, all factual inferences are drawn in favor of the
plaintiffs. When such inferences are applied to the affidavit testimony of Joyce
Stroschein, her testimony, at most, creates a material issue of fact as to whether PILOT
fees were associated with the connection/capacity fees collected by the City and whether
those fees were transferred to the General Fund, and thus unconstitutional and violative
of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act
3. There was an unconstitutional taking.
a. The PILOT component of the user fee qualities as a compensable
property interest.

The City argues that the PILOT component does not constitute a compensable
property interest for purposes of the Plaintiffs' claim for an unconstitutional taking. The
essence of the City's argument is that "monies paid are not a recognizable protected
property interest."23 This assertion is incorrect based upon relevant Idaho case law that
the City fails to cite and which rejects the argument advanced by the City.
In BHA Investments, Inc. v. City ofBoise, 141 Idaho 168, I 08 P.3d 315 (2004),

the Idaho Supreme Court held, "[m]oney is clearly property that may not be taken for

21

Supra at p. 6

22

Jd.

23

Def. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 8-9 (citations omitted).
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public use without the payment of just coinpensation."24 The BHA Investments, Inc.
decision is squarely·on point and is clear, unequivocal legal authority that stands contrary
to the proposition advanced by the City. Yet, the City never cites or discusses the BHA
Investments, Inc. decision. The Idaho Supreme Court continues:
To put the matter simply, the taking of money is different, under the Fifth
Amendment, from the taking of real or personal property. The imposition of
various monetary exactions-:taxes, special assessments, and user fees-has been
accorded substantial judicial deference.25
The Idaho Supreme Court ultimately found that the "City had no authority to charge the
liquor license transfer fee, its exaction of the fee constituted a taking of property under
the United States and Idaho Constitution.',26
In the Building Contractors suit, this Court.unequivocally found that "any fee
which includes a PILOT component is unreasonable, arbitrary and contrary to statute. "27
The portion of user and/or connection fees assessed to pay PILOT fees to the City, failed
to conform to the statutory requirements ofldaho Code§ 50-1028.28 Since the City had
no authority to charge the PILOT component of the connection and user fees, "its
exaction constituted a taking of property under the United States and Idaho
Constitutions. "29
b. The PILOT component of the user fee was used without just
compensation.

The City argues that the PILOT fee was not used without just compensation. The
City misapprehends its burden on summary judgment. Under Rule 56(c), as the moving
24 Id.

at 172, 108 P.3d at 319 (citing Brown v. Legal Found o/Wash.• 538 U.S. 216 (2003)).

25 Id.

(citing BHA Investments, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348, 63 P.3d 474 (2003)).

26

Id.

Mem. Dec. and Order p. 24, dated November 13, 2013
28 Id.
27

29

See BHA Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho at 172, 108 P.3d at 319
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party, the City must come forward with affirmative evidence establishing that there are
no triable issues of fact that just compensation was given for the use of PILOT
component. 30 Rather than present the Court with admissible evidence of the just
compensation provided to each of the user fee payers, the City merely argues
generalities, assumptions and conclusions: "[t]here is no factual basis to conclude that the
PILOT transfer did not provide just compensation to the user fee payers."31 The City's
argument is not on par with its burden. It must affirmatively demonstrate to the Court that
any PILOT transfer transaction provided identifiable compensation to the user fee payer
rather than merely positing the absence of evidence as proof of compensation. ·
At the very least, the issue of just compensation is a question of fact for the jury.
32

In Covington, the Idaho Supreme Court wrote:
In Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 596 P.2d 75 (1979), this Court held that all
issues regarding inverse condemnation are to be resolved by the trial Court,
except the issue of what is just compensation. Once the trial Court has made the
finding that there is a taking of the property, the extent of the damages and the
measure thereof are questions for the jury. 33

Although Rueth involved an inverse condemnation, the holding that just compensation is
a jury question is equally applicable to this case.
Regardless of the City's failure to provide affirmative evidence in support of its
argument, just compensation is "measured by the property owner's loss rather than the
government's gain."34 The U.S. Supreme Court has observed that: "[w]e ... noted that

30

See Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c); see, e.g., Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,531, 887 P.2d
1034, 1038 (1994); Shelton v. Shelton, 225 P.3d 693,698 (Idaho 2009)

31

Def. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 10

32

City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 854, 136 P.3d 310,325 (2006); Covington v. Jefferson
Cnty., 137 Idaho 777, 780, 53 P.3d 828, 831 (2002)

33

Id. (emphasis added)

34

Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 235-36 (2003)
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the private party 'is entitled to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property
had not been taken. He must be made whole but -is not entitled to more. "'35 In Brown,
Justice Stevens made clear that the measure of just compensation is measured by net loss
to the plaintiff rather than public gain.36 In this case, it is undisputed that since 2006 the
City has taken no less than $28,329,231.13 from connection and user fee payers for the
impermissible PILOT program.37 That is over $28 million that signify the collective fee
payers' or "property owners' loss."38 Again, no amount of generic "public gain" through
services provided to the public as a result of this taking can compensate for the property
owners loss.39
Thus, the City's arguments about the benefits that the city or its residents derived
from the use of the fees is irrelevant and does not establish the absence of triable issues of
fact as to whether just compensation was received. The fact is that the user payers lost
significant, identifiable sums of money because of an impermissible fee. They have
receive no compensation for those sums and the fact that the City allegedly provided
certain benefits makes no difference for purposes of ascertaining whether just
compensation has been made. There has been no compensation made to the class
plaintiffs. The City does not even attempt to make an effort to disarticulate and establish
the relative value of the services for each individual impermissible user fee paid, and
likely cannot make such a determination. In short, there has been no correlation or
connection between the alleged services provided and the user fees themselves.
35

Id (citing Olsonv. United States, 292 U.S. 246,255 (1934))

36 Id.

at 236

38

See Olsen Aff. Ex. B.
Id.

39

Id.

37
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Ultimately, the City cites no legal authority for the notion that just compensation
can be determined through services or municipal benefits derived from the taking. This is
clearly because such a notion is antithetical to fundamentals of a takings analysis.
Invariably, every single case where there has been a taking it is done with some
identifiable benefit to the government and its citizenry'. For example, taking property to
widen a road will "benefit" all citizens who use the road. However, the use of the road by
the person whose property was taken to effectuate the widening of the road does not
constitute just compensation for the market value of the taken property. Courts require
more than just the incidental enjoyment of the services resulting from a taking to find that
the individual has received just compensation.
4. The Court's ruling in Building Contractors has retroactive effect.

The Court's decision does not inherently limit itself to prospective application.
Instead, the Court deals with the connection and user fees from both historical and future
perspectives. For example, the Court enjoined future connection and user fees from being
assessed a PILOT fee for general fund purposes.40 Yet, the Court also wrote that "[t]o the
extent that PILOT fees have, are, or will be charged to the connection fees being
accumulated in the water and sewer accounts the Court finds the connection fees are
being used impermissibly. Additionally, any PILOT fees drawn from user fees are also
impermissible taxes. " 41
Decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court follow the "usual rule" as to retroactive
application to all past and pending cases. 42 The Court has discretion to limit retroactivity
40

Mem. Dec. & Order, p. 26, November 13, 2013

41

Id. at 23

42

BHA Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho at 173, 108 P.3d at 320
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and weighs three factors: ( 1) the purpose of the decision; (2) the reliance upon the prior
law; and.(3) the effect upon the administration of justice if the decision is applied
retroactively .43 It is unclear whether a District Court has the authority to limit the scope
of its prior decisions when a final judgment has been entered in that case and the case has
no subsequent history, i.e., appeal. In this case, all of the factors weigh in favor of
applying the decision retroactively.
As to the first factor, the Plaintiffs submit that the purpose of the Court's prior
order was specific and narrowly tailored to resolve the propriety and permissibility of the
PILOT components. The decision was certainly designed to provide prospective,
injunctive relief and to prevent the City from further taking property that it had no
authority to take. One of the fundamental purposes of the finding was whether the City's
actions vis-a-vis the PILOT transfer fees, historically, were ever permissible. The Court
found that they were not. 44 This finding and the entry of an injunction are independent of
a claim for the return of payment attendant to that taldng. By necessity, the Court's first
order of business is to determine the legality of the fee and, if illegal, to stop any further
assessment of the fee. Only then can the issue of repayment for an unlawful taking be
addressed.
Second, the Court relied upon prior law to reach its findings. There is no credible
dispute over this fact. The Court relied on a significant amount of clear case law authority
in reaching its conclusions.

43

Id.

44

Mem. Dec. & Order, pp. 22-24
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The third factor relates to the number of cases that would be reopened if the
decision were applied retroactively.45 The Court's decision was narrowly tailored and
factually specific to make this element a non-issue because no prior case would be
reopened. In fact, no cases are being reopened, this case is independent from the Building

Contractors case insofar as it is a case about the recoupment of fees to two classes not
represented in the Building Contractors case, the classes of plaintiffs wrongfully assessed
PILOT and pre-PILOT connection and/or user fees respectively.
Finally, the City argues that the issue of an unconstitutional talcing was previously
litigated in the Building Contractors litigation. In fact, that was not what was litigated in
the Building Contractors case. The Building Contractors case litigated the fegality and

constitutionality of the PILOT fee and the ability of the City to collect those fees going
forward. This case is a 42 U.S.C. §1983 case for a refund of fees to the identified classes
of plaintiffs flowing from the City's imposition of a fee structure that resulted in
unconstitutional talcings.
5. The City is not immune from the claims articulated in the Complaint.
The City's Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) immunity arguments citing LC. §6904A are fundamentally flawed. While the City may have "discretion" as to whether or
not to construct utilities, it does not have discretion to act outside of its authority by
imposing of unconstitutional fees related to the utility. Indeed, under the City's
interpretation of the "discretionary function" defense, there could never be a claim
against the City for any of its actions. That is certainly not the intention of Sterling v.

Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986), which states that "clearly, then,

45

BHA Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho at 173, 108 P.3d at 320
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'discretionary function' does not include functions which involve any element of choice,
judgment or ability to make responsible decisions; otherwise every function would fall
within the exception."46 Moreover, the budgetary decisions made by the City on its
assessment and expenditure of revenue and fees are fundamentally operational in nature,
and not for policy purposes thereby eviscerating any claimed immunity under Sterling.
The City's interpretation of Section 6-904A suggesting that under no
circumstances can an injured party recover improperly collected taxes or a fee is equally
flawed. The statute does not preempt or supplant other available statutory relief in this
regard, not the least of which is_42 USC§ 1983 under which this lawsuit is pled.47
Section 1983 provides redress for property improperly taken pursuant to the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Idaho Code Section 63-3074
provides an avenue for the refund of taxes or property illegally or erroneously seized to
satisfy a tax obligation.48 Simply put, this section is limited solely to "ordinary
negligence claims."49
In Greenwade, the Court analyzed the meaning of the apparent prohibition of
claims arising out of an assessment of a tax or fee. The Court wrote:
The term "claim," as used in the ITCA, describes claims arising from tortious
conduct. Greenwade's claim for the return of property erroneously or illegally
seized for the payment of taxes does not appear to fit the definition of a claim for
tort damages, and thus would not be barred by LC.§ 6-904A. 50

46

Id. at 227, 723 P.2d at 771

41

See Complaint, Jury Demand and Request for Class Certification, 11

48

See Greenwade v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n 119 Idaho 501', 808 P.2d 420 (Ct. App. 1991)

49 Id.

so

See also, Harris v. State Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,847 P.2d 1156 (1993)

Greenwade, 119 Idaho at 504-05, 808 P.2d at 423-24
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Though Greenwade involved a claim to return property seized under the Idaho Income
Tax Act, the notion expressed by the Greenwade Court applies here. This case involves
the return of money impennissibly taken by the City, plus prejudgment interest. The
nature of the Plaintiffs' claims does not involve damages as that term is used in Idaho
Code 6-904A. Instead, it seeks a refund of fees illegally imposed by the City. Idaho Code
6-904A does not impliedly or expressly prohibit such an action. 51
Finally, and perhaps most important, the ITCA does not immunize the state or its
political subdivisions from claims based on federal law.52 To the extent the plaintiffs
allege takings under the United States Constitution, the ITCA does not apply.
6. Conclusion and relief requested.

Based upon the above-articulated submission, the plaintiffs request that the City's

51

Id. at 506, 808 P.2d at 425

52

Holloway v. Brechtse, 279 F. Supp. 2d 613,616 {E.D. Pa. 2003); BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise,
supra at322
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on April 1, 2015, I
served a true and correct copy of the PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on the following by the method
of delivery designated below:

El
Blake G. Hall
Nathan R. Starnes
Hall Angell Starnes
1075 S. UtahAvenue, Ste 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: (208) 621-3008
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-.3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
!SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgh@hasattomeys.com
.sla@hasattomeys.com
nrs@hasattomeys.com
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STA.TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated~ ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C

TlDRD AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STROSCHEIN

Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Bannock

)

: ss.

Joyce A. Stroschein, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

That I am over the age of eighteen {18} and am competent to testify in this matter.

I make this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge unless otherwise indicated.

·--.

This affidavit is made under the penalty of perjury.
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2.

I am the current Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") and Treasurer for the City of

Pocatello. I have served in the finance department of the City since October 2001,
including City Controller from 2006-2008 and the Finance Manager from 2008-2014. I
am knowledgeable regarding the financial affairs of the City, including the types of funds
that include a PILOT component and the varying types of services provided within the
City for water and sewer.
3.

Calculation of how much a PILOT component is incorporated into a given user

fee is a complex and multifaceted calculation. The impact of the PILOT component on
any given fee may vary significantly based on the user. That is, the amount of a PILOT
component on one user may vary dramatically for another. For example, there would be a
difference in the amount of a PILOT apportioned to a residential single-family unit
versus a commercial unit. Likewise, there would be a difference in the amount of a
·PILOT apportioned to a residential customer living in a townhouse without a yard versus
a residential user who has a large yard and required more volume over 1,000 gallons or
who has a larger service line (i.e.,%", 1", 1 W', etc.). Attached hereto as Exhibit A are
Utility Billing Rates that demonstrate the costs for a given user, whether residential,
commercial, etc.
4.

Importantly, the motivations for a refund for a taxpayer will likely be drastically .

different between renters who do not pay property taxes. That is, assuming that the City
were required to repay the PILOT, the taxpayer will likely have a strong desire to
minimize the amount of the award because ultimately the taxpayer will be required for
shoulder the heavy burden of repayment of the tax. Conversely, the renter would likely
have a motivation to obtain a larger damage award.
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5.

If the Court were to award damages in this litigation, the impact of a damage

award for each individual user in the City of PocEttello will be a complex and onerous
task. The analysis would require two complex steps to identify the amount ofrefund each
user would be entitled to. First, the City would have to determine how much PILOT was·
incorporated into each rate. More specifically, the City would have to identify what
portion of a given rate (i.e., commercial, multi unit, single family, etc.). The second step
would be to analyze at each respective user account and determine what the monthly use
was on a month-by-month basis. This would require the City to examine the monthly

usage for each user for each month that a reimbursement was required.
6.

With respect to the first step, in order for the City to determine how much PILOT

was incorporated into a given rate, the City would be forced to hire an expert with the
necessary technical expertise to provide the necessary information regarding how a given
rate was developed, including the amount of a PILOT apportioned to said rate. The City
would hire Raftelis, the finn that performed the rate study, to analyze and provide this
information.
7.

One the amount of the PILOT apportioned to each rate has been identified by

Raftelis, the City will then be required to identify bow much each rate user would be
permitted to recover on a monthly °basis. For example, when looking at a sewer rate, there
will be a base service charge that may include a PILOT but also a volwne charge per
1000 that would also have a PILOT component. Thus, a given user may have a higher
volume charge that would include a larger amount of PILOT. This amount would
fluctuate based on the monthly usage. In order for the City to perform this step of the
analysis, the City would be forced to hire software experts to create a software program
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that can data mine this infonnation. The software would be unique to the City and not
available commercially. The program would be used to detennine the impact on the cost
per user and usage rate for each user in a given month.
8.

As of February 2015, the City had 16,826 active accounts billed by the City of

Pocatello. Each active account may, however, have subaccounts tied to them (multifamily, apartment, complexes, landowners of multiple properties, etc.). Given that the
population of the City does fluctuate, the City would have to identify other closed
accounts that fall within the prescribed period of time. Thus, the City would have to look
at a minimum of 16,826 active accounts for each month. In a twelve--month period, the
City would be required to examine approximately 201,912 accounts, exclusive of
subaccounts.
9.

Finally, any damage awards that were assessed against the City would require a

rate study to be perfonried. In order for the City to ensure it has sufficient capital to
operate the City and repay the damage award (in addition to the experts required to
calculate the damages) the City must know how much money will be required for a bond.
Beca1.1se the City does not have any current reserves to repay any damage award, the City
will be forced to go to bond for the amount. Any bond will necessarily require the
property taxes to increase to repay said bond. In order to develop a rate, the City looks at
capital needs (improvements or equipment) to develop the.revenue requirements for the
City. Thus, while the rates may decline, the City would be forced to increase property
taxes (as it did in 2015) to satisfy the deficiencies and repayment ofa bond. It is
noteworthy, that individuals who did not live in the area during the period when a PILOT
was collected will be forced to bear the burden of increased taxes if a damage award was
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assessed. Ultimately, the amount of work for the City is significant, expensive, and
lengthy. Depending on the individual user, the motivations and arguments for and against
the class action vary.
10.

Given the complexity of the user rates and the numerous potential account types,

the identified Plaintiffs, Ed Quinn and Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park, are not representative
of the class members. Specifically, Ed Quinn has a single-family account. Neither Mr.
Quinn nor Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park can represent the interest of a commercial user, an
industrial user, a newly arrived homeowner, a renter who is a user fee payor, etc.
Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of Ed Quinn's Utility Service
record.
11.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of Hill~Vu Mobile Home

Park's Utility Service record, which demonstrates garbage, sewer, and water utilities.
This account is a residential multi~unit account.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public
in and for said State, this 2cid day o f ~ 2015.
Apiil.

IQotaryPublic for Idaho

.
Residingat: MoCum,nnyl
My commission expires: ·2/22/20/ 8"
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the
following this _g_ day of March, 2015, by the method indicated below:
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Fax: 529..9732
NathanM. Olsen, Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 524~3391

[\c'.(Mailing
['} Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

[i,Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

G.HALL
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UTILITY BILLING RA TES-FISCAL YEAR 2015 (Second phase, WA & GA)
EFFECTIVE OCTOBER!, 2014
WATERRATES
LINE SIZE

INSIDE

3/4"
1"
l W'
2"
3"
4"
6"
8"
10"
12"

$ 8.35
9.70
15.50
20.20
51.50
82.40
155.00
225.00
352.00
504.00

OUTSIDE
$ 12.53
14.55
23.25
30.30
77.25
123.60
232.50
337.50
528.00
756.00

CB-Inside

UNMETERED
$33.13 per unit-Inside City
$49. 70 per unit-Outside City

$5.85
6.79
10.85
14.14

VOLUME CHARGE (PER 1,000 GALS}

INSIDE

Single Family Unit (first25,000 gallons)
Single Family Unit (over 25,000 gallons)
Multi Units
Commercial
Summerline
Unpotable
Hydrants (by pennit only @ CM rate-Water Dept)

$2.28
2.86
2.12
1.74
2.80

FIRE LINES
2"
$ l.50
4"
8.90
6"
24.75
8"
52.05
10"
89.20

OUTSIDE

NIA

$3.42
4.29
3.18
2.61
4.20
0.57

1.74

NIA

CB-Inside
$1.60
2.01
1.96

SEWERRATES
CB-Inside

Inside Citv Outside City
Single Family units
Multi-family/Commercial:
Service charge per billing
Volume chg per 1,000*
Industrial:
Service charge per billing
Volume chg per 1,000*

$28.20

$33.85

6.25
4.06

7.50
4.88

$19.74

6.25
2.15

l\.fONTIILY SANITATION CHARGES
~ervice {1 (!ickug/lVk}
MU/SF Residential Cart
MU Additional Unit Cart(s)
CB Residential Cart
CB/SF/MU MCR**
MU/SF 64-gallon Cart
CB 64-gallon Cart
Business Cart
Additional Pickup
Additional Pickup Day
Garbage-only Recycling Cart**
Yard Waste Collection
Cart cleaning charge
3-yard Container
3-yard Con-Special Pickup-SPU

Base Charge
$14.78
14.78
10.35
14.78
13.64
9.55
14.78
12.84
12.84
5.00
5.00
20.00
73.52
16.98 (minimum)

Rent

Tax

$

$

Billing Charge
$1.62
1.14
1.62
1.14
1.62

9.71

.59

1.62

Total
$16.40
14.78
11.49
14.78
15.26
10.69
16.40
12.84
12.84
5.00
5.00
20.00
85.44
16.98

*Based on winter water average (November through April consumption) unless location also has an active summerline.
**Billing fee may apply, 3-month minimum
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UTILITY BrLLING RATES-FISCAL YEAR 2015 (First phase, Sewer only)
EFFECTIVE AUGUST l; 2014

WATER RATES
Lu';'E SIZE

INSIDE

3/4"
I"
lW'
211
3"
4"
6"

$ 7.94
8.70
13.32
16.41
44.99
71.32
129.82
189.95
292.93
414.28

8"

IO"
12"

OUTSIDE

CB-Inside

$ 11.92

$5.56

13.05
19.98
24.61
67.49
106.98
194.74
284.93
439.39
621.42

6.09
9.33
11.49

VOLUi.\rIE CHARGE (PER 1.000 GALS)
Single Family Unit (first 25,000 gallons)
Single Family Unit (over 25,000 gallons)
Multi Units
Commercial
Summerline
Unpotable_
Hydrants (by pellllit only@ CM rate-Water Dept)

UNl\lETERED
$3 I .86 per unit-Inside City
$47.79 per unit-Outside City

FIRE LINES
2" $ 1.50
4"
8.90
24.75
6"
8"
52.05
10"
89.20

INSIDE

OUTSIDE

$2.22
2.78
2.05
1.66
2.71

$3.34
4.17
3.08
2.50
4.08

I.66

NIA

CB-Inside
$1.56
1.95
l.90

SEVt'ER RA.TES
Single Family units
Multi-family/Commercial:
Service charge per billing
Volume chg per 1,000*
Industrial:
Service charge per billing
Volume chg per 1,000*

Inside Citv

Outside Citv

CB~Inside

$28.20

$33.85

$19.74

6.25
4.06

7.50
4.88

6.25
2.15

MONTHLY SANITATION CHARGES
Senice (1 pickup/wk)
MU/SF Residential Cart
MU Additional Unit Cart(s)
CB Residential Cart
CB/SF/MUMCR**
MU/SF 64-gallon Cart
CB 64-gallon Cart
Business Cart
Additional Pick-up
Additional Pickup Day
Garbage-only Recycling Cart**
Yard Waste Collection***
Cart cleaning charge
3-yard Container
3-yard Con-Special Pickup-SPU

Tax

Base Chat'ge
$14.31
14.31
10.02

s

Billing Charge
$1.56

$15.87
14.31

I.IO

14.31

13.21
9.25
14.31
12.43
12.43
5.00
10.00
20.00
7I.20
16.44 (minimum)

Total
I I.12
14.31

l.56
I.IO
1.56

10.35
15.87

l.56

12.43
5.00
10.00
20.00
82.72

14.77

12.43.

9.40

.56

16.44

*Based on winter water average (November through April consumption) unless location also has an active summerline.
**Billing fee may apply, 3-month minimum
,
***Pilot project concluding November 30, 2013. If it continues the price will increase from $5.00 to $!0.00 April I, 2014.
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UTILITY BILLING RATES-FISCAL YEAR2014 (Amended)
EFFECTIVE DECEl\·IBER 20, 2013
WATER RATES
LINE SIZE
3/4"
I"
I W'

2"
3"
4"
6"
8"
IO"
12"

INSIDE
$ 7.94
8.70
13.32
16.41
44.99
71.32
129.82
189.95
292.93
414.28

OUTSIDE
$ 11.92
13.05
19.98
24.61
67.49
106.98
194.74
284.93
439.39
621.42

VOLUl\1:E CHARGE (PER 1.000 GALS)

UNl\'IETERED ·

CB-Inside
$ 5.56
6.09
9.33
11.49

$31.86 per unit-Inside City
$47.79 per unit-Outside City
FIRE LINES

2"
4"
6"
8"
10"

OUTSIDE
$3.34
4.17
3.08
2.50
4.08

INSIDE
$2.22
2.78
2.05
1.66
2.71

Single Family Unit (first 25,000 gallons)
Single Family Unit (over 25,000 gallons)
Multi Units
Commercial
Summerline
Unpotable
Hydrants (by permit only@CM rate-Water Dept)

1.66

$ 1.50
· 8.90
24.75
52.05
89.20

CB-Inside
$1.56
1.95
1.90

NIA

SE\VER RATES

Single Family units
Multi-family/Commercial:
Service charge per billing
Volume chg per 1,000*
Industrial:
Service charge per billing
Volume chg per 1,000*

Inside Citv

Outside Citv

CB-Inside

$21.83

$26.05

$15.29

4.80
3.07

5.70
3.66

4.80
1.66

MONTfilY SANITATION CHARGES
Service {l J:!icku:g/wk)
MU/SF Residential Cart
MU Additional Unit Cart(s)
CB Residential Ca11
CB/SF/MU MCR**
MU/SF 64-gallon Cart
CB 64-gaUon Cart
Business Cart
Additional Pickup
Additional Picla1p Day
Garbage-only Recycling Cart**
Yard Waste Collection***
Ca11 cleaning charge
3-yard Container
3-yard Con-~pecial Pick'llp-SPU

Base Charge
$14.31
14.31
10.02
14.31
13.21
9.25
14.31
12.43
12.43
5.00
10.00
20.00
71.20
16.44 (minimum)

Rent

Tax

$

$

Billing Charge
$1.56

I.IO
1.56
1.10
1.56

9.40

.56

1.56

Toti!!

$15.87
14.31
11.12
14.31
14.77
10.35
15.87
12.43
12.43
5.00
10.00
20.00
82.72

16.44

*Based on winter water average (November through April consumption) unless location also has an active summerline.
**Billing fee may apply, 3-month minimum
***Pilot project concluding November 30, 2013. If it continues the price will increase from $5.00 to $10.00 April I, 2014.
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UTILITY BILLING RATES-FISCAL YEAR 2014
EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 2013
WATER RATES
LINE SIZE
3/4"
I"

I Ya"
2"
3rr
4"
6"
8"
10"
12"

INSIDE
$ S.75

9.58
14.67
18.07
49.55
78.55
142.99
209.22
322.64
456.30

OUTSIDE
$ 13.13
14.37
22.01
27.11
74.33
ll 7.83
214.49
313.83
483.96
684.45

VOLUME CHARGE {PER 1.000 GALS)

UNMETERED

CB-Inside
$ 6.13
6.71
I0.27
12.65

$35.09 per unit-Inside City
$52.64 per unit-Outside City

FIRELrNES
2" $ 1.50
4"
8.90
6"
24.75
8"
52.05
89.20
IO"

OUTSIDE

INSIDE

Single Family Unit (first 25,000 gallons)
Single Family Unit (over 25,000 gallons)
Multi Units
Commercial
Summerline
Unpotable
Hydrants (by pennit only @CM rate-Water Dept)

4.59

CB-Inside
$1.72
2.15

3.39
2.75
4.49

2.IO

$2.45
3.06
2.26
1.83
2.99

$3.68

I.83

NIA

SEWER RATES

Single Family units
Multi-family/Commercial:
Service charge per billing
Volume chg per 1,000*
Industrial:
Service charge per billing
Volumechgper 1,000*

Inside Citv

Outside Citv

CB-Inside

$25.85

$30.85

$18.IO

4.80
3.63

5.70
4.33

4.80
l.97

MONTHLY SANITATION CHARGES
Service fl E!icku!!/wk}
MU/SF Residential Cart
MU Additional Unit Cart(s)
CB Residential Cart
CB!SFflvIU MCR**
MU/SF 64-gallon Cm1
CB 64-gallon Cart
Business Cart
Additional Pickup
Additional Pickup Day
Garbage-only Recycling Cart**
Yard Waste Collection***
Cart cleaning charge
3-yard Container
3-yard Con-Special Pickup-SPU

Base Charge
$14.46
14.46

Rent

s

Tax
$

l.10

10.13

14.46
13.35
9.35
14.46
12.56
12.56
5.00
10.00
20.00
71.94
16.61 (minimum)

Billing Charge
$1.56

1.56
l.10
1.56

9.50

.57

1.56

I21ru

$16.02
14.46
11.2:,
14.46
14.91
I0.45
16.02
12.56
12.56
5.00
10.00
20.00
83.57
16.61

*Based on winter water average (November.through April consumption) unless location also has an active summerline.
**Billing fee may apply, 3-month minimum
***Pilot project concluding November 30, 2013. If it continues the price will increase from $5.00 to $10.00 April I, 2014.
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SANITATION CONTAINER RATES
Effective October 1, 2014

Temporarv 3-vard Container Service

Daily rental charge
(Daily rental charge with sales tax)
Each pickup of container
Monthly billing charge

$ 2.36

(2.50)
25.00
1.62

3-yard Container Service

Rental charge
Monthly service
Monthly billing charge
Container cleaning charge-privately owned containers
Special Pickup (5 minute minimum)

$ 9.71

73.52
1.62

100.00
17.00

Roll-off Box Service

Monthly 17/20-yard box rental
Daily 17/20-yard box rental
Monthly 30/32-yard box rental
Daily 30/32-yard box rental
Monthly 40-yard box rental
Daily 40-yard box rental
Monthly billing charge
Pickup charge per pull
Bannock County landfill charge per ton
Bannock County landfill charge for clean inert fill per ton
Overweight charge per ton
Re-location Charge

$ 89.39

2.98
99.93
3.33

118.57
3.95
1.62

167.94
25.00
17.00
50.00
75.00

Privately Owned Compactor Service

Pickup charge per pull
Bannock County landfill charge per ton
Bannock County landfill charge for clean inert fill per ton
Overweight charge per ton
Monthly billing charge
Compactor deaning fee

$167.94
25.00
17.00
50.00
1.62
250.00

Sales tax of 6% will be assessed on all rental charges except customers who are exempt.
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UT220U01
Customer ID:
61005
Location ID:
41824
Cycle/Route • . . . .
Initiation date. . .

4/02/15
08:51:24
Name: QUINN HOMES
Addr: 2085 SUNRISE WAY
04 26
Amount due . . • . . :
41514

Pending . . . . . . . :

$9.41
$.00

Termination date
C.A.F.# . . . . . . . .
Y=Yes
1
Maintain .E-notification
Number of bills . . .
Inactive
Cust/Loc status (F4)
A
Customer type (F4) ••
Type options, press Enter.
_
1=Select
2=.Assign
3=User defined
S=Display
6=Assistance progrmn
7=Rate group change
B=Renewable
9=Suspend
Qpt Service
Rate group Service Assigned !ro:
> WA WATER
PO. SF I
Active. Service

F3=Exi t
F7•Alternate addr
F2-Bquifaz

F4=Prompt
FS=Update owner
F8=Reprint appl

F6=Recurring charge
F24=Hore keys

458

/.r··--~. ::.

OT220U01

'·

\,

c1my
OF PO""~nn:o'LLO
...
l.,,ft,:,l,,llf

':1/U~/l!:l

Cu$ ...Jmer Services Maintenance

Cu~tome~ lD:

46681

Location ID:

28918

Cycle/Route. .
Initiation date

Name: HILL-VO MOBILE HOME PARK
Addr: 4530 S 5TH AVE

02 26
10194

Termination date . .
Number of bills . . .

Cust/Loc status (F4)

08:45:36

1
~

Amount due

. . . . .

Pending . . . . . . .
C.A.F . .f • • • . • • • •
Maintain E-notification
Customer type (F4}

$5,189.00
$. 00
Y=Yes

Inactive

T'ype options , press Enter.
1=Se1ect
2=Assi911
3=User defined
S=Display
&=Assistance program
7=Rate group c'.b.ax,.ge
8=Renewa1:>le
9=Su•pend
Opt Service
Rate .vroup Service Assigned To;
> GA GARBAGE
PO MU I
Active Service
GO GARBAGE ONLY
PO <,~tJ I
Available Se:r~ice
> ST STORM WATER
PO MO I
Inactive Service
> SW SEWER ·
PO NP I
Active Service
> WA WATER
PO :MO I
Active Service
F2=Bqaifu:
F3=Ezit
F7-:AJ.te:rnate addr

1'4=Prompt
F_S=Update owner
F8=Reprint appl

F6=Recurring charge
F24=Ko_re keys
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EXHIBIT C
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CITY OF POCATELLO

cut ~Saa.er Service$

Customer ID:

46681
28918

Location ID:

Cycle/Route • . . . ;
Initiation date
Termination date

Name: HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK
Addr: 4530 S 5TH AVE

02 26
10194

• .

Number ·of bills . . .
Cust/Loc status {F4)

9/0j/14

08:06:41

Maintenance

1

A

Amount due . . . • .
Pending . . . . . . . :
C.A.F.# • • • • • • . •
Maintain E-notification

$5,392.00

$.OD
Y=Yes

Customer type (F4)

Inactive

Typ1;1 options, press Ent~i'.

1=Select · 2=Assign
7=1.ate group change
Opt Service
> GA GAR~AGE

GO GARBAGE ONLY

> ST STORM WATER

> SW SEWER
> WA WATER
F2=Eq11ifax

F3=Exit

F7==Alternate addr

·
3=0ser defined
S=J)isplay
&=Assistance program
8=Renewable
9=Suspend
Rat:e group Service Ass;i.gned io:
PO MO I
Active Service
PO MU I
Available Service
PO MO r·
Inactive Service
PO MU I
Active Service
PO MU I
Active Service

F4=Prompt

F5=UpQate owner

F8==Rep:riiit app1 ·

F6=Recurring charge
F24=More keys
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
!SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgh@hasattorneys.com
sla@hasattorneys.com
nrs@hasattorneys.com
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C
AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL

Plaintiff,
V.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
: ss.
)

Blake G. Hall, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am one of the attorneys for the Defendant in the above-referenced matter. I am over
the age of eighteen and competent to testify. This affidavit is based on my personal
knowledge unless otherwise stated.
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.
2.

That attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Third Affidavit of
David K. Swindell from the Bannock County case of Building Contractors v. City of
Pocatello, Case No. CV-2001-5228-0C.

3.

That attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of the Idaho Secretary of
State printout of the Certificate of Assumed Business Name of Hill-Vu Rocking R
Mobile Home Parks.

4.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
Dated this _g_ day of April, 2015.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO, befo
for said State, this;)._ day of April, 2015.

LESLIE GEORGESON
Notary Public
State of Idaho

AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL. 2
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..

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this~ day of April, 2015, by the method indicated below:·
Michael D. Gaffuey, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street _
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Fax: 529-9732
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 524-3391

[l('fMailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

[M Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Fax

[ ] Overnight Mail
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
901 Pier View Drive, Ste. 203
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 646-7108
JSB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgh@hasattomeys.com
sla@hasattomeys.com
nrs@hasattorneys.com
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY

BUILDING CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST IDAHO,
an Idaho non-profit corporation,

Case No. CV-2001 ~5228-0C

THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K.
Plaintiff,

SWINDELL

v.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bannock

)
; ss.
)

David K. Swindell, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
I.

I am the current Chief Financial Officer ("CFO'') for the City of Pocatello. I have served

as the CFO of the City since August, 200 I. I am over the age of eighteen and competent to
testify in this matter. This affidavit is based on 'my personal knowledge unless otherwise stated.
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2.

In my capacity as the CFO for the City of Pocatello, I am intimately familiar with the

financial affairs of the City and its adoption of policies related to franchise fees, Retum on
Equity policies, PILOT fees, Enterprise Funds, and the Capacity/Connection fees.
3.

Plaintiff has a fundamental misunderstanding of how capital improvements are financed

by the City. A capital improvement does not have to be paid for by a bond. There is no
requirement that a municipality go into debt to build capital improvements. Often times, the City
will pay for capital improvements projects without any debt being incurred. These projects are
financed entirely from user fees that are collected and accumulated over time. Where a very
large project is required and it is not practical to finance the project without debt, a bond will be
requested. Under Idaho law, a revenue bond is appropriately issued pursuant to Article 8,
Section 3, Idaho Constitution and the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, Idaho Code §§ 50-1027 through
50-1042. It is worth emphasizing, however, that not all capital improvement projects are
financed through a revenue bond and there is no legal requirement that a municipality undertake
debt to finance capital improvements when the improvement. can be paid using existing cash
reserves.
4.

User fees have no relationship to the connection/capacity fee. The connection/capacity

fee is only charged to recover a new connector's proportionate share of the City's wastewater
and water backbone facility costs. "A new customer must ·'buy-in" to this system by making a
contribution equal to the amount of equity a similar existing customer has in the system. Note
this is not the cost to p1·ovide new service to the new custo111er, and when new capacity is

needed, all customers will bear the cost" (City of Pocatello Wastewater Utility Financial
Planning Study, June 18, 2010 Red Oak Consulting, page 6-1 "System Capacity Fees", emphasis
added). Of importance, and framing how the City views a capacity fee, the connection/capacity
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fee does not cover expansion. ThusJ the Connection fee is a contribution equaJ to the amount of
equity a similar existing customer has in the system. The Connection fee is not the cost to
provide new service to new customers; when new capacity is needed, all customers will bear the
cost equally. The connection fee is to offset the cost for existing users whose capacity will be
diminished by the new users and will, thus, require replacement of existing infrastructure more
regularly.
5.

The water and wastewater departments have money held in four different fund groups.

The first fund group is Fund 31 and 32. Funds 31 and 32 are the operating funds. This fund is ·
comprised entirely of user fees that are collected by the water and wastewater departments,
respectively. The second fund group is Funds 37 and 38. Funds 37 and 38 are the capacity fees.
This fund is comprised entirely of the connection/capacity fees that have been collected by the
water and wastewater departments. The third fund group is Funds 60 and 61. Funds 60 and 61
are the debt service funds for the water and wastewater departments. The debt service funds are
reserves that are set aside to meet the annual debt service payments required by the bond
covenants. The final group is Funds 73 and 74. Funds 73 and 74 are the construction funds.
These funds are where all of the proceeds from the bonds are placed for water and wastewater;
Money for bonded projects will be withdrawn from these funds to pay for approved bonded
projects. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the City's Monthly Cash
Report for June 2013.
6.

The Monthly Cash Reports are public records and can be accessed on the City's website

at http://www.pocatello.us/finance/finance_cash.htm. The Monthly Case Report identifies the
current cash in each of the City's respective funds, including the funds above.
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7.

Currently, the City has not spent any of the connection/capacity fees. Rather, these fees

have been placed in a .dedicated fund (Fund Nos. 37 and 38). Fund 37 holds the
connection/capacity fees for the water department. Fund 38 holds the connection/capacity fees
for the wastewater department C'WPC"). Each of the respective funds contains all of the
connection/capacity fees gathered between 2007 and current (as of July 2013). As of June 2013,
Fund 37 contained $1,391,089.36 and Fund 38 contained $1,217,131.20. Fund 37 and 38 is
dedicated to holding only the connection/capacity fees. There are no other funds that are held
here.
8.

Funds 37 and 38 were initially created in March 2013 to increase transparency of how the

connection/capacity fees were spent. As ·of todays date, none of the connection/capacity fees
have been spent. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Monthly Cash
Report for February 2013. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the
Monthly Cash Report for March 2013.
9.

Currently, I am in the process of compiling the FY2014 Budget for the City. The City

has detennined that the connection/capacity fees will be used for debt service. As such, the City
has budgeted approximately $725,000 for debt service for the water department in FY2014. The
City intends to use the remaining funds from Fund 37 for debt service in FY2015. The City has
budgeted approximately $1,384,000 for debt service for the wastewater department in FY2014.
This will exhaust nearly all of the funds in Fund 38. Using this approach, a11 of the

connection/capacity fees can be accounted for and there has been no funds transferred to the
general funds from the connection/capacity fees.
10.

All of the bond funds have been placed and segregated into construction accounts found

in Funds 73 and 74. Of the initial $9.5 million dollar water bond from 2008, there remains
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approximately $1,303,841.57 of that bond. The remaining amount has been spent on capital
improvements projects (e.g., water main replacement or construction of the South Valley Water
Tank). Currently, there are no bond proceeds in Fund 74 (WPC). Despite the constnlction funds
being exhausted, the City still must retire the bond. This is done using funds from user fees and
co1U1ection/capacity fees over the course of several years. The funds that are used to make the
annual debt service payment sit in a reserve account fund (Funds 60 and 61 ).
1I.

While the City does budget for certain items, the amounts actually expended may not be

consistent with the budget. More specifically, a budget is simply an attempt to identify how
money that is collected by the City will be spent in a given year. If the money collected for the
year is lower than that budgeted, the money cannot be spent consistent with the budget.
Furthermore, as it relates to water and wastewater budgets, the budget does not differentiate
between bonded funds and user fee funds. The City will spend fees consistent with the available
funds in the operational fund (and when available, funds in the construction fund). Simply
because a project is budgeted for does not mean that the project actually was canied out.
Moreover, just because a project is budgeted at a certain amount does not mean the project
actually cost that same amount.
12.

It is also important to emphasize that the connection/capacity fee is entirely separate from

the ROE or PILOT fee. As I have explained previously, the PILOT fee (rate of return) is a
payment in lieu of taxes fee charged directly to the utility. The fee operates similar to the
property taxes assessed to and paid by Idaho Power or Intennountain Gas (except the PILOT fee
does not include County or school district). The PILOT fee is a cost of doing business for
both the water and sewer departments. The respective departments charge user fees and those
fees take into consideration the 'PILOT fees that have been charged. The PILOT fee is set by the
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City, with my assistance. The PILOT fee is derived from the City's property tax against the
systems valuation. The PILOT fees are not assessed to arty specific individual or entity in the
City but are only assessed against the water or wastewater department respectively (there are
other departments that also pay PILOT fees). Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct
copy of the FY2014 Budget worksheet accounting for the PILOT fees (including the FY2013 tax
rate being applied).
13.

I have reviewed the expert report and affidavit of Mr. Hunter. Mr. Hunter incorrectly

asserts that the finance department of the City lacks appropriate oversight. I personally am
involved with multiple discussions with the City's legal department regarding all aspects of the
City's budget and fee systems. Numerous discussions with legal counselhave occurred about
the appropriateness of the PILOT fee and the best method to implement this fee. The PILOT fee
has 110 relationship to the connection/capacity fee. If the connection/capacity fee is detennined
to be unreasonable, the PILOT fee is not invalidated.
14~

I have also informed the auditor of all potential legal issues, including the PILOT fee.

Each year the auditor has separate meetings with the City's legal staff and the Mayor. I am
present at both meetings to explain the nature of the office call (make sure the auditor is aware of
the City's lawsuits and that Management understands their role),. I then leave to ensure my
presence does not improperly influence the auditor. Following the meetings, the auditor prepares
a note disclosure in the published financial report that identifies any financial exposure that is
material to the entity. The City takes its responsibility in keeping the auditor informed very
seriously and has done so each year. Mr. Hunter's assertions that the City's financial department
lacks oversight is conclusory, false, speculates about what conversations were had with the
City's auditor. The City complies with all aspects ofGAAP.
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.
15.

Because I have a background in accounting, I am aware of general accepted accounting

principles ("GAAP"). I employ those principles when I prepare financial statements for the City.
Mr. Gallagher's statement that GAAP is not applicable in developing his recommended rates is a
correct statement of fact Accounting principles relate to how transactions have occurred and
what the financial position of the entity is at a specific point in time. Accounting principles are
not forward-looking with an attempt to predict future needs. Convers~ly, the purpose ofa
financial rate study, such as the rate studies used to detennine the capacity fees, is necessarily
'

forward-looking. Accounting principles can help detelinine what fuel costs may be in 3-5 years,
what an EPA discharge pennit may require, or what the effect a significant boom in development
might be on the existing water systems. A financial rate study is ,designed to specifically address
these concerns in an effort to assist the City can maintain viable and long~lasting infrastructure.
Without a rate study, the City would never be able to plan for future needs based on current
trends. As the City's CFO, I rely heavily on these types of studies, in conjunction with
discussions with the various utility superintendents and the Direct of Public Works to ensure the
City's future needs are accounted for and met. The failure to use rate studies that project future
needs would be a breach of my obligations to the City and its residents.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
II
II
II

II
II
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,.,

DAVID K. SWINDELL

SUBSCRJBED AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notal'y Public in anp
for said State, this~ day of August, 2013.

KONNI R. KENDELL
NOTARY PUl:ILIC
STATE OF 1DAH0

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby ce11ifythat I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this ../.l- day of August, 2013, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary postage affixed
thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail.
Nathan M. Olsen
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "En Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho s·3402
Fax: 208-524-3391
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[ ] E-Mail
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[ ] Courthouse Box

473

EXHIBIT A
474

Monthly City Cash Report
A short discussion to provide helpful infonnation on how to read the report.
a. Timing. We present this report to the Council on the third Thursday of the month, reporting
the cash situation as of the end of prior month. Thus, during the October meeting we report the cash
situation as of the end of September and so on.
b. What is included. The cash report displays all the money that the city has. A household
analogy might be list of what you hold in all of your checking and savings accounts, There are things
other than cash that are impo11ant. Jike debt and non-financial assets. We report those in our annual
audited financial report. Still, cash is very important and the Council monitors it monthly.

c. Structure of the report.
J) Statement of Cash and Cash Equivalents for City Funds. By "city funds,'' we mean the money
avai1able to support operations, as opposed to money restricted to support activity in three trust funds.
We report that separately, per 3) below. In this one-page section, citizens should note how much
money we have, how it Went up or down versus the prior month, and how the money is invested. It is
nonnal for the city to "lose" cash in most months, as expenses exceed revenue. The exception is in
January and July, when revenue spikes with semi-annual property tax receipts.

2) Change in Cash and Cash Equivalents for Qty Funds. This one page report details how the
cash changed during the month, with emphasis on revenue received. The major expense is "all checks
issued." We don't detail the expenses here but we do provide a separate report that does {Payroll and
Claims Report). Citizens should note the various revenue sources and we often provide comparisons
to prior years on important items such as sales tax revenue and so on.
3) Statement of Cash and Investment Balances for Trust Funds. This is where we discuss the
status of the three trust funds, with Police Retirement being the largest. This one page shows the
investment status, discusses changes·during the month and summarizes the fund balances all on one
page. Citizens should note how this money is invested and how fund balances changed. Since the
retirement fund has long-term liabilities, it is typically invested in long-tenn bonds.
4) Fund balances for All Funds. This report displays the cash by city fund, with a comparison to the
previous month. The total on this report equals the total of the city funds {report #I) and the trust
funds {report #3). The second page provides discussion and analysis for the month. Citizens should
note funds that are negative, as these are borrowers from the General Fund. Some funds are always
negative because they are financed with federal grants. We spend the money and then wait to get
reimbursed. While typical, it is sti11 important to monitor.
·
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CITY OF POCATELLO
STATEMENT OF CASH, CASH EQUIVALENTS AND INVE~Ef!!5 BALANCES FOR CITY FUNDS__
ASOF JUNE_30!._2D13

,..--------

___..............
-.......-

..

......

·- . - ,

·---

Cash cm Hand
cash in Banks
Cash held bvthird parties
Cash held atthe State of Idaho Investment Pool
Total cash

Value at Market
29,107.71
$
2;822,207.36

--

681,042.46
$

7,851,721.07
11,384,078.62

lnvesbnenls at Faim1arket Value
Current Investments
City Government
Certificate of Deposit
Money Market Funds
Total cash equivalents
Total cash and cash equivalents

"Th,

$

2,594,813.04
5,009,636.95
$7;604,449.99
18,988,528.61

$

5,029,755.66

f--+ $

5,029,755.66

.$

24,018,284.27

$
$

. ,.·-b.e.r'4-D···-

$1,2, 8,<El94.36 f om last
Repres1
monl h. .
. nts

. ----" --· -··-·
1::.! ··-m.estment

~

~

Lona-Tei'm Investments
General Government
State Investment Pool Bond Fund

......_.., ...;

--·-

·-·-1 ·

loni erterm

Total long-tenn investments inve stments
Total Cash, Cash Equivalents and
Long-Tenn invesbnents
·-

..,,

II._..__ __ ,_..._

Down

~-

hli w":
$1,278,69: .43
1t0 in last mor1h

--1

..
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Change In Cash and Equivalents City Funds
June 30, 2013

--·

Cash Receipts
Cemetery Receipts
,..
Police Resource Officiers - School DisC25
Golf Lease
AFLAC remainder receipted
· Em.ironmental·Engineering
Police Fees and Fines
Airport Rent & Landing Fees
Cheyenne Conidor.;,ID Dept ofTransportation
Worker:s Compensati_on Premiums
Transit SeMce ChafQes
Airport Security Grant

--

I-

1-~·-

____

--

--. -..---18,765.00
19,576.34
22A70.17
26,506.41

--

---~

28,100.0Q
33.~5.74
39,519.35
40,98M9
45,796.SS
51,593.26
6$.537, ()0

:=-IJIIDllllllR~~lllf~li~-~~?ii~'fitW:
Water SeMce Charges and LID 119 receipts
.
79,295.661
Community Recreation Center Ser.foe Charges
1
92,Q45'.321
:
-ij~~fliifi[fi}fil-t, ·: . -; :
Building Fees and Permits
Other l\lliscellanE!ous receipts
Water Pollution control Ser\4ce Charges
Ambulance
Bannock County tax
Utility Billing Senfce Charges
from outside murces

116,572..84
119,p92,99
187,065;97
240,641.58
860,037.57
1,738,.097.03
4,011,262.06

I

__..._ ..........

_

0.47%
0.49%
0.56%
0.66%
0.70%
0.85%
0.99%
1.02%
1.14%
1.29%
1.71%
1.71%

1.98%
2.29%
2.82%'
2.91%
2.!38%
4.66%
6.00%
21.44%
43.33%
100.00%

Cash Disbursements
-5, 176,735.34
Total payroll and material claims per July 4th report
58,523.20
Leas Trust Funds Claims
City Fund payroll and material claims
Merchant fees (credit card acceptance feest
Bank sel'llice charges
Retume(i Checks
I
Bond payments expensed
Other checks cut (Libraiy trustee, Youth forum, Police narc's)
Administrati,on support fee
Total ·cam dispersed to .outside sources
Net ~Sh received by operations
Internal activity
Long-te!Tll inwstments sold
City PortfOlio
.
Other disbursements
capital Gain/Loss
I
1operating result for June 2013:
Other Receipts
I
Down
$1,278,692.43
1
I
Principal Accrued
Long-tenn imestment purchased
Net ,;hange In cash and Jang term lnvesfment
Fair Market Value Adjustments
City Long Term pQrtfolio
$
Net change cash value and long tenn investment value i

-

"' "'

in

·-

". ....

-

-·

'.-.

---··

..

"' '

~s. 11 a,212.14
0.00
-2,513.02
-2,450.63
-114,490.28
-2,545.27
54.92
-5,240.156.42
-1,228;894.36

7,895.60
0.00
-1,220,998.76
-57',693.67
(1,278,692.43)1

I
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CITY OF POCATELLO
STATEMENT OF CASH, CASH EQUIVALENTS AND INVESTMENTS BALANCES FOR TRUST FUNDS
AS OF JUNE 30, 2013

-----·-·~

~

----------··

--·

Cashin Bank
Cash held in Broker Accounts

$219,936.46
-~-32.08 - - - · - - · -

-

_Total cash and i:ash equivalents
LONG TERM INVESTMENTS

Municioal Bonds
FNMA. Mortgage Notes
"All the Trust money we
-- have":
FHLMC Mortaaae Notes ----~mDown $279,455.59 for ·the month
GNl'll\l\ MortQaae Pools
Other Aaencv Bonds
FHLB notes
"'-..
Total Cash, Cash Equivalents and Long-Term Investments

'

----

·-

$219,968.54

ia.

$4,985,465.09
2,010,847.90
39,010.29
31,237.63
284,078.30
$92,592.00
$.7;663, 199.75

-·-~------

·-

Change in Cash and Equivalents For Trust Funds
For June 2013

Cash ·Receipts
Return of lnwstment Capital
Interest
hom outst!e. sources
Cash Disbursements
All checks issued
Postage
. ---Bank fees
Admin Support Fee
. Total cesh dispersed
to outside sources
Net cash recel11ed by operations_

(;i~~~

..,
.

.,____

26,841.46

-58,481.15
,.10.12
-31.93
-54.92

---

-

4,052.31

_____

,

.

-$31,7~6.66

-

Internal activity
Long-term inwstments sold
Police Retirement Portfolio
Other disbursements
Capital Gain/Loss
Other Receipts
Principal Accrued
Long-tem, inwstment purchased
Trust operating result for
Net change in cash and long term investment the month: Down $279,455.59
Fair Market Value Adjustments (Unrealized)
Police Long Term portfolio
-...........
Net change l,i cash value and long term investment value

--·

-

-$4,055.59
-32.78

--

0.00
-$35,825.03

.

Iii'

''('A~W:---·-

-$279,455.59

TRUST FUND BALANCES - CHANGE
June 30, 2013
FUNDS

CASH

CASH

NET

ENDING
BALANCE

ENDING

BALANCE

CHANGE
IN CASH

08130/13

BYFUND

05131/13

POLICE RETIREMENT lRUST
AIRPORT BOND lRUST
SO.BAN.HVVY.DEV.TRUST
TOTALS

7,926,062.70
16,589.47
3.17
$7,942,655.34

7,646,608.91 -$279,453.79
16,590.84
1.37
-3.17
0.00
$7,663,199.75 -$279 455.59
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·-

-·- -

I

~-~----·

-----------~--=·
FUNDS

I

·-

-

I

05131113

001 _ GENERAL FUND

LIABILTJY INSURANCE FUND
S1REETFUND
-·~-·
004 RECREATION FUND
005 CEMElERY FUND
006 AIRPORT FUND
1007 - LIBRARY FUND
-·
009 POC. REG. TRANSIT FUND
VIDEO
SERVICES
FL.IND
012
013 BUSINESS IMPROV. FUND
014 CHIEF 1HEATRE FUND
016 EMERGENCY REPAIR FUND
017 STORMWAlER ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE FUND
SUBTOTAL SPECIAL REVENUE FUNDS
030 SANITATION FUND
031 WAlERFUND
03.'2 WAlER POlllffiON CONTROL
---~-----~~-----···--·-035 AMBULANCE FUND
037 WAlER CAPACITY FEE
038 WPC CAPACITY FEE
SUBTOTAL ENTERPRISE FUNDS
050 INFORMATION SVS1EMS FUND
052 UTILITY BILLING FUND
·-~-053 MEDICAL INSURANCE FUND
054 PUBLICWORKS DIRECTOR
055 FUEL FUND
.-~M~·.~ ·~w~,~~--··~-.~~-· --~---056 WORKERS INSURANCE FUND
SUBTOTAL INTERNAL SERVICE FUNDS
I
059 DEBT SERVICE FUND GOV
060 DEBT Sl:RVICE FUND WPC
051 DEBT SERVICE FUND WAlER
SUBTOTAL DEBT SERVICE FUNDS
070 FEDERAL AID PROJECTS
071 S1REET SPECIAL PROJECTS
072 AIRPORT CONSTRUCTION
··~----~·-····-~-~--~
.073 WAlER CONSTRUCTION
075 FIRE APPARATIJS CAPITAL
076 BUILDING RENOVATION
SlREETEQUIPMENT CAPITAL
078 CAPITAL ACQUISffiON FUND
079 ANIMAL CONS1RUCTION FUND
SUBTOTAL CAPITAL PROJECT FUNDS
OBO FORECLOSURE STABILllATION
oa1 ,_ CDR-CDBG ENTITLEMENT FUND --------·-·~-~-·
082 ENERGY BLOCK GRANT
"
088 POLICE GRANT FUNDS
SU_BTOTAL GRANT REVENUE FUNDS
951 POLICE RETIREMENT TRUST
952 'RETIREMENTPAYOlITTRUST
953 AIRPORT BOND TRUST
954 EIDC REVOLV. LOAN 1RUST
955 CDR LOAN TRUST
957 ZOD1MPROVEMENT1RUST
···-····-··-958 WAlER ACQUISITION TRUST
959 SIDEWALK REVOL. LOAN TRUST
960 STANDROD 1RUST
961 SO.BAN.H\NY.DEV. lRUST
962 FACADE LOAN lRUST
il63 PARKS AND RECREATION DEVELOPMENTlRUST
964 PROPERTY ABATEMENT FUND
SUBTOTAL TRUST AND RESTRICTED FUNDS
970 SEIZED FUNDS AGENCY
971 UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AGENCY
973 STAlE SALES TAX.AGENCY
g74 COBRA INS. AGENCY
~

on

~-~

-·---. -· .............--.........

CASH
ENDING
BALANCE
.06/30/13

. 2,313,520.26

2,952,642.83

·--

002
003

CASH
I
ENDING
J
BALANCE._+

~1,509.39
1,233,730.06
3.39,341.09
232.374.01
349,'371.81
418,421.59
(344;823.21 ) __ ._
-~
112,346.25
{0.00)
113,032.32
2,371.95
136,007.19
3;133,&R47
3,443,460.94
1,458,544.44
2,011;255:54
-149,257.80
1;364,869.36
1, 193;031.20
e;s20;41s.2e
203;651.33
710;269.62
1,351_,833.70
64,463.07
155,493.39
870,976.53
3,3&6;887.64
(34,783.09)
(129.36)
719,722.52
684,810.07

(296;228.04)
310,000.00
(481,696.86)
1,353;089.50
33,054.00
81,199.00
0.00
399,319.10
2,754,380.45
4,153,117.15
(0.00)

(13,406.77)
(0.00)
9,780.87
(3,625.90)
7,926;062.70
415;882.76
16,589.47
132,944.30
286,334.41
72,282.69
116,239.21
13,169.18
1B0.(i72.56
3.17
77,177.85
3,288.43
66,778.06
9,307,324.79
24,349.12
0.00
0.00
10,124.59
"nn

-·

NET
CHANGE
IN CASH
BYFUND ·-.

(639,022.57)

606,974.82
1,018,370.41
325,862.89
215,442.99
332.,750.98
- 370,385,43
(524,414.38)
93,941.03

'65,465.43
(215,359.67)
(13,478.20)
(16. 931. 02)
(16,620.83)
(48,036.16)
(179,591.17)
(18,405.22)
{0;00)
0.00
(167.46)
112,864.86
8,320.42
10,692.37
30,258.18
166,265.37
2,729,136.77
(404,545.70)
53,627.07
3.497,088.01
(14,597.40)
1,443,947.04
1,756,681.54
(254,574.00)
1s1.m.os ~-~---···· 47;91~.28
2S,220,00
1,391,089.36
1,217,131.20
24;100.00
9,503,114.23
{117,305.05
17,943;39
221,794.72
(3,321;21)
705,948.41
1,382,667.65
30,833.96
79,747.71
15,264.64
(33,779.94)
121,713.45
. ·-·
20,906.18
&91,862.71
3,404, 754.&tl
47,867.02
(31,044.09)
3,739.00
220,074.16
219,944.80
(25.92)
719,696.60
908,597;31.
223,787;24
(178;108.96)
(474,337.00)
0.00
310,000.00
(542;544.18)
(60,847.32)
{49,247.93)
1;303,841.57
4,131.75
37,185.75
5,740.00
86,939,00
0.00
0.00
1,083.33
400,402.43
(563.93)
2,753,816.52
(277,813.06)
3,875,304.09
(0.00)
0.00
(144,773.21)
(131.366.44)
-··----··
(0.00)
0.00
1,112.65
10,893.52
(133,879.691
(130,253.791
(279,453.79)
7,546,808.91
3,334.52
419,?17.28
1.37
16,590.84
(25.92)
132,918.38
10,095.08
296,429.49
823.00
73,105.69
o.oo
116,239.21
(25.92)
13,143.26
180,574.05
UiO
(3.17)
0.00
(25.92)
77,151.93
0.00
3,288.43
3,295.03
70,073.09
9,045,340.67
(261;984.221
(985.00)
23,364.12
0.00
o.oo
0.00
0.00
12,231.70
2,107.11
nnn

nnn
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961T ISO. BAN. HWY. DEV. lRUST --I
[
962 FACADE LOANlRUST
963 PARKS AND RECREAllON DEVELOPMENT TRUST
964 PROPERlY ABATEMENT FUND
SUBTOTAL TRUST AND RE$TRICTED FUNDS
970 SEIZED FUNDS AGENCY
971 UNCLAIMED PROPER1Y AGENCY
973 STATE SALES TAXAGENCY
974 COBRA INS. AGENCY
975 FIREFIGHTERSECTION 218
SUBTOTAL AGENCY FUNDS

3.17
--77,177.85
3,288.43
66,778.06
9,307,324.79
24,349.12
0.00
0.00
10,124.59
0.00
34,473.71

----~-i=-

33,239,632.04 .

TOTAL ALL FUND TYPES

o;scus.sioo

l

HIU;0/4.!.

.

,•

·1.ou,

·'

~

O.l.

77,151.93'
3,288.43
70,073.09
!!,045;340.57
23,364.12
D.00

·-·-

------~-~-----:
(3.17);

---(25.92)i

-

o.oo
3,295.03
1261,984.22)
(985.00)

o.oo

o.oo

12,231.70
0.00
35,595.82

0.00
2, 107,11
0.00
1,122.11

.31,681,484.02

(1,558,148.02)

& Ana!¥§1s ("Ql&Y Funds''):

....

,_
,_

,_ City Operating result for June 2013 was a loss of $1,271!,692.43.

,_

,- City Revenues: : June was an a1.erage month for re\enues (S4m \6 $3.2m last year). We recei\.ed Slate Liquor
,- re1.enues of 113,302.00, an increase of 3.69% o\er last years 109,267.00. We recei1.ed the following grant rewnues:
,_ Airport Grant of $61!,427.00, Federal Construction Grant of $40,988.09.
,- City Expenses: ~penses were nonnal for June. We had $5.2 million in expense, {w. $4.7 million in 2012) and 4
,_
,_ million in re-.enue such that at month's end, the city is down $1,278,692.43 (city funds).
.__ City Investment .Posh.Ire: At month .end, City funds were 79% In cash or ,short-tenn imiestments and 21 % iii long tenn
,- in\estments. $12,881,476.73 ofall assets (54%) were in one of the two State of toalw imestment pools and
,_ $5,009,636.95 of all assets (21%) were in money market accounts. Key lnwstment rates:

--

----

Investments
State Investment Pool Short Term:
State Investment Pool long Term:
Money Market rate

,-

-

·-

,ft

......
~

c--

,-

,-

0.1648%
1;945%
.05%

.

All the money we haw:
Less the stuff we really shouldn't touch:
Sanilatioil Enterprise
Water Enterprtse
WPC Enterprtse
Medical Resene
Workers Comp. ReseM
Trust Funds
Result:

c--

,-

Change vs. lest month

~

....

-

'---

...

$ 31,681.41!4.02

L..

3,4:97, 088.01
3,467,485.21

I-

1,s1s,s2e.34

-

Hia3Hl~Zf:i

·-

'-

1,382,667.86
891,882.71

;...

-

$ 12,802,534.34

L..

This positi\e number, hence no in!emal borrowing this month. It ls $6,692,065.42 more than one year ago. Toe total
amount of cash. cashequh.elents, and long tel!TI im.estments Is $4,551,463-42 more than one year ago (much due to the ....
$2,753,816 in the animal shelter construction fund, the result of bond proceeds for the project; rest due mostly to modest ....
....
improi.ements in utility cash balances).

~

-

,-

L..

....

.up.0103%
down.116%
no change

Outlook: July will be an abow aierage month for re\enues. We will receh.e our second largest property tax remittance
from Bannock County for property taxes paid in June, which is when the second half of the annual assessment Is due.
We expect expenses to be a1erag, with some allowance tbr seasonal contstructiori acthAty and peak employment for
,,_ seasonal summer operations.
Overall: June's performance was satisfacto'Y.

,_

L..

....
....
I-

I-

-

....
....

~

Rate

Combll!l!d Cl&Y i!!!!:I Itllil lDIUDil El!![[AWIDg An1IJ111;

,_

-

I-

Trust Operating Result for June is a loss of $279,452.52. We issued $58,481.15 in.benefits. Interest earnings of
$22,789.15 were not enough to coi.er expenses and unrealized market losses of $243,630.77. 01.erall, the trusts funds
hai.e 2.8% of their imestments in cash or cash equivalents and 93.2% are in l009er term im.estments.

I·-

,-

I-

,_

Respectfully.

....
....

''-

...
'-'

....
....
L..

Da\.id Swindell, Chief Financial Officer

L..

....

,__
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EXHIBIT B
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Monthly City Cash Report
A short discussion to provide helpfu I information on how to read the report.
a. Timing. We present this report to the Council on the third Thursday of the month, reporting
the cash situation as of the end of prior month. Thus, during the October meeting we report the cash
situation as of the end of September and so on.

b. What is included. The cash report displays all the money that the city has. A household
analogy mjght be list of what you hold in all of your checking and savings accounts. There are things
other than cash that are i111portantt like debt and non~financial assets. We report those in our annuaJ
audited financial report. Still, cash is very important and the Council monitors it monthly.

c. Structure of the report.
1) Statement of Cash and Cash Equivalents for City Funds. By "city funds:' we mean the money
available to support operations, as opposed to money restricted to support activity in three trust funds.
We report ~hat separately, per 3) below. In this one..page section, citizens should note how much ·
money we have, how it went up or down versus the prior month, and how the money is invested, It is
normal for the city to "Jose" cash in most months, as expenses exceed revenue. The exception is in
January and July, when revenue spikes with semi-annual property tax receipts.
2) Change in Cash ·and Cash Equivalents for City Funds. This one page report· details how the
cash changed during the month, with emphasis on revenue received. The major expense is "all checks
issued." We don't detail the expenses here but we do provide a separate report that does (Payroll and
Claims Report). Citizens should note the various revenue sources and we often provide comparisons
to prior years on important items such as sales tax revenue and so on.
3) Statement of Cash and Investment Balances for Trust Funds. This is where we discuss the
status of the three trust funds, with Police Retirement being the largest. This one page shows the
investment status, discusses changes during the month and summarizes the fund balances all on one
page. Citizens should note how this money is invested and how fund balances changed. Since the
retirement fund has long-term liabilities, it is typically invested in long~term bonds.
4) Fund balances for All Funds. This report displays the cash by city fund, with a comparison to the
previous month. The total on this report equals the total ofthe city funds (report# 1) and the trust
funds (report #3). The second page provides discussion and analysis for the month. Citizens should
note funds that are negative, as these are borrowers from the General Fund. Some funds are always
negative because they are financed with federal grants. We spend the money and then wait to get
reimbursed. While typical, it is still important to monitor.
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-·-~·

STATEMENT OF CASH, CASH EQUIVALENTS AND INVESTMENTS BALANCES FOR CITY FUNDS

-

ASOF FEBRUARY 28, 2013

·-·--·

·Value atMa_rket
25,612.70
12,658,226.76
684,271.95
6,676,027.59
20;044, 139.00
$

Cashon Hand
Cash in.Banks
Cash held by third nartles
Cash held at the State of Idaho Investment Pool
Total cash

$

lnvesbnents at Fairmarket Value

current Investments

City Gov~.rnment
CertlfiCErte of Deposit
"Thel lumber": i own
Total cash eq1,1ivalents
.p1;111:10, llilU.1'1 Tl'O TIRISI
Total cash and cash equivalents
---·--~~
-

ft-·· ,~

·-·-.t.t.."

$

2,593,954.73
$2,593,954. 73
22,638,093.73

$

5,037,794.97

$

5,037,794.97

H $

27,675,888.70

$
r

caslio1 short'tenn
imiestr ~ts

Lona-Tenn lravestments
General Government
State Investment Poof Bond Fund

Ren ""Sents 11 %.

T<~tal long-tenn inve$bnenus tota in longer erm
imv istments

Total Cash, Cash Eauivalenls and
Long-Tenn investmen1S

"

.. ..

.. ··-

lhil 11e": Down $2,011,68 .96

-..

frc mlastmorm,
.

··-.

..
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----

..

Change in Cash and EquivalenlsCity Funds
February 28, 2013
----

,-

cash Receipts
Police Caribou Cnty grant
Airport Grant
Animal Control Fees and Fines
Water & LID119
Fire fighting reimburse Lemhi Co
Cemetery Receipts
Police Fees and Fines
Building Fees amf P~its
Workers Compensation Premiums
Airport Rent & Landin~f Fees
Transit SeNice Charges
Ccinimunity Recreation Center Seniice Charges
Other Miscellaneous Receipts
Transit Grant.:state

..

...

·--·-·
····--.-.-.-~

.....

_....

-

..

8,354.84

0.23%

12,610.00
15,480.33
16,648:89
20,180.80
24,675.00

0.35%
0.43%

37,522.10

-

40,820.39
43,359.61

-~-~

44,3Sq.41
49,062.90
55,021.34

64,125.59
64,469.00

0.47%
0.57%
0.69%
1.05%
1.14%
1.21%
1.24%
1.37%
1.54%
t80%
1.80%

118JIIRIIIJf8-~~f~lll,fi\!i;.;~;J.{g-11111
240,641.58
(i, 74%

Ambulance
Water Pollution Control SenAce Charges
Cheyenne Corridor-ID Dept of Transportation

2_62,352.46

~ · · · •-.

Utility BIiiing Senace Charges
from ot1tside spurces

7;35%
7.87%

"l,·IJ-···'.
281,214.99

.

303,478.49 ~· 8.50%

1,445,488.63

40.47%

3,571,730.09 100.00%

Cash Disbursements
Total payroll and material claims per March 7th report
-5,609,934.42
Less Trust Funds Claims
58,491.29
-City Fund payroll and material claims
Merchant fees (credit card acceptance fees)
Bank seri.ice charges
Returned Checks
Water Bond Payment
Account corrections and adjustments
Other checks cut (Library trustee, Youth forum, Police narc's) ·
Administration support fee
Total cash dispersed to outside sources
Net cash received by operations
lntern11I activity
Long,temi ini.estments sold
City Portfolio
Other. disbursements
Capital Gain/Loss
Operating result for February 2013:
Other Receipts
Down $2,011,688.96
Principal Accrued
Long~tenn investment purchased
"-.
Net change in cash and long ierm Investment
"-.
Fair Market Value Adjustments
"-.
City Long Tenn portfolio
$
Net change in cash value and long ferm investment value

,,

-5,551,443.13
-5,319.91
-1,470.25
-1,833:55

-9;249.62
~39.77
-1;375.78

51.75
-5,570,680.26
-1,998,950: 17

8,620.12
0.00
-1,990,330.05

-21,358:91
(2,011,688.96)
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CITY OF POCATELLO
STATEMENT OF CASH; CASH EQUIVALENTS AND INVESTMENTS BALANCES FOR TRUST FUNDS
AS OF FEBRUARY 28, 2013

Cashin Bank
Cash held in Broker Accounts

$421,731.63
32.0B

Total cash and cash equivalents

$421,763.71

LONG TERM INVESTMENTS

----

Muriicioal Bonds
$4,944,703.34
FNMA l'vbrtaaae Notes
2,186,255.11
"All the Trust money we
FHLMC llllortgage Notes
48,958.00
ha"''': Down $30.108.27 for
the month
151,978.52 ··-~-·H--•GNIW\ Mortgage Pools
---·
-- 296,886.00
Other Paencv Bonds
..........
FHLB notes
$98628.50
-...........
"' $8,149,173.18
Total Cash, Cash Equivalents and Long-Term Investments

-;
~~-;

Change In tash and Equivala:nts For Trust Funds
For February 2013

cash Receipts
~tum of lm.estment Capital
lrite~st
i'rom outside soun:-es
tash D1sburseinen1s
All checks Issued
Postage
Long,tenn imestments purchased
Admin Support Fee
Total

·--- --

...-~·---

72,195:76

.,_,,~~y~ .•

. " ..

-10.14
-100,000.00
~51.75

cash dispersed

-15B54a04 ---------·---

to outside a>un:-es
Net cash received by operations

----·

61,267.32

-$86,347.28

Internal activity
Long-term im.estments sold
Police Retirement Portfolio
Other (lisbursements
Capital Ga.in!Loss
Other Receipt$
·-----__._-_,..
__.-~~-·--·~Princloal Accrued
Trust operating result for
Long-te1m im.estment purchased
Net change in cash and long term investment the month: Down
. .
.
.
..
$30,108.27
Fair Market Value Adlustments (Unrealized)
Police Long Tenn portfolio
-............
Net change in cash value and Jong term investment value

-$61,287.32
712.69

___

----·-.-----

~~~·

100,000.00
~$46921.91

4-t
... ~-.$30,
108.27

TRUST FUND BALANCES ~ CHANGE
February 28, 2013

FUNDS

951
953
961

POLICE RETIREMENTTRUST
AIRPORT BOND TRUST
----~-----~---·-----SO. BAN. HWY. DEV. TRUST
TOTALS

CASH

CASH

NET

ENDING
BALANCE

ENDING
BALANC!:

CHANGE

01/31/13

02/28/13

BY FUND

8,132;582.77
16,586.83 -..---· 16,587.24
3.17
3.17
$8179,281.45 $8,149,173.16
8,162,691.45

IN CASH

-$30, 108.68
0.41

·o:oo

-$30, 108.27

485

I

--~·~-FUNDS

I
GENERAL FUND

001

.050
052
053

054
055
056
059
060.
061
070
071
072
073
075
076

on

078
79
080
061
082
OBS
951
952
953
954

955

957
958
959
960
961
962

963
964
970
971
973
974
975

---

01131/12

CASH
ENDING
BALANCE
02128/12

J

l

NET
CHANGE
IN CASH
BY FUND

-

I

-

8,780,937.12

LIABILITY INSURANCE FUND
623,712.02
S1REETFU!:JD
1,835,304.26
RECREAllON FUND
449,914.40
CEMETERY FUND
291,854.34
AIRPORT FUND
565,131.71
LIBRARY FUND
837,070.98
POC. REG. "TRANSIT FUND
(344,905.15)
······- -·· ---·--·~-- -~-..-·-VIDEO SERVlOES FUND
55,404.49
BUSINESS IMPROV. FUND
0.00
CHIEF THEATRE FUND
113,486.46
EMERGENCY REPAIR FUND
17,724.17
STORMWAlER ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE FUND
246,827.68
SUBTOTAL SPECIAL REVENUE FUNDS
4,691,625.36
SANITA110N- FUND
3,383,756.54
WAlERFUND
3,907,603.84
WAlER POLLUTION CONTROL
825,024,47 -·---·----·
AMBULANCE.:FUND
66,917.04
SUBTOTAL .ENTERPRISE FUNDS
8, 183,301.89
INFORMATION SYSlEMS FUND
271,818.92
UTILITY BILLING FUND
629,952.63
MEDICAL INSURANCE FUND
1,414:,996.91
PUBLIC WORKS DIRECTOR
176,132.30
FUEL FUND
79,555.24
WORKERS INSURANCE FUND
833,888.48
3,406,341.48
SUBTOTAL INTERNAL SERVICE FUNDS
DEBT SERVICE FUND GOV
54,188.02
DEBT SERVICE FUND WPC
1.-406.973.44
DEBT SERVICE FUND WATER
722,951.20
SUBTOTAL DEBT SERVICE FUNDS
2, 184,112.66
FEDERAL AID PROJECTS
(613,984.94)
STREET $PECIAL PROJECTS
0.00
(462,958.11)
AIRPORT-CONSTRUCTION
1,6.70,992.1)6
WA1ER CONSTRUCTION
16,527.00
FIRE APPA!'(AlUS CAPITAL
..
BUILDING RENOVATION
58,239.00
STREET EQUIPMENT CAPITAL
0.00
CAPITAL ACQUISmON FUND
394,985.78
ANIMAL C:ONSTRUCTION FUND
270.00
SUBTOTAL CAPITAL PROJECT FUNDS
1,064;060.79
(1,661.54)
FORECLOSURE STABILIZATION
1,343.77
CPR-CDBG ENTITI.EMENT FUND
(0.00)
ENERGY BLOCK GRANT
23,099,93
POLICE GRANT FUNDS
22,782.16
SUBTOTAL GRANT REVENUE FUNDS
POLICE RETIREMENT TRUST
8,162,691.45
402,544.68
RETIR!::MENT PAYOUT TRUST
16,586,83
AIRPORT BONI;) TRUST
105,909.41
EIDC REVOLY: LOAN TRUST
290,211.14
CDR LOAN lRUST
76,661.22
ZOO ANlMAL 1RUST
102,565.43
WA1ERACQU1Sm0N 1RUST
SIDEWALK REVOL. LOAN 1RUST
13,272.86
-··-·-··--·-------"
181,112.93
STANDRQD TRUST
3.17
SO.BAN.HV\IY.DEV.TRUST
78,981.53
FACADE LOAN TRUST
3,043.43
PARKS AND RECREATION DEVELOPMENT TRUST
PROPERlY ABATI:MENT FUND
63,255.99
9,486;840.07
SUaTOTAL TRUST AND RESTRICTED FUNDS
SEIZED. FUNDS AGENCY
25,847.50
UNCLAIMED PROPERlY AGENCY
0.00
----- O.OD ,__
STA1E SALES TAX.AGENCY
COBRA INS. AGENCY
11,107.10
FIREFIGHlER SECTION 218
o.oo
SUBTOTAL AGENCY FUNDS
36,954.60

002
003
004!
005
006
007
009
012
013
014
016
017
030
031
032
035

CASH

ENDING
I
j __ BALANCE

_ _ _ ••.__w

7,675,637.97

(1,105,299.15)

688,969;08
65;257.06
{294;632.46)
1,540,671.80
422,634.50
(27,279.90)
621.93
292,476.27
· (53,755.90)
511,375.81
(98, 149.:11)
738,921.67
(456;038.56)
(111,133.41)
12o;as4.53 ----- 65,490.04
0.00
0.00
(53.58)
113,432.BB
(26,129.69)
(8,405.52)
.265;081.93
18,2!>.\.25
l461;510.97)
4,230;014.39
62;857.73
3,446;614.27
3,668,986;51
(23B;617. 33)
267,103.90
1,092,12$.37
(47,947.57)
18,969.47
43;396.73
8,226,698.62
281,233.57
9,414.65
(951.00)
629,001.63
(1,667.84)
1,413;309.07
14,038.67
190,170.97
(17,464.05)
62,091.1.9
25;369.51
659,257.99
28,719.114
3,435,064.42
1,220.95
55;408.97
(5,854.68)
1,401,108.76
(25.92)
722,92tt28
(4,669,65)
2,179,443.01
(399,964.50)
214.020.44
.Q.00
o.oo
(452,474.85)
10,493.26
(32,532.36)
1,638,459;70
20,658.75
4,131-75
5,740,00
63,979.00

o.oo

396,069.11
(336.25)
1,266,390.96 _
(911.05)
(19,041.42)
{0.00)
18,278:25
(1,674.221
8,132,582.77
405,879.20
16,587.24
105,883,49
290,185.22
76,415.39
116,239.21
13,246.94
181,113.04
3.17
77,255.61
3,288.43

63,126.57
9,48,,806.28
34,718.61

0.00
35.29
9,401.86
(712,475.31)
(668,319.551

o.oo

1,083,33
(606,25)
202,380.17
750.49
(20,385.19)
0.00
(4,821.68)
(24,456.38)
(30,108.68)
3,334.52
0.41
(25.92)

(25.92)
(245.83)
13,673.78
(25.92)

----"--o.ff
0.00

(1,725.92)
245.00
(129.42]
(15,033.79)
8;871.11
0.00
35.29
(1,705.24)
(712,475.31)
(705,274.15)
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963 - iPARKSAND RECREATION DEVELC ::NTiRUST :
T
964' jPROPERTY ABATEMENT FUND
-· ~ . SUBTOTAL TRUST AND RESTRICTED FUNDS
970 SEIZED FUNDS AGENCY
971 UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AGENCY
--- --·-·-----···---- -·-··
973 STA1E SALES TAX.AGENCY
9741 COBRA INS. AGENCY
....-975' FIREFIGHTER SECTION 21 B
-----------·
SUBTOTAL AGENCY FUNDS

TOTAL ALL FUND TYPES

j

___________ _,!,,i::o:>J'

3,043.43 63,255.99

_____ \"I, U:>.\J.:J

245.00

3,288.a.

-----·-----(129.42)
63,126:57 l
(15,033.79)
9,48.1,806.28

9,496,840;07

8,871.11
25,847.IID
34,718.61
..
.o.oo
0.00
0;00
0.00 --------· 35.29 ---------- 35.29
(1,705:24)
11,107.10
.9;401.86
(712,475.31)
0.00
(712,475.31)
(705,274.15)
36,964:60
(668,319.55

-

37,866;859.13

35;825,0&UB

(2,041,797.25)

-

~T""

-

-

,--

--

l:!ilillllHla:o I AniilYAili ("Cib'. EMDlhl"):
Qty Operating result for February 2013 was a Loss of $2,011,688.96.

City Revenues: Februaiy was an average month for revenues ($3.6m vs $3.4m last year). The_ City received quarterly
payments from the county of State Sales Tax $466,313.75 (up 2.93% from last years $453,651.61) and Cable Franchise
Fees of $75,572.99 (down 2.67% from last year). The City ieceived Transit Grants of $64,469.00, IDT Construction
Grants of $281,214.99, and Aiiport Grant of $12,~10.00.

'"--

City E~pen,es: Expenses were normal for Febn,iary. We had $5.6 million in expense, (vs. $5.1 mUlion in 2012) and 3.6
-- million
in revenue such that at month's end, the city is Down $2,011,688.86 (city·tunds). One unusual everit was the

--

processing cif the section 218 social security refund for firemen for year 2009. Portions of this revolved thru the city's
payroll accounts.

-

I--

,--

--,_

City lnvesbnent Posture: At monlh end, City funds were 82% in cash or short-tenn investme:nts and 18% In long term
investments. $11,713,822.56 of all assets (33%) were in one of the two State of Idaho investment pools. Key inv1:1stment
rates:

Investments
State Investment Pool Short Term:
State Investment Poo!Longlerm:

-

Rate

0.251%
2.203%

Change vs. last month
up.091%
up.037%

, __
- D:ilillllHl!!D 1Dd AnllJ§il l"ID11l Eundl"):

Trust Operating Result for Februaiy is a loss of $30,108.27. We issued $58,481.15 in benefits. Interest earnings of
- $10,908.44,
realized gains of $712.69 and unrealized gains of $16,813.64 were not enough to cover expenses. Overall,
-,_ the trusts funds
have 5% of their investments in cash or cash equivalents and 9~ are in longer term investments.
~

!Ji!!Dbio1d "11¥ 1Dd Ir:1,11t lommal E!:!![C!1:W:iD9 ADIIY.li&:

--

--

All the money we h;ave:
Less the stuffwe really shouldri'!touch:
Sanitalion Enterprise
WE!ter Enterprise
WPC Enterprise
Medical Reserve
Workers Comp. Reserve
Trust Funds
Result:

$ 35,825,061.88

3,446,614.27
6,030,371.49
2,493,237.13
1.413,309.07

859,257.99

a H:a m. la

$13,433,098.75

This positive number, hence no internal borrowing !his month. II is $1,476,865.39 less than one year ago. The total
amount of cash, cash equivalents-. and long tenn investments is $1 ;587,862.97 less than one year ago.

- Outlook: March will be an average month for revenues. We expect expenses lo be above average becaus;e March will
- have three payroll dates {1 March, 15 March and 29 March). We also expect to complete the 2010, 2011 and 2012
- section 21 B social security refunds forfireftghters.
,__ Overall: February's perfonnancewas satisfactory.
·,-

-

>---

t--

,__

Respectfully,
David Swindell, Chief Financial Officer

~
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EXHIBIT C
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Monthly City Cash Report
A short discussion to provide helpful information on how to read the report.
a. Timing. We present this report to the Council on the third Thursday of the month, reporting
the cash situation as of the end of prior month. Thus, during the October meeting we report the cash
situation as of the end of September and so on.
b. What is included. The cash report displays all the money that the city has. A household
analogy might be list of what you hold in aJI of your checking and savings accounts. There are things
other than cash that are important, like debt and non-financial assets. We report those in our annual
audited financial repmt. Sti11, cash is very important and the Counci1 monitors it monthly.
c. Structure of the report.

I) Statement of Cash and Cash Equivalents for City Funds. By "city funds," we mean the money
available to support operations, as opposed to money :restricted to support activity in three trust funds.
We report that separately, per 3) below. In this one•page section, citizens should note how niuch
money we have, how it went up or down versus the prior month, and how the money is invested. It is
nonnal for the city to "lose" cash in most months, as expenses exceed revenue. The exception is in
January and July, when revenue spikes with semi-annual property tax receipts.
2) Change in Cash and Cash Equivalents for City Funds. This one page report details how the

cash changed during the month, with emphasis on revenue received. The major expense is "all checks
issued." We don't detail the expenses here but we do provide a separate report that does (Payroll and
Claims Report). Citizens should note the various revenue sources and we often provide comparisons
to prior years on important items such as sales tax revenue and so on.
3) Statement of Cash and Investment Balances for Trust Funds. This is where we discuss the
status of the three trust funds, with Police Retirement being the largest. This one page shows the
investment status, discusses changes during the month and summarizes the fund balances all on one
page. Citizens should note how this money is invested and how fund balances changed. Since the
retirement fund has long-tenn liabilities, it is typically invested 'in Jong-term bonds.
4) Fund balances for AH Funds. This report displays the cash by city fund, with a comparison to the
previous month. The total on this report equals the total of the city funds (report #1) and the trust
funds (report #3). The second page provides discussion and analysis for the month. Citizens should
note funds that are negative, as these are borrowers from the General Fund. Some funds are always
negative because they are financed with federal grants. We spend the money and then wait to get
reimbursed. While typical, it is still important to monitor.
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CITY OF POCATELLO
STATEMENT OF CASH, CASH EQUIVALENTS AND INVESTMENTS BALANCES FOR CITY FUNDS

---~--

AS OF MARCH 31, -~013

-

-

Value at Market
$

cash on Hand
Cash In Banks
Cash held bythird parties
Cash held at the State of Idaho Investment Pool
Total cash

$

25,247.71
5,239,754.93
692,899.36
6,677,314.26
12,63S,216;26

Investments atFainnarket Value
Current Investments
City Government
Certificate of Deposit
Money Market Funds
"TheN 1mber":
Total ~sh eq1.dvalents
.'.?o..:-~, rn .mlast
·Total cash and cash equivalents •Up~:1"11
_,.._
:~-o,,v :.. ,
'---.

'

$
$

;. $

-~

2,594,095;85
8,QQ0;364;os
:$10,594;459.94
23,228,676.20

.cash ot llhorttenn

investm ents
Long-Tenn Investments
GenerJI Government
State Investment Pool Bond Fund

$

5,052,861.85

Total long-term Investments tota in longer erm -+ $

5,052,861.85

··--

Ren "ESents ll !it.
:lll'l\ll

Total Cash, Cash Equivalents and
Long-Tenn investments

...

I,··•

stments

..

h= .-": UD~i.

lli549_3f

H $

28,282.538.05

frc mlastmoi th,
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Change in Casti and Equivalents City Funds
March 31, 2013

Cash Receipts

--

.. I
-

cemeteiy Receipts
Traffic Receipts
Westem State Equip. Cat Exe refund
Grarit - Entitlement - Federal
Animal Control Fees and Fines
Airport Rent & Landing Fees
Polio¢ Fees and Fines
--·
Transit SeNice Charges
Worke'6 Compensation Premiums
Other Miscellaneous Receipts
Building Fees and Pennits
C<:immunity Recreation Center Service Charges
water & LID119 Receipts
·-----·-~·--~M-Oa_,-____
Transit Grant-State ID
Chey;enne Cc:irridor,ID Dept of Transportation
Water Pollution Control Sernce Charges
Bannock Co1.1nty-Ambulanoe
Bannock Cou_oty tax

.

·~--

_.,,_

8,871.19
9,407.87
9,788.89
12,474.74
15,667.15
29,496.52
52,401.16
60,053.48
64,704.07
68,490.88
73,299.49
94,507.62
1.01,977.79
124,414.00

125;265.08
168,890.63
240,641.58
368,171;93

-

0.11%
0.11%
0.12%
0.15%
0.19%
0.35%
0.63%
0.73%
0.78%
0.83%
0.89%
1.14%
1.23%
1.51%
1.52%
2.05%
2,91%
4.46%

19.78%
25.70%

34.80%
8;25B;160.59 100.00%

tiom. outside _a,urces

C;tsh D1$bursements

Total pa;yroll and material claims per March 7th report
-7,770,285.66
58,503.89
Less Tru$t Funds Claims
City F.iind payroll and material claims
Merchant fees (credit card acceptance fees)
Bank s1:1rvice charges
Returned Checks
Water Bond Payment
Gemeral ObUgaUon Bond Closing Costs
Account corrections and adjustments
Other checks cut (Library trustee, Youth forum, Police narc's)
Administijlth:>n s11ppeirt fee
Total cash dispet$ed to outside sources
Net cash received by operations
Internal activity
Long~t~rm iovestments sold
City Portfolio
other disbu~ements
Capital Gain/Loss
Operating result for March 2013: Up
Other Receipts
$606,649.35
Principal Accrued
Long-term investment purchased
Net change In cash and long term Investment
'\..
Fair Market Value Adjustments
'\..
City Long Tenn portf91io
$
Net change In cash value and long tem, Investment value

"

'~

-7,711,781.77
0.00
-1,001.05
-2,377.95
114,490.28
-64,873.00
-341.39
•744.99
51.75

-7,666,&78;12
591,582.47

8,784.43

0.00
600;365.90

6,282.45
605,849.35
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CITY OF POCATELLO
-----STATEMENT 5)F CASH, CASH EQUIVALENTS AND INVESTMENTS BALANCES FOR TRUST FUNDS
AS 0~ MARCH 31, 2013

·-

Cash tnBank
Cash held in Broker Accounts

- $437,041.34
32.08

Total cash and cash equivalents

$437,073.42

-

-----~

·--

LONG TERM INVESTMENTS

Municipal Bonds
FNMA Mortgage Notes
FHLMC Mortaage Notes
GNMA Mortgiage Pools
Other Aaencv Bonds
FHLB notes

$5,000,516.34
2,184,437.22
46,408.45
70,197.60
299,659.80
"$98,SOEi.60
............
.. $8,136,799.43
Total Cash, Cash Equivalents and Long-Term Investments
"All the Trust money we
have": Down $12,373.75 for
the month

Change in Cash and Equivalents For Trust Funds
For March 2013
Cash Receipts
Return of lnwstment Capital
Interest
from outside soumes
cash Disbun;ements
All .checks issued
Postage
Long-terrn im.estments purchased
Admin Support Fee
Tot;,I cash dilspersed

~
208;639.10
~~·:
-22.74
-134,773.75
-51.75
~193,329.39

to oullide soun:es
Net cash received by operations

$15,309.71 .

Internal .activity
Long-term investments sold
Police Retirement Portfolio
Other disbursements
Capital Gain/Loss
Other Receipts
Princlpal Accn1ed
long-term investment purchased
Trust operating result for
Net change in cash and long tenn Investment the month: Down

·.

·.

. $12,373.75

Fair Market Value AdiustmenlS (Unrealized}
Police Long Term portfolio
Net change in casi value and long term investment value

"- ,.

-$129,179.90
788.68

134,773.75
$21,692.24

-:
.-$12,373. 75

TRUSTFUNDBALANCES-CHANGE
March 31, 2013
FUNDS

POLICE RETIREMENTTRUST
AIRPORT BOND 1RUST
SO. BAN. HWY. DEV. lRUST
TOTALS

CASH

CASH

NEI'

ENDING
BALANCE

ENDING
BALANCE

CHANGE

02128/13

03/31/13

8,132,582.77 8,120,208.20
16,587.24
16588.06
3.17
3.17
$8,149,173.18 $8,136 799.43

IN CASH
BY FUND

-$12,374.57
0.82
0.00
-$12,373.75
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FUNDS -------·--,--.··

I

002
003
004

005
006

007
.009
012
013
014
016
017
030
031

032
035
037
038

050
052
053
054
055
056
0.59
060
061
070

071
072
073
075
076
077

078
079
080
081
082

088
951
952
953
954
955
957

958
959
960

961
962
963
964

970
971
973
974

--

GENERAL FUND

I

LIABILITY INSURANCE FUND
STREET FUND
RECREATION FUND
CEMETERY FUND
·---~----·
AIRPORT FUND
-------·LIBRARY FUND
POC.REG.lRANSITFUND
·VIDEO SERVICES FUND
BUSINESS IMPROV. FUND
CHIEF THEATRE FUND
EMERGENCY REPAIR FUND
STORMWATER ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE FUND
SUBTOTAL SPECIAL REVENUE FUNDS
SANITATION FUND
WATER FUND
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
AMBULANCE FUND
WATER CAPACITY FEE
WPC CAPACITY FEE
SUBTOTAL ENTERPRISE FUNDS
INFORMA110N SYS1EMS FUND
unLITY ·BILLING FUND
MEDICAL INSURANCE FUND
PUBLIC WORKS DIRECTOR
FUEL FUND
WORl<;ERS INSURANCE FUND
SUBTOTAL INTERNAL SERVICE FUNDS
DEBT SERVICE FUND GOV
DEBT SERVICE FUND WPC
DEBT SERVICE FUND WATER
SUBTOTAL DEST SERVICE FUNDS
FEDERAL AID PROJECTS
STREETSPECIAL PROJECTS
AIRPORT CONSTRUCTION
WA1ER CONS1RUCTION
FIRE APPARATUS CAPITAL
BUILDING RENOVATION
SlREET ECUJPMENT CAPITAL
CAPITAL ACQUJSmON FUND
ANIMAL CONS1RUCTIDN FUND
SUBTOTAL CAPITAL PROJECT FUNDS
FORECLOSURE STABILIZATION
CDR-CDBG ENTilLEMENT FUND
ENERGY BLOCK GRANT
POLICE GRANT FUNDS
SUBTOTAL GRANT REVENUE FUNDS
POLICE RETIREMENT TRUST
REllREMENTPAYOUTTRUST
AIRPORT BOND lRUST
EIDC REVOLV. LOAN TRUST
CORLOAN TRUST
ZOO IMPROVEMENTlRUST
WAlER ACQUISfflON TRUST
SIDEWALK REVOL LOAN TRUST
STANDROD TRUST
SO.BAN.HWY.DEV.TRUST
FACADE LOAN lRUST
PARKS AND RECREATION DEVELOPMENT TRUST
PROPER1Y ABATEMENT FUND
SUBTOTAL TRUST AND RESTRICTED FUNDS
SEIZED FUNDS AGENCY
UNCLAIMED PROPER1Y AGENCY
STATE SALES TAXAGENCY
COBRA INS. AGENCY... .,.., .....

I

------

-

-- ·--·-

7;675,637.97

688,969.08
1,540,671.80
422;1534.50
292,476.27
511,375.81
738,921.67
(456,038.55)
120,894.53
0.00
113,432.88
(8;405.52)
265,081.93
4,230,014.39
3;446,614.27
3,668,986.51
1,092,128.37
18,969.47

-

--·-·

--- _

NET
CHANGE
IN CASH
BY FUND

I

!

001

CASH
ENDING
BALANCE
03/31113

CASH
ENDING
BALANCE
02/28/13

8,226,698.62.
281,233.57
629,001.63
1,41~.3(19.07
190,170.97
62,091.19
859,257..99
3,435,064.42
55,408.97
1,401,108.76
722;925.28
2, 179,443;01
(399,964.50)
0.00
(452,474.85)
1,638,459,70
20,658-.75
63.979..00
0.00
396,069.11
(336.25)
1,266,390.98
(91.1.05)
(19,041.42)
{0.00)
18.278.25
·1,674,22
a,132,582.n
405;879.20
16,587.24
105,883.49
290,185.22
76,415.39
116,239.21
13,246.94
181,113.04
3.17

n,255.61
3,288.43
63,126.57
9,481,1106.28
34,718,61
0.00
35.29
9,401.86
",,i;.-,

.a..,e, ll'!l4'\

5,326,204.00

422,689.28
1,201,438.29
406,673.78
257 ,22.7. 79
425,673.41
616,660.88 ..
(310;624.78)
92,520.82
10a.97
113,379.30
(2,530.10)
.273,985.59
3,497,203.23
3,520,104.41
2,133,481.12
1,234,148.23
53,530.88
'1,364,869.36
1,193,031.20
9,499,165.20
259;597.78
637,327.55
1.418.776.36
200,066.24
83,962;09
896,636.37
3,496,366.39
65,321.25
208,012.88
722,899.35
996.233,49
(315,274.98)
0.00
(442,303.25}
1,577,894.43
24,790.50
89,719.00

0.00
397,152.44
2,799,683.75
4,111;6$1.89
(911.05)

(3B;276.07)
(0.00)

33,242.76
-5,944.36
8,120,208.20
409,213.72
16,568.06
105,857.57
287,297.30
7~,077.56
116,239.21
13,221.02
181,114.55
3.17
77,229.69
3,288.43
62,997.15

9.46U3&.63
24,576.34
0.00
20.31
9,515.36
nn"

(2,350,433.97'

(266,279.80)
(339,233.51)
(15,960.72)
(35,248,48)
(85,702.40)
(122,260.79)
145,413.78
(28,373.71)
108.97
(53.58)
5,875.42
S,903.66
1732,811.16]
73,490.14
(1,535,505.39)
142,019.86
34,561.41
1,364,869.36
1,193,031.20
1,272,466.58
(21,635;79)
8,325.92
5,467.29
9,895.27
21,870.90
37,378.38
61,301.97
9;912.28
{1,193,095,88)
(25.92
.(1, 183,201Ui2
84,689.52
0.00
10,171.60
(60,565.27)
4,131.75
5,740.00
0.00
1,083.33
2,800,020.00
2,845,270.93
0.00
(19,234.65)
0.00
14,964.51
'4,270.14
(12,374.57)
3,334.52
0.82
(25.92)
(2,887.92)
(4,337.83)
0.00
(25.92)
1.51
0.00
(25.92)
0.00
(129.42}
{16,410.65
(10,142.27)
0.00
(14.98)
113.50
., .. ., A"71: '°l1
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961

i iSO. BAN. HWY. DEV. lRUST

.

__ ·

. ···---····----- ,---------

H:ri,n;,.U4 •

3.17 J ------.

962 , FACADE LOAN lRUST
77,255.61
1-9-53c+-t,.P--A=RK--S,-A"'"'N""""D;-,R=E=c=R=EA-,Tl=oc-N-,.D~E~V-E-LO-P-M=E=NT-lR=u-s=T-+-----'-3"-,2-ss-.4---13 .. --964 PROPERTY ABATEMENT FUND
6:t126.57
970

·-

,

---·-·

l.::n,

0:00

(25.92):
0.00
62;997.15 1
(129.42)
SUBTOTAL TRUST AND RESTRICTED FUNDS
9,481,806.28
9,465,335.63!
{16,470.651
SEIZED FUNDS AGENCY
--+--~34":"',i!e-71""8;..,,.61~--_.......24,..,.,,,5~76,;..,.34,;;.,;..;-.---{~10=",-r,14~2.'=27=1.)
77,229.691
3,288.43

·------------------·---··-··
971
UNCLAIMED PROPER1Y AGENCY
973
974
975

·un,'!"14.~'
. . 3.1'..

0.00
~---------+-------!··--·····
35.29

STATE SALES TAX AGENCY
COBRA INS. AGENCY
FIREFIGHTER SECTION 218
SUBTOTAL AGENCY FUNDS

9,4.01.85
----(712,475.31)
(668,319.55)

0.00
20.31
9,515.36
0.00
34,112.01

.35,825,061.88

36,419,337.48

TOTAL ALL FUND TYPES

0.00
(14.98)
11s·.so
712,475.31
702;431.56

594,275.60

plscuuioa & AnaJysis ("CHy Funds"l:

,-

,_ City Operating result for March 2013 was a gain of $606,649.35
1-

,- City Revenues: March was an above average month for revenues ($8.26m vs $3.5m last year). The increased revenues ,- are due to 941 social security refunds from the IRS of $2.1M and General Obligation Bond sales of $2.9M. The City
,- received llD Grants of$125,265.08, Transit Grants of$124,414,0D, and Entitlement Grant of $12,474.74.
....

-

,__ City Expenses: Expenses were above nonnal for March, Both March In 2013 and March in 2012 were three payroll
....
,__ months wllich made them above nonnal compared to other months. The city also executed a pass thru social security ....
rt!fund to firefighter.. that withdrew from the system via statewide election last July. We had $7.66 million in expense, (vs ....
- $7.8 million in 2012) and $8.28 million in revenue such that at month's end, the city is up $606,649.35 ln the city
f--o op~J"ating fun~s. The Fire departm,nt section 218 Social Security ref~ncJ w.aS money In .and money out; but the animal
--- shelter bond proceeds are naturally held just forlhat puipose. Less the effect of the 1>olid proceeds, normal operating
- result would be a cash loss of $2,202,078.06 instead of a gain of $606,649.35. A loss Is a typical opeialing result for
- March, which normally has very modest revenue but continued operating expenses in the ta>:funds. Reader$ should
- note that tile General Fund is down -$2,350,433.97 forMan:h 2013. That's typical. March2012 general fund was down - ,_ $1,888;860.32 for example.
,,_

,-

- City Investment Posture: At month end, City funds were 82% in cash or shorMelTTI investments and 18% in long term
_ investments. $11,730,176.11 ofall assets (35%) were in one of the two State of Idaho investment pools and
_ $8,000,364.09 of all assets (24%} were in money market accounts. Key investment rates:

,_

-

-

Investments
State Investment Pool Short Term:
State Investment Pool Long Term:
Money Market rate

··-

,_
,_

DllCUSSjDn

aud Alllllllil l"l[llst

Change vs. last month

Rate

0.179%

2.359%
.05%

,_

,...

--

down.079%
up.166%
new

-

E11ods")i

- Trust Operating Result for March is a loss of $-12,373. 75. We Issued $58,481.15 in benefits. Interest earnings of
- $79,459.20, realized gains of $788;68 were not enough to cover expenses and unrealized losses of is4,D65.99. Overall, •- the trusts fundS·hive 5% of their investments in cash Or cash equivalents and 95% are in longer term investments.
-

,_

,__ Combjned Cil)' and Irust Internal Borcowjng Analysis:
._
,..._
'.._
___

All the mpney we have:
Less the stuff we really shouldn't touch:
Sanitation Enterprise
water Enterprise
WPC Enterprise
Medical Reserve
Wolken; Comp. Reserve
Trust Funds
Result:

-

-

·s 36;419,337,48
t-

3,520,104.41
4,434,274.91
1,442,161.11
1,418,776.36
896,636.37

-

813679943
$ 16,57M84.89

- This positive number, hence no internal borrowing this month. It is $3,311,550.78 more than one year ago. The total
- amount of cash, cash equivalerits, and long tenn investments IS $4,798,051.18 more than one year ago.

-_

OuUook: April will be an above average month for revenues as we expect to received our share of State revenues,
We expect
,__ expenses to be average.
e- (Liquor, Highway User and Sales Taxes) co,llected durin,g the first quarter of the 2013 calendar year.

,_ Overall: March's pelformance was unusual, given the bond proceeds and social security p.ass-thru, but satisfactory.
,_ Respectfully,

-

-

-

,,-

.....

,_ David Swindell, Chief Financial Officer
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city or ~ocaceiio
_
Budget L(:-·)1 Miscellaneous Informati( \Entry

GM225U01
~
"
r _.
f

Budget level
Account number

FY2014 BUDGET
. 2013

Total budget amount
Seq.#/
Pri9rity
l 00
2 . no
3 00
4

oo

s no

6

no

no
a on
7

8/07/13
12: 01: 10

001 0000 370 61 · 00 INTERFOND REVENUES / PAYM

2,482,847

Freeform information

Amount
66286

03Q-300J-S30.96JS SANITATION
031-3001-530, 9615 WATER
032-3010-53Q,96J5 WPC
OSQ-SQOQ-530,96-15 INFO TECHNOLOGY
052-5200-530, 9615 HTTT.TTY BU,I,JNG
PMT lrsf I,IEtt bp TAXES BASED -QN E':V:J3
Q;·D0972222Sl -··. .

- 1 37S:frTQ

3703

TAX RATE

9 00
10.00
JJ QO
12 00

1'3=Exit

+

1'7=Update

F9=Copy

F12=Cancel
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~

•

.L

l J

1

w•~z

v~

~~~~~o••-

Budget L( \1 Miscellaneous Informatir '·\-Entry

O/U//13

12: 02: 25

FY2 014 BUDGET
Budget level
A'.ccount number
2013 031 3001 530 96 15 INTERFUND CHARGES/ PAYME
1,034,544
Total budget amount
Seq.#/
Priority
Freeform information
Amount
1,

on

2 oo
3 00
4.00

001 -QDQD-37Q-6J oo GENERA!, FUND
BASED ON VALUE OF J Q6, 327,327
FYJ3 CITY TAX RATE DE -, 009729799

) 034544

5 00

.ao

6
7.00

.e. oo
9 QO

JO ,00
J J 00
+

12,00
F3=Bxit

F7=Update

F9=Copy

Fl2=Cance1
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GJV!:.:::;::: !:, U u ..L
..)_

(

'

~•wI

B·udget level

Account number
Total budget amount
Seq.#/
Priority
l 00
2' no
3.

oo

~•

~v~a~~-·~

Budget L(- '>:l Miscellaneous Informati,< ; Entry

'

0/Vf/J..j

12: 03: 12

FY2014 BUDGET
2013 032 3010 530 96 15 INTERFUND CHARGES/ PAYME
1,375,670

.
Freeform information
001-0000-370 6) an GENERAL FIINO
BASED ON '\TAI'.IJE OF 141. 387,320
FYJ3 crTv TAx RATE op

Amount
J 375670

009229799

4.00
5 00
6 00

7 no
8 00
9 00

l O 00
lLOQ
J 2 .OQ

F3=Exit

+
F7=Update

F9=Copy

Fl2=Cancel

498

~"'-

t.

.'I.

..

EXHIBITB
499

. ·-·- ------·-·-

---------- . ---

-·-··· -····--·-·-·---.

-~

CERTIFICATE OF
EILED EFFEC'T~VE
ASSUMED BUSINESS NAME
..

•

Pursuant to Section 53N504, fdaho Code, the undersigned .
submits for filing a certificate of Assumed Business Name;

I -~: r? -, ? 7

r:·:

9: D6

Please type or print loeihly.

Jnstructions are Included on back of application.

1. The assumed business name which the undersigned use(s) in the transaction of
business is:
Hll!Nu & Rocking R Mobile Home Parks

2. The true name(s) and bysjness address(es) of the en1ity or individual(s) doing
business under the assumed business name: .
liimi
complete Address
Ricky G Robinson

3535 Somerset Dr, PocatellO, 10 83201

Logan Robinson

5354 W Old Hwy 91, Inkom. ID 83245

3. The general type of business transacted under the assumed business name is:

D
D
· · ··D
D
0

Retail Trade
Wholesale Trade

Services ·
Manufacturing·

D Transportation and .Public Utilities
D . Construction
D Agriculture
Submit Certificate of
D . Mining
Assumed Business

Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate

4. The name and address to which future
correspondence should be addressed:
Hill-Vu & Roeking R Mobile Home Parks

Name and $25.00 fee to:

Secretary of State
450 North 4th Street
P0Box83720
Boise ID 83720-0080

4530 S 5th Ave

208 334-2301

Pocatello, ID 83204

5. Name and address for this acknowledgment
copy is (ff olhur Chan #4 above):

...,.......... ... •-:.~

Secnitary of State u11 anly

S~tgjni ~i~~~~~~:;·~·- !-.-i

~-!--!. ·~·---~---~·-·=--

:,!..,,.i:;_:::i,;-,~·-=-~--~-

=·=·~~~------ ..

--=·

Printed ame: Ricky G Robinson .
Capacitymtle:....· P._a...,rtnbe...r _ ~ - - - - - - -

Slgnature:

--,t11~--------

JDA11) SECRETARY OF STATE·

84/27/2812 15188
Cit 5Bl3 CT1 269813 111 1321797
1 I 25.N

111

25.H ASBIii NAIi I 2

lllln,rrnl Rw.
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1/30/2014

IDSOS Viewing Business En1ity

IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE
Viewing Business !Entity
Ben Ysursa, Secretary of State

[ New Search ] [ Back to Summary ]

4530 S 5TH AVE
POCATELLO, ID 83204

Type of Business: ASSUMED BUSINESS NAME
Status: CURRENT, CURRENT 27 Apr 2012
State of Origin: IDAHO
Date of Origination/Authorization: 27 Apr 2012
File Number: D155220

Filed 27 Apr 2012 ORIGINAL
FILING
Idaho Secretary of State's Main Page

[ Help Me PrintNiew TIFF ]
View Image (PDF format) View Image (TIFF
format)
State of Idaho Home Page

Comments, questions or suggestions can be emailed to: sosinfo@sos.idaho.gov

501
http://www.accessidaho.org/public/sos/corp/D 155220.httnl
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com

-\
?,'
:,r

2015 APR IO PM 12: 07

~

BL ..
DE~UTY LERK

Nathan M. Olsen, ISB No. 7373
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Facsimile: (208) S24-3391
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: CV-2014-1520-0C

vs.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,

ORDER SHORTENING TIME

Defendant.

This matter having come before the Court by means of the plaintiffs' Motion to
Shorten Time, and good cause having been found,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time for hearing Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike
Affidavit ofBlake G. Hall and Third Affidavit ofJoyce A. Stroschein (IRCP 7(b)(3)) and
Motion to Strike Portions ofthe Affidavit ofJoyce A. Stroschein filed August 28, 2014,

ORDER SHORTENING TIME - 1
502

The Second Affidavit ofJoyce A. Stroscheinfiled March 13, 2015 and Third Affidavit of
Joyce A. Stroschein Dated April 2, 2015 be shortened to Monday, April 13, 2015 at 2:00

p.m.
y.v-

Date: April J.Q., 2015

~

itonorak stephenDunn

ORDER SHORTENING TIME • 2
503

/

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on Apri1 ll)20I5, I served a true and correct copy of the ORDER
SHORTENING TIME on the following by the method of delivery designated below:
Blake G. Hall
Sam L. Angell
Hall Angell Starnes
1075 S. UtahAvenue, Ste 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: (208) 621-3008
Michael D. Gaffney
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Fax:.(208) 529-9732
Nathan M. Olsen
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen
485 E Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: (208) 524-3391

~: U.S.Mail

fill
.,,,,,;- Hand-delivered

~
'"·"" Facsimile

!Cf::

Q

Hand-delivered

~
.,.,,,,,. Facsimile

Hand-delivered

lfk
,,,.,;, Facsimile

U.S.Mail

I

~, U.S.Mail

ID.J
.;;.,.)

ORDER SHORTENING TIME - 3
504

Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
NathanM. Olsen, ISB No. 7373
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff's,

Case No.: CV-2014-1520-0C

vs.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF
THE AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STROSCHEIN FILED AUGUST 28t
2014, THE SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF
JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN FILED
MARCH 13, 2015 AND THIRD
AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STROSCHEIN DATED APRIL 2, 2015

Defendant.

The plaintiffs, through counsel of record, hereby move to strike the following

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STROSCHEIN FILED AUGUST 28, 2014, THE SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STROSCHEIN FILED MARCH 13, 2015 AND THE THIRD AFFIDAVIT OFJOYCE
A. STROSCHEIN DATED APRIL 2, 2015 - 1505

portions of the Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein filed August 28, 2014 as follows:
I.

Paragraphs 5 and 13 in their entirety insofar as they are inconsistent with

the Court's prior findings and conclusions articulated in the Court's Memorandum
Decision and Order on City's Motion to Reconsider and Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for
Reconsideration, filed November 15, 2013 in the case Building Contractors Association
ofSoutheast Idaho v. City ofPocatello, Register Number CV - 2011 - 5228 - OC, Sixth

Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Bannock County (hereafter "Memorandum
Decision") related to PILOT fees (and its precursors) assessed in regard to
connection/capacity fees.
2.

Paragraphs 14 through 19 in their entirety on the basis of foundation and

relevance. The affiant has failed to reference or provide source documents for any of the
referenced funds identified, Additionally, the paragraphs are irrelevant to the issues
raised in the City's pending motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiffs move to strike the following portions of the Second Affidavit of
Joyce A Stroschein for the reasons enumerated below:
1.

Paragraph 3, first and second sentences on the basis that there is no

foundation for said statements and the statements are conclusory in nature.
2.

Paragraph 4, first and second sentences on the basis that the statement is

without foundation, vague and argumentative. The statement regarding "substantial
compensation and benefit to the user fee payer" is also speculative and unquantified,
therefore does not address the issue of damages or mitigation of damages, just
compensation or any other remuneration to the plaintiffs to support an affirmative
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STROSCHEIN FILED AUGUST 28, 2014, THE SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STROSCHEIN FILED MARCH 13, 2015 AND THE THIRD AFFIDAVIT OFJOYCE
A. STROSCHEIN DATED APRIL 2, 2015 - 2506

/.-··~~'?",
:~

defense that the defendant provided fair and reasonable· compensation for imposition of
the unconstitutionally levied fees.
3.

Paragraph 5 in its entirety, except for the eighth sentence which states

"The PILOT transfer provided the monetary support for all General Fund services,"
insofar as the remaining statements are irrelevant, without foundation, conclusory and
speculative.
4.

Paragraph 12, first sentence and third sentence insofar as they are without

foundation, speculative and unquantified and therefore do not address the issue of
damages or mitigation of damages, just compensation or any other remuneration to
support an affirmative defense that the defendant provided fair and reasonable
compensation for the imposition of the unconstitutionally levied fees.
The plaintiffs move to strike the following paragraphs from the Third Affidavit of
Joyce A. Stroschein dated April 2, 2015:
1.

Paragraph 4 of the affidavit is speculative and improper insofar as it makes

a number of assumptions about the "motivations" for various class members vis~a-vis
damage claims.
2.

Paragraphs 5 through 9 on the basis that it improperly invades the

province of the finder of fact and also attempts to draw legal conclusions as to how
damages would be calculated. Additionally, these paragraphs are also speculative insofar
as they attempt to outline steps that the city would take to finance any damage award,
whether the city has sufficient funds to cover a damage award, etc. This evidence is
inadmissible in the same fashion that admissibility of insurance or other means to pay a
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STROSCHEIN FILED AUGUST 28, 2014, THE SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STROSCHEIN FILED MARCH 13, 2015 AND THE THIRD AFFIDAVIT OFJOYCE
A. STROSCHEIN DATED APRIL 2, 2015 - 3507

judgment is inadmissible.

3.

hs 10 and 11 impennissibly make legal conclusions, i.e. whether

/

/

I/

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STROSCHEIN FILED AUGUST 28, 2014, THE SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STROSCHEIN FILED MARCH 13, 2015 AND THE THIRD AFFIDAVIT OFJOYCE
A. STROSCHEIN DATED APRIL 2, 2015 - 4508

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

()
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on April[_, 2015, I
served a true and correct copy of the MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE
AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN FILED AUGUST 28, 2014, THE SECOND
AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN FILED MARCH 13, 2015 AND THE
THRID AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN DATED APRIL 2, 2015 on the
following by the method of delivery designated below:
Blake G. Hall
Sam L. Angell
Hall Angell Starnes
1075 S. Utah Avenue, Ste 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 .
Fax: (208) 621-3008
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID.
Fax: (208) 2

D·

YI~

C]'

Q Hand-delivered

l;J, Facsimile

.i' U.S. Mail/.:,_; Hand-delivered

<.s.

Mail

··"' Facsimile

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STROSCHEIN FILED AUGUST 28, 2014, THE SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STROSCHEIN FILED MARCH 13, 2015 AND THE THIRD AFFIDAVIT OFJOYCE
A. STROSCHEIN DATED APRIL 2, 2015 - 509
5

Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
Nathan M. Olsen, ISB No. 7373
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: CV-2014-1520-0C

vs.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,

MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF
BLAKE G. HALL AND THIRD
AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STROSCHEIN (IRCP 7(b)(3))

Defendant.

The plaintiffs hereby move this court for an order striking the Affidavit of Blake
G. Hall and the Third Affidavit Joyce A . .Stroschein on the basis that the affidavits were
served in violation ofIR CP 7(b)(3)(B). This motion is supported by the Affidavits of
plaintiff's co-counsel Michael D Gaffney and Nathan M. Olsen.

MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL AND THIRD
AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN (IRCP 7(b)(3)) - 1 510

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3)(B) requires that any affidavit filed in
opposition to a motion must be served on the opposing party so that it is received no later
than seven days before the hearing:.
(B) When a motion is supported by affidavit(s), the affidavit(s) shall be served
with the motion, and any opposing affidavit(s) shall be filed with the court and
served so that it is received by the parties no later than seven (7) days before the
. 1
heanng.

Regardless of the certificate of service attached to the affidavits, the affidavits of
opposing counsel, Michael D. Gaffney and Nathan M. Olsen, along with the date stamps
demonstrating receipt of these documents show that the affidavits were received on April
7, 2015 or only six days before the hearing. The April 6, 2015 post marked envelope
shows that the City's counsel misrepresented when mail service was effected by four
days.
Normally, a difference of one day would not be hugely significant, however in
this case, the Affidavit of Blake G. Call contains exhibits totaling almost 40 pages, many
of which are multiple spreadsheets related to purported collection of connection and user
fees related to Pocatello water and sewage department.
Likewise, the Third Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein contains eight pages of
purported financial documents related to utility billings, without any explanation or
foundational documents related to the preparation of these summary documents.
Under the circumstances, the failure to provide these documents in accordance
with the rule does not allow the plaintiff sufficient time to determine the significance of

1 IRCP

7(b)(3}(B) (emphasis added)

MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL AND THIRD
AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN (IRCP 7(b)(3)) ~ 2 511

the documents to the class certification motion, and in some instances determine what the
documents in fact are designed to represent.
For these reasons, the plaintiffs strongly urged the court to strictly apply the

MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL AND THIRD
AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN (IRCP 7(b)(3)) - 3 512

'

.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho and on April

r,

2015, I

served a true and correct copy of the MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE
G. HALL AND THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN (IRCP 7(b)(3)) on
the following by the method of delivery designated below:

/
Blake G. Hall
Sam L. Angell
Hall Angell Starnes
1075 S. UtahAvenue, Ste 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: (208) 621-3008

ltl\l U.S. Mail •

Au.S.Mail

Hand-delivered

IEJ'i':

.

''""' Hand-delivered

l?Jit · Facsimile

l~h

Facsimile

MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL AND THIRD
AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN (IRCP 7(b)(3)) - 4 513

Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
Nathan M. Olsen, ISB No. 7373
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: CV-2014-1520-0C

vs.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D.
GAFFNEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G.
HALL AND THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF
JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN

Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
)ss.
)

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL AND THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STROSCHEIN
-1
514

I, Michael D. Gaffney, having been duly sworn on oath, depose and state:
1. I am co-counsel for Plaintiffs in the above-entitled case.
2. I am competent to testify and do so through personal knowledge.

3. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the April 6, 2015 postmark
on the envelope from Mr. Hall's office which contained the Defendant's Response in
Objection to Motion for Class Certification, Affidavit of Blake G. Hall and Third
Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein.
4. Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the first pages of the

Defendant's Response in Objection to Motion for Class Certification, Affidavit of Blake
G. Hall and Third }flidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein marked received on April 7, 2015.
Date:

Aprile

~J

e on this _JJ 'day of April, 2015.

Not
u lie for Idaho
Resi&ing t: I d.a.JfldP.,JJ..,j, IP
~
My C· ission Expires: q -·t ( · ac_)Q.()
r_g_tJ.~Y}!"''''''
~~~'ffll Ls i,,,~
~""e...'
"' ........... o,..~~
~ ~"" ....
__ . ,, ~

..

s~ ..·
RY··· \
f!!i I 0~N
\ ce.:=.

-

J ..

-\i._1

..

:~
!•

:

!:

1 E
r . : ..:

.,:.:. ·.•·. pu~\;'
: :::
V
.....
. --..i,:::,
t
\ \.V •

~

~

~

~

~

...

••

§

•••••••o•;;;~~

~''.11,,,,,,,,111111\\\\\;
§1l\TE. \}\. 'II.'''"

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL AND THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STROSCHEIN
-2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho and on Aprnf, 2015, I
served a true and correct copy of the AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL AND
THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN on the following by the method of
delivery designated below:
Blake G. Hall
Nathan R. Starnes
Hall Angell Starnes
1075 S. UtahAvenue, Ste 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: (208) 621-3008

O:, U.S. Mai~Hand-delivered

~.S. Mail

~I Hand-delivered

Or

· · Facsimile

EJ::: Facsimile

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL AND THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STROSCHEIN
-3
516

- :ilALL AN_GELL STARNES, :LLP
- 1075 S UTAfl, SUITE 150
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83402

-

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

517
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
!SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgh@hasattomeys.com
s1a@hasattomeys.com
nrs@hasattomeys.com

,•'·<,I

Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
CLASS CERTIFICATION

V.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendant, City of Pocatello, by and through its attorney of record, and
hereby submits this response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification as follows:
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. Initially, Defendant City of
Pocatello would note that a Motion for Summary Judgment has been filed with the Court.
Inasmuch as that motion addresses the underlying merits of the case, it is important to first
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHANR. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
!SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgh@hasattomeys.com
sla@hasattomeys.com
nrs@hasattomeys.com
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUN1Y
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C
AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL

Plaintiff,

v.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
: ss.
)

Blake G. Hall, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am one of the attorneys for the Defendant in the above-referenced matter. I am over
the age of eighteen and competent to testify. This affidavit is based on my personal
knowledge unless otherwise stated.
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BLAKE 0. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
/SB No. s 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgh@hasattomeys.com
sla@hasattomeys.com
nrs@hasattomeys.com
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY

HILL-VU MOBILE HOME -pARK, on.
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUlNN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,

TWRD AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STROSCHEIN

Plaintiff,
v.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bannock

)
: ss.
)

Joyce A. Stroschein, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

I.

That I am over the age of eighteen (18) and am competent to testify in this matter.

I make this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge unless otherwise indicated.

-----

This affidavit is made under the penalty of perjury.
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Michael D. Gaffney
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
-ISBN: 3558
Nathan M. Olsen
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen
485 "E" Stt·eet, ldaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 523~4650
Fax: (208) 524-3391
ISBN: 7373
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
.

.

HILL~VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf
of itself atid all others similarly situated, ED
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated,

Case No. CV-2014:1520-0C

Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF
NATHAN M, OLSEN

vs.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO .

)

. ) ss.
County of Bonneville

)

AFFIDAVIT OF NATHAN M. OLSEN· 1
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I, Nathan M. Olsen, do solemnly swear (or affinn) that the testimony given in this
sworn statement is the truth, the whole tmth, and nothing but the truth, that it is made on my
personal knowledge, and that I would so testify in open ·court if called upon to do so.
1.

I am co-counsel representing the Plaintiffs in this matter.

2.

I did not receive until April 7, 2015, delivered to my office by the U.S. Postal

Service, Defendant's Response in Objection to Motion for Class Ce11ification; Affidavit of Blake
G. Hall; and Third Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein, all of which contain a date on or before
April 2, 2015 on the "Certificate of Service.ti

3.

Attached hereto as Exhibif"A" is a copy of.the envelope in which the documents

described in paragraph 2 above were enclosed reflecting the postal stamp date of April 6, 2015,
indicating that they were not in fact mailed until that date..
4.

On March 18, 201 S, I had a teleconference with Nathan Stames, one of the

counsel for the City of Pocatello in this case.. He info1med me that, after checking with
representatives from the City, although it would be complex and somewhat laborious, it is
possible to calculate the amount of the PILOT fee on an individual fee payer basis. He indicated
that it may require a "special master" to do the research a d calculations, but that it was doable.
DATED this 81h day of April, 2015.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby ce1tify that I am a dul,J!i;:ensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in
Id~ho Falls, Idaho, and that on the_(]_,,_ day of April, 2015 I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing
document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage
.
.
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rul.e S(b), l.R.C .P.

Pe1·sons Served:

Method of Service:

Blake G; Hall, Esq.
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP
1075 S; Utah Ave., Ste. 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

·( ) mail (-- ·j hand ( ) fa,,: ( ) email
/

FAX: (208)621-3008
EMAIL: bgh@basattorneys.com

I

./
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HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1075 S UTAH, SUITE 150
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83402

.

ATTORNEYS A.T I.Aw

Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street

Idaho Falls. ID 83402
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
Nathan M. Olsen, ISB No. 7373
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: CV-2014-1520-0C

vs.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,

NOTICE OF HEARING

Defendant.

All parties will please take notice that a hearing has been set before the Honorable
Stephen S. Dunn at the Bannock County Courthouse, 624 E. Center, Pocatello, Idaho on
Monday April 13, 2015 at 2:00 p.m. on the following matters:
1.

Motion to Strike Affidavit of Blake G. Hall and Third Affidavit of Joyce

A. Stroschein (IRCP 7(b)(3)); and

NOTICE OF HEARING - 1
525

2.

Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein filed

August 28, 2014, The Second Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein filed March 13,
20 l 5 ;~d r~-~~ A~~davit of Joyce A. Stroschein Dated April 2, 2015

Date: Aprili!/;
;:;:)'7//'

o,f,6y

Mic aeJr.'
Of Beard St.,,Clair Gaffney PA
Attorney
Plaintiffs

for

NOTICE OF HEARING - 2
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.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

?

I certify I am a licensed attorney in the,_ of!daho and on April,J:: 2015, 1
served a true and correct copy of the NOTICE OF HEARING on the following by the
method of delivery designated below:
/

Blake G. Hall
Sam L. Angell
Hall Angell Starnes
1075 S. UtahAvenue, Ste 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: (208) 621-3008

~{ U.S. Mail

~and-delivered

:~~c~e~;e~ty Courthouse
Pocatello, ID 8}201
Fax: (208) 236t7().13 /

~ . S . Mail

~\ Hand-delivered

rth
-~,,,.,· Facsimile

~J

Facsimile

¢1/"~) //

~-J

M1c]iia~ ..G'aff?fy

/

Of BYard St. Olair Gaffney PA
Attomeyfor Plaintiffs
·

l
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• MAY-21-2015 02:E?PM From:

ccL)THUR

12082398650

,·

Michael D. Gaflb.ey
Beard St. Clair Oaf.lhey PA
2105 C-0ronado Street
Idaha Falls, ID 83404
ISBN; 3SS8

Natban M. Ol&en
Peter11enMoss Hall & Olsen
435 44E1' Street, Idaho Faus; IO 83402
Telephone: (208) S23-46SO
Fax: (208) 524-3391
ISBN: 7373

Attorneys :for Plaintiffs

IN TD DISTRlC'l' COURT OF THE SIXTH JU.0ICI.U, DISTRICT
OFTBE STATE
IDAHO, IN AND l'OR BANNOCK COUNTY

or

HILL-VU MOJ3lLE HOME PARK, on behalf
<>f itself and all othei'S similarly situated, ED
QUINN, au beltalf ofhimself and all otbera
sim.ilal'ly situated~

Case No. CVw2014-1S2o..oc

AFFIDAVIT OF LOGAN ROBINSON
vs,

CITY OF POCATELLO, Bll. Idaho
m,w.icipality,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

) ss.
County of Bonneville

)

AFFIDAVIT OF LOOAN ROBINSON - Page l

MAY-21-2015 16:02

From:12082398660

ID:N+T PMH+o

Pageil02

R:95%
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{"\

,.(;~..,·~-~-1

, MAY-21-2015 02:28PM From:CC\:. -~HUR

12082398650

To:S __ )3391

I, X..01an Robjnson, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the testi.moo.y given in tbis swom
statement is the tru~ the whole truth, attd nothing but the ll'Uth1 that it is mode <>n my personal
knowledge, and that I wo1dd so testify in open oourt if called upon to do so.
l.

I am the managm- sud owner 4'Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park,.- one Qfthe plaintiffs in this

action.
2.

I personally do not tesids in the City of Pooatello. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, I

have resided in Bannock, County near In.~al10.
3.

Through my property rental b~esses, sinoe the be,gino.iog of 2007, I have on aVCt"age

paid app1'0ximately$lO,OOOpermouth to the City ofPocatello for monthly water, sewer and
garbage services. From the beginnius of2007 through the end of2013, during the time that the
City of Pocatello conducted its illegal PlLOT proguim. I believe l have paid approximately
$840,000 to the City of .Pocatello for these setvices. The City has never .in any way, shape or
fom1 i-e.imbursed me for any of the fees improperly taken fi:om me for the Pil,OT program or

other impcmtiasible \lSeB,

DATED this _1J__ day of

ldll/

... 2015.

}A,:H

SUBSClUBBD ANO SWORN to befoi

I

.Z015.

~~~

(SEAL)

NtitaJ:yhblic for State ofldaho

Pe,

Residing at~,
e-fd l O 'J1:)
My Commission Expires: 6-l o •Ql '2
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MAY-21-2016 15:02

From:12082398660

ID:N+T PMH+O

Page:003

R:95%
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.

("''"'!.

{"'°\

ic1082398650

MAY-ei-2015 02:28PM From:CCb,>iRTHUR

To:S. ~391

CBRmICATB OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a dtdy licensed attomey in tho State of Idaho, with my office in
Idaho Palls. Idaho, and that on the~ day of_fV\o 1 fr--> 20151 sexved a true and correct

copy of the foregoing document on the persons li&ted below by first cles, xnail, with t,he correct
postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordaw:e with Rule S{b), I.R. C.P.

Persons Served:

Method of Service;

Blake G. Hall, Esq.
HAU.ANJBLL &STARNES, L1Jt
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste.150
Idaho FaUs, ID 81402

( ) man (v'jhaud ( ) fax ( ) email

FAX1 (208) 621M3008

EMAIL: bgll@hasattomen.com

Ne.thanM. Olsen

AFFIDAVIT OF LOGAN ROB1NSON -Page 3
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From:12082398650

ID:N+T PMH+O

R:96%
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.

)

Michael D. Gaffi1ey
Beard St. Clair Gaffaey PA
2105 Coronado Stl'eet
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
ISBN: 3558
Nathan M. Olsen
Pete1'Sen Moss Hall & Olsen
485 "En Street, Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Fax.: (208) 524-3391
ISBN: 7373
Attorneys fo1· Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY

HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf
of itself and all others similal'ly situated, ED
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all othel's
similady situated,

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C

Plaintiffs,
AFFIDAVIT OF
NATHAN M. OLSEN

vs.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
) ss.
)

AFFIDAVITOFNATHAN M. OLSRN -1
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()

I, Nntlum M. Olsen, do solen111ly swear (ol' affirm) that the testimony give11 in this
swom statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that it is made 011 my
personal knowledge, an~ that I would so .testify hi open court if called upon to do so ..
I.

I am co~cotmsel representing the Plaintiffs in this matter.

2.

Attached as Exhibit 1 is an August 13, 2013 hearing transcl'ipt and "Statement of

Cash" that was submitted by the City to the Cou1't in the Building Contractors' case and is being
reproduced and marked here for the convenience of the CoUt't.
3.

Attached as Exhibit 2 are portions of the Red Oak Consulting Water and

Wastewater Studies which were submitted by the City to the Comt in the Building Contractors'
case and is being reproduced and marked here fol' the conve

DATED this 22nc1 day of May, 2015.

Nathan M. Olsen
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 22nd day of May, 2015.
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()

()

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby ce1'tify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 22nd day of May, 2015 I sel'ved a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage
thereon, 01· by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule 5(b), I.R.C.P.
Persons Served:

Method of Service:

Blake G. Hall, Esq.

( } mai~}'h~d ( ) fax ( ) email

HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP

1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
FAX: (208)621-~008
EMAIL: bgh@hasattorneys.com
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EXIDBIT "1"
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,.,

Court Proceedings before Hon. Stephen s. Dunn, Judge

'

'•

1(.

I
1.

1

le.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL

2 DISTRICT vUDIClAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO
3

4

I.
I
I
I
I

()

BUILDING CONTRAC'.1'0RS,

7

)·
)

Plaintiff,

5

6

)
)

vs.

)
}
}

)

CITY OF :POCATELLO,

8

}

Defendant.

)

.)

case No.
CV-2011-5228-0C

t©fV

10
11

The above-entitled matter came on for
12 hearing on the dates and times indicated herein at the
BANNOCK COUNTY CO~RTHOUSE, Idaho Falls, Idaho.
13

BEFORE: The Honorable STEPHENS. DUNN,
14 SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Judge, Presiding,

15

APPEARANCES

17 Fo.r the Plaintiff:

18
19
20
21
22

23

NATHAN M. OLSEN
PETERSEN MOSS HALL
485 E: Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho

&

OLSEN
83402

For the Defendant:
BLAKE G.' HALL

HALL ANGELL STARNES
901 Pier View Drive, suit
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

203

24

25

1
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Court Proceedings before Hon. Stephen S. Dunn, Judge
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CITY OF POCATELLO
STATEMENT OF CASH OASH EQUIVALeNTS AND INVSSTMl:NTS BALANCES FOR TRUST FUNDS
AS OF JUNE 30, 2013

Cash In Bank
Cash held In Broker Accounts

$219,936.46
32.06

Tolal ual1 and ea.sh eciulvalents

$219.968.54

1.0NG TERM INVESTMENTS

Municlnal 13onds
FNMA. Mortaaae t,,loles
'~II the Trust moneywe
FHLMC Morklaaa Notes.
have": Down $219,46ii.59 flit
themonth
GNMA. M::lrtaaae Pools
......
Other Agennv Bonds
FHLB notes
iotal Cash, Cash Equivalents and Long.Term lnve;tments

""'-

$4 985,465.09
2010847.90
39,010.29
31,237.63
284.078.30
192,592.00
.. $7,683,199.75

Chanaa In Cash and l:qu1Valenl$ For Trost Fund,
fer June 2.013
Cash Receipt.
Retum of lnwslmant Capllel

4,052.31
!l'".ac~ •

Interest
Jrom outtlde .sources

;!f:.111

•

28 841.46

· cam D1sbuNl8m11nls
All chocks Issued

·58481.16
-10.12
·31.93

Postage
eenkfees

Mmln Suppoit Fee

-54.92

·rl'"'~'l nn.-D:l":.!3]

Total cam dfspor#d

to outlldesourcos
Net cash received bv operetlons

•$31.73S.6S

Internal aclMty
l.ong-term lnw&tnients sold
Police Rallremenl Porlfollo
Other disbursements
· Capllal Gain/Lon
Olhor Receipts
Princllial Accrusd
Lona-lenn lnwstment 11urchaSt1cf
Trust oporaUng raault for
Net ol1ang1 In cash 110d Jong form Investment the month! Down $279,-'165.59
Fair MarketVatu1fAdJustmenls tUnrealfied)
Police Long Term portfolio
-.........
Net change In cam va/u11 rmd long term Investment value

FUNDS

TRUST FUND BALANCES • CHANGE
June io 2013

-32.78
0.00
.535 a25.03

,,. ~
• 78456.59

CASH

CASH

NET

ENDING

ENOINO
BALANCE
06130/13

CHANGE
IN CASH
BY FUND

BALANCE
05/31113
POLICE Rl!11REMENT TRUST
AIRPORT BOND lRUST
SO. BAN. HWY. DEV. TRUST
TOTALS

-$4 056.69

7,926,062.70 7.646.608.91 -$279 453.79
16689.47
16.690.64
1.37
3.17
0.00
-3.17
$7 942 655.34 $7,663.199.75 ·$279,455.59
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CASH
FUNDS
001

GENl=RAI. FUND

ErRJJNG
BA!.AHCEi
05/31113
2,962,142.$3

CASH
ENUING
BALANCE

OS130/13
2,318.620,28

NET
\A"V\NGE
L~CASH
BY FUND
163$022.$7

002. LIAelLITT INSURANCE FUND
003 SlREETFUNO
004 RECRl:A110NFUND
006 =MeTERY
F ND

541,009.39
608,974.62
86,.f66.43
1 233,780.08
1018370,41
121li,359.67)
339,341.09
326,88:U19
(13,478.20)
232,374.01
21s,,142,99
(18,931.02)
loo'- L
349,371.81
33:1,760.98.
(18,620.83}
.------:.------+---'4;,.;.1e:",4"=2~1.6==e;-i----3;;:1::,;ao,"":iBS,;;.:;;43..+--"-s-...,.~,4.;.;:si;o3;:;a;:;.1e~
0011 POC. REO, 'JFIANSlfFUND
{344,823.21
(624,414,38,)
(17&,691.17}
012 VIDEO SERVICES FUNO
112,348.26
93,941.03
(18,-I05.2i
013 ttu::,1NSSS IMPRQV, FUND
(0.00
(0.00)
0.00
014 CHIEFlHEATRE FUND
113.032.32
112,8&1.86
{167..411
018 EM1:1tuENC'f REPAIR FUND
11:,37'1.95
10 692.37
8,320.42
Of7 S100MWATl:R ENVIRONMEMTAL SCIENCE FUND
138,007.19
1611,28!1.37
80,268.18
SUBYOTAL SPECIAL RWENU!i FUNDS
$.133,682.47
2.729.138.77
1404,646,70
030 SAN/fA110N FUND
3,443 .f60.94
3,497 088,01
53,82.7.0l'
011 WAlERFUNO
1458,5#.44
1.443,847,04
(14,697,110
032 vv'AlERl'OLLUTIONCONTROL
2,011,255.54
1758,e81.54
(264,674.00)
A7
,no
03'5 AM9UI.ANCE FIJND
1d11.2111_1111
u,,, """ '"" W\t".Hl.ilH n::c:
1,384,880.3e
1,391,0&0.36
26,220.00 1kl

001-

A n ~ A~T . . .

<Ji IFoa9a~w~PiiiCiiCAiAij"Aciirrv~F.i_eeilmmifm"iifflr----+--=-,1rii,1i93,i,'03i.1n.2iio+-......"";1;i!.9ti,·1i':,1nsiuffto===;..i21i4!ii10iio.ioonlf ~v
uuu•-11\1. ,.., , -

050
0Sl!:

053
054

055
0118
1059

060
081
070
071

"'""' l'UNIJl!i

INFORMl\1l0N SYSraMS FUNO
UTILITY B1lLIN1:1 FUND
MEDICAL INSURA""""" FUND
PUBLIC WORKS DIRECTOR
i<UEL FUND
WORKERS INSURANCE FUND
SU13TOTAL IN1'1:RHAL SERVICE FUNOS
DEBT SERVICE FIJND GOV
OEBTSERVICEFUNDWPC
0EBTSERVIC£FUN0WA1T:R
SUBTOTAL DEBT Sf:RVJOI! FUNDS
FEDERAL AID PROJECTS
STREET SPECIAL PROJ.EOTS
AIRl'0RTC0NS1RUC110N

07.2 ·
073 WAlEROONS1RUCTION
076 FIRE APPAAAnJS OAPITAl
076 BUILDING RENOVATION

077

SlR!:ETEQUIPMENrCAPftAL

018

06"1
91i2

CA.P!TALACQU1Sffi0N FUND
ANIMAL CONSffllJCTlON FUND
SUBTOTAi. OAPIT.Al PROJliCT FUNDS
FORECLOSURE STAPILIZATION
OCR.COB« ENTITLEMENT FUND
ENERGY 81.00K GRANT
POLICI:! GRANT FONDS
SUBTOTAL GIWIT REV£NUI!. FUNDS
POLICE RE11REMENT1RUST
RETIREMENTPAYOLrrlRUST

963

AIRPORT BOND TRUST

079

oao
081

082
088

964 EtDCREVOLV, lOANTRUST
8115 COR LOANlRUST
957 ZOO IMPROVEMEl'tTTRUST
9G8 WATERACQu1SmON1RUST
969 SIDl:WAlK REVOL. LOAN lRUST
960 STANDR0D1R1JST
981 SO. BAN, lfN'f. DEV, lRUST
982 FACADE LOANmUST
863 PARKS AND RECREAllON OEVELOPMEMl'lRUST
984 PROPERlY ABATEMENT FUND
S:UB'fOTAI. TRUST AND RESTRIOT!i'.D FUNDS
970 SElZED l'UNPS AGENCY
971 UNCU\~~ED PROPERlY AGENCY
873 STAlE SALES TAXA8ENOY
874 COBRA INS. AGENcY

203,851.33
710,268.82
1,351Jl33.70
64,463.07
165,493.39
870,918.63
3,36$.887.64
134,783.09
(129.35
7t9,722.62

9,503,1lat,iW
221,794.72
700,948.41
1,382,667,61S
79,747. 71
121,7'3.46
891,882.71
3 404,7'4,86
l31,D«,09
219,944.80
719,696.80

684,1)10.07
(2911,22&04)
810,0DO.OO

908,Stf,31
(474,33,7;tlo:
:m;l,000,DO

',GJW,4111,28

(481,696.86

(642,&14.16

1 35~ 089.50
83 054.00
81, 199.00
0.00

• 1,303,M1.li7
37,185.75
86 939.00
0.00
400,402.43
2,763,818,62
3.876..304.011

0

soo.:m,.10

2,764,380.MS
4,1111.1i7.111

ro.oo

(13,406.77

ro.oo

t IHtJun,urn

30,833.00
16,28'4.&4
(39,779.94
20,tl08.18
47,887.02
3,738.00
220,074.16
(26.92}
%23,781.24
(178 1u8.9BJ
0.00
180,841.32]
(49,247.93]
4, 131,76
6,741l.OO
ll.00
i,083.33
lli53,9,,: ·
la77813.0B

o.oo

(131,386.44}
0.00
1, 111!.G5
(130,263.79
{279,<153.79
333Ui2
1.31
(25.92
10,095.08
U3.00
0.00
(26,92
1.60
{3.17:
(2U2l

(O.OOJ
8,780.67

(144.773.21
(0, 00)
10,893.52

7,926,082.70
416,882.78
1U89.47
132,944.30
2811.33"Ui

7,646,608.91
410,217.28.
18,680.64
132,918,38
296,429.49

116,239.21

-11&.239.21

1S, 169,1&
180,672.58
3.17
77,177.85
3 286.43
68 778.08
8 307 324,78

24,34M2

18,143,26
180.674.06
0.00
77,161.93
3,288.43
70 073,D9
ll,0'5,340,57
23,3e-l, 12

o.oo

o.oo

0.00
10,124.69

O.OD
12,231.70

0.00
2,107.11

nnn

t'lM

11(111

0,00

8,295.03
1261984.22
(986",00)

o.oo
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¥

SO, BAN,·fiM', DEV. TRUST
FACADE LOAN 1RlJST
PARKS ANO RECREATION DEVELOPMENT TRUST
PROPERlY ABATEMENTFUNP
SUBTOTAL TRUST ANP Rl:STRIOTED FUNDS
070 SEIZED fUNDS AGENCY
971 UNCLAIMED PROPERlY AGENCY
973 STATE SALES TAX AGENCY
974 COBRA INS. AGENCY
875 FIREFIUHlt:R SECnuN 218
SUBTOTAL AGENCY FUNOS

:. '

961
982
96)
06-1

(

.

TOTAL ALL FUND TYPES

- PIM11alpn

3.17
77,177.86
3,288,-13·

sa.na.oe

1W,ll/'l.UIII

1,bl/

0.00
77,Ui1.93
3,288.43
70,073.08

(3.17)

{26.~2

0.00
3296.03

UOT,324.7$
24,349.12
0.00
D.00
10.124Ji9
0.00

{104& 340,67

34,473.71

Sll.696.112

0,00
1,122.11

33,239,Gi2,04

31,Qf!,484.02

U,668,148,02

23,384.12
0.00

o.ao

(281,984.22
(986,00
Q.00

o.oo

12,231.70
0,00

2,107.11

.

U.11.a.wll (''Olly F~:

- City OperaUIIIJ result rot June 2013 1•1as a loss of $1,278,89U3.

,_

i- City Revenues: : June was en awrage monlh tr re\1fflUU (S4nl 1.$ $3.2m last yea,}. We racehad Slt!e Liquor
.... re\enues or 1t3,302.00, an Increase of 3.69% owr lost yeen 109,267.00. We recel\e<I Ille fothr,vlng grant rewnues:
... Alrpolf Gran! of $88,427.00, Federal Consl/Ucllon Gtenl of $40,988.09.

;: 01m, ExpensH: Expenses were no,mal tor June. We had $6.2 mlflJon In ex(cense, (\I, $4.7 mllUon In 2012) and 4
_ mlt Ion In 1t1enue such thal at month't emr, the clly r, down $1;278,692.43 city runt!&}.

,..
,..

- City h1ve&1me11t PoGtute: At month end, Cl~ ftrods were 7'1% In cash or shod·tonn fnvslrnenls and 21% In long tellll
_ lnwslmenlll, $12,881,476.73 of 1111 assels (6 %) were In ons oflhe t~vo Stale of Idaho lnimlment pools and
$5,0DB,698.95 of all easels (21%) were In money mlllkel a11D0Unls, Key ln\eslmenl «dee:

..c.

..

i-

Investments
State Investment Pool Short Term:
State Investment Pool tongTerm:
Money Market rate

--

(

Rate
0.1648%
1.945%

.OS%

Change vs, last month

....

up.Ol03K

!-

down.1™'
nocllange

~

,-

i..

--

...

,_ 1'1ust OP.erallno Result lbr June Is a Ion er $27!M52.52. We Issued ,:a,461.'16 In llsnefits. lnleresl e1tmln~ of
_ $22,189.16 were not enough to cowr expenssa 11nd umeallied malkst oasaa of $243,630.77. Owtall, lbs trusls1ilnds
_ ha\e 2.8% of lhal1 lnu1almeole In cash or cash equlvalenls and 93.2% are In tonger l«m lnwslments.

,_ C~mblpal! Cl~ llld '.l:nlll l11!1!t11DI BQcri:IWl11g A1111l)'Jls;
Alllhe mane; we ha\o:
$ $1,661,484.1>2
Leas !he slu we really shouldn1 louch;
3,497,011&.01
Sanltallan E11ta:imae
3,467,,485,21
Waler l:nle,pris
1,876,628.34
WPC Enleq11:tse
,_
1,382,667.66
Madlaal Raaer.e
,_
891,862,71
Worker& Comp. Resents
7§!1Ml!i,Zli
Trust Funds
i,...

-

--

Result:

f..

$12,802,834.34

poallill'l numbs~ he!ICl:I no lnlemal borrowing this monlll. II rs $8,692,GaS.42 more than one )'tit ago. Toe tote!
,_ Thia
amounl of cash, CllshaqUlwlenls, and long !em, lmestmenls Is $4,651,483.42 more lhanone year agD (much du& lolhe •
,- $2,76318111 In t_he anlmal shelter const,ucllon fund, lho real.Ill of bond pro~eds for 1h11 proJeot rest due mostly lo modeal
c- lmprowmen!s In u!lflly cash balances).

.... outloolu July 1'1111 be an abcw awrago month for rownuos. Wawlll recslw lll.11' second largest J)lopmy tax remittance
,...

--

-

tom Bat111ock Counl)' for property taxes pall! In JiJM, whk:h I$ WIien the seoonll half of the annual assessment Is due.
,_ Wo expect eicpanaes 10 be awrag, l'lllh some a!IO'ovance for sea$0nal conlslructron acth!ly and paak amploymenl for
seasonal summer operations.
•

,...
~

overal11 June's pelfo/lllanca was sellslm,lory,
ReapaclliJlly,

- Oa\ld S1vlndell, Chief Flnanclsl Officer
-

--

--l

I

I

I
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3. Operating F~nd
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water

3.2. Reserves:.
Unrestricted operating reserves available at the beginning of the stµdy pe1iod total .
$2,799,000. Red Oak recommend~ tbe utility maintain a minimum.operating r,::serve of at
least 90 days of O&M, or approximately $1.9 mi11ion.

Reve~ue for the water utility is derived from water sales; interest income, and other .

miscellaneous sources: .:

. .

3.3.1. Water-Sales Revenue
Revenµe of the water utility derived prhn,l)t'j\y from water tat~s. Water sales rev~.r;iue
under existing.rates is based on the pi;-ojooted munb~_of water accounts and water usage
amo~t for ea.eh customor class. Annual revenu~ from existing water rates asswnes an
annual gi.:owth rate of 1.0 percent for single- family, multifamily, and circuit breaker
classes, while commercial and summer line customers assume 0.5 P(?!Cent growth
annually. Annual revenue from existing water sales is projected to increase from $8.9
million in 2011 to $9.4nilllionin 2015 and-is shown on Line 1 of Table 3Nl.
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r:
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r
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n
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Red Oak devel~ped a five,;year fi~a11claJ plan fat the ~tudy period, 2011 tluough 2015.
~purees of revem,J~. qnd revenue requirements for tlie.
utility are summarized in this
section. Table 3-1 shows the flow of fund_s.

3.3. Revenue

r.

j

· ·3.1. lntroducti on.

.3.3.2, MiscellAneous Revenu,i .
Miscel1aneous operating revenue includes site leases, Palisades and Chesterfield reservoir
water saies, Fory Inc. water sales,. conn~ctions, intere~t income, and other mis~ellaneous
items. Miscellaneous revenue in: the water operating fund, excludfng interest income, is
projected to average $445,300 during the,study period. Interest income is calculated using
2.0 percent annually and iii applied to t~e average annual operating fund balance.

3.4,·; Revenue· Requirements
Revenue requirements of the water utility include O&M1 ebt service transfi s
~p1tiil improvement fund, 1rMsfers to·the stomiwater fun and.other revenue
requirements.

,•,:,;~ REllDAK
• •"• ! CONSULTING·
• • • ••
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3.4.1:. Operation and Maintenance Expenses
O&M consists: of the cost of perso~el and materials to treat and distribute clean water on
a routin~ basis. Since these costs arb an ann~al ·obligation of the water utmty, they.must
be met from annual water sales.revenue. O&M is projected to increase from $7.1 million
in 2011 to $7.9 million in 2015 and represents 61.5 percent ofthe study period revenue
requirements. Table 3·2 summarizes projected O&M ex.penses.;
3.4.2. Debt. Service
The water µtility currently ma~es debt service p~yments ·oti a single:water revenue bond.
Since only water improvements were financed by this issue, the full debt service payment
!i_projected as a water utility revenue requil"em.ent.- De;,bt:service payments this issue .
average $7201000 annually and are expecte~ ~~ cease iif 2028 when 1he loan matures.
Payments on this loan represent aP.proximately 5.9 percent of total revenue requirements
throughout the ·study period. An it\terfund loan of $3.2 million is proposed over two
years, 201 l and 2012, to finance the conskQctio:n. of a central water shop facility.
Proposed payments on this interfund loan begin in 2011 and average $322,600 during the
study period.

on

3.4.3. Capital lmprCS.vement Fund Transfers.
The water capiJal.improvement· juµd was established ro'. the City to hetp finance water
capital improvement projects. Annual transfe~ to· the.capital improvement fund are
required beginning in 2q1z and continue tbro~g~iout the study period to assist in
financing the capital improvement program. These tr~nsfers total $8.7 million and
represent 17 .1 percent of the study period revenue requirements. All expenditures from
this fund must be approved by City Council.

3.4.4. SJormwatitr Fund Transfers
Cost.s: associated with supporting stonnwater scirvices are included in water utility
revenue requirem~ts. Sto1mwater ,ervices represent $2701600 or 0.4 percent of study
period rev.enue·requirements. · ·
·
· =
3.4.5. Other Revenue Requi.rements · Payment in-lieu-of taxes (PILOT) and return on equity remburse the City for the use of
asset~ and right-of-ways.. These amounts represent 2.3 percent.~d 13.0 pe1·cent of the
study period revenue requirements~ res~ectively:

·3.5. Cash Flow:Analysis
A comparison c;sf operating fun~ t(?Venue and revenµe_ requirements is shown in Table 3-1 !

Projected revenue-under existingiates is jnad~q1.1ate to·meet revenue requirements and
sustain minimum reserves throughout the.study period.
·
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Section 3
Operating Fund

..
.
.
To ensure a sound fiscal utility operation,' aii operating reserve equal. to at least 90 days of
O&M should be·inaintained. Thus; a:minin1um operating reserve ranging from $1,8
milli(?n-,in 2011 to $2,0 million in 2015 is retommended. ·

Revenu~s should also be sufficient tc(provide.adwate coverage for d~bt service. Debt
s";rvice coverage ofat least 125 percent is recommended.
~.
- P!ojected wate~ sale.s revenue undef existing rates is in~dequate fo m~et revenue
requirements ahd sustain minimum reserves throughout the study period. Red Oak
recon_unends adjusting rates at the beginning each fiscal year during the study period to
produce the water sales revenue shown fu the tabulation below.
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r

!

itE1fllJilr~IJ:;;i~;r,11;:

'
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2011
2012
2013
20~4
201S

r:

I' ,:

r
n
n

$ 687,900

$8,933,700
· 9,298,900
· 9,329,400
9,360,200

1,487,200
2,325,300
. 3,233,400
4,217,000

9,391;200

$9,621,600
10,786,100
11,654,700
12,593,600

13,608,200

Red Oak°fi1r~he1· recommends annually updating the water. utilfty'sfive~yearfi,iancial
plan to recognize alianges in growth, wate,- sales, operating expen,ses, capital
·
improvement needs, and capitalfinancing requirements.
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5. Rate Design

.[

5.1. .Introduction: ..

rft

In the developqient of schedules of water rates, a ·basi.c consideration is t~ establish ·
equitable charge~. to customers ¢0mJJief!surate with the cost of providi·ng·s~tvice. The
only .method of assessing eqtirely equitable ~vater rates would lie the determination of
each ·customer•s biJI based upon their particular service.requirements. Since this is
impractical, schedules of rates are no~ally designed to meet average conditions for
gr~ups of customers hav!ng similar service requirements. Rates should be reasona~ly
simple in application and· subject to as few misinterpretations as possible,

r
L

r

Cost of service studies are the result of engineering estimates based to some extent upon
judgment and experience, and detai]ed results should not be used as ex~ct answers;bU:t as
guidelines to ~e necessity forrate\aajustments. Practical considerations·may enter into
the fipal choice of charg~, recognizing suoh factors as· previous rate levels, the degree of
adjustments indicated and policies concerning the application ofrates. Recognition of
EnvironmentalJ>rotection Agency=regulations must also be considered ta assure receipt
of fe~eral grant funds.

I..

I.
[

5.2. Exl~Ung Rates

[

EX:isqng r~es have been.in effect since OctQbcr 2008. Monthly base charges vary by.
meter size and are applicable to all customers. Volume charges vary by customer class
and include a two-block increasing charge structure for single family residential
·
customers and auniform. charge structure for multiftunily, comm.eroial, and swmnedine
customers. Circuit breaker rates are 70% ·of'existing rates for single family and
sunmi.erline customers with %-, 1-, 1%-, and 2..inch IQ.~ters. Outside City.rates are 50%
greater than inside City rates.
·
.
.

f.
[
[

.5.3.

r. .·

Proposed Rates
.

Revenue requirements and cost or'service allocations described in previous sections of
this report provide the·basis..for designing water rates. Revenuereqµ~rements show the
need for adjqsqnents and ·tfie 1evet:of'revenue required, Cost of service allocations lead· to
U11itcosts of service, which areused·in the rate design pl'ocess as a basis for determinjng
whether proposed rates will reasonably recover cost ofservice from customer·classes as
well as prov~de: the total levei revenue required.
.

[

of

[

Cost of.service rates have been developed for the test period tl:iat proportionately r¢cover
cJass cost of servioe and increase ~nnual water sl!,les. Proposed rates for 2011 through
..
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[

2014 transition from existing rates to 2015- &mt of service rates· and are shown ht Table 5:.
1. Proposed rat.es retain the existing.rate structure and· are designed to generate the
additional .revenue needed in 2011 llirough io1s.

l_
I.

[
[

r
I

L ....,

[

Proposed rat~s include monthly_seyvice charges and volume charges. P;roposed service
charges are designed to re.cover costs related to utility billing and meters. Utility billing
costs are the same for all meter sizes, while ·meter costs vary"by ~eter size.

volume cblifges are applicable to a11 watel' usage andlare designed to recover volumerelated costs. Volume charges.for fiscal year 2015 range ftom $2.15 per thousand, gallons
for the nonresidential class to $3.8:5 .per·thousand gallons for sunimerlin~ customers. The
difference h{ volume charges is reiated to different -usage· and fire protection
chara?teristics of each: customer class.
·

5.4. Typlc~,: ~onthly Water. BIiis

[·
r-

[.

Table S:~ compares typical monthly single family and nomesideri~al water bills under
existing and proposed rates over the·study period. Based on median monthly usage of
9,000 gallons, single family bills wilt increase $1.93 per-month :from $25.05 under
existing rates to $26.98 under proposed 2011 rates.
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2. Operating Fund

n
n
;

~

n

Sources of revenue and revenue requirements for the wastewater utility fur the five-year
study period, 2006 through 2010, are summarized in this section. Table 2-1 shows the
flow of funds.

Il

2.1. Financial Plan Scenarios

n

Red Oak analyzed four financial plan scenarios to determine the effects on annual rate
adjustments by varying the timing and amount of debt issued, and including revenue
received from existing or proposed capacity fees. The financial plan scenarios included!

n.

![ I

• Scenflrlo J,

r

• Sce11ario 2. Includes existing capacity fee revenue and cash financing capital
projects from user fees and reserves over the study period.
Scenario 1 best reflected the wastewater utility financial objectives of mitigating revenue
increases, and maximizing the mix of existing debt and equity to finance capital projects.

r

Includes proposed capacity fee revenue and cash financing capital
projects from user fees and resenres over the study period.

!

;i !'

r,
I '

i '

2.2. Revenue
Revenue of the wastewater utility is derived from wastewater service rates, investment
mcome, and otl1er miscellaneous sources.

r:
I;

2.2.1. Wastewater Service Revenue
Revenue of the wastewater .utility is derived principally from wastewater service rates.
The existing schedule of wastewater service rates became effective October 2005.

n
! '

n
I ;

Estimated 2006 through 2010 wastewater service rate revenue is based on the number of
wastewater accounts and amount of water sales billed fur wastewater service during 200S.
Annual revenue from existing wastewater service rates, assuming a 2.0 percent growth
factor for utility billing customers, is projected to increase from $6.8 million in 2006 to
$7.4 tn1Ilion in 2010.

r-,

j

I

I

~

p

•

n
[ ;

Wastewater service rate revenue is received from utility billing and special billing
accounts. Utility billing accounts are billed by the utility billing personnel. Special billing
accounts are billed by personnel at the wastewater treatment plant. A summary of
projected revenue under existing rates for 2006 is shown on the following page.
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n
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I

Special BIDJng

!

:

~

Unmonitored
Monitored
Chubbuck (North ofl-86)
Seplio Haulers
Total Special B11Ung
Alt Olher customers
Total Utillty Billing

,...,
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$51,700
$957,300
$503,400

$49,800
St,562,lOO
ti.2~3.900
$1,321,100

2.3. Miscellaneous Revenue
MisceJlaneous operating revenue includes biosolids/land lease revenue, cogeneration
power sales, interest income, and other miscellaneous revenue. Miscellaneous revenue in
the wastewater operating fund, excluding interest inc.oine, is.projected to average $78,800
during the study period. Interest income is calculated using 2.5 percent at111ual interest
rate applied to the average aru1ual operating fund balance.
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Revenue requirements of the wastewater utility include operation and maintenance
. O&M) expense, routille ca ital outlays, ifebt service and transfers to the capital
tlllprovement.!Y_n.

~

) f
I

2.4. Revenue Requirements

_i

*M

2.4.1. Operation arid Maintenance Expense
O&M consists of the cost of personnel and materials to collect, treat and dispose of
wastewater on a routine basis. Since these costs are an annual obligation of the
wastewater utility, they must be met from wastewater service rate revenue. O&M
projections include an average 4.0 percent armual inflation allowance. O&M is projected
to increase from $3.4 million in 2006 to $4.0 million 2010 and represents approximately
47.0 percent of total revenue requirements. Table 2-2 summarizes projected O&M
expenses.
2.4.2. Routine Capital
Annual capital outlays are projected for recurring minor capital additions and
replacements. All allowance for capital outlays is projected to range from $30,000 in
2006 to $303,800 in 2010 and represents about 3.0 percent of revenue requirement.
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Operating Fund
2.4.3,

Debt Service

The wastewater utility currently makes debt service payments on State Loan 1897·01,
1898-09, 1899-01, and a 2014 refunded bond issue. Since only wastewater
. improvements were financed by the issue, all of the debt service 1s
ecte as a
~ astewater utility revenue requirement. e service payments on existing debt average
a6out $1.9 million annualJy. The""loans mature in 2022) 2023, 2024, and 2014,
respectively. Payments on existing debt service represent approximately 23.6 percent of
revenue requirements.
2.4.4. Capital Improvement Fund Transfers
The wastewater capital improvement fund was established by the City to help finance
wastewater capital improvement projects. Equal annual additional transfers of $580,000
are required in 2007 through 2010 to assist in :financing tl1e capital impl'Ovement
program. These transfers total 6.0 percent of the study period revenue requirements.
Payment in-lieu-of taxes and return on equity pay the City back for the use of assets and
right-of-ways. These amounts repr~ent 3.6 percent and 16.8 percent of the study period
revenue requirements) respectively. All expenditures from this fund must be approved by
tl1e City Council.

2.5. Cash Flow Analysis
A comparison of operating fund revenue and revenue requirements is shown in Table 2-1.
Projected revenue under existing rates is insufficient to meet revenue requirements
through the study period.
To ensure a sound fiscal utility operation, an operating reserve equal to at least 60 days of
O&M should be maintained. Thus, a minimum opel'ating reserve ranging from $585,000
in 2006 to $690,000 in 2010 is recommended.
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Projected revenue under existing wastewater service rates is inadequate to meet revenue
requirements of the wastewater utility through 2007. The wastewater service revenue
increases shown below are projected to meet future wastewater utility expenses) provide
adequate operating reserves, and satisfy debt service coverage requirements throughout
· the study period. Itis reco111,nended that this cmhjlow analysis be updated a11nually to·
reflect curre11t estimates of revenJ1es, O&M, capital inrprove111e11t needs, and capital
/l1'anclng requirements.
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5. Wastewater Service Rates
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In the development of schedules of rates for wastewater service. a hasio consideration is
to est11blish equitable charges to customers commensurate with the cost of providing
service. The only method of assessing entirely equitable rates for wastewater service
would be the detemtlnation of each customer's bill based upon his particular service
requirements. Since this is impractical, schedules of rates_ are normally designed to meet
average conditions for groups of customers having. similat service requirements. Rates
should be reasonably simple in application and subject to as few misinterpretations as
possible.
The cost of service studies .are the result of engineering estimates based to some extent
upon judgment and experience, and detailed results ·should not be used as exact answers
but as guides to the necessity for rate adjustments. Practical considerations may enter into
the final choice of charges, recognizing such factors as previous rate levels, the degree of
adjustments indicated and policies concerning the application of rates. Recognition of
EPA regulations must also be given to assure receipt of federal grant funds.

.

5.1. Existing Rates
i ~

'

.

r:

1

I •

r
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I

Tho existing rates, sho;wn in Table 5-1, have been in effect since October 2005.
Residential customers are charged a flat rate for all usage. All other customers are
charged a service charge and a volume charge based on actual winter water usage. In
addition to volume charge.CJ, industrial users are charged a separate strength charge for
discharges in order to separately recoup the cost of treating potentially more potent
wastewater.
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5.2. Cost of Service Rates
The revenue requirements and cost of service allocations descn'bed in previous sections

Jfl. 'oftlilii report provide the basis for designing wastewater rate."9. Revenue req\drements

'show the need for adjustment and the level of revenue required. Cost of service
allocations lead to unit costs of service that are l1Sed in the rate design process as a basis
for detennining whether proposed rates will reasonably recover cost of service from
customer classes as well as provide the total level of revenue required.
Cost of service rates have been developed for the test period that proportionately recover
class cost of service and increase annual wastewater sales revenue. Cost of service rates
are also shown in Table 5-1 and faclude a flat monthly charge for residential customers, a
monthly service charge and volume charge for all other customers. Industrial customers
are charged separately for all sewage strength components including BOD, TSS 1 TKN,
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6. System Caps.city. Fees
6.1. Introduction
The City charg~s water capacity f~es to all'new connectors. This fee·is intended to
recover the new connector's propo~~cµtatQ share of the Ci!}''s water backbone facility
cos.ts .. The·current water fees have been in effect since October.ioo9•.

~.2. System Buy-in Method
.

.

The capacity fee calculations perfonned in this study are. based.011 tne system buy-in
metliod. This method is based.on the concept that exi~ting_90stomers, through rates and
other assessments, have developed a valuable water system. A new customer must "buy~
in11·to this system by making a contribution:equal to the amount equity a similar
existing customer has in the system. ;Note this is not the. cost to provide new service to the
new·customer, and when new capacity is needed, all customers will bear·the cost.

of

To compute the system capacity fees using the system huY.~in method, the following
general procedure i~ used:
;
·
.•. Deteanine existing wate~ system equity._

[

• Estimate system capacity.
• Calculate u11it equity cost.

[

• Calculate capacity fee.
Implementation .of fees designed using the system buy-in mQthod results in new
customers paying their proportionate share of facility cc;,sts incurred to serve them, The
fees are dependent on the capacity required to serve a customer and the tlnit equity cost of
existing facilities expressed as dollars per iqtlt of capacity. Fees u~ng the system t?uyMin
method can readily be calculated using utility fixed asset records. Because fees can be
traced to suoh records, they are-generally understood\by customers and supported on an
engin~ering economic basis.

.LJ
r

l...

[

6.2.1. Syst~m Equity
Detennination of the system value ia the fir.st important consideration in using the system
buy-in methodology to compute capacity fees. System value is-calcul~ed by adding
replacement co.st of=existing back~one system inves~ent to the cost ofplanned capi{al
improvements. The backbone system includes all major water ~istribution and production
faciUties, .
·
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r.

Replacement cost represents .the cos~ of dupiicating existing facilities at current prices.
The cost to replace the Citts wat~r system was developed using historical cost
infonnation fi'om fixed ~s~t records and restating these costs it:i cU1T~t dollars using tlte
Construction Cost Index'(CCI) published by Engineering News~Record (ENR). Table 6-1
shows t11e allocation. of system assets to .functional co~f components to ai;r:ive at 2010
replacement costs.

[

r.-

~-. ;o determine net eq~ity j~ the system, replacem~t. C?st of_~e ~xisting backb~ne system
- 1s reduced by the o_utstanding d~bt on ~elated fac1hties. ~qwty 1s not reduced by
accminilated depreciatio1:1, ·Once a new c~stomer,conn.ects to the water s stem, that
· customer begins paying c arges for. !i~ice simil§T to all existing customers. These
charges typically include pa}'lllenf for retirement of outstanding debt. For this reason, it is
fl( ~cessary to deduct o~tstanding debt from system value before developing tnese fees.
Table ·6-2 develops the system capacity fee for the study Pt=?riod. System net equity is
projected to il1¢rease from $48.i million in 2011 to $62.5 million in 2015. These
h1creases are due to the addition of schedul~d major capital· improvements, reduction in
outstanding debt, and an annual inflation allowance ofS.O percent.
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6.2.2. Equivalent C~paclty Units
In order to app_ly an.equitable fee to .new customers, customer classes:and meter sizes
need tb be expressed in common capacity units. The sfiindard capacity unit is defined as
l1aving the ,average wate~ characteristics of~ existing customer with a 1~inch meter.
Meter sizes 1-inch and smaller serve about 66 perceut of the City's wate~ customers.
Capacity units are d~termined for a1lother meter sizes based on the meter capacity ratios
of maximum safe continuous capacity as puJ,lished in the AWWA M6 manual. The
nwnber of capacity units is projeo!ed to increase from 18,623 in 2011 to-19,363 in 2015.

wl

[
[

[

6.2.3. Unit Fee Calc.ulation
The capacity fee p~ capacity unit i~ the r~sult of dividing the net eqµity of backbone
system investments by the total-capacity units. The proposed 2011 capacity fee is $2,580
for a C\1Stomer ·with a :l.:inch ,vater m~ter or :~aller. Table :6~3 shows existing and
proposed- water capacity'fees for each meter siize for the study period.
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6. System Capacity Fees
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The City charges wastewater,.capacity fees to all new connectors. Th.is fee is intended to
recover the new coMector's proportionate share of the City's wastewater backbone
facility costs. The current wastewater fees have been in effect since 2006.

~·
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6.1. System Buy-In Method

,.....

TI1e capacity fee calculations performed in this study are based on the system buywin
method. This method is based on the coneept that existing custbmers, through rates and
other assessments, have developed a valuable wastewater system. A new customer must
"buy-in" to this system by making a contribution equal to the amount of equity a similar
ex:isting customer has in the system. Note this is not.the cost to provide new service to
the new customer, and when new capacity is needed; all customers will bear the cost.
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To compute the system capacity fees using the system buy-in method) the following
general procedure is used.
• Detennine existing wastewater system equity.

•
•
•
I

Estimate system capacity.
Calculate unit equity cost.
Calculate treatment plant capacity fee.
Calculate collection system capacity fee

Implementation of fees designed 11sing the system buy-in method :results in new·
customers paying their proportionate share of facility costs incurred to serve them. The
fees are dependent on the capacity required to serve a customer and the unit equity cost of
existing facilities expressed as dollars per unit of capacity. Fees using the system buy~in
method can readily be calculated using utility ftxed asset records. Because fees can be
traced to such records, they are generally understood by customers and supported on an
engineering economic basis.

6.1.1. System Equity
Determination of the system value is the first important consideration in using the system
buy-in methodology to compute capacity. System value is calculated by adding
replacement cost of existing backbone system investment to the cost of planned capital
improvements. The backbone system includes all major wastewater collection and
tJ.'eatment facilities. The backbone collection mains are defined as the system of major
wastewater collection interceptor sewer mains, typically including those greater than 12
inches in diameter. Assets have been grouped into two categories, treatment-related
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;
;

facilities and collection-system facilities. This separation recognizes that some customers
will not receive benefit from the collection system infrastructure, such as customers of
Chubbuck.

rI
!

'.. !

Replacement cost represents the cost of duplicati11g existing facilities at cmTent prices.
The cost to replace the City's wastewater system was developed using historical cost
infonnation from fixed asset i-ecol'ds and restating these costs in cmrent dollars using the
Construction Cost Index (CCI) published by Engi11eeri,1g News~Record (ENR). Table 6..
1 shows the allocation of system· assets to functional cost components to anive at 2007
replacement cosls. Table 6-2 shows the percent allocation to functional cost components
for each asset category.
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To determine net equity in the systems replru::ement cost of the existing backbone system
is reduced by the outstanding debt on related facilities. Equity is not reduced by
accumulated depreciation. Once a new customer connects to the wastewater system, that
..£.ustomel' begins pa)1ng chciries for service like all existing §ustomeis. t[ese charges:__
typically include payment for retirement of outstandins: debt. For this reason, it is
·necessary to deduct outstanding debt .from system val~ before developing these fees.
-
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Table 6-3 develops the treatment plant capacity fee for the study period. Treat:rn.ent plant
net equity is projected to increase from $37.2 million in 2007 to $44.S million in 2010.
Table 6-4 develops the collection system capacity fee for the study period. Collection
system net equity is projected to increase from $22.l million in 2007 to $24.9 million in
2010. These increases are due to the addition of scheduled major capital improvements,
reduction in outstanding debt, and an annual inflation allowance of 4 percent.

e.1.2. Equivalent Ca~aclty Units
In order to apply an equitable fee to new customers, all customer classes need to be
expressed in common capacity units. For the puq10se of this calculation, the standard
capacity unit is based on the system maximum month flow in gallons per day (gpd). The
standard capacity unit is a single family· equivalent with a l •inch watel' meter contributing
200 gpd of wastewater flow. Fees for other water meter sizes are based on the meter
capacity ratios ofmaximum safe continuous capacity as published in the AWWA Manual
M6. ·The number of capacity units is projected to increase from 8,058,000 gpd in 2007 to
8)551,300 in 201 o.
6.1.3.

Unft Fee Calculation

The treatment plant capacity fee per unit is detennined by dividing the net equity of
treatment plant assets by the total capacity units. This unit cost is multiplied by 220 gpd
and the relative meter capacity ratio for the meter size calculated. The proposed 2007
treatment plant capacity fee is $1,020 for a customer with a 1-inclt water meter.
Table 6~5 details the capacity fees for each meter size fur the study period.
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@heardstclair.com
Nathan M. Olsen, ISB No. 7373
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Case No.: CV-2014-1520-0C .

Plaintiffs,
vs.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,

PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM

City.

The plaintiffs submit this supplemental memorandum in support of their Motion
for Class Certification and response to the Defendant City of Pocatello's (City) Motion
for Summary Judgment. This memorandum is supported by the pleadings previously
filed in this case, the record in the Building Contractors' case and the affidavits of
Nathan M. Olsen, Ed Quinn, and Logan Robinson submitted herewith.

PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM - 1
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The City's Impermissible Use of Connection Fees Constitutes a Taking
Regardless of its Assessment.

As has been noted, the Building Contractors' case solely sought injunctive and
declaratory relief, i.e. a declaration of rights as to certain City policies and action and a
halt to any impermissible policies moving forward. In contrast, this case addresses the
potential compensation for past harms resulting from the City's improper conduct, i.e. the
taking of property through the City's unconstitutional PILOT program. As such, one of
the key questions before the Court is whether regardless of the methodology utilized for
the "calculation" of the connection fees, the improper "use" of connection fees for the
PILOT can be recovered in a takings action. As discussed below, well established law in
Idaho suggests that the initial test of the appropriateness of a fee is whether it wa&
actually used for its authorized and intended purpose, regardless of its calculation.
A.
Connection Fees that Are Not Used for Their Intended and
Authorized Purposes are Disguised Taxes Regardless of How They Were
Assessed.

In a leading Idaho case Loomis v. City of Hailey, l 19 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272
( 1991 ), the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the legality of a connection fee being
collected by the City of Hailey under the so called "equity buy-in" formula developed by
the City. In so doing, however, the Court established a distinct and fundamental test that
must be determined before any analysis of the calculation or "assessment" of a fee:
First, we must determine whether the connection fee constitutes an impermissible
tax. Secondly, we must determine whether the connection fee is appropriately and
reasonably assessed.
Id. 119 Idaho at 438,807 P.2d at 1277. (emphasis added)

The Court then provides the analysis for what constitutes "an impennissible tax:"
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The Idaho Revenue Bond Act authorizes the collection of sewer connection fees,
Schmidt v. Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 48,256 P.2d 515 (1953), and it is clear
that so long as the fees collected pursuant to the Idaho Revenue Bond Act are
allocated and budgeted in conformity with that Act they will not be construed as
taxes. However, if fees are collected under the disguise of the Act and allocated
and spent otherwise, then the fees are primarily revenue raising and will be
construed as truces. Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 .
(1989). Thus, to determine whether the sewer connection fees are in reality taxes
in disguise we must determine whether the monies collected from those funds are
dispersed in accordance with that Act.
Id.

In applying the analysis to the facts in Loomis, the Court held that:
It is undisputed that the City of Hailey places the connection fees into a separate
fund to be used for replacement of sewer and water system components, however,
no monies from this fund are transferred to the city's general fund, and none are
used to retire the bond indebtedness. 1 The monthly service charges are used to pay
for the bond indebtedness and general operating costs of the systems.
Id. (emphasis added)
If further held that:

In the present case, the fact that connection fees are specifically expended on
replacement of system components is entirely within the discretion of the city
government as long as other revenues allowed by LC. § 50-1033 from the system
are appropriately used to pay for the other necessary purposes including
retirement of bond indebtedness;
Id. 119 Idaho at 440,807 P.2d at 1278. (emphasis added).

In essence, the Idaho Supreme Court made it abundantly clear that regardless of
how the municipality assesses or calculates fees, it cannot improperly use the funds. This
approach simply makes sense, in that it prevents mischief or the "facade" of a particular
fee formula which has the appearance of propriety but which in fact hides the improper
use of the fees. Thus, the real question for determining whether a "fee" is in fact a
"disguised tax" is not how it is calculated, but rather how it is used. In other words, the
1

As will be discussed and applied infra, the Loomis Court acknowledged that connection fees cannot be
used for "general fund" purposes or to "retire bond indebtedness." That is because according to the
statute bond payments are to be derived solely from the monthly charges for services (i.e. the user fee.)
Id. IC § 50-1033.
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Court should simply "follow the money" to determine whether there·is a disguised tax:
In this case, there is no dispute that connection fees have been improperly used in the past
and since the decision in the Builders' Case.
B.
As Reflected in the Findings, the Record of the Building Contractors'
Case Connection Fees Were Historically Co-mingled and Transferred to the
General Fund for the Impermissible PILOT Program.

The record in the Building Contractors' case includes a voluminous
number of pages of City budget documents, affidavits and deposition testimony from
which the plaintiff painstakingly demonstrated to the Court the flow of connection fees to
the general fund for use in PILOT program (prior to March of2013). Accordingly,
beginning with page 7 and throughout its Memorandum Decision, the Court affirmed
that: (1) that there was never "any evidence as to how the connection fees and user fees
could have been over separately accounted for prior to March 2013" and (2) "[a]fter the
connection and user fees were co-mingled into the water and sewer funds, the evidence
supports, and the city concedes, that the city then transferred money from the water and
sewer funds into the general fund under transfers at a been called by various names. "2
The Court's findings on this issue were extensive and conclusive:
As noted, the record reflects that prior to March 2013 the connection and user fees
were collectively poured into the water and sewer funds accounts. In his
deposition, Swindell explained that when the building department collected a
connection fee as part of a building permit, 'then those funds and dollars are
credited to the water fund or water pollution control fund as appropriate.'
Swindell further explained that connection/capacity fees were channeled into
three funds: 1) building permit - designated as fund 001; 2) water - designated as
fund 031; and 3) wastewater - designated as fund 032. Swindell also explained
that the user fees were poured into the water and wastewater funds named above
in his first affidavit Swindell stated: "the capacity/connection fees are collected in
segregated into the appropriate water and wastewater funds. 11 in the letter to
Logan Robinson, Mayor Chase names the "Water, Sewer and Sanitation Funds"
- See CV-2011-5228 Nov. 13, 2013, Memorandum Decision, p. 8 (emphasis added)
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as the "enterprise funds." Mayor Chase explains they are called the "enterprise
funds" because the money placed in these funds comes mainly from fees
generated by each of the three public utility enterprises.
Next, money from the above named funds was transferred into the general fund
under a program that has had various names including, Return on Equity, Rate of
Return, PILOT, and franchise fees.

***
Swindell further explains that the "internal franchise fee" AND "Payment In Lieu
Of Taxes (PILOT)" have replaced the "rate of return" or "return on equity." The
franchise fee and PILOT are two different transfers that are taken from the water
and wastewater funds. Swindell explained that "the combined amounts of FY 13
franchise fee and PILOT are 13 .8% of planned revenue for water and 15 .5% for
sewer."
According to Swindell's Fourth Affidavit, the City does not charge a PILOT fee to
connection fees, but only to the user fees charged to the customers of the systems.
What the Affidavit does not say is that PILOT fee has never been charged to
connection fees during the ti~e that both connection and user fees were comirtgled. However, prior to that Affidavit, it was clear that all connection and
user fees were poured into the three "enterprise funds." The City then had a policy
of transferring money from the water and sewer funds into the general fund.

***
What is clear and undisputed at this point is that revenue collected from the
connection fees and user fees collectively were transferred to the General Fund,
via the PILOT the transfer program, and used to "help fund the activities of the
General Fund."
C.
New Evidence Shows that the Funds Transferred Into the Newly
Created March 2013 Water & Sewer Connection Fee Funds Were
Improperly Used to Re-Pay Bond Indebtedness.

In March of 2013, without any notice or approval from the City council, the City
created two separate funds to hold the water and sewer connection fees (Funds 37/38),
and then transferred into those funds from the general fund the equivalent of what it had
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collected and used from the connection fees from 2007 through 2013. 3 The total amount
deposited into the two newly created accounts at that time was $2,557,900.56. 4
There is nothing further in the Building Contractors' case record with regard to
what happened to the monies in Funds 37/38. However, after that case was decided and
the current case was filed, there is now newly admitted evidence on how Funds 37/3 8
have been or intended to be spent by the City. As such, there is now no question
whatsoever the every connection fee dollar collected from 2007 through March of 2013
and thereafter has been impermissibly used by the City.

In the summer of 2014, the plaintiffs moved for a pre-judgment writ of attachment
to freeze the newly created Funds 37/38 as a potential source of recovery for damages.
After the motion was filed, the City of Pocatello approved its FY 2015 Budget. 5 The City
submitted the Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein in response to Plaintiffs' motion. Ms.
Stroschein's sworn testimony includes the following explanation and stunning admission
with regard to Funds 37/38:
Funds 37 and 38 are the funds which record the connection/capacity fees. These
funds are comprised entirely of connection/capacity fees that have been collected
by the City's water and wastewater departments. At no point has the City ever
deposited any user fees that contain a PILOT component into Funds 37 or 38,
these funds represent the entirety of the connection/capacity funds collected by
the City since its inception in 2007. The third fund group is Funds 60 and 61.
Funds 60 and 61 are the debt service funds for the water and wastewater
departments. The debt service funds are reserves that are set aside to meet the
annual debt service payments required by the bond covenants.
3

4

5

During an August 13, 2013, hearing in the Building Contractors' case, City attorney Blake Hall admitted
the following: "So the City said here's the length of time we've been charging the connect fee, here's the
total amount of money that we have spent - or that.we have collected during that time period. Pull that
money out of our general account, and we put it into a dedicated account so we can assure total and
complete transparency." See marked trial transcript provided as attachment to May 22, 2015, Olsen Aff.
as Ex. 1.
·
See second page of the "Statement of Cash" as of"June 30, 2013" provided by the City in the Building
Contractors' case, attached as Ex. l for the convenience of the Court to Olsen Aff. Ex. 1 (and marked.)
Olsen Aff. Ex. 1.
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In the past monies are (sic) transferred into these funds from Funds 31 and
32, but after the creation of Funds 37 and 38 we have budgeted and
transferred monies to Funds 60 and 61 to cover the required current debt
service payment. 6
Ms. Stroschein goes onto testify that:
Consistent with the FY2014 Budget for the City, the City has determined
that the connection/capacity fees will be used for debt services. As such, the
City budgeted approximately $725,826 for debt services for the water department
in FY2014. The City intends to use the remaining funds from Fund 37 for debt
service in FY 2015. The City has budgeted approximately $1,384,780 for debt
service for the wastewater department in FY 2014. This will exhaust nearly all of
the funds in Fund 38. 7
Thus the equivalent of all of the connection fee funds collected from 2007
through 2015 have been allocated or spent on debt service payment. Of further note, in
adding up the numbers an additional $320,949 in connection fees had been deposited
since the end of June 2013 - through July 15-2014. Thus the total amount of fees
deposited into those accounts since its inception in March of2013 through July 15 of
2014 is $2,878,849.56 - all of which has been allocated toward "debt retirement."
In other words, after the City transferred the equivalent of what it had collected
and spent in connection fees into Funds 37/38, rather than spend those fund~ on the
"replacement, maintenance or repair" of the existing system as required by statute and
which it has long indicated to the public were the intended use of these funds, it instead
has spent or budgeted all those fees and the fees collected thereafter on repayment of
bonds which is not authorized by law. As emphasized in the Loomis decision,
connection fees are not to be used for bond retirement, but rather the debt obligations
should come from the monthly user fees. Loomis at 119 Idaho at 440,807 P.2d at 1278,
IC § 50-1033.
6

August 29, 2014, Affidavit of Joyce Stroschein, 114.

7

Id.115.
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Simply put, in "following the money," not one single connection fee dollar since
2007 has been spent for authorized uses under law. 8 From 2007 through March of 2013,
no connection fee funds were spent on replacement, maintenance or repairs of the system,
but rather were transferred to the general fund where they were improperly expended for
the general purposes of the City. Then, in March of 2013, in a blatant attempt to "cover
its tracks," the City transferred the equivalent of what it had collected in connection fees
into the newly created Funds 37/38. Those funds, and the connection fees collected
thereafter, were then improperly spent and allocated for debt retirement, effectively
removing that statutory obligation from the monthly user fees contrary to IC§ 50-1033.
Thus, the calculation for determining damages from improper taking of connection fees is
relatively simple - 100% of all connection fees collected by the City from 2007 through
2015.
D.

The New Evidence Showing the City's Improper Use of the Connection Fees
in Direct Contradiction of the Red Oak Studies Warrants Equitable Relief.

Along with monetary damages, the Plaintiffs' Complaint seeks "any other legal or
equitable relieve deemed justified by the Court." Complaint, Prayer for Relief16.
Equitable relief differs from that of a damage award in that:
"EQUITY LOOKS UPON THAT AS DONE WHICH OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN
DONE."
Equity will treat the subject-matter, as to the collateral consequences and
incidents, in the same manner as if the final acts contemplated by the
8

What is particularly troubling is that this sudden reallocation of the fees contained in Funds 37/38 toward
"debt service" was clearly a blatant attempt to avoid having these funds frozen pursuant to the Plaintiffs'
then pending pre-judgment writ of execution. See 120 of Ms Stroschein's affidavit wherein she states
that "Freezing Funds 37 and 38 will have significant implications on the City's retirement of debt
obligations."
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parties had been executed exactly as they ought to have been; not as the
parties might have executed them.
Blacks Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition at 435.
Given the new evidence and facts that have come to light after the completion of
the Building Contractors' case and the filing of the Complaint in this case, the Court is
not precluded from providing such equitable relief. As such, it should order a halt of the
assessment of the connection fees until the City can enact a policy for the proper
assessment and use of such fees.
Throughout the Building Contractors' case and this case, the City has heavily
promoted the "Red Oak •• studies conducted in 2006 and 2010 as the supporting basis for
the assessment of user and connection fees in the City of Pocatello, including the current
fees (which are approved on an annual basis by the City council.) The reports were
utilized to justify a capacity fee rate jump of 1,500% alone between 2006 and 2007, with
a consistent increase of between 8% to 10% each year since then and until at least 2015. 9
The Court has relied upon the Red Oak studies in determining that the City's assessment
of the connection fees, including the steep increases, were appropriate. Given the
additional evidence in this case, there is now no question that the City did not implement
a connection fee based on what was publicized by the Red Oak studies, suggesting that
the studies were prepared and presented by the City in bad faith as well as bringing into
serious question the methodology that was allegedly used in the studies to calculate the
connection fees.
The Red Oak Studies (prepared for water and wastewater respectively) explicitly
indicate that the '"debt service" payments are to be derived from the revenues obtained
9

See again copies of the City Resolutions passed in 2006 and 2007, attached as Exhibits 5 and 6 to the
January 4, 2013, Affidavit of Nathan Olsen in the Building Contractors' case.
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from the monthly user fees. 10 That debt obligation is part of the "revenue requirements"
factored into the monthly fee rate recommended by the studies.

11

The studies are also

explicit in that the capacity or connection fees are based solely on the "replacement" of
the existing system through capital improvement projects. 12
The studies then make a virtually identical and critically important disclosure with
regard to the assessment and calculation of the connection/capacity fees:
To determine net equity in the system, replacement costs of the net equity in the
system, replacement cost of the existing backbone system is reduced by the
outstanding debt on related facilities. Equity is not reduced by accumulated
depreciation. Once a new customer connects to the (water/wastewater) system,
that customer begins paying charges for service similar to all existing customers.
These charges typically include payment for retirement of outstanding debt. For
this reason, it is necessary to deduct outstanding debt from system value
before developina; these (capacity) fees. 13
In direct contradiction to the Red Oak studies relied upon by the City in its
connection fee rates, none of the nearly $3,000,000 dollars assessed and collected were
ever used for "replacement" of the "existing backbone" of the system. Rather, those
funds were first transferred to the general fund for general purpose use by the City. Then
- after having this fact exposed in the Building Contractors• case - the City then
transferred the equivalent of what it had collected in connection fees during that period
into newly created Funds 37/38. The City then expended or budgeted all of the funds
toward debt service which was to be covered by the user fees.

'0

See the 2010 Red Oak Studies on Water- Sections 3-1, 3.3.1, 3.4, and 3.4.2, and 2006 Wastewater2.2, 2.4, 2.4.3, and 2.5. attached and marked for the convenience of the Court in the May 22, 2015,
Olsen Aff. Ex. 2.

11

Id. Water Report Sections 3-3 and 5.3, Wastewater Report Section 5.2.

12

13

Id. Water Report Sections 2.3, 2.4, and 6.2.1. Wastewater Report, Sections 3.1- 3.3. 6.1, 6.2.
Id. Water Report Section 6.2.1., Wastewater Report 6.1.1. (emphasis added.)
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In essence, the Red Oak studies falsely disclosed both the intent and the actual use
of the connection fees. The connection fees were never used for "replacement" of the
existing system. They were also misrepresented to be calculated after "deducting
outstanding debt from system value" because such "charges" belong to the "existing
customers" not the new connectors: The Red Oak studies were nothing more than a false
premise to justify massive increases in the connection fees, which in the end were
improperly used for the general purposes of the City and/or for the debt obligations which
by statute are the obligation the user fees. This kind of bad faith or arbitrary and
capricious conduct should not stand and demands equitable treatment by the Court.
Thus, in addition to awarding damages for all of the improperly collected fees, the Court
should also invalidate the current connection fee assessments - requiring the City to
develop legally authorized fee rates.
II.

The City's Improper Use of Connection/User Fees for Other Expenditures of
the City Does Not Constitute "Just Compensation."

Using generalities and without citing any authority, the City makes the amorphous
claim that despite the illegal PILOT transfers to the general fimd, there was no taking of
fees "without just compensation" because fee payers "benefitted" from the general fund
expenditures of the City, i.e. through its general services including mayor, city council,
finance, city hall, etc ... (hereinafter referred to as "fringe benefits." ) Def. Mem. Supp.
MSJ, pp 1O~ 13. In essence, the City suggests that - as a result of the improper transfers resident fee payers eajoyed such fringe benefits and a resulting reduced property tax rate
that had to be immediately "increased" after the PILOT program ceased. Id. p. 13. Upon
further review, this argument is woefully flawed, and if anything further demonstrates the
injurious effect to the fee payers.
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First, the City makes the false assumption that all of the fee payers are in fact
residents of the City of Pocatello. This is simply not the case. In fact, both of the named
Plaintiffs in this case are not residents of the City. Ed Quinn has been at all times
relevant and currently is a resident of Bannock County near McCammon, Idaho. (See
Aff. Of Ed Quinn.) Hill-Vu's owner Logan Robinson has at all times relevant and
currently is a resident of Bannock County near Inkom, Idaho . (See Aff. of Logan
Robinson.) Both of these individuals conducted their business in Pocatello, which
required the payment of the fee. Mr. Quinn paid the connection fee as part of a permit
fee to allow him to develop property. Mr. Robinson paid the user fees for the rental units
he owns in the City. Both of these individuals expected the fees to go toward their
intended and legal uses. They did not obtain that benefit. Instead, the City has now
admitted that their fees went to the general fund to help reduce the property taxes for the
residents of the City. Both individuals did not obtain any of the fringe benefits from the
City services funded in part by the impermissibly used fees. In other words, adding insult
to injury, not only were Mr. Quinn's and Mr. Robinson's fees improperly taken, but they
also wrongly subsidized the City's property tax rates. This is not "just compensation" but
is in fact quite the opposite.
In addition, regardless of the fee payers' residence, long established authority
does not support the proposition that "just compensation" can consist of such alleged
benefits from the impermissible use of the ''taken property." Nor is it feasible. Again,
the City does not even bother to provide any legal authority as to what constitutes 'Just
compensation." In fact, this is a fundamental principle that has been defined over time in
numerous court decisions since practically the implementation of the U.S. Constitution,
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including by the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has succinctly
defined the term as follows:
The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation. And "just compensation" means the full monetary
equivalent of the property taken. The owner is to be put in the same position
monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken. In
enforcing the constitutional mandate, the Court at an early date adopted the
concept of market value: the owner is entitled to the fair market value of the
property at the time of the taking.
United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970) (emphasis added).
Thus, in order for there to have been "just compensation" for property taken, the deprived
property owner must· 1) be given the "full monetary equivalent of the property taken" 2)
"at the time ofthe taking." Id.
Using this basic doctrine established by our U.S. Supreme Court, the City's
argument that fee payers received ''just compensation" completely falls apart. First, the
City has not nor can it possibly demonstrate that fee payers were given the "full monetary
equivalent" of what was taken from them. This is particularly true given the varying fee
amounts that were improperly taken by the City. For instance, during the time that the
City enacted its PILOT program, Mr. Robinson paid around $840,000 in user fees to the
City, approximately 10% or $84,000 of which was improperly used under the PILOT
program. (See Robinson Aff.) Yet the City has in no way (nor can it really even
feasibly) showed that the so called "benefits" that were provided by the PILOT fee are
equivalent to $84,000 improperly taken. Further, as the owner of many rental units, Mr.
Robinson's total fees paid were significantly if not exponentially higher that a single
residence owner during that same period. Yet it is impossible for the City to prove that
the fringe benefits received by Mr. Robinson from the PILOT fee are exceedingly greater
than a single residence owner.
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Regardless, the City is precluded.from making this argument by the fact that it
cannot show that the so called "benefit" of the PILOT fee was equivalent to the property
taken at the time ofthe taking. In fact, there was no such "benefit" at the time of the
taking because the fee was not yet spent by the City. There is no authority to suggest that
"just compensation" means some "future" benefit provided by the City.
In summary, the City's so called "just compensation" argument is wholly
unsupported by fact or law. More than anything it is a red herring and further reason
why the City's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied.
III.

The Fee is a Property Right Protected by the Takings Clause.

The City has attempted to make the argument that because the PILOT was a
"disguised tax," that somehow absolves it from a takings action despite the fact that the
City imposed the impermissible PILOT as part of the utility fees. Simply put, the clear
authority does not allow the reclassification of a "fee" as a ''tax" to avoid a takings
challenge.
Idaho law clearly provides that the exacting of improper fees constitutes "a taking
of property under the United States and Idaho Constitutions." BHA Invest., Inc. v. City of

Boise, 108 P.3d 315, 319, (Idaho 2004). There is literally no reason to look to other
jurisdictions, including federal courts, for an answer to the question whether the Takings
Clause protects fees such as the ones involved in this case. The Idaho Supreme Court has
expressly held that the Takings Clause applies to situations such as the present case.
In BHA Investments, Inc., the Court held, "Money is clearly property that may not
be taken for public use without the payment of just compensation. Brown v. Legal Found.
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of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 123 S.Ct. 1406, 155 L.Ed2d 376 (2003)." Id. at 319. The Court

continued:
In BHA Investments, Inc. v. State we quoted from San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City
and County ofSan Francisco, 27 Cal.4th 643, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 41 P .3d 87,
106 (2002), as follows: "To put the matter simply, the taking of money is
different, under the Fifth Amendment, from the taking of real or personal
property. The imposition of various monetary exactions--taxes, special
assessments, and user fees-has been accorded substantial judicial deference."
Although we acknowledged that the tal<lng of money by a governmental entity in
co1U1ection with the granting of a privilege is viewed differently from the taking
of real or personal property, in that the taking of money in that circumstance has
been accorded greater judicial deference, we did not hold that money was not
property. Since the City had no authority to charge the liquor license transfer fee,
its exaction of the fee constituted a taking of property under the United States and
Idaho Constitutions.
Id.

The Idaho Supreme Court has similarly noted that fees "can be either a legitimate
fee or a disguised tax." In re Certified Question ofLaw, 320 P.3d 1236, 1242 (2014). 14
Regardless of how the fees are characterized, either as a true fee or a disguised tax, there
is no obligation on the part of the fee payer to pay the fees under protest. Id. In BHA
Investments, Inc., the Court noted:

We have also held that a city's imposition of a purported fee that does not bear a
reasonable relationship to services to be provided by the city is in reality the
imposition of a tax. Brewster v. City ofPocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765
(1988). We have not held, however, that when a city imposes a fee that it has no
authority to impose at all, such fee must be paid under protest before it can be
recovered.
The purpose of the analysis regarding excessive fees is to prevent a city from
imposing an illegal tax by masquerading it as a fee. That analysis does not apply,
however, where the city does not have the authority to impose either the tax or the
fee. If it has no authority to impose any fee at all, it does not matter whether the
fee imposed bears a reasonable relationship to the services provided. It is illegal
regardless of the amount of the fee. In this case, the City did not have the
authority to impose either a fee for the transfer of a liquor license or a tax on the

14 The Court

also equates the term illegal fee with that of disguised tax.
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transfer of a liquor license. Therefore, the analysis of whether liquor license
transfer fee was in reality a disguised tax does not apply.
We have declined to apply the payment-under-protest requirement to an action
seeking recovery of unlawful fees. In Owner-Operator Independent Drivers
Ass'n, Inc. v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 125 Idaho 40 l, 871 P.2d 818
(1994), we held that interstate motor carriers were entitled to recover the portion
of their state registration fees that exceeded the amount authorized by federal law
even though they had not paid those fees under protest. There was no statute
requiring that the fees be paid under protest in order to challenge them, and we
refused to apply the payment-of-tax-under-protest requirement to the motor
carriers in that case.
·
The City ordinance denominated the sum owing as a "transfer fee," not a tax. In
BHA I, the City argued that it was a properly imposed fee and not a tax. Now, the
City contends it was a tax all along and that Bravo and Splitting Kings should be
denied recovery because they did not pay that "tax" under protest. Where the City
denominated the sum owing as a "fee," the payment-of-tax-under-protest
requirement does not apply. The district court erred in holding that Bravo and
Splitting Kings were required to have paid the liquor license transfer fee under
protest in order to bring this action.

BHA Investments, Inc., 108 P.3d at 323.
The Idaho Supreme Court has clearly spoken on the issue of whether Plaintiffs
may recover against municipalities or governmental agencies for illegal fees/disguised
taxes. The Court has held that Plaintiffs have a right to recover under the Takings Clause
of both the United States and Idaho Constitutions. The mechanism for such a recovery is
appropriately a Section 1983 cause of action.
IV.

Class Actions are Specifically Designed to Address Complex and Difficult
Cases in an Efficient Manner.

The City has also claimed that considering the remedy of a class action for the
numerous affected fee payers is "too complicated" or "too costly.'' In fact, class actions
are specifically designed to handle complex cases such as this. In addition, it sets up an
orderly process for those who have been injured and wish to collect under the action.
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Thus, contrary to what the City is suggesting, this is a more efficient and less costly
process for the adjudication of the claims. That will certainly be true in this case.
The fundamental purpose underlying Rule 23, and comparable rules throughout
the United States, is to simplify the judicial process for complicated cases. 15 The Ohio
Supreme Court observed that the purpose of a class action is "to simplify the resolution of
complex litigation, not complicate it." State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd, 855
N.E.2d 444,455 (Ohio 2006). Rule 23(b)'s prerequisites for class actions suggest as
much. The rule identifies several justifications for maintaining class actions and each of
the justifications are underpinned by streamlining extremely complex cases. Indeed, there
is no other legal mechanism for resolving highly complex lawsuits when the requirements
of Rule 23(b) are met.
"One of the paramount values in this system is efficiency. Class certification
enables courts to treat common claims together, obviating the need for repeated
adjudications of the same issues. See I Herbert Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on
Class Actions§ 1.06 (3d Ed.1992); General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 149, 102
S.Ct. 2364, 2366, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982)." In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel

Tank Products Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 783 (3d Cir. 1995). The Third Circuit continued:
The Supreme Court has articulated other important objectives served by class
actions. Class actions achieve "the protection of the defendant from inconsistent
obligations, the protection of the interests of absentees, the provision of a
convenient and economical means for disposing of similar lawsuits, and the
facilitation of the spreading of litigation costs among numerous litigants with
15

Idaho's Rule 23(b) tracks with its federal counterpart. Because there is little Idaho case law on the issue
of the complexity of class action litigation, and the rules are substantially similar the Court should look
to federal courts' interpretation ofthe comparable rule. See David Steed& Associates, Inc. v. Young, 115
Idaho 247,249, 766 P.2d 717, 719 (1988) (impliedly overr'ld by Idaho First Nat. Bankv. Bliss Valley
Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d 841 (1991)).
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similar claims." United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402-03,
100 S.Ct. 1202, 1211-12, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980).

Id. at 783-84. McLaughlin on Class Actions described the purpose of the class action
mechanism as follows:
The Supreme Court observed more than 60 years ago that it is a bedrock
"principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment
in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party. 11 Further,
general principles of standing ordinarily prevent a litigant from purporting only to
assert the rights of another. The class action is the most prominent exception to
these baseline legal tenets, available in certain defined circumstances where the
absent class members' interests are deemed to be adequately represented by
another similarly situated entity and unitary adjudication of similar claims or
issues is efficient and fair to the parties. As one state Supreme Court observed, the
modem class action "is a procedural device that was adopted with the goals of
economies of time, effort and expense, uniformity of decisions, the promotion of
efficiency and fairness in handling large numbers of similar claims."
1 McLaughlip. on Class Actions § 1:1 (11th ed.) The treatise continues and identifies the
three-fold purpose of modem class action practice:
First, class actions promote the efficient and economical administration of justice
by avoiding multiple suits that would involve duplicative evidence on the same
subject matter. As the Supreme Court has recognized, " 'the class-action device
saves the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue·
potentially affecting every [class member] to be litigated in an economical fashion
under Rule 23."' As one court asserted in approving the controversial use of
aggregated as opposed to individualized proof of damages in an asbestos class
action, "[u]nless we can use the class action and devices built on the class action,
our judicial system is not going to be able to cope with the challenges of the mass
repetitive wrong."
Second, class actions provide a metho4 of protecting the rights of those who
would not realistically bring individual claims for practical reasons, such as cost
of prosecution or ignorance of their rights. The determination that a suit presents a
"negative value" claim for which, on an individual basis, the game is not worth
the candle weighs heavily on most class certification decisions. The class action is
presumed to be fair to all persons aligned with the representative plaintiff; since
all are "parties" to the suit for preclusion purposes, if the suit is successful all will
be equally entitled to appropriate relief.
Finally, the class action avoids inconsistent results by offering the efficiency and
predictability of a unitary adjudication or settlement of the claims of all persons to
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whom the defendant may be liable based on similar facts. Indeed, defendants have
''a distinct and personal interest in seeing the entire plaintiff class bound by res
judicatajust as [the defendants are] bound."
1 McLaughlin on Class Actions§ 1:1 (11th ed.) (internal citations omitted).

All class action lawsuits are, ostensibly, highly complex. They inherently involve
multitudinous parties and complex legal issues pertaining to bedrock principles
underlying the notions of class certification. Thus, asserting that the legal issues involved
in a suit might be too complex to handle in the context of class action is inconsistent with
the very raison d'etre of Rule 23.
Once the class is certified, the case proceeds just as would any other type of
litigation. The Court would set the trial date and relevant disclosure timeframes. Of
course, given the complex nature of class action litigation, the Court could employ a
variety of procedures to simplify and streamline the complex evidentiary issues faced by
the parties. Frequent status conference calls with the Court to keep the Court informed on
the parties' progress and preparation could be used to manage the case.
The Court could also, for example, appoint a special master to hear evidence of
damages and that special master could then issue a report that could be read to the jury.
The Court could bifurcate proceedings pursuant to Rule 42 and have separate
trials on the liability component and then another trial on the issue of causation and
damages. In this case, the evidence should be straightforward since the City can easily
calculate the percentage of the rate that comprised the PILOT fee. In fact, the City has
already done so and has that knowledge. Thus all of the parties know the relevant
percentage. It should be a relatively streamlined process to identify the amount of
damages and develop an allocation procedure for Court approval.
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Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH IDDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C

FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A.
STROSCHEIN

Plaintiff,

v.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bannock

)
: ss.
)

Joyce A. Stroschein, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

That I am over the age of eighteen (18) and am competent to testify in this matter. I

make this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge unless otherwise indicated. This
affidavit is made under the penalty of perjury.
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2.

I am the current Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") and Treasurer for the City of Pocatello.

I have served in the finance department of the City since October 2001, including City Controller
from 2006-2008 and the Finance Manager from 2008-2014. I am knowledgeable regarding the
financial affairs of the City and its adoption of policies related to the Payment-In-Lieu-Of-Taxes
("PILOT") component of the user fees, return on equity, and the capacity/connection fees.
I have served as the CFO of the City since August 2014. I am intimately familiar with the
financial affairs of the City and its adoption of policies related to the Payment-In-Lieu-Of-Taxes
("PILOT") fee, return on equity, and the Capacity/Connection fees. I am also familiar with the
revenue bonds the City has and what the annual bond payment is and how the City has expended
and operated the various funds within the City, including Funds 37 and 38.
3.

The City previously had revenue bonds for water and wastewater facilities. In

approximately Fall of 2013, the City was successful in refinancing those revenue bonds to lower
the total debt obligation. The refinancing was for the existing bonds on existing water and
wastewater infrastructure and was not for future growth.
4.

In my first affidavit, filed with this Court on_August 29, 2014, Plaintiff erroneously

suggested that the City was improperly expending the capacity fees in violation of Idaho's
Revenue Bond Act, Idaho Code §§ 50-1027 through 50-1042. The City has never used the
capacity fees to fund future growth nor has it transferred the money to the General Fund for use
or repayment of Ge.neral Fund debts. Rather, the City has only used the capacity fees to pay for
operation, maintenance, and replacement of existing infrastructure. Bond retirement for a given
year is intertwined with the continued operation of the City's water and wastewater systems. It
would be factually incorrect to suggest that the bond retirement for a given year is not part of the
continued operation and maintenance of the City's infrastructure. In 2013, the City budgeted to
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use the capacity fees to make current debt payments for the FY2014. The debt payments were for
the current year only and did not prepay any of the debt obligations. Rather, the capacity fees
were used to pay current debt service obligations only on the due date of the bond for FY2014
and not for future debt payments. The debt payment for FY2014 is part of the City's operating
costs for the water and wastewater departments. Importantly, none of the capacity fees collected
were used to fmance future growth. Rather, these funds were designed only to pay for the
maintenance and improvement on existing water and wastewater infrastructure. In sum, the
payments made were for ordinary and necessary expenses associated with the continued
operation of existing infrastructure.
I

5.

It is important to recognize that the City is required to maintain the water and wastewater

infrastructure to ensure compliance with Federal and State laws. These recent revenue bonds
were designed to satisfy this specific maintenance requirement and without conducting this
maintenance upgrades, the City would fall out of compliance and be subject to federal and state
penalties and fines. The use of the capacity fees was used specifically for these purposes and not
for future growth. All of the money expended by the City from the capacity fees was only for
current, same-year expenditures and not future expenses (such as future debt payments).
6.

There is no factual support for any suggestion that between 2007 and March 2013 that the

capacity fees were transferred to the general fund for use to satisfy the City's general fund
purposes. Rather, all of the capacity fees were accounted for and moved into Funds 37/38 to
ensure transparency. Nothing untoward has ever been done with the expenditure of the capacity
fees.
7.

If an individual did not live in the City boundaries and was not using water or wastewater

services, they would not have paid any PILOT component because they would not have paid the
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user fees. In this case, Mr. Quinn states that he has not paid any user fees and therefore would
not be entitled to any potential recovery if the PILOT fee were deemed to be an improper taking.
(See generally Quinn Affidavit).

8.

Mr. Robinson states that he does not personally reside in the City of Pocatello but that he

does own several rental properties located in the City of Pocatello. (Robinson Affidavit, ,r 3). Mr.
Robinson confinns that he has paid water, sewer and garbage fees to the City for these rental
properties. As an owner of property located within the City he enjoyed a tangible benefit of,
among other things, lower property taxes. As I previously indicated, one of the inevitable
outcomes if the City is required to repay the PILOT fees collected until November 2013 is that
the City will be forced to bond for any damage award and the property taxes will necessarily
increase.As such, Mr. Robinson's property taxes will increase, which increase will likely exceed
any potential recovery in this matter. It is also disingenuous to suggest that Mr. Robinson did
not enjoy any of the benefits derived from the collection of the PILOT. One such tangible benefit
was keeping the water and user fees lower because the City was able to consolidate services. Had
the water or sewer department not enjoyed consolidation of the identifies services (i.e., in-house
legal, finance, planning & development, human resources, etc.) the operation costs for the
department would have necessarily increased, which would have required the user fees to
increase. This consolidation resulted in significant savings to the departments as was detailed by
the analysis provided for FY2006-FY2014 and attached to my prior ·affidavit as Exhibit A.
9.

Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, the City cannot "easily calculate the percentage of the

rate that comprised the PILOT fee:'·' (Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum, p. 19). The PILOT
is a component of the user fee that was calculated in the Red Oak Studies. The City does not
have ready access to this information nor has this request been made because it will require the
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City to retain the expert senrices of Red Oak. Plaintiffs paint an overly simplistic picture of how
to determine the PILOT component and how each user would be affected by a damage award. As
detained in my prior affidavit, the amount of PILOT each individual user paid will vary based on
a number of factors. This calculation will be a very onerous, expensive, and time-consuming
project. To suggest that this could be quickly and easily determined is simply false.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

SUBSCRIBE9~ SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in and
for said State, this _!j_'7I.ay of June, 2015.

Residing at: 5',-,,yw.fk &..· /J)
My commissioll'expires: _...,1~}....:;~.:;ob<...!.'/_.()'-----.

I

'
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

-

I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this _.;i_ day of June, 2015, by the method indicated below:
.
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
21 OS Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Fax: 529-9732
Nathan M. Olsent Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 524-3391

[ ]
[ ]
[}(.I
[-]

Mailing
Hand Delivery
Fax
Overnight Mail

[ ] Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[)(I Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN - 6

579

'""

,,.

BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L.. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1675 S Utah Avenue, Suite 1.50
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
/SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgh@hasattomeys.com
sla@hasattomeys.com
nrs@hasattomeys.com
· Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH WDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C
DEFENDANT'S SUR-REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

v..

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendant, City of Pocatello, by and through its attorney of record, and
hereby submits this Sur-Reply Memorandum in Support Motion for Sununary Judgment as
follows:
INTRODUCTION

The primary issue before this Court is whether the decision in the Building Contractors
case relative to the collection of the PILOT fee constituted a taking anci whether that decision
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should be applied retroactively. The City has provided this Court with significant and persuasive
argument that inures to only applying the decision prospectively. Plaintiffs have made a general
objection to prospective application but have not raised any additional support for retroactive
·application in their supplemental briefing.
Rather than address the merits of this litigation, Plaintiffs have devoted significant time
addressing issues that are outside the pleadings and have previously been adjudicated in the
Building Contractors case. Specifically, argument related to the appropriate expenditure of the

capacity fee under the Revenue Bond Act is outside the scope of the pleadings. This litigation
was initiated as a class action to recover the PILOT component collected from the user fees and
capacity fees. As was fully briefed in the City's Moti<?n for Sununary Judgment, the capacity fee
has never contained a PILOT component. Arguments relative to alleged improper spending of
the capacity fees is outside the scope of the pleadings. Further, any renewed challenge to the
amounts and calculations of the capacity fees has previously been resolved in the Building
Contractors case and is res judicata.

Even considering the arguments advanced by Plaintiffs, summary judgment on all claims
is appropriate. The manner in which the City has expended the capacity fees is consistent with
the Revenue Bond Act. The Revenue Bond Act specifically pennits all revenues to be used for
payment of the bond and interest when due as well as the operation of the utility. This is exactly ·
what the City has done. As such, there is no legitimacy to the challenge of the City's use of the
capacity fee being outside the pennissible uses under the Revenue Bond Act. Even ignoring the
arguments of the prospective application of the Building Contractors case, the Takings Claim
fails because the residents of the City, including Mr. Robinson, received just compensation for
the PILOT fees in the fonn of reduced tax.es, consolidation of necessary services, and increased
DEFENDANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 2
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City services. Ultimately, sununary judgment in favor of the City is appropriate and this matter
should be _dismissed with prejudice.

ARGUMENT
A.

The Capacity Fees Were Spent Consistent With The Revenue Bond Act.

Preliminarily, it is important to focus on the scope of the pleadings in this matter. This
case was initiated as a class action. Plaintiffs sought to certify two classes: (1) capacity fee
payers in the City of Pocatello, and (2) user fee payers in the City of Pocatello. These classes
sought recovery of the previously collected PILOT component that was incorporated into the
·User Fee. Plaintiffs also claim recovery of the PILOT component that was allegedly incorporated
into the capacity fee. However, as was fully addressed in Building Contractors the capacity fee
never contained a PILOT. In the most recent supplemental brief filed by Plaintiffs, they seek to
raise issues that are outside of the pleadings and are not properly before the Court. Accordingly,
the Court should ignore any argument and only address the issues appropriately before the Court.
Despite beirig outside the scope of the pleadings, one of the primary arguments advanced
by Plaintiffs with respect to the capacity fee is whether the capacity fees were expended in
conformity with Idaho's Revenue Bond Act, Idaho Code§§ 50-1027 through 50-1042. 1 Plaintiff
makes numerous factual statements that lack foundation and are contrary to the plain language of
the permissible uses under the statute. Plaintiffs suggest that the City's use of the capacity fees in
the operation of the City's water and sewer system can only be used for replacement and
maintenance on existing infrastructure.
As is clear from the existing case law, including Loomis, the revenues collected pursuant

Curiously, Plaintiffs' Complaint acknowledges that the intended purpose of the capacity fees is
"operation, maintenance, repair, replacement of the existing system and bond repayment."
1
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to Idaho's Revenue Bond Act (the "Act") must be used in conformity with the explicit
recognition that "fees are not utilized for general fund or for future expansion of the water and
sewer system." Id. at 440, 807 P.2d at 1278. Absent from the record is any evidence that the
capacity fees were utilized for the general fund or for future expansion of the water and sewer
systems.
Rather, as confinned by Ms. Stroschein;the City has never used the capacity fees to fund
future growth nor has it transferred the money to the General Fund for use or repayment of
General Fund debts. The capacity fees have only been used for the operation, maintenance, and
replacement of existing infrastructure. (4th Stroschein Aff., ,i 4). The City is required to
maintain the water and wastewater infrastructure to ensure compliance with Federal and State ·
laws. The bonds were designed to satisfy maintenance requirements and ensure the necessary
upgrades to the system were made to maintain compliance with applicable laws. (4th Stroschein ·
Aff., 15). All of the funds used by the City were for same year expenditures and not future
growth or expenses. (Id.). If the capacity fees were not used for general fund activities or for
future expansion, the use of the capacity fees is appropriate. Because the capacity fees were
expended only for the operation and maintenance of existing infrastructure, the City's
expenditure of the capacity fees was consistent with the mandates of the Revenue Bond Act and

Loomis.
Because the capacity fees were not spent on general fund activities or for future
expansion of the system, the City acted appropriately in its expenditure of the capacity fees. The
plain language of the Act and the enumerated uses of"appropriat[ing], apply[ing] or expend[ing]
the revenue of such works" confirms the City's actions. I.C. § 50·1033. To fund revenue bonds
that serve the municipalities, it is appropriate to "prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls, or
DEFENDANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 4
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charges." LC.§ 50-I030(f). Pursuant to Loomis, the collection of a connection/capacity fee is an

appropriate fee collected as revenue under the Act. Loomis, 119 Idaho at 439,807 P.2d at 1277
(citing Schmidt v. Village ofKimberly, 74 Idaho 48,256 P.2d SIS (1953)). Idaho Code§ 50-1032
further mandates that bonds be self-sufficient and that revenue collected be used to pay to the
bond and the operation and maintenance of the systems that were installed by the bond:
The council of a city issuing bonds pursuant to this act shall prescribe
and collect reasonable rates, fees, tolls or charges for the services,
facilities and commodities furnished by such works or rehabilitated
existing electrical generating facilities, and shall revise such rates, fees,
tolls or charges from time to time, to provide that all such works or
rehabilitated existing electrical generating facilities shall be and always
remain self-supporting. The rates, fees, tolls or charges prescribed shall be
such as will produce revenue at least sufficient, (a) to pay when due all
bonds and interest thereon for the payment of which such revenue is or
shall have been pledged, charged or otherwise encumbered including ·
reserves therefor, and (b) to provide for all expenses of operation and
maintenance of such works or rehabilitated existing electrical generating
facilities, including reserves therefor.

I.e. § 50-1032 (emphasis added). Section 50-1032 mandates that the revenue be used to pay
"when due" all bonds and interest and to further provide for all expenses of operation and

maintenance. There is no distinction made between types of revenue and how it may be used.
Idaho Code § 50-103 3 further describes permissible uses of revenue collected under the
Act:
Any city issuing bonds under sections 50-1027 through 50-1042, Idaho
Code, for the acquisition, construction, reconstruction, improvement,
betterment or extension of any works or to rehabilitate existing electrical
generating facilities, shall have the right to appropriate, apply or
expend the revenue of such works or rehabilitated existing electrical
generating facilities for the following purposes: (a) to pay when due all
bonds and interest thereon, for the payment of which such revenue is
or shall have been pledged, charged or otherwise encumbered,
including reserves therefor; (b) to provide for all expenses of
operation, maintenance, replacement and depreciation of such works
or rehabilitated existing electrical generating facilities, including
DEFENDANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 5
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reserves therefor; (c) to pay and discharge notes, bonds or other
obligations and interest thereon, not issued under this act for the payment
of which the revenue of such works or rehabilitated existing electrical
generating facilities may have been pledged, charged or encwnbered; (d)
to pay and discharge notes, bonds or other obligations and interest thereon
which do not constitute a lien, charge or encwnbrance on the revenue of
such works or rehabilitated existing electrical generating facilities, which
may have been issued for the purpose of financing the acquisition,
construction, reconstruction, improvement, betterment or extension of
such works or to rehabilitate existing electrical generating facilities; and
(e) provide a reserve for improvements to such works or rehabilitated
existing electrical generating facilities. Unless and until full and adequate
provision has been made for the foregoing purposes, no city shall have the
right to transfer the revenue of such works or rehabilitated existing
electrical generating facilities to its general fund.
LC.§ 50-1033 (emphasis added). Again, like Section 50-1032, Section 50-1033 does not
distinguish between the types of revenue collected and simply confirms that a municipality has
the right to use the revenues collected for the five enumerated purposes. Relevant here,
Subsection (a) permits the revenues to be used for the payment "when due" of the bonds and
interest and subsection (b) permits for revenues to be used for the operation of the works. The
plain language of the Act explicitly permits in multiple statutes that "revenue," without
distinguishing between the types of revenue, be used for payment of then due bonds and interest.
In this case, Plaintiffs erroneously suggest that use of the capacity fee, which is revenue
appropriately collected under the Act, cannot be used to pay then due bonds and interest. This
argument is at odds with the plain language of the statue. As Ms. Stroschein detailed in her
fourth affidavit, the collection fees were used to pay for the bonds and interest that were due in

that fiscal year and not in future years. (4th Stroschein Aff., fl 3-4). That is, the City is using
revenue for payment of the bonds that are due in that year and are not making a prepayment or
lump-sum payment of the bond that would be due in the future. No capacity fees were used to
fund future bond indebtedness or future growth of the water or wastewater systems. (4th
DEFENDANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6 ·

585

r-·,

\...}
Stroschein Aff., 15). Moreover, bond indebtedness is part of the operation of the water and
wastewater departments. If the bond payments are not made, the system cannot continue in
operation because the City would default on its obligations. Accordingly, use of the capacity fees
to pay for the continued operations of the system through ensuring bond payments are made are
appropriately performed under the enumerated uses in Section 50-1033.
Finally, the relevant bonds were obtained for the continued operation of the existing
infrastructure with system updates made to comply with Federal and State environmental laws
and requirements. (4th Stroschein Aff., 15). These upgrades are necessary for the City's existing
system to remain in compliance with operational guidelines. Use of the capacity fees goes to pay
for the continued maintenance of the existing infrastructure to comply with federal and state
guidelines. (Id.).
Plaintiffs reading of Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991 ), is
overbroad and inconsistent with the Act and therefore has limited application here. Loomis
centered on whether a capacity fee could be collected by the City of Hailey and whether it could
use the collected revenues from "one year to pay for expenses to be incurred in the future." Id. at
440,807 P.2d at 1278. The focus of the Idaho Supreme Court was not oil whether bond
indebtedness in the same year could be paid with the revenues collected. The issue in Loomis
with respect to expenditures was limited in application and materially differs in its application to
this case. The relevant and applicable conclusions from Loomis to this case are that the City may
collect a capacity fee and that apply here are that capacity fees cannot be used for general fund
activities or for future expansion of the water or wastewater systems. So long as the capacity fees
are "allocated and budgeted in conformity with the Act" ther.e is no violation of the Revenue
Bond Act. Loomis, 119 Idaho at 439,807 P.2d at 1277. The City has not used the capacity fees
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for general fund activities nor has it used the fees for future expansion. Thus, the City has
allocated and budgeted the capacity fees consistent with the Act
· B.

Capacity Fees Have Never Been Used For General Fund Activities-All Of The
Funds Were Accounted For And Transferred Into Funds 37 and 38.

As is clearly revealed through Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum, the Plaintiffs'.
most important motivation in this matter is a second attempt to invalidate the previously
adjudicated issue of whether the collection and amount of the capacity fee is appropriate. An
inordinate amount of effort was devoted to the single issue of suggesting that the capacity fees
should be halted and new rate studies performed. (Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum, pp. 9,
11).

As occurred in the Building Contractors matter, Plaintiffs continue to suggest that the
capacity fees were used for General Fund activities because they were from 2007 through March
2013 deposited into the General Fund. However, as this Court is well aware, every dollar
collected in capacity fees was identified and then transferred out of the General Fund in March
2013 to ensure transparency. As was fully addressed in the Building Contractors case and
reaffirmed here, none of the capacity fees were spent for general fund purposes or for future
expansion. (41h Stroschein Aff., 16). Rather, the City has allocated and budgeted the use of the
capacity fees to conform to the Revenue Bond Act There is no factual support for the suggestion
that the capacity fees were spent for general fund purposes or for future expansion. Accordingly,
the Court should ignore this tired argument that has been fully considered and dismissed without
effect.
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C.

The Red Oak Studies Were Reasonable, Not Arbitrary, and Conform To Statutory
Requirements.

Plaintiffs again attempt to attack the Red Oak studies as being created in bad faith or with
false premises in an attempt to have the study invalidated entirely. (Plaintiffs' Supplemental
Memorandum, p. 11). As noted above, this request is outside the scope of the pleadings and
should be ignored. Even though this request is outside the pleadings, no new rate study should be
order because this Court has previously reviewed the Red Oak study and concluded that the
methodologies employed to calculate the fees was appropriate:
The Association argues that Mr. Hunter's method for calculating rates is
more appropriate that the method employed by the City in creating the
Red Oak report. However, in the Court's view Mr. Hunter's statements are
more a criticism of the Red Oak method than they are a recommended
alternative method. More importantly, although the Red Oak report may
result in higher rates than Mr. Hunter's suggestions, the Court will not
dictate to the City what methodology it should employ in calculating its
fees. Instead, the Court is limited to evaluating whether the fees are
reasonable, not arbitrary, and conform to the statutory requirements.
Although the Association challenges the Red Oak study, the Court finds
that it was a reasonable methodology, which was not arbitrary or
unreasonable.
(Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider, p. 24). The
methodology used by Red Oak to calculate the fees is not changed by how the City uses the
revenues it collects. Rather, the Red Oak methodologies would not be altered in any fashion and
a new rate study would likely render the same fee because the same methodologies used by Red
Oak would again be employed. The methodologies employed are sound and appropriately
address how each of the fees were calculated. Plaintiffs real complaint is not with the calculation
of the fees, which was previously determined to be a "reasonable methodology, which was not
arbitrary or unreasonable," but rather, with how the City chose to expend the collected revenues.
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The study does not become invalid based on how the City chose to allocate and budget the
collected revenues. Accordingly, there is no validity to the suggestion that a new rate study be
required.
D.

"Just Compensation" Was Provided For The Collection Of The PILOT Component
Of The User Fees.

Plaintiffs argue that no just compensation was provided to the purported classes because

Mr. Quinn and Mr. Robinson do not live in the City and therefore they would not have received
just compensation for the PILOT. First, with respect to Mr. Quinn, it is obvious that Mr. Quinn
would not have received the benefits of the PILOT because he never actually paid user fees.
Because Mr. Quinn did not pay the user fees for water and wastewater services, he would not be
entitled to any reimbursement of a PILOT. Rather, Mr. Quinn simply argues he did not receive
just compensation for the capacity fee. As has been previously addressed in the City's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, the capacity fees have never contained a PILOT. As such, there is no
validity to Mr. Quinn's argument that he did not receive just compensation. Mr. Quinn's
admission that he never paid a user fee confirms that he is not a proper representative of the
putative class because he does not represent the class as an individual who has not lived in the
City of Pocatello for the relevant period.
With respect to Mr. Robinson, he suggests that because he does not personally live in the
City that he has not received just compensation. Mr. Robinson does, however, admit that he
owns rental properties with the City of Pocatello boundaries and he pays water and wastewater
user fees on those properties. As the property owner of Plaintiff Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park, Mr.
Robinson did receive just compensation in the form of lower property taxes. As noted in Ms.
DEFENDANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 10
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Stroschein's Second Affidavit, "the payment of the PILOT component of the user fee did not
result in a windfall for the City, nor did those monies sit idly in the City's bank account. Rather,
all of the PILOT fund transfers were completely exhausted each year to pay for the City services.
Likewise, the user fee payers received a substantial benefit in a lower user fee because the water,
sewer,- and sanitation departments were able to operate more efficiently and avoided redundant
service, such as legal, financial, human resources, etc." (2nd Stroschein Aff.,, 12).
Mr. Robinson also received tangible just compensation in the fonn of lower user fees as a
direct result of the consolidation of services. (z1111 Stroschein Aff., fl 5-12; 4th Stroschein Aff., ,
8). Further proof of the just compensation provided is the inevitable increase of property taxes
that will result from the City's bonding to cover any awarded damages, costs, or attorneys' fees
if the Building Contractors case is applied retroactively. (4th Stroschein Aff.,, 8). The only way
to cover the expended PILOT is to go to bond, which will increase all property taxes in the City.
Moreover, the Plaintiff Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park and its residents did receive tangible benefits
in the form of fully funded City programs. The PILOT fee did result in just compensation for
each user fee payer and Plaintiffs have failed to identify any legitimate evidence to support their
opposition. Rather, Plaintiffs entire argument is predicated on improper conjecture, which is
insufficient to create a_genuine issue of fact with respect to the just compensation received by the
user fee payers in the City of Pocatello.
Ultimately, if application of the Building Contractors case is applied retroactively, the
result is a negative consequence for all property owners in the City. That is, any retroactive
damage award would necessitate a costly and extensive process of determining what amount of
damages is apportioned to each specific user. (Third Stroschein Aff., ,, 3-9). For example, Mr.
Robinson claims payments in excess of $10,000 per month to the City of Pocatello for monthly
DEFENDANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 11
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water, sewer and garbage services. (Robinson A:ff., ,- 3). The amount of PILOT component paid
on a monthly basis would vary drastically from a single-family user paying less than $100 per
month for service. Ultimately, there is absolutely no plausible benefit to be received by the
taxpayers in the City of Pocatello who own property if the Building Contractors case is applied
retroactively. Once the City was order to cease collection of the PILOT it immediately did so and
has never restarted collection of the PILOT. The City has abided by this Court's order and
continues to do so to date. Prospective application of the Building Contractors case ensures the
City does not violate the Revenue Bond Act into the future without harming the citizenry of the
City of Pocatello.
E.

Collection Of An Impermissible Tax Is Not A Property Interest Under Federal Law.

Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, reliance on Federal law regarding the unconstitutional
takings claim is not only appropriate but required where the only legitimate claim remaining
after application of the Idaho Tort Claims Act (see Defendant's Memorandum and Reply in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment) is the unconstitutional takings claim under the 5th
and 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. As previously noted, uniformity in
application of federal statutes is vital. Osborn v. Salinas, 131 Idaho 456,458, 958 P.2d 1142,
1144 (1998). It is inappropriate to ignore federal laws with considering a takings claim under

federal law; Thus, when considering federal case law interpreting 5th Amendment
unconstitutional takings claims, the dearth of authority supports the conclusion that the collection
of a tax deemed to be improper does not result in an unconstitutional taking.
F.

Plaintiffs' Cannot Satisfy The Requirements For Class Certification.

Plaintiffs severely misrepresent the City's position relative to class certification. Plaintiffs
suggest that the City objects to class certification because this matter is ~'too complicated" or
DEFENDANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 12
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"too costly." This is not, however, one of the City's arguments in opposition to class
certification. While this lawsuit has the potential for the resolution to be complicated and costly,
the objection rests with Plaintiffs inability to satisfy the prerequisites for class certification found
in Rule 23, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. It is incumbent on the Plaintiff to satisfy all four
factors in Rule 23(a) and at least one factor in Rule 23(b) before a class can be certified. Plaintiff
cannot satisfy these requirements.
In fact, the affidavits of Ed Quinn and Logan Robinson further confirm that they are poor
class representatives. Specifically, Mr. Quinn and Mr. Robinson confirmed in their affidavit that
they do not live in the City of Pocatello boundaries. (Quinn Aff., ,r 2; RobinsonAff., ,r 3). Mr.
Quinn has never paid user fees and would not be entitled to any refund of the PILOT. Mr.
Robinson claims he does not use any of the services in the City of Pocatello and ignores the
significant benefit oflower property taxes that resulted from the City's collection of the PILOT
through the user fees. These admissions confirm that Quinn and Robinson are not qualified and
competent to serve as class representatives because their interests are antagonistic to the interests
of the absent class members. See In re Northern Dist. ofCal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prod Liab.
Litig., 693 F.2q847, 855 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, the numerous types of potential users are not

represented by Mr. Quinn or Mr. Robinson (i.e., commercial, industrial, multi-family, etc.).
Given the argument presented by Plaintiffs, they have failed to advance sufficient
evidence to find that all four factors in Rule 23(a) and that at least one factor in Rule 23(b) have
been established. Specifically, Plaintiffs cannot overcome the significant policy concerns of the
negative ramifications for all property owners in the City of Pocatello. Neither can Plaintiffs
establish that the two class representatives are typical of the entire putative class or that their
interest will adequately represent the entirety of the class. For these reasons, and as more fully
DEFENDANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 13
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addressed in Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, class
certification is inappropriate at this time.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant City of Pocatello respectfully requests that this Court
grant its Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims and dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint with
prejudice. Moreover, Defendant further requests that the Court deny Plaintiffs' request to certify
the two identified classes.
With this filing, Defendant considers the matter has been fully briefed and s~bmitted to
the Court for resolution. Defendant does not believe additional oral argument is necessary but
will appear at oral argument if the Court concludes additional argument would be helpful to the
Court.
Dated this~ day of Jtme, 2015.
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Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.
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485 "E" Street
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Fax: 524-3391
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[X] Fax
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Under IRCP § 7(b)(3)(B):
I

"When a motion is support d py affidavits(s). the affidavits(s) shall be served with the
motio.n.''

Id.
Moreover., IRCP § 56(c) requires

t any affidavits in support pf a Motion for Summary
1

I

judgment ..shall be served at least : tja.ty eight {28) days befor~ the time fixed for the hearing.,,

Id. Although the Court did allow l ave tbr the Plaintiffs to fu~er respond to Defendant's
Motiun, and for the City to "reply" to such response, it did not J/l'ant Defendant leave to provide
i

additional affidavits in support of °ff:i' Motion for Summary Judgment. As such, Defendant has
'

not com.plied w:ith the ntles, aim

s. Stroschein's affidavit should be stricken and disregarded in

its entirety. Further, the Court• s c rnsideration of this affidavit would be highly prejudicial in that
the Defenclar1t providing it as part fits "reply' provides no oPpoitunity for the Plaintiff to
respond to the entirely new allegat ons of the a:ffidavit.

Additionally, Ms. Stroesc -in's affidavit contains state:(n.ents that w:e contl'adictory to her
earlier statements and to o"ther test ntony on the record in the l~ng history of this case. The

affidavit is submitted in bad faith . y the Defendant in an attem:pt to subvert Plaintiff from
pointing out these blatant inconsis encies.

Ms. Stroeschein's a:ffida.vi: also contains a number of st'a.tements which are otherwise
inadmissible, summed up as follo s:
Paragraph 3: Lack offoun ation. The statement fails t~ provide any specific infonnation
with regard to the bonds th t were being repaid with thq connection ·fees, other than the
vague statement that such , ands were "not for future growth." Further, whether the bond
obligations are for "future owth'~ or not is completely:irrelevant in the case. Pursuant to
Article Vill, Section Thre of the Idaho Constitution, b¢nd repayment must be tnade
"solely" from the monthly, ates.
:
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Paragraph 4: Lack ofFmm ation and argumentative. A;gau.1. Ms. Stroscheinprovides no
foundation for her stateme t. Further, she is arg1.1ment~ive. Regardless, other than the
admission that capacity fe s are being used to satisfy 4~~ebt obligationst the statement is
irrelevant (and contradicto to the record.)
Paragraph S: Is entirely co lusory and consists of legal, conclusions.

Paragraph 6: Is entirely co clusory~ argumentative and;consists of'legal conclusions.
:

Paragraph 7: Speculative, gumentative, hearsay and c~nsists oflegal conclusions.
'

Paragraph 8: Speculative, rgumentative, lack offound.tion. consists oflegal
conclusions. and hearsay.

Paragraph 9: Speculative, gumentative, lack of foundation, consist.s oflegal
conclusions.
Pursuant to the foregoing, , e Court should suumYnily ~trike the affidavit. Plaintiffs
request oral argument if deemed n cessary by the Court.
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IN THE DISTRICT €0URT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OP'! IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK
COUNTY
.
I

i

.

'i
I

I-ll.,L-VU MOBILE HOME PAltk, on
behalf of itself· and all others sim1Iarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf qfhimself
and all others similarly situated, I

Plaintiffs,
vs.

1

case No.CV~2014-1520~0C
MOTION FPR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT

I
I

.

CITY OF POCATELLOt m1 Idallo

municipality,
Defendant.
COMES NOW, Plaintiffs

I
I
I

iy and through their counsel of record and pursuant to Rule

lS(a) end 20(a) of the Idaho~ of Civtl Procedure, hereby IllQVC fur an order allowing

plaintiffs leave to file their First "41le11.ded Complaint, in the form attached hereto. The general
effect of this amendment would bJ to add declaratory and injim.ctive relief invalidating the water
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I

I

I

and sewer connection fees as well las damages d1.1e to the recent arbitraiy and capricious actions
.

of the Defendant.

I

Ii

This amendment is necessary because, at the time of filing the original complaint.

Plaintiffs were.unaware of the internal actions taken by the De;fendant that are the Stlbject of
these additional claimsJ and/or were taken after the complaint was filed, which were learned

through discovery.
This motion may be supported by a memorandwn filed-within two weeks of the tiling of

this motion pursuant to IRCP § 7. Plaintiffs will also set a hearing to ftn1:he:r support their
motion through oral _argument.
DATED this 12111 day of June, 2015.

Na
M. Olsen
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Idw10 Falls, Idaho, and that on the 12111 day of June, 2014, I seryed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document on the persons listed below by :first class :qiailD with the co1rect postage
thereon~ or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance 'o/ith Rule S(b), I.R.C.P.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY

HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C
AMENDED COMPLAINT JURY
DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS
CERTIFICATION

vs.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
. municipality,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiffs, Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park, Ed Quinn and all others
similarly situated and for a complaint against the above named Defendant allege as follows:
AMENDED COMPLAINT WRY DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS
CERTIFICATION -Page 1
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JURISDICTION
1. This action· is brought for damages and other ap~opriate relief under 42 USC § I 983
for violation of the Plaintiffs' civil rights under the color of state and federal law.
2. Defendant, the City of Pocatello (City) is a municipality incorporated in the State of
Idaho and administered pursuant to I. C. § 50-101 et al., and located within Bannock County.
3. The Court has jurisdiction over the City under I.C. § 5-514.
4. Bannock County is the proper venue for this action under LC. §5-402 or 404.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
5. The City has implemented ••system capacity fees," sometimes referred to as
"connei;:tion fees" or "capacity fees" which a person must pay along with a separate "building
pennit fee" prior to or in relation to new construction. Capacity Fees consist of separate fees
charged for water, waste water, and waste collection as set by the City Council on an annual
basis.
6. Usually at the same time the City sets Capacity Fee rates, the City sets monthly "User
Fees" for customers of the City water, wastewater and sanitation collection system.
7. The City deposits the _collected C~pacity and User Fees into separate accounts for
water, waste water, and sanitation.

8. Pursuant to Idaho law and the State and Federal Constitution, Capacity and User fees
can only be used for their intended purposes, including operation, maintenance, repair,
replacement of the existing system and bond repayment

AMENDED COMPLAINT JURY DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS
CERTIFICATION -Page 2
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9. Around 2005, the City initiated a policy with regard to the Capacity and User Fees
titled under various names, including "Return on Equity,""Rate of Return," "Franchise Fee," and
"Payment in Lieu of Taxes" hereafter collectively referred to as "PILOT.
10. In late 2006, City Mayor Chase requested an opinion from the Attorney General for

the State ofidaho (IAG) on the legality of the PILOT policy. In an opinion dated February 6,
2007, the IAG told the City that the policy did not comply with law, setting forth the statutes and

case law supporting such opinion. The City did not disclose the IAG's opinion to the public. It ·
also disregarded the opinion and continu_ed with the_ PILOT policy.
11. Since 2007, no less than $30 million has been transferred by the City from the
water, sewer and sanitation accounts under the guise of its PILOT program to fund the general
activities of the City. No less than $6 million has been transferred as such since 2011.
12. The City has also admittedly promoted, planned and spent Capacity Fees for capital
improvement projects that expand the water, wastewater and waste collection systems without
first obtaining a bond as required under the Idaho Revenue ~ond Act (IRBA). The IRBA only
allows Capacity.Fees to be utilized for maintenance, repair and replacement of the existing
system.
13. The Building Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho (BCASEI) filed an action
in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State ofldaho in and for Bannock
County (Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C) (Idaho Case) challenging the legality of the City's

\

Capacity Fee and User Fee policies, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

AMENDED COMPLAINT JURY DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS
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14. In a November 15, 2013, Memorandum Decision and Order the Idaho Court held that
the City's PILOT programs, or any other program with a similar intent are unconstitutional and a
violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.
15. During the discovery stages of the Idaho Case, the City failed to produce the 2007
IAG opinion and any related correspondence or documents pertaining to that opinion although
such information was clearly requested. The IAG opinion and its related correspondence was
provided only through a subpoena by the BCASEI issued directly to the State of Idaho in January
of 2013.
16. The BCASEI had to pay the City over $2,500 just to obtain the City's financial
records to determine the flow of the Capacity and User Fees.
17. The City has also either destroyed or failed to keep and maintain records
pertaining to its Capacity and User Fee policies. Some records have been destroyed after the City
became aware of potential claims with regard to these policies. Such conduct constitutes a
violation of the Idaho Municipal Records Retention Act I.C. § 50-907, et al., and spoliation of
evidence.
18. During the course of the litigation in the Idaho Case, as a reaction to a court decision,
the City withdrew no less than $2,608,220 from the general fund equivalent to the amount of
Capacity Fees collected by the City since 2007, and have deposited such funds into separate
accounts, $1,391,089 in City "Fund 37 11 and $1,217,131 in City "Fund 38."

AMENDED COMPLAINT JURY DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS
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19. In the summer of 2014, the Plaintiffs moved for a pre-judgment writ of attachment to
freeze the newly created Funds 37/38 as a potential source ofrecovezy for damages. After the
·motion was filed, the City of Pocatello approved its FY 2015 Budget.
20. As confirmed by the sworn statements of City CFO Joyce Stroeschein. under the
FY 2015 Budget all of the monies in Funds 37/38 have been §Pent or are dedicated toward the
"bond covenants" or debt obligations ofthe City. Including the amounts collected since March
of 2013. that amount now allocated toward 1'debt retirement" constitutes no less than
$2.878,849.56. representing the amount of connection/capacity fees collected from 2007 through
August of 2014.
21. The City historically promoted "Red Oak " studies conducted in 2006 and 2010 as
the su:gporting basis for the assessment of user and connection fees in the City of Pocatello,
including the current fees (which are approved on an annual basis by the City council). The
re:gorts were utilized to justify a ca:gacity fee rate jump of 1,500% alone between 2006 and 2007,
with a consistent increase of between 8% to 10% each year since then and until at least 2015.
22. The Red Oak Studies (prepared for water and wastewater respectively) explicitly
indicate that the "debt service"·payments are to be derived from the revenues obtained from the
monthly user fees. That debt obligation is part of the "revenue requirements" factored into the
monthly fee rate recommended by the studies. The studies are also explicit in that the capacity or
connection fees are based solely on the "replacement" of the existing system through capital
improvement projects.

AMENDED COMPLAINT JURY DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS
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23. The Red Oak studies then make a virtually identical disclosure with regard to the
assessment and calculation of the connection/capacity fees:
To determine net equity in the system. replacement costs of the net equity in the system. .
replacement cost of the existing backbone system is reduced by the outstanding debt on
related facilities. Equity is not reduced by accumulated depreciation. Once a new
customer connects to the (water/wastewater) system, that customer begins paying charges
for service similar to. all existing customers. These charges b:'.Pically include payment for
retirement of outstanding debt. For this reason, it is necessary to deduct outstanding
debt from system value before developing these (capacity) fees.
24. In direct contradiction to the Red Oak studies relied upon by the City in its
connection fee rates, none of fees assessed and collected were ever used for "replacement" of the
"existing backbone" of the system. Rather, those funds were first transferred to the general fund
for general pm;pose use by the City. The City then transferred the equivalent of what it had
collected in connection fees during that period into newly created Funds 37/38. The City then
expended or budgeted all of the funds toward debt service which was to be covered by the user

25. The Red Oak studies falsely disclosed both the intent and the actual use of the
connection fees, as well as the basis for calculating the connection fees.

COUNT I- UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING
26. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference.
27. The 5th Amen,dment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the states under
the 14th Amendment, prevents the taking of private property without due process oflaw or
without just compensation.
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28. Idaho Const. Art. I § 14 essentially incorporates the 5th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.
29. Under U.S.C. 42 § 1983, a person who is deprived of their rights under the color of
any act, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any public entity is entitled to redress
at law or in equity.
30. Under the doctrine of "Res Judicata" the Court should accept and adopt the
declaratocy ruling by the Idaho court that the fees transferred for use under the City's PILOT
policy were impermissibly assessed and collected.
31. In addition, the City's use of Capacity fees for the purpose of capital improvement
projects that expand the system are likewise impermissi~le and a violation of the IRBA.
32. Additionally. the City's use of Capacity Fees for the purpose of bond repayments are
strictly prohibited and unconstitutional in that under Idaho Const. Art. Vill § 3 such payments
must "solely" come from the monthly rates.
33. The City's unlawful fee policies have resulted in the taking of private property of the
Plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals.34. The City's actions have resulted in a violation of the Constitutional rights, by the
taking of private property without due process of law and without just compensation.
35. The Plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals and entities have suffered injury
caused by the City charging an unlawful fee and seek compensation for damages in an amount
which-will be proven at trial, which in any event is many times in excess of $25,000.
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COUNT II - UNJUST ENRICHMENT

36. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference.
37. Plaintiffs have conferred a benefit on the City in the form of Capacity and/or User
Fees which have been used by the City for purposes not authorized by the Idaho Constitution.
38. The City has been knowingly and willingly receiving an improper benefit at the
expense of the Plaintiffs and other similarly situated individuals and entities.
39. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the City to retain this benefit
without properly reimbursing Plaintiffs and others who have paid the fees.
COUNT III - INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

40. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference.
41. The City did knowingly assess a Capacity Fee under the false premise that such fees
· would not be calculated and/or used for bond repayment. which is strictly prohibited under the
state law and constitution.
42. Every Capacity Fee dollar that has been collected and used by the City has either
been used for improper purposes of the general fund or for bond retirement in contravention of
what was publically claimed and disclosed by the City.
43. The City has and continues to implement a Capacity policy that is unlawful,
inequitable, and a violation of Plaintiffs' members' rights.44. The continuance of the City's Capacity Fee policies will result in waste or irreparable .
injury to Plaintiffs and its members.

AMENDED COMPLAINT JURY DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS
CERTIFICATION-Page 8

609

45. Plaintiffs and its members are entitled to injunctive relief requiring the City to cease
and desist its current unlawful Capacity Fee collections and policies.
46. The City should further be enjoined from relying upon the Red Oak studies for its
Capacity Fee rates, which will require a declaration that the current Capacity Fees are not lawful
or enforceable.

COUNT IV -EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND/OR EQUITABLE TOLLING
47. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference.
,.

48. The City knowingly made a false representation of, concealed and/or destroyed
material facts to the detriment of the Plaintiffs.
49.· Alternatively or in addition, essential information bearing on the Plaintiffs' claims ·
could not be discovered ~ough reasonable diligence.
50. Alternatively or in addition, the City's fee policies, i.e. PILOT program and capital
expansion without proper bonding procedures, were void as a matter of law.
51. The Plaintiffs had no knowledge of the concealed or falsely represented material

facts.
COUNT V -ATTORNEY FEES
52.

All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein py reference.

53.

The Plaintiffs have retained the services of the above named legal counsel to

pursue their rights.
54.

The Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their attorneys fees and expenses under LC.

§12-117, 58~115, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and any other applicable statute or rules.
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CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION
55. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference.
56. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of a Class consisting

of all individuals or entities who have paid Capacity or User Fees to the City since 2007.
57. Class certification, including the possibility of subclasses, is warranted and

appropriate under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiffs pray for the following relief:
1. For a monetary judgment consisting of all improperly collected and spent Capacity and

User Fees since 2007, plus interest at the statutory rate of 12% per annum.
2. That there be immediate injunctive and declaratory relief preventing the enforcement

of the current Capacity Fee assessments until as such time the City can enact a legal and proper
Capacity Fee.
3. That the City should be required to deposit all monies collected from the unlawful fee

into a common fund and all members of the class should be allowed to petition the fund for a
recovery of their damages.
4. That punitive damages be awarded for the City's wrongful conduct pertaining to the

Plaintiffs' equitable estoppel claim.
5. An award of attorney fees and costs, and further that the City should be required to
reimburse the damages fund for any such awarded attorney fees based upon the allegations
contained herein so as not to further harm the class.
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6. Any other legal or equitable relief deemed justified by the Court.

PLAINTIFFS REQUEST A JURY TRIAL FOR ANY ISSUES TRIABLE BY JURY
DAIBD this _ _ day of June, 2015.
PETERSEN Moss HALL & OLSEN

Nathan M. Olsen
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
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()BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES~ESQ.

HALL ANGELL .STARNES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenuej S1;1.ite 150
Idaho Falls. Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
!SB No.'¥ 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgh@hasattorneys.com.
sla@hasattomeys.com
nrs@hasattorneys.com
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
fN THE DJSTRJCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,_ IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of its.elf and alJ others simi1ar1y
situated, ED QUINN, on behalfofhitnself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,

Cas~No. CV-2014-l520-0C

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO STRIKE FOURTH

STROSCHIEN AF.FIDA VIT

v.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,

Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendant, City of Pocatello, by and through its attorney of record, and
hereby submits this Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Fourth Affidavit

of Joyce A. Stroschein tiled June 5, 201.5 as follows:
ARGUMENT

Before the Court Is an attempt by Plaintiffs to strike the Fourth Affidavit of Joyce
Stroschein ("-Fourth Affidavit"). The Plaintiffs' motion suggests that striking the motion is
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appropriate because the affidavit was not filed with the original moving papers. It also alleges

various unsupported reasons to strike.portion$ of the affidavit. The claimed objections are
unpersuasive and striking the affidavit is unwarranted. The City reqqests that the Court deny

Plaintiffs) motion to strike the Fourth Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein and consider her affidavit
as part of the City's Mc;>tiou for Summary Judgment.

A.

General Objections

Plaintiffs suggest that the Fourth Affidavit should be stricken because it was not filed
with the original moving papers -as stated in Rule 56(c), Idaho Rules- of qvil Procedure. As this
Court can -appreciate, this case is unique in that the Court provided the parties with additional
time to make argument outside-the time requirements provided by Rule 56(c)-providing both
parties to file supplemental briefs to fully address the merits of the-summary judgment.
Specifically, the matter·was fully briefed and argued to the Court. however, at the hearing

additional time was provided to supp1einent the briefing and evidence in the record. While
Plai_ntiffs argue that the rules do not provide for affidavits filed with a reply, the rules likewise do

not contemplate a .sur-reply; The Court has discretion to allow additional filings and affidavits
out~ide the rules,

In this case, Defenda)lt filed a Fourth Affidavit of Joyce Stroschein with the Citf s surreply to address newly raised issues. The filing of the Fourth Affidavit was appropriate and

preserved judicial reso.urces-l>ecause it avoided the. filing of a motion for reconsideration. In the
supplemental b1ief filed by Plaintiff they raised new issues, including suggestions that the

Connection Fees were comingled and Spent for general fund purposes, that the connection fee
was improperly allocated, and that a n~w rate study was required. Plaintiffs also filed additional
affidavits that could have easily been prepared and filed with the initial objection .
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The Fourth Affidavit specifically addresses the factual misstatements made by Plaintiffs.

A review of the affidavit rev~als that the·affidavit specifically addresses factual misstatements
that the connection fees were spent for general fund purposes or· capital improvements ..Ms.
Stroschein also addresses the erroneous suggestion that the connection fees were spent to retire
future debt. Rather, Ms. Stroschein clarifies that the connection fees were allocated for same year

debt service. E&eh of these stat~.ments addresses newly raised issues and .not previously argued
issues. As such, the affidavit was appropriate.

Witho1,1t specifics. Plaintiffs suggest that Ms. Stroschein offers contradictory statements
and her affidavit is a bad faith attempt to address claimed inconsistenci~. Nothing in Ms.

Strosc-hein's Fourth Affidavit is contradictory to her prior testimony or other statements m~e by
others in the But/ding Contractors. matt;er. In this case, Ms. Stroschein 's affidavit addresses
issues that were not previously addressed and clarified specific fiictu_al inaccuracies. It is not bad
faith to clarify factua.Ily unsupportable statements or to clarify issues that bear on the

fundamental issues being addressed by the motion for smmnary judgment. Moreover, the City
has an obligation to identify factually unsupportab)e statements advanced by Plaintiffs. lt cannot
be consid.ered bad faith when addressing these issµes. Ultimately, the general objection to strike

the affidavit because it was not filed with the·initial moving brief is not well taken .
.B.

Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiffs make very broad and general evidentiary obje~tions suggesting the paragraphs
lack foundation, ar~ speculative; conclusory, or legal co11clusion. Many of the objections related

to the erroneous legal proposjtion that capacity fees cannot be spent consistent with the Revenue
Bond Act. 'Inis position is contrary to the plain language of the Revenue Bond Act @mi the Idaho
Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiffs suggest that the tenn •'revenue" does not include capacity
DtFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIF~S' MOTION TO STRIKE FQURTH SlltOSCHl:JN AFMOAVIT • 3
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fees. This suggestion is incorrect and contrary to the plain language of the.Act and the

Constitutfon. Each of the respective paragraph$ wiJI be addressed in turn.
Paragraph 3; Ms. Stroschein is the CFO for the City of Pocatello and has served in

various financial roles with the City since October 200 l (4th Stroschein Aff., 2). She has the
ability to confirm that the capacity fees were never used to finance future growth but that any

fees collected were for existing-infrastructure, as required by the Revenue Bond Act. Thete is no
foundation for the proposition tbat the Idaho Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 3 requires bond
repayment solely from monthly rates. Rather. the Constitution states that principle and interest be
paid solely from "revenue" derived from •~rates and charges·forthe use of and the service

rendered by" the various facilities. The Constitution does. not distinguish between monthly fees
and other charges, including capacity fees. This is confirmed bytbe Revenue 8ondAct, which
states the same. So long as the capacity fees are not spent for general fund purposes or future

growth and the funds are allocated for the same year, they are appropriately spent consistent with
the Act and Constitution. Paragraph 3 is appropriate and should not be stricken.

Paragraph 4: T}Jis paragraph lays the requisite foundation and corrects factual
misstatements.advanced by Plaintiffs. As has been confirmed by virtually every affidavit

submitted _i:p this tnatl;er ·and the !Ju.ilding Contractors matter, none of the capacity fees have ever
been aUocated for the general fund or for future expansion. Ms. Stro~chein can testify what

expenditures a.re required for the continued operation of a given system. As the CFO she has
intimatelmowledge of what funds are required to pay for the operation of the system and that
bond indebtedness payments are included to operate the water and wastewater-systems. She can
also testify that no connection fees were allocated to pay future indebtedness. Rather., her

statements address the specific requirements of the Act and Constitution. As ·such, the statements
DEFENDANrs OPPOSITION TO· PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE FOURTH STROSCHEIN l\FRDAVIT • 4
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in paragraph 4 are relevant, Jay the requisite foundation and are not argumentative. Para.graph 4

should not be stricken.
Paragraph 5: There is nothing that is conc]usory or l~al argument advanced in

,paragraph 5. Rather, this paragraph addresses the specific requirements o-fthe Revenue Bond Act
a11d the Constitution and how revenµe collected pursu~.nt to the Act may be allocated.

Paragraph 6: This paragraph specifically addresses the factual misstatements advanced
by Plaintiffs in their SupplemeniaJ Brief: Namely, Ms. Stroschein counters the suggestion that

the capacity fees were used for general fund purposes or improperly expended. These statements
are no c:onclusory. argumentatiye, ot improper legal conclusion.
Paragraph 7: !his statement confirms th~ obvious proposition tha,t an individual who

does not pay user fees would not be entitled to a reimbursement of the PILOT component of the
user fee. It is illogical to su~geS.t that this statement is speculative~ argumentative. or a .legaJ

conclusion because an individual cannot receive a refund for something they never paid. There i$
no basis for the objections to Paragraph 7.
Paragraph 8: In his :affidavit, Mr. Robinson en:oneously ~uggests that he has not

.received any benefit from the PILOT component of the user fee. This is incorrect and paragraph

8- addresses this argument. Ms. Stro.sche1n has previously addressed the benefits received by
various users and specifi.cally appJied it to Mr. Robinson who incorrectly concludes no benefit

frot'.I;] the PILOT com.ponent of the: user fee. Paragraph 8- is not speculative, argumentative,
lacking foundation, or· conclusory. Rather, they comport with previous· affi.dayit testimony.

Paragraph 9: Plaintiffs make the conclusory statement that the PILOT fee can be easily
calculated. Ms. Stroschein confirms that it does not have easy access to this infonnation and
hiring an outside consultant will be required tQ calculate the PILOT that was incorporated into
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE FOURTH STR0SC1i£IN AFflDAVIT • 5
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the user fee u.nder the Red Oak studies. This statement confirms the same statements made in

. Ms. Stroshein's third affidav:it. Nothing in paragraph 9 is improper and warr~nts being stricken.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant City of Pocatello respectfully requests that this Court
deny Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Fourth Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein.

Dated. this

/-1 day ofJ une, 2015.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

r hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the full owing
·this _Li:_. day of June, 20.15 ~ by the method indicated below:
Micha~l D. Gaffney, Es.q.
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFN_EY PA
21 05 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 8.3404
Fax: 529-9732

[ ] Mailing
[ J Rand Deli very_
[)cf .Fax
£ J Overnight M.ail

Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "'E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 524~3391

[ J Hand Delivery

[ ] Mailing
[)4' Fax
[ J Overnight Mail
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Attorney for National Association ofHome Builders

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK et al.

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C

Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF POCATELLO,
Defendant.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
COMES NOW Plaintiff Amicus National Association of Home Builders and hereby
moves the Court for pennission to file the attached Amicus Curiae brief in support of Plaintiff
Hill-VU Mobile Home Park and in opposition to Defendant City of Pocatello's Motion for
Summary Judgment. The proposed brief, which is attached, argues that the City of Pocatello
should not be able to use the illegal PILOT program as a shield against a just compensation
claim.
In Idaho, amicus curiae briefs are often accepted by Idaho courts when the briefs provide
valuable arguments and views. Rugging v. Ada County Paramedics, 188 P.3d 885, fn. 1 (Idaho,
2008) (amicus brief by Professional Fire Fighters ofldaho and International Association of Fire
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMJCUS CURIAE BRIEF OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME
BUILDERS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Page 1 of3

620

Fire Fighters Local Union 149 addressing fireman's rule accepted); Bingham City v. Com 'nfor

Reapportionment, 55 P.3d 863,865 (Idaho, 2002) (Court considered amicus brief filed by
residents of Madison County urging adoption of specific reapportionment plan); Boundary

Backpackers v. Boundary County, 913 P.2d 1141, 1150 (Idaho, 1996) (U.S. government joined
as amicus to contest county ordinance); Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 732 P.2d 297,312
(Idaho, 1987) (Pharmaceutical Manufactures Association allowed to submit amicus brief on
policy considerations of liability claims related to drugs); Poss v. Meeker Mach. Shop, 712 P.2d
621, 626 (Idaho, 1985) (Idaho Trial Lawyers Association allowed to file amicus brief in workers
compensation case). While the cit_ed cases are in the appellate context, they demonstrate a
substantial willingness by the Idaho courts to consider a variety of viewpoints from parties
seeking to present amicus briefs.
Here, the view of the National Association.of Home Builders is reflective of the home
building and development community in Idaho. Its proposed brief is not duplicative and will
assist the Court by providing an analysis of the applicable case law and the impact of granting
the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Accordingly, the National Association of Home Builders requests that its amicus curiae
brief be considered by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
DATED: June 30, 2015
MAYNESTAGGARTPLLC

~ /7-~
~

Steven L. Taggart
Counsel for National Association ofHome Builders
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the June 30, 2015 I served a true and correct copy of the
attached document, via U.S. postage_ first class prepaid:
Honorable Stephen S. Dunn
624 E. Center, Room 302
Pocatello, ID 83201
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
Hall Angell & Starnes, LLP
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Michael D. Gaffney
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Nathan M. Olsen
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

~ £ U I- ~

Rosalie Wanlass
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Attorney for National Association ofHome Builders

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK et al.

Plaintiff,
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C
V.

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF NATIONAL .

ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS
IN OPPOSfflON OF DEFENDANT CITY
OF POCATELLO'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CITY OF POCATELLO,

Defendant.
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I.

INTERESTS OF AMJCUS
The National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) is a Washington, D.C.-based trade

association whose mission is to ensure that housing is a national priority and to advocate for all
Americans to have safe, decent, and affordable housing, whether they choose to buy a home or
rent.
Founded in 1942, NAHB is a federation of more than 800 state and local associations.
About one·third of NAHB's approximately 140,000 members nationwide are builders or
remodelers, including over 900 members from Idaho. NAHB's builder members construct about
80 percent of the new homes each year in the United States and play a critical role in the local
and nationwide economy. NAHB members support the traditional American dream of home
ownership, as well as for the development of housing (whether ownership or rented) that creates
livable neighborhoods and communities. Whether high rise or ranch, urban or rural, -NAHB
builds many types of homes for all types of families. At the end of the day, NAHB members are
central to the process that determines where and how we, as Americans, live.
NAHB is a vigilant advocate in the Nation's courts, and the organization uses its 75
years' worth of national perspective to frequently participate as a party or amicus curiae in the
courts to safeguard the property rights of its members.
NABB is well positioned to track the effects of such local public policy measures as fees
and/or taxes on long·term national policy goals, such as maintaining affordable housing. In the
instant case, Defendant City of Pocatello ("City") is trying to avoid its Fifth Amendment
responsibilities by hiding behind an illegal fee scheme. Specifically, the City claims that the
money contributed by the Plaintiffs does not constitute a property interest. Additionally, the City
claims that the illegal PILOT component of the user fee is immune to a Fifth Amendment
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK
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challenge. For both of these claims, the United States Supreme Court says otherwise.
A decision adverse to the Plaintiffs will empower other Idaho localities to use legallyquestionable funding methods without any recourse. In turn, builders throughout Idaho will be
forced to expend limited financial resources in order to fight protracted litigation battles. Many
builders will be unable to mount such a struggle, and ultimately will fold their business and/or
pass these costs on to consumers. This will price many Idahoans out of the housing market.
II.

LAW AND ARGUMENT
A. Regardless of Whether the PILOT is a Fee or a Tax, the Money Contributed by
Plaintiffs Qualifies as a Property Interest.

The threshold requirement for a takings claim has been, and remains, the demonstration
of a constitutionally protected property right. The City argues in its Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment that the PILOT component of the fees contributed by Plaintiffs
are not compensable property interests. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summ. Judgment at 8, Hill-Vu Mobile Park v. City of Pocatello, ("Defs. Mem."), No. CV-2014-

1520-0C (filed on April 4, 2015) In part, the City cites United States v. Sperry Corp., for the
proposition that "taxation is not considered to be a taldng because the monies paid are not a
recognizable protected property interest." Defs. Mem. at 8-9, citing 493 U.S. 52, 53 (1989). A
close look at Sperry and other United States Supreme Court precedent shows no evidence for the
City's proposition.
Evaluation of a takings claim involves a two-step inquiry. Each step must be completed
in order. The first inquiry is whether the claimant holds a property interest. See, e.g., First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).

Only after this inquiry is complete should a court consider whether that property interest has
been taken. In Sperry, a private company brought Fifth Amendment Takings and Due Process
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claim against the federal government in order to recover a user fee that was charged pursuant to a
federal· statute. This fee was used to pay for the administration of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal. Defendants would have you believe that the Supreme Court rejected the challenge
because "monies paid are not a recognizable protected property interest." Defs. Mem. at 8. This
is not true. In fact, the Supreme Court heard the Fifth Amendment Takings claim, meaning that it
had already moved past the first inquiry as to whether plaintiff had a property interest in money
he used to pay the fee. Ultimately, the Court found there was no taking because the user fee was
reasonable; in part, because the user fee was not an illegal tax that violated the principle of
intergovernmental tax immunity. Sperry, at 60-61. In explaining its holding, the Court stated:
"[A] reasonable user fee is not a taking if it is imposed for the reimbursement of the cost of
government services." Id at 63 (emphasis added). Clearly, the Supreme Court would not have
decided the takings issue in the case if it had first held monies paid are not recognizable property
interests.
There's more. In Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, the United States
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state statute stating that interest earned on money
deposited in the registry of the court shall be deemed to be income of the office of the clerk. 449
U.S. 155 (1980). The County's scheme did not merely "adjust the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good"; but instead, it was a "forced contribution to
general governmental revenues." Id at 163. Further, the Court noted that "[t]he earnings of a
fund are incidents of ownership of the fund itself and are property just as the fund itself is

property." Id at 164. The Court closed by saying, "a State, by ipse dixit, may not transform
private property into public property without compensation, even for the limited duration of the
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deposit in court . . . . This is the very kind of tlrlng that ·the Taking Clause of the Fifth
Amendment was meant to prevent." Id
In Village of Norwood v. Baker, a locality went through condemnation proceedings in
order to build a road through petitioner's land, and then enacted a separate ordinance which
assessed upon the remainder of petitioner's land, an amount equal to the amount the city paid for
the land for the street, plus costs associated with the condemnation proceedings. 172 U.S. 269
(1898). In short, the village tried to reclaim the very money it had paid for the property. The
Court held that imposing the financial obligation upon the petitioner effected a taking under the
Takings Clause. See also Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 241
(2003)("A law that requires that the interest on [... funds] be transferred to a different owner ...
could be a per se taking requiring the payment of just compensation to the client; Phillips v.
Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156, 172 ("[T]he interest income generated by funds

held in IOLTA accounts is the "private property" of the owner of the princjpal") (citation
omitted).
Most recently, in Koontz v. St. Johns River Management District, the Court held that
monetary exactions are subject to the same legal analysis as exacti,ons of land. 133 S.Ct. 2586
(2014). In Koontz, a landowner applied for permits to develop 3.7~acres of a 14.9 acre piece of
property. Eventually, the governing authority informed Koontz that it would approve
construction only if he agreed to one of two concessions. Of importance here was the concession
that in addition to deeding a conservation easement to the government on the other 11.2 acres of
land, Mr. Koontz would have to pay money to enhance 50 acres of government owned wetlands
located offsite. Similar to Pocatello' s argument in the instant case, the government in the Koontz
case argued that "a requirement that petitioner spend money improving public lands could not
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give rise to a taldng." Id at 2599. The Court disagreed, stating, "Respondent's argument rests on
a mistaken premise. . .. [T]he demand for money at issue here did operate upon ... an identified
property interest by directing the owner of a particular piece of property to make a monetary
payment." Id. (citations omitted).
Clearly, the United States Supreme Court recognizes that money is a property interest and
this Court should be troubled with the City's argument stating otherwise.
B. Regardless of Whether the PILOT Component of the Connection and/or
User Fees is a Tax or a Fee, the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause Applies.

In the precursor to the instant case, Building Contractors, Association ofSoutheast Idaho

v. City of Pocatello, the court specifically noted that the true test of whether or not fees are
permissible is whether or not the revenue collected from fees are used for a permissible purpose _
under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to
Reconsider and Plaintiffs Amended Motion For Reconsideration, Building Contractors,

Association of Southeast Idaho v. City of Pocatello ("Mem. Dec.") at 6, No. CV·2011·5228·0C
(filed on Nov. 15, 2013). The City "conceded" that it was funneling fees by way of a disguised
tax. Mem. Dec. at 20. In short, the City's "concession" is a legal trick. In essence, the City is
operating under the erroneous assumption that its illegal PILOT scheme falls under a general
rule that legally enacted taxes are not takings.
As an initial matter, does it really matter in this case whether the PILOT is a tax or a user
fee? Impact and/or user fees are often measures designed to fund specific infrastructure
improvements for the general welfare, and operate in the real world similar to a tax. For this
reason, courts have applied longstanding and fundamental tests to determine whether an impact
fee is a valid regulatory fee or a tax. Since raising revenue is the primary goal of many fees,
many courts have concluded that such fees are taxes in disguise. See, e.g., Hillis Homes, Inc. v.
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Snohomish County, 650 P.2d 193, 195 (Wash., 1982) (superseded by statute)(holding that

development fees imposed on new residential construction were invalid taxes.). "[T]he power [to
tax] must be derived from the state, and a grant of it will be strictly construed, with doubts
resolves against the existence of any particular aspect of the power." Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr.,
Local Governmental Law at 335-37 (2d. ed. 2001). The difference in this case is that the City has
only relatively recently "conceded" that is employed an illegal tax, but they are doing so only to
evade their responsibility under the Fifth Amendment.
It is generally true that the govenunent's use of a valid taxing authority is not a talcing of
private property lUlder the Constitution. However, this position is not absolute. In Brushaber v.

Union Pac. R. Co., the Supreme Court stated:
[A]lthough there was a seeming exercise of the taxing power, the act complained of
was so arbitrary as to constrain to the conclusion that it was not the exertion of
taxation, but a confiscation of property; that is, a taking of the same in violation of
the 5th Amendment; or, what is equivalent thereto, was so want[ed] in basis for
classification as to produce such a gross and patent inequality as to inevitably lead
to the same conclusion.
240 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1916).
The Court in Koontz reiterated this principle, suggesting that there is a "point a land-use
permitting charge denominated by the government as a tax becomes so arbitrary . . . that it was
not the exertion of taxation but a confiscation of property." 133 S.Ct. at 2602 (citations omitted).
While the Koontz Court did not set a standard for that exact point, it stated that "despite having
long recognized that the power of taxation should not be confused with the power of eminent
domain, we have had little trouble distinguishing between the two." Id (internal citations
omitted} In fact, the Koontz Court predicted Pocatello's legal strategy by reasoning that "[i]f
respondent had argued that its demand for money was a tax, it would have effectively conceded
that its denial of petitioner's permit was improper under Florida law." Id The City should not be
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permitted to implement an illegal scheme only to hide behind that very scheme when a Plaintiff
tries to retrieve what is rightly his.
C. By Forcing Builders to Engage in Protracted Litigation and By Refusing to
Allocate Any Portion of the PILOT Component Under the Connection Fee, The
City's Tactics Negatively Impact Housing Affordability By Increasing a Home
Builder's Development Costs.

A decision adverse to Plaintiffs cannot be allowed to stand, at least not without an
acknowledgment that the decision would eviscerate property rights - for builders and developers,
and all Idahoans. The average home builder is a small business owner who depends on
consistent, straight-forward, and legal procedures in order to survive. The City enacted an illegal
scheme in order to transfer funds into the general fund, and now is employing legal tactics to
further delay just compensation due to .the Plaintiffs. A decision which denies Plaintiffs just
compensation will simply enable government authorities to test the limits of what they can
extract from builders. The building community simply cannot sustain repeated attacks upon their
Fifth Amendment rights. This is not just rhetoric, but statistical as well.
The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) has established small business revenue
ceiling categories for builders (including residential remodelers), for land developers, and for
specialty trade contractors. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Small Business Size
Standards Matched to North American Industry Classification System Codes (July 14, 2014),
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Size_Standards_Table.pdf (last visited May 22,
2015). Incredibly, 96 percent of builders, 94 percent of land developers, and 98 percent of trade
contractor establishments are small by SBA standards. Stephen Melman, Structure of the Home
Building Industry, Special Studies, (Dec. 1, 2010) at 3, available at http://www.nahbclassic.org/

generic.aspx?genericContentID=148743&channe1ID=3 l 1 (last visited May 22, 2015). Only 4
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percent of home builders finished 2007 with $10 million or more in annual receipts. Id. at I.
Land developers follow a similar profile; 61 percent of land developers having less than $1
million in business revenue in 2001. Id. at 2. Home remodelers are even smaller with 84 percent
of all residential remodelers having annual receipts of under $1 million.Id.
In short, those affected by land use procedures, such as home builders and developers, do
not just create vibrant neighborhoods, they also fit the profile of your average neighbor who must
carefully balances revenue with expenses. If Idaho cities continue to enact impermissible fees
and/or taxes, it will break the backs of the building conununity by delaying construction projects
and forcing builders to expend large amounts of money in litigation.
Further, the housing/development industry is a cruel and unforgiving environment. In
fact, the U.S. Census Bureau reported on the births and deaths of U.S. businesses in 2006. With a
baseline of 161,650 establislunents in the residential construction industry, 30,697 firms entered
the industry and 29,095 businesses failed. Melman, Structure ofthe Home Building Industry at 5.
The percent change of business births was 19 percent and the percent change in deaths was -18
percent. Id. Shockingly, this is over twice the turnover as compared to the U.S. manufacturing
sector as a whole. Id
Builders need and in fact are legally entitled to a degree of uniform, consistent, and
predictable land use procedures, and these factors are often the determinative factor between the
success or failure of a single project or the entire business.
The building community is not the only one affected by protracted litigation and illegal
fees. Builders are forced to transfer some of the costs of protracted litigation to the home buyer.
Even a modest increase in the price of a home has drastic effects on housing affordability for a
large number of potential home buyers. Nationally, a $1,000 increase in home price leads to
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about 232,447 households priced-out of the market for a median-priced new home. Natalia
Siniavskaia, Metro Area House Prices: The "Priced Out" Effect, Special Studies (Feb. 1, 2012),
available

http://www.nahb.org/en/research/housing-economics/special-studies/state-and-

at

metro-area-house-prices-the-priced-out-effect-2014.aspx (last visited JW1e 1, 2015). In Idaho, the
median price for a hose in 2014 was $252,325. Id at Table 2. As the median price of a new home
increases by just $1,000, 1,088 Idaho households will no longer be able to qualify for a new
home purchase. Id. at Table 2. In the Boise-Nampa market, a $1,000 increase in the sales price
of a home will cause an additional 474 households to be priced out of the market. Id. A similar
increase in the Idaho Falls area causes an additional 108 households to be Wlable to purchase a
home.Id
The priced-out effect is exacerbated through government regulation and constraints on
housing development. Already, regulations imposed by government at all levels accoW1t for 25
percent of the final price of a new single family home built for sale. Paul Emrath, How
Government Regulation Affects the Price of a New Home at 1-2, Special Studies (July 5, 2011),
available

at

http://www.nahb.org/en/research/housing-economics/special-studies/how-

government-regulation-affects-the-price-of-a-new-home-2011.aspx (la$! visited JW1e 1, 2015).
Every time a local or regional government raises construction costs by increasing the price of
construction permits or fees, the cost of building a house rises. For example, permit, hook-up,
impact, and other fees paid by the builder during the construction phase adds, on average, about
3.6 percent to the final price of a new home. Id at 7.
The City commingled connection and user fees and is now asking everyone to believe
that it somehow was able to only parcel out user fees when it implemented its illegal PILOT
scheme. Now it is hiding behind that scheme to avoid its obligation to provide just compensation
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to Plaintiffs. Time costs money, and in this case, it negatively affects home buyer affordability in
Idaho.

III.

CONCLUSION
The Fifth Amendment's "guarantee that private property ·shall not be taken for a public

use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). The City of Pocatello is not playing
by this rule of law; instead, the City implemented an illegal PILOT program, but then is standing
behind that program to claim that is should not have to pay just compensation. Supreme Court
precedent does not allow for this.
It is the proper role of this Court to safeguard the liberty and basic rights of private
property ownership afforded all Americans, including Plaintiff and all others similarly situated.
Based on the foregoing, Amicus brief, NAHB respectfully requests that this Court deny
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
DATED: June 22, 2015
MAYNESTAGGARTPLLC

Counsel ofRecordfor Amicus Curiae
National Association ofHome Builders
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Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH.JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF nm STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalfofhimse]f
and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff:

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

V.

CITY OF POCATELLO. an Idaho

rnunicipali:tY.
Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendant,.City of Pocatello, by and through its attorney of record, and

hereby submits this Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs-· Motion for Leave to Amet1d Complaint
as follows:

Before the Court is a motion for leave of court to amend the complaint. Plaintiffs seeks to
amend their complaint to obtain the same relief requested in the Building Contractors action,
DEFENDANT•s OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
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namely "invalidating the water and sewer connection fees" as well as damages associated with
the City's use of the connection fees. (PI. Motion for Leave to Amend. pp. 1-2). ·.I 'his motion is
defective and should be denied for three reasons. First. the Plaintiffs' t'notion shouid be denied
for ·the undue delay in making this motion. The underlying facts they claim support this motion
were well known and "Plaintiffs unnecessarily delayed resolution of this matter. Second, the

proposed amendment would be futile because the amendment rests Qn an improper reading of the
law regarding the Idaho Revenue Bond Act and the Idaho Constitution. Finally, the issue seeking

to invalidate the capacity fee is resjudicata having been fully resolved in the Building
Contractors case. Denial of the motion is appropriate and within the sound discretion of the

Court.

ARQUMENT
A.

Plaintiffs Have Failed To Support Their Motion With Authority Contrary To Rule
7(b)(3).

The City objects to Plaintiffs filing any written briefs in res_ponse. to this opposition, ~nd
further, that the City be provided with an opportunity to file a written response to issues raised by

Plaintiff.i; at oral argument, should the Court. pennit oral argument on this motion. Plairttiffs
indicated in the.ir Motion Seeking Leave to Amend Co.mplaint that they may be filing_ a
supporting brief within ·(he 14 days of the motion being filed. Rule 7(b)(3)(C) ·states·: "[l]t shall
not be necessary to file a brief or memorandum of Jaw in support of a motion~ but the moving
party must indicate upon the face of the motion whether the party desires to present oral

argument or file a brief within fourte-en (14) days with the court in suppon of the motion."
Plaintiffs indicated that It may be filing a supporting memorandum within fourteen days. The
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moving papers were filed and served on June 12. 2015. More than fourteen days has elapsed and

Plaintiff$ failed to file a briefin support of their motion. Further, Plaintiff has not complied with
the requirement that ora] argument be requested. Specifically. Plaintiffs suggest they wi] I s~t the

motion for hearing to further support their motion through oral argument. There is no explicit
indication that oral argument is requested1 this is corroborated by the failure to notice up the
matter for hearing~ Under Rule 7(b)(3)(D), the failure to file a brief and request oral argwnent
permits the Court to deny thetnotion without notic.c,Bccausc of Plaintiffsj failure to comply
with RuJe 7(h)(3), the Court should deny the Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint.
Even if the Court were to find that oral argument had been requested, the desire to
present oral argument is not mandatory and is left to the sound discretion of the CQurt. Defendant
.does not believe that oral argument is necessary and that the motion should be denied without
fi,lrther argument. Defendant has supplied this Court with sufllcient legal ai1d. factual support to
justify the denial without oral argument. While Defendant does not believe that oral argument is
necessary and the li'iotion can be denied, Defendant would request an opportunity to file a
responsive briefing to any written filings made by Plijintiffs. Further, Defendant should be
provided an opportunity to file a response to any oral argument made by Plaintiff! because it wilJ
not have had an &4equate opportu:n.ity"to research, prepare and address arguments ~ade in
support of the motion to amend -at an oral argumen1. To deny the City a full and. fair opportunity

to prepare and respond to argum¢nts raised by Plaintiffs at oral argument is prejudicial and
should not be condoned by the Court. The City should not be forced to respond to argum~nts
blindly and without an opportunity to address arguments advanced by Plaintiffs.. Thus, to. the
extent that briefing is pennitted ·or oral argµment heard, the City should be pcnnhtcd to file a

DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOT[ON
FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMEND.ED COMPLAINT- 3

639

,-

________ ... ,..,vvv

ILIC

JUI

t

('),,

l.4:UL:jb l015 MST Page 6 of 15

('''t

written response addressing Plaintiffs' arguments.

B.

There Is Insufficfont Good Ca_use·To Permit The. Cpmplaiut To Be Amended.
Pursuant to Rule 15(_a), Idaho Rules of CiviJ Procedure, afler a responsive ple$.ding has

been filed a party may atnend a pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the other
party. ln this case, Plaintiffs seek )eave to amend their complaint to allege ai1 entirely new cause

o.faction. Leave to amend a complaint should be given when justice so requires. Id. However,

··r t]he denial of a plaintiff's motion to amend a complaint to add another· cause of.action is
governed by an abuse of discretion standard of review:·' Estate <l"Becker v. Callahan, l 40 Idaho
522~ 527, 96 P.3d 623,628 (2004) (quoting Thomas v. J\.fedical Center Physicians, P.A., 138

Idaho 200,210, 61 P.3d-557, 567 {2002)). Denial of a request for leave to amend is appropriate
where a valid claim is not being advanced,, the amendment is futile, or the moving ·party has
unreasoQa,~Jy delay¢d the request. Spur ProductsCorp. v. ,Stoel Rives UP) 142 ldaho 41, 44, 122
P.Jd 300, 303 (2005); Callahan. 140 Jdaho at 527-28, 96 P.3d at 628-29; Smith v. Great Basin

Grain Co.• 98 Idaho 266. 272, 561 P.2d 1299, I305 (1977). DeniaJ of Plaintiffs request to amend

their complaint is appropriate her~ because they have unreasonably delay the filing of this

request and the proposed amendment is futile because no valid daim is bei.ng advanced.

1.

The Proposed Amendment is Untimely and Prejudicial.

While leave to amend a complaint should be freely given, it need not be allowed if there

is undue del.ay 011 the part of the movant. Spur Products, 142 ldaho at 44, 122 P.Jd at 303; Smith,

1 The

test for determining whether the district court abused its discretion is: (1) whether the court
correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion; {2) whether the court acted within the
outer boundarie~ (lf its discretion and consistently with th~ legal standards appHcabl.e to the
specific choices avaiJabl~ to it; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
Estate of Becker v. Callahan, t 40 Idaho 522, 527, 96 P.3d 623,628 (2004) .
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98 ldaho at 272,561 P..2d at '1305; Foman v. Davis\ 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227,230, 9
L..Ed.2d 222 (1962). The Iack of diligeuce is sufficient reason for refusing to permit an
amendment. Spi1r Products, 142 Idaho at 44, 122 P.~d at 3.03;- Freeman v. Continental Gin. Co.. ,

381 F .2d 459, 469 (5tt' Cir. 1967). ln this case, Plaintiffs seek to amend the complaint to allege a
claim based on the City~s aUeged improper spending of the capacity fees collected since 2007.

Plaintiffs suggest this is newly discovered iufonnation, however, how the City allocated and
budget¢d the- capacity fees has been known for many mon:thst even before this litigation was

initiated.
Specifically, in the First Affidavit of J1.1yce Stroschein she articulates_ that the capacity

fees were used to repay bond indebtedness for the water and v,-astewatet infrastructure. ( l 81
Stroschein Aff.. if1 l 7~20). This affidavit was filed on August 29, 2-014, in support of the City's

opposition to & request to show cause that would have improperly frozen Funds 37/38. Plaintiff',
chose not to pursue the matter further and specifically drd not amend their complaint until the
instant motip.n. The nearly one year-delay in seeking to amend the complaint will unnecessarily
prolong_ this litigation and raise issues that couJd have been raised much earlier. This matter was
filed in st:ate c-ourt (it had previously been filed in federal court :and was dismissed) more than 14
months ago. The matter will continue to languish in state court without a time]y resolution
because the proposed amendment will be subjected to a second motion for summary judgment.

Summary judgment on all claims has already been filed and further delayed following
oral argwnent at the request of Plaii1tiffs to smhmit supplementtµ briefing. The initial motion for

summary judgment was filed March 13, 2015. The matter-was argued to the Courton April ll,
2015. At 1he hearing the Court permitted Plaintiffs to file supplemental briefing. The motion,
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which was filed more than three months ago stiU awaits resolution. "Plaintiffs' attempt to prolong

this litigation is- unwarranted and there is not viable explanati"on for any delay in asserting a new
daim where it has known of the facts it aileges for nearly a year. As other courts have

recognized, when addressing motions to .amend, '·[a] busy district court need not allow itself to
be imposed upon by the presentation of theories seriatim. Liberality in. amendment is important
to assure a party a fair opportunity to present his claims and defenses, but 'equal attention should
be given to the proposition that there must be an end finally to a particular litigation.,,. Freeman,
38 l F .2d at 469~ Friedman v. Tranamerica Corp.., 5 F.R.D. l l 5, l l 6 (D.Del 1946); Pallottino v.
City ofRio Rancha, 3-1 F.3d 1023, 1027 (101h Cir. 1994); Midc:iJie:.· Metropolitian District No. J

Pallottino, 31 F.3d at 1027. Given th~ significant passage ofthile where Plajntiffs have ·not
sought amendmenl and the unne<.,-essary protraction of this lawsuit, deni~l is appropriate.
Moreovet, considering the fact that summary judgment has been previously filed~ this

further supports denial of Plaintiffs' motion to· amend. Numerous other courts have refused
untimely amendments that were pursued after summary judgment wa.s made. See, e.g.. Union

Planters Nat'l Leasing. Inc.

11.

Woods, 687 F.2d 117, 121 (5th Cir.1982); Canallns. Co. v. XMEX

Tramp .. LLC, No. 3:13-CV-156-KC, 2015 WL 1S09506, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 31., 2015);

Eisenmann v. Go-uld~National Batteries. Inc.• 169 F.Supp. 862, 864 {E.D.Pa., J958);: Gaylord
Shops. Inc. v. South HiJJs Shoppers' Ci"ty, Inc., 33 F.R.D. 303 (W .D.P~.• 1963 j. The rea$01nug fot

refusing to pennit amendments after summary judgment has been filed is sound: "[m]uch ofthe
value of summary judgment procedure ... \\'ould be dissipated if~ party were free to rely -011: 011e
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theory in an attempt to defect a motion fqr summary judgment and then. sl10uld that theory prove
unsound, come back long thereafter and fight on the basis of some other theory." Freeman, 38.I
F..2d at 469-70.
In this ·case, the attempt to amend the complaint merely alleges a theory of recovery that
has already been adjudicated in Building Contractors and is yet another moving target that the

City must hit to have this matter fully ai1d finaJJy resolved, The instant m-0tion results in undue
prejudice on the City supporting denial. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. IS(a)t undue prejudice means·

undue difficulty in proS¢cuting or de.fe11ding a lawsuit as a result of a change of tactics or
theories on the part of the plaintiff. Minter v. Prime &111ip.

co:, 451 F.3d 1196, 1208 (10th Cir.

2006}~ see also Jones v. Wildgen, 349 F.Supp.2d 1358, 1361 (D.Kan.2004). While any
amendment invariably cause~ s9111e "'prac.ticaJ prejudice/~ Jeaye to an'lend may b~ de11ied when

the amendment ••would work an injustice to the defendants.n Koch v. Koch Indus., 127 F.R.D.
206, 209-10 (D,Kan.1989). ·Prolonged litigation runs contrary to the rules of civil procedure and

the untimely delay by the Plaintiffs should not be condoned. I.R.C.P. 1. Denial ofthe·motion to
amend is w1thln the discretion of the. Court and will not be disturbed on appeal so long as the
Court acts within the reasonable bounds of discretiQn. Denial .is appro_prlate and in line with the
decisions of numerous other courts that have denied amendment after summary judgment has

been filed.
2.

The Proposed Amendment Would Be Futile.

As has be.en the subject of substantial briefing in this matter, the proposed amendment

would be futile b(!cause it suggests a legal violation wber~ none is present. Plaintiffs advocate for
a reading of the word ~·revenue" in the Idaho Revenue Bond Act and the ldaho Constitution that
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does not include capacity fees. Plaintiffs suggest that only monthly user fees: can be used to pay

for bond indebtedness. This argi1ment i$ contrary to th.e plain 1:artguaie of the Act and the
Constitution, which permits col1ection of, inter alia. fees as sources of revenue. Neither the Act

n.or Constitution m~nda4!s any limitatio1)s on the fe_e types used but.rather simply address
pem1issible uses in tenns of"revenue't only, which necessarily includes capacity fees collected.
A more complete discussion of this argument is found in the City's sur-reply in support of
motion for summary judgm~m and is incorporated herein by reference. Needless to say, the

proposed amendment seeks a re lief that cannot be afforded under- the law. Where a proposed
amendment does not allege a viable cause of action, denial of the request to amend the pleading
is appropriate. See Spur P1'oducts, 142 Idaho at 44, 122 P.3d.at 303; Black.Canyon Racquetball
Club, inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bqnk, N.A .• 119 ldaho 171,175,804 P.2d 900,904 (1991).

Furthermore, the futility of the amendment i~ evidenced by the damages claim advanced
by Plai.nti'ffs. Plaintiffs would not be entitled to a return of the capacity fees collected by the City

as this Court previously declared the collection appropriate and consistent with the Idaho

Constitution and the Idaho Reve-nue, Bond Act in the Building Contractors case. Because the
collection was consistent with Idaho law. the capacity foes would not be recoverable. Rather. the
only pennissible relief would be an order that the City appropriately spend the c11pacity fees. The
Court previously mandated that the City properly budget and expend the capacity fees in the.

Bui/fling Contractors case and the City has complied with the Court's order aiid Idaho law on
how the capadty fee can be spent. Accordingly, where a claim is advanced for which no relief

can be affqrded, denial ofthe motion is appropriate-. The proposed Amended Co.mpfaint seeks_
relief that i.s unavailable to Plaintiffs rendering the-0laim futile.
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The Proposed Amended Complaint is Barred By The Doctrine Of Res Judicata

In addition to the motion being improper because of an unreasonable delay and the
futility of the proposed amendment, it should likewise be denied because· it ·is barred by the

doctrine of res judicata. Under principles of res judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the
merits by a court of ¢ompetent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the

same parties upon the same claim. Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 fdaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805
(2002); Aldape v. A.kinJ, l 05 Idaho 254, 256, 668 P.2d 130, I32 (Ct. App. 1983); see Diamond v..

Farmers Group. Inc., 119 Idaho 146, .150~ 804 P.2d 319,323 (1990). The tltree fundamental
purposes served by res judicata are:

First, it ••[preserves] the acceptability ofjudicial dispute resolution against
the corrosive dis.respect that would follow if the same matter were twice
litigated to inconsistent results.•• Second, it serves the public interest in
prot¢cting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and third,
it adva.nces- the private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive
claims.
Hindmarsh, 138 ldaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 8:05 (quoting Aldape, 105 Idaho at 257, 66.8 P.2d at 133
(citation omitted)).
The doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent relitigation of a claim

previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the same cause of
actiqn which were actually made or which migh~ have- bee.n made. Hindmarsh, 138. Idaho at 94~
57 P.3d at 805; Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912, 915-916, 684 P.2d 314. 317-318. (Ct. App. 1984)

(''[T]he rule against splining .& claim applies even though the remedies or forms ofrelief
demanded in one suit are different-from those demanded in another."); see also U.S. Bank Nat'/

A.~s 'r, v. Kuenzli. 134 Idaho 222, 226, 999 P.2d S77, 881 (2000) (noting Idaho has adopted the
"transactional approach'' to res judicata ).
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In this case, the amendment seeks relief that has already been addressed in the Building

Contractors case. Namely. Plaintiffs (Mr. Quinn only because he is the only person who has paid
c_apacity fees) seeks to invalidate the capacity fee and recover damages associated with the paid
capacity foe. Applying the principle$ of res j udil::ata to the proposed amendment it is. clear that
this newest proposed relief is the same that was raised in the Building Contmcters case and. is,

therefore, batted. SpecifiCijlly, it cannot Iegitimateiy be argued that the same· parties ate not
involved. Whi-le the BuiJding Contractors Association of Southeast lc;lal10~ the Plaintiff in the

Building Contractors matter, are no.t nait1ed plaintiffs, Mr. Quinn was one.of the primary
individuals involved -as the President of the. Assodation. Mr, Quinn submitted affidavits- in the

Building Contractors matter a11eging the same .facts as alJeged here. The beneficiaries of any
relief here would be the same benefid~ries in the Building Contractor.~ matter. Simpl:y put, the
same parties are involved.
The sa.n1e claim found irt the Building Contractors case is being requested by the
proposed amendment here. A review of the Complaint in the Building Contractors case reveals

the following relief:
1.

That the Court declare the City's S.!!ll~~~!i~P.:.f§~.P.9.0~ to

be a violation of the Idaho State Constitution and Code as an unauthorized
tax.
2.
That the Court declare the City's ~!!!U~~~!!9~J~!_ROU~~~ to
b~. a violation of the Idaho State Constitution and Code in regard to
bonding requirements.
3.
That the.Court declare the City's connectio.nJee.»olicies to
be a violation of the United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution as a
taking of private property without just compensation, for which the
Plaintiff is entitled to equitable and legal remedies under U.S.C. 42 §
1983.4.
That the Plaintiff be provided. injunctive relief by cease and
desi~t of the enforc.eme1it and collection of the City's current ~9.UP.:!~!!J!\tQ

f~M·
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5.
That the City be required to repeal aU prior. ~Q~ne~tion.f#~
polie·ies and prepare a new connection fee policy that is valid under Idaho
and U.S. law, and that .the Plaintiff and any other-interested member oft:he.
public have the opportunity to review and provide input ht the
development ofs.uch policy.
6.
A declaration by the Court that arty pl'oposed fee by the
City to ·'fund the c-osts of growth', be implemented according to the strict
provisions of the Idaho Development Fee Impact Act.
7.
That a det~nnination be made of the precise amount of
connection and user fees that have been improperly coHected and utilized
since at least 2005.
8.
That Plaintiff be awarded damages in an amount to be
detem1ined by the. court at trial for overcharging .the amount due i1 for
search and copying costs of records under Pl-aintifrs .freedom of
information request.
(Building Contractors C.'-omplaint, p. 13-14 (emphasis added)). The clear purpose of the Building

Contractors case ·was to obtain declaratory and injunctive reJief invalidating the water and
wastewater capacity tees and to obtain damages associated with the coIJection of the capacity
fees (,r 7). In this case, the Plaintiffs-are- seeking to amend to obtain the same relief afforded in
the BuildingCortJracto1's matter) namely, to amend the complaint to ••add declatato-ry and
injunctive relief invalidating the water and sewer connection fees as well as damages.~' (Pl
Motion for Leave to Amend, pp. J-2). The capacity fee has previously been adjudicated by this
.Court and found to be appropriate and. within the permissible framework of Idaho law.

Ultimately, the same parties and same claims involved in the BuildingContractfJrs case are
involved here with the proposed amendment. Because. res j~dicata serves to ~ duplicativ~

cJaims previously decided by courts, the proposed. amended complaint should be. denied.
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Based on the· foregoing, Defendant City of Pocatello respectfully requests that this Court
deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave To Fi]e First Amended Complaint.

Dated this

1'" day of July, 2015.
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CERTJFlCATE OF SERVICE
l hereby certify that I served a true copy of.the fo:rego"ing docutnent upon the following
this_£_ day of July., 2015, by the method indicated below:

Michael D. Gaffuey, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
"2105 Coronado.Street
lda.ho FaH-s, ID 83404
Fax: 529-9732
Nathan M. 01sen, Esq..
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
48:5 "E'' Street
Idaho FaUsc, ID 83402
Fax.: 524-.3391

;{
[ J Mailing
[ yHand Delivery
[/] Fax
.
[ ] Overnight Mail
/
[/j .Mailing
[ VH d D 1·
.11 Fsan. e tvery
[ ] Fax
[ J Overnight Mail

~AKE 1;
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BLAKE G. HALL.ESQ;
SAM L. ANGELL,ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL ST i\RNES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls. Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621 n3008
!SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484

.bgh@hasattorneys.com
sla@hasattornevs.com
----=-·-·-···············
.,... _.. _____ _
nrs@hasattomeys.com
Attomeys for Defendant City of Pocatello

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on beha]f of himself
and all others similarly situated.
Plaintiff:

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C

DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION ro
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AMIC-US CURIAE BRIEF

v.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant

COMES NOW Defendant, Chy of Pucatel1o; by and through its ijttorney of record, and

hereby submits this Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae- Brief of Nation
Association of Home Builders In Opposition To Det)ndant's Motion for Summary Judgment as
follows:
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ARGUMENT
A.

There Is No Legal Support To File An Amicus Curiae Brief W.ith The District
Court.

Before the C-0urt is· a Motion for Leave to File Amkus Curiae Brief of National
Association of Home BuiJders In ·opposjtion to Defendant's Motion for Summary _Judgment.

The National Asso.ciation of Home -Builders' (the "Association") request is not well taken and
should be denied.

The Association suggests. without any support that filing an amicus curiae brief with the
4istrict court is.acceptable and that the fact tbat numero.us amicus curiae briefs have been filed in

the appellate context that this Court should likewise accept the filing. It ~tands to reason that
amicus briefs would only be found in the appeUate context because there is a specific a:Ppellate

rule governin,g such a filing. Rule 8, Idaho Appellate Rules, states:
An attorney, or person or entity through an attorney, may appear as .amicus
.curiae in any proceeding m'.,_request of:th!.Supreme_Court; or by leave
of the Supreme Court upon written application served upon aIJ parties.
setting forth the particular employment, if any, the interest of.the
applicant in the appeal or proceeding and the name of the party in who~e
support the a.micus curiae would aP,pear. The application shaH also -state
whether leave is sought to file an amicus curiae brief or participate in oral

argument, or both. Any objection to the appearance of an amicus curiae
must be made by motion within 14 days of !~ITi~e of t!te a_pJ!licaqon in
the manner provided for motions under- Rule 32. Leave.to appear 1:1s
amicus_eu.riae shall be by written enter of the Supreme Court which
shaJl specify the manner.of appearance by the amicus curiae attorney and
state the time for filj_ng_of ap_ya.micq~_crui!!e brief.
(Emphasis added). Thus, the filing of an amicus brief is filed only after the Idaho Supreme Court

approves the tiling and -sets forth in a separate order the time for filing an an1icus· brief.
Permitting_ the filing of amicus briefs in appellate proceedings cannot reasonable lead to a

conclusion of a ''suhstantiai willingness by the Idaho com-is" to consider other viewpoints of
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR LF..AVE TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF - 2
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third parties. in the district court. Acceptance of amicus briets in appellate proceedings is founded
upon Rule 8 and not a general q.e~ire to allow third pa,rties to inject iheir viewpoints into

litigation, especially at tl1e district court level.
There is no statute, rule, ot controlling case identifying or pennitting the filing of an
amicus brief in a district court. To suggest there is substantiaJ willingness by the Idaho courts to

consider a variety of viewpoints is overly .simplistic and ignores a specific appellate rule
permitting a brief 011Jy a;fter 1;1. request is granted by the Idaho Supreme Com1. Thus, it is
improper to file an amicus brief until leave has been granted. In this case, not only is there no
legal support for the proposition that a an1i.cµs brief could be filed with the District Court, but the
Association improperly filed the brief with the Court. The Court sh01,dd deny the· request to file
an amicus. curiae brief and also strike from the .record the improperly filed brief.

While there is no support for the filing of an amicus brief, to the extent the Court doespermit the filing of the an1icus briet: the City files its objection and requests that the Cout1 grant
the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismiss the matter with prejudice.
B.

The Interests Of The Association Are Irrelevant To This Litigatlon

The Association claims its Amicus Brief is important to this litigation because it ·has a
vi.able interest in this litigation. However~ upon closer review of the Amicus Brief: it is clear that
their i nvo lvem-ent in this Htigation is unnecessary. A review of the brief reveals that the
Association's only concer.n. is a renewed a.nempt to invalidate the capacity foe and they have no
interest in the collection of a. PILOT in the user foe. The entire argument is designed to educate

.the Court about the impact the PILOT has on "home builders" in the City of Pocatello. The
Association's position presents distorted, inflated and irrelevant statistics that presuppose

significant datnage to the construction industry in Po.catelJo. None of the statistics are relevant to
DE"FENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO M.OTION FOR L.EAVE TO ·FIL£ AMI.CUS CIJRl.AE BRIEF - 3
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the issues being ~ddtessed by the Court. Namely~ this litigation centers on two classes seeking
reli.ef: (1) Capacity Fee Payers In the City of Pocatello, arid (2) User Fee Payers in the City of
Pocatello. Of interest to the Association is the first class, "capacity fee payers" because that is the

only class that could arguably ~ffect home building, What the Associ.ati.on ignores is that the
capacity fee has previously been .deemed an appropriate fee in Loomis v. City .of Hailey. J 19

Idaho 434., 807 P.2d 1272 (I 991 ). This Court further concluded in the Building Contractors case
that ·the. City's collection of the capacity fee, including the amount collected, was appropriate and

consistent with .Idaho statute and law. The Association is arguing issues that have previously
been adjudicated in the Building Contract()rs matter. As such, the arguments advanced are

irrelevant and fai] to address any of the issues in this case.
It is also apparent from the. An1icus Brief that the Association is ignorant to the fact that
the capacjty fee has never contained a PILOT fee. In the Building Contractors matter. th.e
Ciipacity fee· and the amount of the fee was· declared to be reasonable and appropriate. However,

this Court took issue \\~th the City3s collection of the PILOT component ofthe·user fee. It is the
user fee alone that contained a capacity fee. (See Defendant's Memorandum In Support of

.Motion.fhr Summary Judgmenl, pp. 6~8~ Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support qf.lv.fotion
for Summary Judgment, pp. 2·4). Immediately .following the Court's conclusion regarding the
PILOT. the Chy readjusted the. user fee. because it wa.~ the onJy fee -that contained the PJLOT

component. (Id). Thus. the user .fee, which is paid by city residents for water and sanitation
services. is irrelevant to building costs. confinning the Association lacks any relevant

relationship to this litigation.
Finally, the Association lacks any standing in this matter, as they would have no
entitlement to any potential recovery. The Association has not paid user fees nor has it paid
DEFENDANT'S OPP0Sl1'10N TO MOTlON FOR L.EA VE TO l<'ILE AMJCUS C:URIAE BRl.l!:F · 4
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capacity fees. As such. there is no reasonable relationship between the Association and this
litigatfon. Ultimately. AH of the issues raised by the Association are either irrelevant or
duplicative of the Plaintiffs• argumentli. The Court ·should strike the Association• s Amie us Brief
from the record.
C.

The Amicus Brief Is Duplieative. Of Argu.ments Advanced By Plaintiffs.

The Associati-on advances the same arguments made by Plaintiffs in this matter,
rendering their brief duplicative. The AmiC1.J$ ·Brief is unnecessary it that it advances the same
arguments already presented to the Court. Spedfically. the Association argues the foHowing_: (1)
the PILOT qualifies as a property interest, (2) that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause applies.
Both of these arguments have been advanced and fully briefed by· Plajntitfs i:n their initia.1
opposing brief and again in the supplemental briefing. A review of the Association's brief on
these issues presents no novel theory or new argument that was not tiddr~ssed by Plaintiffs.
With respect to wh.ether the PILOT-qualifies· as a property interest and Takings Clause
applies, the City has previously brief~d this issue in Defendant's Memorandum In Support of

,Motion.for Summa,y Judgment on pages 8 through IO. lt was further addressed it~ D~fendant 's
Reply Mem.orandum in Support .q/Motionfor Summary Judgment at pages 6 through 7.. None of
the authority cited by the Association is factually analogous to the instant m~tter and does
nothing-to change the Citis analysis. As such, no argument on whether the PILOT component

of the user fee .is an unconstitutional taking is necessary.
D.

The Amicus Brief Is Not Helpful To The Coart Nor Is It Timely.

Mucl1 of the argument advanced by the Association relat!!S to the significant effect the
PILOT wiJI have on bome building in Pocatello, Idaho. The Association purports that if the

PILOT fee is not returned to the Plaintiffs, that h01ne- building will be detrimentally affected.
i>EFENDANT;S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR LEA VE TO FILE AMJCl}S CURJAE BRIEF· 5

654

(-~)
..... __ -

1bis argumen:t is tenuou~. specu_lative, and. without fom1dation that the statistics have any

reasonable relationship to Pocatello, Idaho. ln reality, the cost of building is not influenced by
the PILOT component of the user fee. As with the Plaintiff~ the real motive of the Association is
to have the capacity fee overturned. As this C9urt is ~ware, that issqe was previously addressed
in the BuildinfJ Contractors maiter and the capacity fee was declared to be reasonable, proper,

and in Jin~ with Idaho law. Mo.unting_a second attack on the capac.ity fee is barred by the
.doctrine ofresjudica/a. (See Defendant's Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion fo1· Leave To File

First Amended Complaint, pp. 9~ 11 ).
The Amicus Brief also provides no a~istance to the Court because it advances no new

relevai1t argument not previousJy addressed by Plaintiff; Plaintiffs, are represented by wellqualified cc.>unsel that properly represent the Plaintiffs' interests. The .Association's efforts are

merely duplicative of Plaintiffs' counsel's efforts. The only new argument advances is that .the
building industry is affected by increases in fee.s that must either be born. by the builder or }Jassed

on to buyers. There is no validity to this argument, however, because the capacity fee hl:lS ne··Ver
contained a PILOT component. Further, as discussed above, these are not relevant cons.iderations
when deciding whether the Building Contractors matter has retroactive or prospective
-application and what amount, if any, of the PILOT foe may be returne~ to user fee paye:rs.
Finally,s the Amicus Brief should ·be stricken and ignored by the Court because it is
untimely. While Rule 8 of the Idaho Appellate Rules does not speak to timcliness, the Federal
Rules of Appellate Proce.dure do. Specifically, Rule 29, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
states that ''[-a]n iµ'tllCUS curiae must fiJe its brief, accompanied by a motion for filing When
necessary, no later_ than 7 days after the _princip;albrief of the _:party being_!!!RP:ortcd is

:fi!,1J.." IRAP 29(e) (emphasis added). The City moved for swnmary judgment on March 16,
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMJCUS CURIAE BRIEF- 6
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20 l 5. Plaintiffs filed their initial opposition brief on April 1, 2015. The matter was· arg.1.ted to the
Court on April 13, 20) 5., wherein the.Court permitted Plaintiffs additional time to submit
supplemental briefing. All of the briefing on the pending Motion for Summary .Judgment was

submitted to the Court for resQlution on June 5, 2015. Now, more than a month after briefing as
been completed and the matter submitted to the Court, the Association is attempting to reopen

the tnatter. While the Federal Appellate Rules are not binding on this Court. they do suggest that
timing of an amicus brief is important.Q.Dd must be considered. Themotion to allow the

submission of an Amicus Brief should be denied because the Amicus Brief ~s untimely Md
unnecessarily burdens the Court's docket~ further delays the resolution of this matter, and

unfairly pr~judices ·the City by having to respond to ·an additional motion for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant City of Pocatello respectfuily requests that the. Court
deny the National Association of Home- Buitders' request to submit an A,micus l;uriae brief.
Further Defendant requests that the Court !,trike the improperly filed Amicus Curiae brief from
the Court's .record.
Dated this

,?"'

day of Jul~(.. 2015.
~AKEp.HALL
--J
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I hereby certify tha,! I served a .true copy of the foregoing document upon the foI1owillg
this ___t:_ day of July,. 2015, by the method indicated below:

Mich-a.el D. Gaffney, Esq.
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BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA.
21 OS Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

t ] Hand. Delivery

Fax: 529"9732

['f Email

Email: gaffney(a}.beardstclair.com

[XI FaJ$:

c' J Ovc111ight Mail

[~Mailing

Nathan M. Olsen. Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN

[ ' J Hand Delivery

485 "1E"' Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 524-339"1

[ J Overnight Mail

Email: noisen@pmholaw.c.om
Steven Taggart, Esq.

MAYNESTAGGARTPLLC
PO.Box 3005
Idaho Falls, ID 83403

[}4 Fax

[ )d Email

[;q Mailing
[r ] Hand Delivery
[ )q' Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail
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Fax: 524~6095
Email: stagga11l Ql@gmail.com
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Michael D. Gaffney
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado St., Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Fax: (208) 529-9732
ISBN: 3558
Nathan M; Olsen
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen
485 "E" Street, Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Fax: (208) 524-3391
ISBN: 7373
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY

HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.CV-2014-1520-0C

RENEWED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

vs.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
COMES NOW, "Plaintiffs by and through their counsel of record and pursuant to Rule
15(a) and 20(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby move for an order allowing
plaintiffs leave to file their First Amended Complaint, in the form attached hereto. This
"renewed" motion is not different in any way than the previous motion to amend, and is filed

RENEWED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - Page 1
658

for the sole purpose of alleviating any concern that the Court or defendant may have over the
timing of the memorandum filed in support of the motion contemporaneously filed herewith.
The general effect of this amendment would be to add declaratory and injunctive relief
invalidating the water and sewer collllection fees as well as damages due to the recent arbitrary
and capricious actions of the Defendant.
This amendment is necessary because, at the time of filing the original complaint,
Plaintiffs were unaware of the internal actions taken by the Defendant that are the subject of
these additional claims, and/or were taken after the complaint was filed, which were learned
through discovery.
:, -

Plaintiffs will also request hearing to further support their motion through oral
argument.
DATED this 8th day of July, 2015.
&OLSEN

Nath M. Olsen
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 81h day of July, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule 5(b ), I.R.C.P.
Persons Served:
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

Method of Service:

0

mail ( ) hand ( ) fax ( ) email

FAX: (208) 621-3008
EMAIL: bgh@hasattomeys.com

Honorable Stephen S. Dunn
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center, Rm. 302
Pocatello, ID 83201·

v<'mail ( )hand

( ) fax ( )email

(Chambers Copy)

FAX: (208) 236-7208
EMAIL: karlav@bannockcounty.us

Nathan M. Olsen
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Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
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Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Fax: (208) 529-9732
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Nathan M. Olsen ·
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen
485 "E" St., Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Fax: (208) 524-3391
ISBN: 7373
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY

HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C
AMENDED COMPLAINT JURY
DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS
CERTIFICATION

vs.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiffs, Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park, Ed Quinn and all others
similarly situated and for a complaint against the above named Defendant allege as follows:
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JURISDICTION
I. This action is brought for damages and other appropriate relieftmder 42 USC § 1983
for violation of the Plaintiffs' civil rights under the color of state and federal law.
2. Defendant, the City of Pocatello (City) is a municipality incorporated in the State of
Idaho ~d administered pursuant to I.C. § 50-101 et al., and located within Bannock County.
3. The Court has jurisdiction over the City tmder I.C. § 5-514.
4. Bannock County is the proper venue for this action under LC. §5-402 or 404.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS ·
5. The City has implemented "system capacity fees," sometimes referred to as
"connection fees"

or "capacity fees" which a person must pay along with a separate "building

permit fee;' prior to or in relation to new construction. Capacity Fees consist of separate fees
charged for water, waste _water, and waste collection as set by the City Council on an annual
basis.
6. Usually at the same time the City sets Capacity Fee rates, the City sets monthly "User
Fees" for customers of the City water, wastewater and sanitation collection system.
7. The City deposits the collected Capacity and User Fees into separate accotmts for
water, waste water, and sanitation.
8. Pursuant to Idaho law and the State and Federal Constitution, Capacity and User fees
can only be used for their intended purposes, including operation, maintenance, repair,
replacement of the existing system and bond repayment.
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9. Around 2005, the City initiated a policy with regard to the Capacity and User Fees
titled under various names, including "Return on Equity,""Rate of Return," "Franchise Fee," and
"Payment in Lieu of Taxes" hereafter collectively referred to as "PILOT.
10. In late 2006, City Mayor Chase requested an opinion from the Attorney General for

the State ofidaho (IAG) on the legality of the PILOT policy. In an opinion dated February 6,
2007, the IAG told the City that the policy did not comply with law, setting forth the statutes and

case law supporting such opiJ?on. The City did not disclose the IAG' s opinion to the public. It
also disregarded the opinion and continued with the PILOT policy.
11: Since 2007, no less than $30 million has been transferred by the City from the
water, sewer and sanitation accounts under the guise of its PILOT program to fund the general
activities of the City. No less than $6 million has been transferred as such since 2011.
12. The City has also admittedly promoted, planned and spent Capacity Fees for capital

improvement projects that expand the water, wastewater and waste collection systems without
first obtaining a bond as required under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act (IRBA). The IRBA only
allows Capacity Fees to be utilized for maintenance, repair and replacement of the existing
system.
13. The Building Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho (BCASEI) filed an action

I

in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State ofldaho in and for Bannock
County (Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C) (Idaho Case) challenging the legality of the City's

!

'I
I

Capacity Fee and User Fee policies, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

I

II
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14. In a November 15, 2013, Memorandum Decision and Order the Idaho Court held that
the City's PILOT programs; or any other program with a similar intent are unconstitutional and a
violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.
15. During the discovery stages of the Idaho Case, the City failed to produce the 2007
IAG opinion and any related correspondence or documents pertaining to that opinion although
such information was clearly requested. The IAG opinion and its related correspondence was
provided only through a subpoena by the BCASEI issued directly to the State of Idaho in January
of 2013.
16. The BCASEI had to pay the City over $2,500 just to obtain the City's financial

records to determine the flow of the Capacity and User Fees.
17. The City has also either destroyed or failed to keep and maintain records

pertaining to its Capacity and User Fee policies. Some records have been destroyed after the City
became aware of potential claims with regard to these policies. Such conduct constitutes a
violation of the Idaho Municipal Records Retention Act I.C. § 50-907, et al., and spoliation of
evidence.
18. During the course of the litigation in the Idaho Case, as a reaction to a court decision,

the City withdrew no less than $2,608,220 from the general fund equivalent to the amount of
Capacity Fees collected by the City since 2007, and have deposited such funds into separate
accounts, $1,391,089 in City "Fund 37" and $1,217,131 in City "Fund 38."

AMENDED COMPLAINT JURY DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS
CERTIFICATION -Page 4

664

tJ

c·;

19. In the summer of 2014, the Plaintiffs moved for a pre-judgment writ of attachment to
freeze the newly created Funds 37/3 8 as a potential source of recovery for damages. After the
motion was filed, the City of Pocatello approved its FY 2015 Budget.
20. As confinned by the sworn statements of City CFO Joyce Stroeschein, under the
FY 2015 Budget all of the monies in Funds 37/3 8 have been spent or are dedicated toward the
"bond covenants" or debt obligations of the City. Including the amounts collected since March
of 2013. that amount now allocated toward "debt retirement" constitutes no less than
$2.878.849.56. representing the amount of connection/capacity fees collected from 2007 through
August of 2014.
21. The City historically promoted "Red Oak " studies conducted in 2006 and 2010 as
the supporting basis for the assess~ent of user and connection fees in the City of Pocatello,
including the current fees (which are approved on an annual basis by the City council). The
reports were utilized to justify a capacity fee rate jump of 1,500% alone between 2006 and 2007.
with a consistent increase of between 8% to I 0% each year since then and until at least 2015.
22. The Red Oak Studies (prepared for water and wastewater respectively) explicitly
indicate that the "debt service" payments are to be derived from the revenues obtained from the
monthly user fees. That debt obligation is part of the "revenue requirements" factored into the
monthly fee rate recommended by the studies. The studies are also explicit in that the capacity or
connection fees are based solely on the "r~lacement" of the existing system through capital
improvement projects.
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23. The Red Oak studies then make a virtually identical disclosure with regard to the
assessment and calculation of the connection/capacity fees:
To detennine net equity in the system, replacement costs of the net equity in the system~
replacement cost of the existing backbone system is reduced by the outstanding debt on
related facilities. Eguity is not reduced by accumulated depreciation. Once a new
customer connects to the (water/wastewater) system. that customer begins paying charges
for service similar to all existing customers. These charges typically include payment for
retirement of outstanding debt. For this reason, it is necessary to deduct outstanding
debt from system value before developing these (capacity) fees.
24. In direct contradiction to the Red Oak studies relied upon by the City in its
connection fee rates, none of fees assessed and collected were ever used for "replacement" of the
"existing backbone" of the system. Rather. those funds were first transferred to the general fund
for general pur,pose use by the City. The City then transferred the equivalent of what it had
collected in connection fees during that period into newly created Funds 37/38. The City then
expended or budgeted all of the funds toward debt service which was to be covered by the user

25. The Red Oak studies falsely disclosed both the intent and the actual use of the
connection fees, as well as the basis for calculating the connection fees.
COUNT I - UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING

26. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference.
27. The 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the states under
the 14th Amendment, prevents the taking of private property without due process of law or
without just compensation.
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28. Idaho Const. Art. I§ 14 essentially incorporates the 5th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.
29. Under U.S.C. 42 § 1983, a person who is deprived of their rights under the color of
any act, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any public entity is entitled to redress
at law or in equity.
30. Under the doctrine of "Res Judicata" the Court should accept and adopt the
declaratory ruling by the Idaho court that the fees transferred for use under the City's PILOT
policy were impermissibly assessed and collected.
31. In addition, the City's use of Capacity fees for the purpose of capital improvement
projects that expand the system are likewise impermissible and a violation of the IRBA.
32. Additionally. the City's use of Capacity Fees for the pur;pose of bond repayments are
strictly prohibited and unconstitutional in that under Idaho Const. Art. VIII § 3 such payments
must "solely'' come from the monthly rates.
33. The City's unlawful fee policies have resulted in the taking of private property of the
Plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals.
34. The City's actions have resulted in a violation of the Constitutional rights, by the
taking of private property without due process of law and without just compensation.
35. The Plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals and entities have suffered injury
caused by the City charging an unlawful fee and seek compensation for damages in an amount
which will be proven at trial, which in any event is many times in excess of$25,000.
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COUNT II - UNJUST ENRICHMENT
36 ..All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference.
37. Plaintiffs have conferred a benefit on the City in the fonn of Capacity and/or User
Fees which have been used by the City for purposes not authorized by the Idaho Constitution.

38. The City has been knowingly and willingly receiving an improper benefit at the
expense of the Plaintiffs and other similarly situated individuals and entities.
39. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the City to retain this benefit

without properly reimbursing Plaintiffs and others who have paid the fees.

COUNT Ill- INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
40. All previous allegations are restated and incotporated herein by reference.

41. The City did knowingly assess a Capacity Fee under the false premise that such fees
would not be calculated and/or used for bond repayment, which is strictly prohibited under the
state law and constitution.
42. Evezy Capacity Fee dollar that has been collected and used by the City has either

been used for improper pw:;poses of the general fund or for bond retirement in contravention of
what was publically claimed and disclosed by the City.
43. The City has and continues to implement a Capacity policy that is unlawful.

inequitable. and a violation of Plaintiffs' members' rights.
44. The continuance of the City's Capacity Fee policies will result in waste or irreparable

injuzy to Plaintiffs and its members.
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45 .. Plaintiffs and its members are entitled to injunctive relief requiring the City to cease_
and desist its current unlawful Capacity Fee collections and policies.
46. The City should further be enjoined from relying upon the Red Oak studies for its
Capacity Fee rates. which will require a declaration that the current Capacity Fees are not lawful
or enforceable.
COUNT IV-EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND/OREQIDTABLE TOLLING
47. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference.
48. The City knowingly made a false representation of, concealed and/or destroyed
material facts to the detriment of the Plaintiffs.
49. Alternatively or in addition, essential information bearing on the Plaintiffs' claims
could not be discovered through reasonable diligence.
50. Alternatively or in addition, the City's fee policies, i.e. PILOT program and capital
expansion without proper bonding procedures, were void as a matter oflaw.
51. The Plaintiffs had no knowledge of the concealed or falsely represented material
facts.
COUNT V - ATTORNEY FEES
52.

All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference.

53.

The Plaintiffs have retained the services of the above named legal counsel to

pursue their rights.
54.

The Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their attorneys fees and expenses under LC.

§12-117, 58-115, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and any other applicable statute or rules.
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CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION
55. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference.
56. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of a Class consisting

of all individuals or entities who have paid Capacity or User Fees to the City since 2007.
57. Class certification, including the possibility of subclasses, is warranted and
appropriate under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiffs pray for the following relief:
1. For a monetary judgment consisting of all improperly collected and spent Capacity and

User Fees since 2007, plus interest at the statutory rate of 12% per annum.
2. That there be immediate injunctive and declaratory relief preventing the enforcement

of the current Capacity Fee assessments until as such time the City can enact a legal and pro12er
Capacity Fee.
3. That the City should be required to deposit all monies collected from the unlawful fee

into a common fund and all members of the class should be allowed to petition the fund for a
recovery of their damages.
4. That punitive damages be awarded for the City's wrongful conduct pertaining to the

Plaintiffs' equitable estoppel claim.
5. An award of attorney fees and costs, and further that the City should be required to
reimburse the damages fund for any such awarded attorney fees based upon the allegations
contained herein so as not to further harm the class.
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6. Any other legal or equitable relief deemed justified by the Court.

PLAINTIFFS REQUEST A JURY TRIAL FOR ANY ISSUES TRIABLE BY JURY
DATED this _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _, 2015.
PETERSEN Moss HALL & OLSEN

Nathan M. Olsen
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
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Nathan M. Olsen
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen
485 "E" Street, Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Fax: (208) 524-3391
ISBN: 7373
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY

HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.CV-2014-1520-0C

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
RENEWED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

vs.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs through Counsel of Record hereby provides the following memorandum in
support of their Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. This memorandum is
supported by the pleadings previously filed in this case.
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Rule 15(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governs the amendment of pleadings. In
relevant part, it provides, that after a responsive pleading has already been filed:
" ... a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court ... and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires."
Rule 20(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in part that:
''All persons may be joined in one action as defendants ifthere is asserted against jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out the of same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of
law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action."
The plaintiffs' amended complaint makes several necessary amendments, that because of
the nature of such changes, including new claims, could not be made until after recent
developments. This included facts that either were not known or did not occur until after the
filing of their complaint. The general effect of this amendment would be to add declaratory
and injunctive relief invalidating the water and sewer connection fees as well as damages due
to the recent arbitrary and capricious actions of the defendant. This includes, in particular the
improper allocation of connection fees toward bond retirement which is contrary to the Idaho
Constitution and the defendant's represented intended uses for the fees, which it also based the
calculation of the fees.
Whether or not to grant leave to amend is a decision left to the sound discretion of the
court. In the interest of justice, courts should favor liberal grants of leave to amend a complaint.

Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 934 P2d 20 (1997). This rule's purpose is two-fold. First, it is to
allow each claim to be determined on its merits rather than on a procedural technicality. Second,
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it is to relegate pleadings to the limited role of notice pleading, rather than place artificial and
unwarranted limitations on the litigation. Clarkv. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 715 P.2d 993 (1986).
Accordingly, Idaho trial courts have routinely granted these motions as a matter of
course. Exceptions have been made when there is a significant prejudice to the opposing party.
For example, if the motion is made after court-imposed deadlines, adds parties that were earlier
dismissed, at a time that multiple discovery deadlines had passed, a court might rightly refuse to
allow the amendment. Maroun v. Wyre less Sys., 141 Idaho 604, 114 P.3d 974 (2005). But if
there is no substantial reason, refusing to grant leave is an abuse of discretion. Carl H
Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866,993 P.2d 1197 (1999); Idaho School for
Equal Educ. Oppor. ex rel. Eikum v. Idaho State Bd ofEducation ex rel Mossman, 128 Idaho
,.,,·,

2726, 912 P.2d 644 (1996).
In this case, the defendant would not be prejudiced by the amended complaint. At the
last hearing in this matter, the Court vacated the trial date set for this matter in August of 2015.
Although the secondary date for the trial was initially set January of 2016, it is not clear yet
whether this will be the trial date as well. The Court now has before it the plaintiffs' motion for
class certification and defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court also made it clear
in the prior hearing that the parties would have ample opportunity to brief and/or conduct
discovery on the complex issues in this case.
No such reason to deny the motion to amend exists here, substantial or otherwise. The
amendments to the complaint are warranted by recent developments in the case. There is no
prejudice from allowing the amendment.
Because justice so requires, the motion for leave to amend must be granted.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST
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DATED this gt11 day of July, 2015.

Nath
lsen
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, with my office in
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 8th day of July, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule S(b), l.R.C.P.
Persons Served:
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP
1075 S. UtahAve., Ste. 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

Method of Service:

~ l ( )hand ( ) fax () email

FAX: (208) 621-3008
EMAIL: bgh@hasattomeys.com

Honorable Stephen S. Dunn
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center, Rm. 302
Pocatello, ID 83201

~ l ( ) hand ( ) fax ( ) email

(Chamb rs Copy)

FAX: (208) 236-7208
.
EMAIL: karlav@bannockcounty.us

Nathan M. Olsen
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL; ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ;
HALL ANGELL STARNES,. LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3.003
Fm. (208) 621-3008
JSB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgl.l@lhas.attomeys.Gom
sl~}hasattomQY:c;.com
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nrs@hasattorneys.com
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello

IN THE PISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STA,TE OF IOAHO,. IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, oi1

behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and oth_ets similarly situated,

all

Case No, CV-2014-1520-0C

DEFENDANT~s RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIF.FS'

Plaintiff,

RENEWE;D MOTION TO AMEND
COMPLAINT

v.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,

Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendant, City of Pocatello, by and through its attorney of record, and hereby

submits this Response in OpposiJion·to P]aintiffs' ReneWe4 Mopon for Leave to Amend Complaint ~s
follows:

ARGUMENT
Before the court is the Plaintiffs<> renewed motion for· leave of court to am.end their

compl&int. The Plaintiffs se.ek to ren~ their motion to ameil.d their complaint "for the sole.
purpose of alleviating any concern the Court or Defendant may have over the timing of the.
677
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memorandum filed in support of the motion to amend". (PL Renewed Motion for Leave to

Amend, pp. 2). The City requests the Court deny the Plaintiffs' renewed motion bec~use it is
identical to the Plaintiffs'· first motion to amend its complaint, and therefore, unnecessary.
The Plaintiffs' renewed motion presents no substantive issue or argument that was not

previously raised ih its first motion to amend its complaint. Rather, the Plaintiffs' renewed
motion is a thinly veiled attempt to avoid a previous violation ofrµle 7(b)(3)(C), and any

consequences following such a violation under rule 7(b)(3)(D). A c0urt may deny a moving
party's motion, witho_ut notice, 'if the· moving party does not requ_est oral _argwn~nt and does not

file a brief within fourteen (14) days. I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(D). The Plaintiffs' first motion to amend

th.eir complaint violated 7(b)(3)(C) by not filing their supporting bri~f within 14 days after
indicating their intent to file a brief. Plaintiffs also failed to request a bearing for oral argument in

their first motion, The City mise.d this issu.e in. its first brief opposing the Plaintiffs' motion.
(Defendant's BriefOppos_ingMotion to Amend pp. 2·3).1ne Plaintiffs' renewed motion should

not be accepted because the motion is -only an attempt to avoid procedural rules. Further, ·no good
cause for the failure ~o comply with th~ procedural rules was given. As such, the Plaintiffs,

renewed motion should be stricken from the record.

In the· event the Court does not deny the Plaintiffs' renewed motion for the reason.s ~tat.ed
tlbove~ the Plaiutiffst motion should still he denied for reasons stated in the City's. first brief

opposing the Plaintiffs motion to amend. Specifically, the renewed motion should be denjed
because the Plaintiffs lack sufficient good cause for the court to pennit the amended complaint.

(Defendant's Brief Opposing Amendment pp. 4). Furthennore, the renewed motio11 should be
denied because the Plaintiffs' proposed amendment to their complaint is. barred by the doctrine
of r~s judicata. (Defendant's Bri~f Opposing Amend_ment pp. 9). Hereinafter. the City would. like
678
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to incorporate sect1ons ..H.. and '·c· of its original brief to the court oppo.sing the Plaintiffs, first

motion to amend their complaint. The arguments from ~ections· "B'~ anq '"'C;., still apply to the
renewed motion and provide ample justification to deny the unwarranted amendment.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant City of.Pocatello respectfully reqµests that this Court deny
Plaintiffs' Ren~wed Motion for Leave To File First Amended Complaint
~

Dated this~ day of July, 201S.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing.document ~pon the following
this lb .fl:...day of July;, 2015, by the method indicated below:.
·
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Fax.; 529·9732
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 '·En Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 524·3391

[)J"Mailing

[ 1 Hand Delivery
~ Fax

[· J Overnight Mail

[)<{Ma.mng

[ J Hand Delivery
[>J Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

BLAll G. HALL
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
/SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgh@hasattorneys.com
sla@hasattorneys.com
nrs@hasattorneys,com ·.
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF IBE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C

ORDER

Plaintiff,

CITY OF POCATELLO, an-Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
Based upon the Defendant's Motion to Vacate Hearing and good cause appearing
therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing currently set for August 10, 2015, at 2:00
p.m. be rescheduled for August 17, 2015 at the hour of 2:30 p.m.

DATEDthls_i" _day of August,2015.
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing docwnent upon the following
this _7th_ day of August, 2015, by the method indicated below:
Michael D. Gaffney,Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Fax: 529-9732

[ ] Mailing

[ l Hand Delivery
[A Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 524-3391

[ ] Mailing
[ } Hand Delivery
[ ./J Fax .
[ ] Overnight Mail

Blake G. Hall, Esq.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 621-3008

[ ] Mailing
Hand Delivery
[ .;j Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail

[l

CLERK OF THE COURT

D~~L

ORDER RESCHEDULING HEARING - 2

682

. -·~-

-

... - ...

BLAKE G. HALL. ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue.Suite 150
Idahq Falis, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208} 522-3003
Fax (2.08) 621-3008
!SB No. 's 2434, 7011 & 7484
bgll@_hasattorneys.com
s1a@hJisattorney$.com
nr.s@hasattorne~.com
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
JN THE 01STR1CT COURT OF THE SIX'l'H JUDICIAL D1STRlCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE H;OME PARK,, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly

situated; ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others silnilarly situated,

Case No. CV-20 l 4-1520~0C
DEFENDANrs RESPONSE IN

OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

Plaintift:

v.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendant City of Pocatello, by and through its attorney of record, and

hereby submits this Opposition Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint as follows:
INTRODUCTION

On August 17, 2015, the Court took up argument regarding Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend
Complaint. Given the untimely filing of a .substantive brief on the motion.• the Court provided
Defendant's fourteen days to provide a response to the motion. In addition the opposition
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOT.ION TO AMEND COM.r.LAINT" 1
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previously t1led with the Court on July 7, 2015. the City supplements their response with the
following objections confirming d~nial of the motion is appropriate .. The motion to amend should
be denied for tv.ro reasons (1) the deadline to amend th,e Complaint elapsed on Fe.bruary 17,

2015; and (2) the re.lief being $ought through the amendment cannot be granted rendering the
amendment futii'e.

A.

· The Scheduling Order Required Amendments to the Complaint No Later than
February 17t 2015.
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to Amend on June 12. 2015. A memorandum in

support did not accompany the motion. Upon the City's objection for failing to support the
motion with argument, Plaintiffs then filed a renewed motion to am!!nd on Ju.ly 8, 2015. Neither
motion to amend was timely and no good ca.use was provided for failing to timely make a motion
to amend; On December 19, 2014, the Court lodged the Order Setting Jury Trial ("Scheduling
Order''). The Scheduling Order mandated that "M_Q'.flQ~§_IO AJ).Q_fART.lES..QRAME~P.

PLEADINGS shall be filed no later than 60 days afterth.e date of this Order." Scheduling Order;
p. 2-3 (emphasis in original). Any motion to amend the complaint was required no later than
February 17, 201.S. The purpose of the Court ordered scheduling deadlines is to control the
subsequent course of the action and ·"shall not b~ modified except. by leave of the district judge ..
. upon a showing of.good cause." I.R.C.P. 16(a). See also Johnson v. Mammoth Rec:reations,

Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 60.8 (9th Cir.1992); US. Dominator, Inc. v. Factory Ship Robert E. Resqff,
768 F.2d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir. 1985) (court may deny as untimely a motion filed .after the
scheduling order cut-off date where no r~quest to modify the order has been made); Dedge v.

Kendrick, 849 F.2d J198 (11th Cir. 1988) (motion filed after the scheduling order cut-off date is
untimely and may be denied solely on that ,growid).
DEFENDANT,S RESPONSE TN OPPOSJTIONTO
PLAINTIFFS'· MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 2
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Here, Plaintiffs filed the motion to amend well after the court imposed d_eadHne for

.amending- a com_plairit. Absent from the.motion is any acknowledginent of the sched.u'ling order
deadline-s.• a request to alter the de~dlines or discussion of the req11ired good cause for why th~
deadHne should be ignored. Rule 16's "'good cause" standard primarily considers the diligence of
the party $eeking the amendment. &e Martin v. Ilohlit, 133 Idaho 372, 376,. 987 P.2d284, 288

(1999). 1 Plaintiffs faiJ to set forth any reasonable explanation for their untimely motion. As noted
previous]y, in the .First Af±idavit of Joyc.e Stroschein she specifically articulates that the capacity

fees were only used to repay bond· indebtedness for the water and wastewater infrastructure. ( I51
Stroschein Af'f., para. 17~20). Stroschein's affidavit discussing how the City was spending the

capacity fees was.filed on August 29. 2014. The underlying tacts Plaintiffs claim support the
filing of the amendment have been known for near-ly one year. There is no good cause that exists

for failing. to' seek an extension to file. As the Ninth Circuit has held:
A scheduling order "is not a frivolous piece of paper_, idly entered, which
can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel without peril.·~ The district
court1s decision to honor the terms of its- binding ·scheduling order does not
simply exalt procedural technicalities over the merits of Johnson's case.
Disregard of the order would undermine the court's ability to control its
docket, disrupt the agreed-upon.course of the litigation, and reward the.
indolent and the cavalier .

.Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 915 F.2d 604, 610-11 (-9th.Cir. 1992) (citations omitte.d).
Since the deadline for amending the complaint elapsed on February 19, 2015, and no· good cause

1

Because ldaho's. Rule 16 is identical in all materia1 respects to the analogous federal rule 16,

courts can look to rulings on the scope of the federal rule for additional in interpreting the Idaho

rule. ComptCi"l 1'. Compton, IOI Idaho 328,334,612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (l980t

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE 1.N OPPOSITION TO
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exists for failing to time]y file the motion_, the Court should dismiss the motion on this basis
alone.

B..

The Relief Being Sought Through The.Amendment Cannot Be Granted, Rending
The Amendment Futile.
·
Despite the disregard for the scheduling order, the Court could also deny the motion

because the proposed amendment is futile. The primary argument advanced by Plaintiff for
Amending the Complaint is to have the capacity fee invalidated and the capacity fees r.efunded.:
"[t]he general effect .of this amendment would be to add -declaratory and injunctive relief
invalidatin_g the ,vater andsewer connection.fees as well as damages due. to the recent

arbitrary and capricious actions of the Defendant.~' (Motion for Leave To File First Amended
Complaint, p. 1-2). The relief requested through the Amendment is unavailable because it is

barred by the doctrine of r~s judicata, rending the amendment futile, Specifically, the Court
previously held in the Building Contraclol'S case that the City's collection of the capacity fee and

the amount ofth~ capacity fee chat$ed was appropriate: ··[t]he City connection and user fees are.
not arbitrary or unreasonably imposed. 1b£1P.t..P.9...JJ!ion and collection of the (OJJ!t~~_tj~-~n~

A~tt (Me:;rrio Decision and Order On Reconsideration, p. 26 (emphasis added)), Because the
coUection and amoW1t of the capacity fee was constitutional and not in violation of the Idaho
Revenue Bond Act, the p.roposed amended complaint seeking· to invalidate ihe capacity fee and
have the collected fees refunded cannot be accomplished. The doctrine ofres Judi.cata bars
reopening these issues in this litigation,
Plaintiff suggests that ·the doctrine of res judicata does .not apply. To establish application
DEFENllANT'S R,ESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 4
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of the doctrine of res judicara, it1 summary the City must demonstrate that the following: (I') a
full and fair opportunity to litigate in the present acrion; (2) the i$_su~ ·being deci4ed in the prioi'
litigation was identical to the issue· being presented in the present action; (3) the presented issue-

was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the
prior litigation; and (S) the party ~gainst whom the issue is asserted w.as ~ party or .in privjty

with a party to the present litigation. Kootenai Elec, Co-Op., lnc. v. Lamar Corp., 148 Idaho 116.,
2-19 P.3d 440 (2009). The can satisfy ea.ch of these elements confirming appli_cation of the

doctrine of res judicata. to the relief requested by the proposed amended complaint.
Herc, th~ Plaintiffs have, and continue to htJ.v~. a fuJI a.n.d fair opportunity to litigate h1 the
present action. All of the issues. previously raised have been fully briefed by both parties. The
issue being raised in th.rough the proposed Amended Complaint is identical to the issue
previously addressed in the Building Contractors matter. One of the primary issu~s raised by
through the proposed Amended Complaint is invalidating the capacity fee (which was fully
briefed in the Building Co.ntractors case}. As noted above~ the Court s-pecifi.cally concluded the
capacity fee was constitutional and the amount collected was not improper. There is no legal
basis to suggest that the capacity fee be invalidated .. which is the primary relief requested in the
proposed Amended Complaint. (Memo Decision and Order On Reconsideration) p. 26). There is
no dispute that the Building Contractor.\· case reached final resolution on the mel'i1s. Finally, the
party against whom the issue is asserted was a pa.rty or in .nrivjty with a party to the pres~l'lt
litigation.. Suggesting that the Plaintiffs here, (represented by Ed Quinn) are not in privity with the

Plainti ff in the Building Contractors case. The Pl~ntiff hete is the same person who .also signed
affidavits as the president of:the Building Contractors Assooiation. The requested reliet:

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT- 5
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invalidation and recover of the capacity fees. would only benefit the builder.s in PocateUo who
were repre~ented by rhe Building Contractors Association. 2 In sum, aH of the elements of res
judicata have been proven. The. reHef sought-through the amended complaint cannot be awarded

because it is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. As such, the Court should deny the 1notion to
amend.

However, even if the Court were to disregard the· doctrine of res judicata, the relief
sought cannot be pl'Ovided, rendering the amendment futile. First,_as noted above, there is 110

legal basis to invalidate the collection of the capacity fee or the amount collecte~. Second, the
contention that the capacity fee was nots.pent consistently with the Revenue Bond Act and the

Idaho Constitution is completely without merit Consistent with Idaho law> the revenues
collei;;ted pursuanl Lo Idaho's Revenue Bond Act (the "Act") must. be used in conformity with the
explicit recognition that "fees are not utjlized for general fund or for future expansion of the
water and sewer system." id. at 440, 807P.2d at 1278. The record in this_ case is devoid of any
evidence that t.h~ City was spending the capacity fees for general fund purposes or future
expansion of infrastructure. Conversely, the record contains explicit testimony ftom City CFO.
Joyce Stroschein, that the capacity fees were only used to repay debt service for existing
infrastructure. As confirmed by M.s. Stroschein:
The City. has never_ used the capacfu'ftes to fund future _growth.nor
bas it transferred_the_money_ to the General Fund for use or repayment
ofG~eraJ Fund debts. Rather, the City has only used the.capacity fees to
pay for operation, maintena_nce, and replacement of t!~ting
!~f.r.!l!l(!!~.t~tt'-· Bond retirement for a given year is intertwined with the
continued operation of the Citfs water and wastewater systems. It would
_be factually incorrect to sugge&t that the bond retirement for a given year

RecalJ that the Building Contractors avoided standing issues despite neve:r having paid a
.capacity fee because it represented builders who had paid the capacity foes.
2

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
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is not part of the: continued 9.P~-~tjgQ 3.P4.m~.i:n.(~~~~-~~ of the City's

infrastructure.
(4 1h Stroschefo Aff., 14 (emphasis added)). Spending the ccl,pacity fee on the. opetation,

maintenance, and- replacement of existing infrastructure· is appropriate ancl consi_stent with the
plain language of the Revenue Bond Act and Idaho Constitution. There is no evidence in the

record that could even be construed in favor of the Plaintiffs that would create .a genuine issue of
fact sufficient to withstand a moti.on for summru.y judgment Whether the capacity fee has been
correctly allocated is a legal issue resolved solely by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act and the Idaho

Constitution. As such, the proposed amendment is futile 3 and the motion to amend sho-µld be

denied.

CONCLUSION
Based on the fore.going, Defendant City of Pocatello respectful1y .requests that the Court

deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint.
Dated this

3 .Because

,?/ day of.August, 2015.

the capac-ity fee is constitutional and the amount of the fee was appropriate, the only

potential relief would be an order from the Court to allocate the ca,pacity fees in a different
manner. The capac.ity fees would no be returned to ·those who paid capacity fees because the

collection and amounts of the capacity fee was. appropriate.

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
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J hereby certify that 1 served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following

this

-3L day of August, 2015~ by the method indicated below:

Michael D. Gaffney) Esq.
BEA.RD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2.10 5 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls~ ID 83404
Fax: 529-.9732
Email: gaffney@bean:lstclair,~..9.ID.

Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: 524-3391
Email: nolsen@pmhoiaw.com
Steven Tagga~ Esq.
MA YNES TAGGART PLLC
P0Box3005
Idaho Fans, ID 83403
fax.:524-6095
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[~ Mai1ing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[)(] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail
[X] Email
f

•

[~ Mailing
[ ] Hand Delivery
[K] Fax

[ ] Overnight Mail
[)(] Email
['(] Mailing

[ J Hand Delivery
p(] Fax
[ ] Overnight Mail
[X] Email

(3G~:
HALL.~.
·...____j

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT. 8

690

·-·----~-----

.••••

----J

--

_ _ ,. .... _

.. _ _

----

···-·

·-::::,-

-

....

-

BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Fans., Idaho 83402.
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
l<JB No. '-s 1434, 7012 & 7484
bgh~sartomeys.com
sla@hasattorneys.com
nrs@hasattomeys.com
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE S.IXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF'THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL· VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,

DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF

Plaintiff,

v.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
'Defendant.
· COMES NOW Defendant, City of Pocatello, by and through its attorney of record, and
hereby submits this Opposition to Amicus Curiae Brief.of Nation Assoeiation of Home Builders
In Opposition To Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ~s follows:

fNTRQPUCTION
On August 17, 2015, the Court took up argument regarding National Assocfation of
Home Builders' Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief.filed in opposition to Defendant's

'DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMJCUS CURIAE BRIEF - .I
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Motion for Summary Judgment.· The Court granteq leave to the National Association of Home

Builders_ to file their Amicus Curiae Brief and provided Defendant's fourteen days to provide a
respon$e. As noted in the opposition briefing, many of the ~gum~nts advanced by the
Association are duplicative of the Plaintiffs· arguments. The other arguments are irrelevant ·and
confitm the Associat'ion' s singular desh'e to invalidate th~ connection fee only. As this Court has
announced previously, the connection fee has never containe<i a PILOT component.

ARGUMENT

The Association advances tllree arguments in their brief: (1) the PiLOT qualifies as a
property interest~ (2} that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause applies; and (3) the PILOT
component of the connection fees will n~gatively harm the building industry in PocateUo, Idaho.
The first two arguments have been the subject of significant briefing an.d only specific and
relevant issues wi11 be addressed. The third issue .is completely unfounded, as the connection tee
has never contained a PILOT component.
A.

The PILOT b Not A Qualifying Property Interest.

Like Pla.intiffst the Association contends that the PILOT component of the user fee that
was collected by the City is a property interested protected under the Fifth Amendment.

Importantly, the PJLOT cannot be charatterized as anything but .a tax. This fact was establi-shed
in the Building Contr1,1ctors matter .. (Building Contractors ~Memorandum Decision on

.Reconsideration, p. 22). As a tax_. under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment~ numerous
courts have routinely recognized that taxation. is not considered· a takit~g. See. e.g., Unite.d .States·

v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 53, 110 S.Ct. 387,. I07 L.Ed.2d 290 (J 989) (holding that a
deduction of a tribunal user foe ftorn a settlement award is not a taking); Commercial Builder$ lr.

Sacramento, 941 F.2d -872, 876 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a purely financial exaction does not
DEfEN.DANT'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FO~ LEAVE TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE .BRIEF - 2
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constitute a taking); Coleman v. C.l.R.• 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir, 1986) {holding that taxes are
not takings, unless the Government tries to "achieve through special taxes what the Takings

Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids if done directly."); Atlas Corp. v. Unite..d States, 895 F.2d
745, 756 (Fed.Cir. 1990) ("Requiring money to be spent is not·a taking of property'');
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States~ 46 Fed. CJ. 29, 40 (2000) C'Requiring money to be

spent is not a taking ofproperty"): Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d ]57I, 1576 (Fed.Cir. 1995)
(1·ejectiug the argument that a red.eral statute constitute:d. a taki.ng, "''because the property allegedly

taken was money"). The logi.c behind not caUing a tax a taking is sound becau~e the City would
be paying money fot money received. Bram:h ,,. Uniied Stales, 69 F.3d I57 l (Fed;Cir. 1995),

cert. denied_, 519 U.S. 810; l17 S.Ct. 55, 136 L.Ed,2d 18 ( 1996). The cases cited by the
Association have been previously addressed and are not dispositive of this issue and <io not add
to the analysis because the ci(ed cases do not address ta,x collections. Ultimately, the PILOT was
a tax ai1d there is no property interest in a collected tax..

B.

The Association's Brief Demon_strates A Fundamental Misunderstanding Of The
PILOT Component Of The User Fees.
There is no dispute that the PILOT component of the user fee ~s decb,red improper in

(he Building Contractors matter. The City has never challenged this ruling and immediately
ceased collection of the PILOT following this Court's ruling. (See generally February 3, 2014

De~tsion on Plaintijf 's Applicattonfo1' Order to Show Cause.). The Association seemingly
suggests, without any-factµal suppon, that th~ connection fee contained a PILOT. This is an
erroneous statement and confirms the real motivation of the Association is to have the capacity
fee overturned. As this Court is well

.

@.Ware,

the PILOT was only incorporated into the user fee

DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOIJ LEA VE TO FlLE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF- 3
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and the connection fee has never contained a PILOT. (See First Affidavit of Joyce. A. Stro.shein. 1,

~Iii 8, 13; February 3, 2014 Decisiori qn Plaintiffs Application for Order to Show Cause, p. 1, 45). As such•. there is no viable argument advanced by the Asso~iation that the connection

contains a PILOT component.
Rather, the relevant question is whether the Plaintiffs' are entitled to a refund of the

PILOT. As has been. fulJy addressed by the parties, the signifi.cant and dispositive issue before
the Court is whe~her the JJuil4ing Contractors case was designed to be retroactive or prospective
in application. The Association's arguments do not address this issue. Substantial and persuasive
autQo-rity has be~n submitted to this Court strongly advocating for a prospective application.

C.

The Statistics Cited By The Association Are "Irrelevant And Does Not Change The
Validity Of The Connection Fee.
The Association cit~s 'irrelevant statistics to suggest that the connection fee ·should be

invalidated because it may hann the building industry in Pocatello. Claims that the building
industry is affected by increases in fees that must either be born by the builder or passed on to
buyets are irrelevant and do not address the merits of the City's Motion f6r Summary Judgment.
In the Building Contracto.rs matter~ the capacity fee was upheld as a constitutional fee and the

amount of the fee was not deemed to. be unreasonable or improper. The Court didf however,
declare. the- PILOT fee improper. This litigation centers on an-attempt tQ recuperate the PILOT
component of the user fee.

The PILOT was only incorporated into the user fee alone and, as ha$ been extensively

1 Paragraph

8: "The existence of the PILOT .is iiTelevant to the policy decision to require
capacity fees for new utility connections. There is no overlap between the PILTO component of
the use fee and the conn~ction/capacity fee. The City has never charged a PILOT component to
the c-onnection/capacity fee." Paragraph 13: "The City has never charged a PILOT component to
the connection/capacity fee and the two different fees have no relationship..,
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR LEA VE TO.FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF- 4
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briefed by the pan:ies, the connection fee has never contained a PILOT. Thus, the argument
advanced by the Association that the capacity fee will hann the building industry is incorrect and

v..ill not be changed by the results of this litigation. Because the capacity fee has never contained
a PILOT component, the fee will not ·be adjusted by the outcome of thjs litigation. Ac¢ordingly,
citing statistics about fees ham1ing the building industry is not appJicable here.2
Finally, any suggestion that the City cannot distinguish between a: user fee and a capacity
fee ig misplaced and ignores the City's action of segregating all of the connection fees ever·

collected and pladng them into Funds 37 and 38. The City can fully account for all of the
capacity foes ever collected. The City will continue to coll~ct the capa1::ity fee because it is

con~titutional and has been previously declared as appropriate. Ultimately, th.ere is no legitimacy
to the Association~s claims that the PocateUo building industry will be affected by this liLigatiorr.

In sum, the arguments advanced by the Association are not helpful in resolving the Citfs
motion for S\lmrnaryjudgment. The Court should find that the application of the Building

Contmctors matter only has prospective application and dismiss this matter with prej.udice.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant City of Pocatello respectfuUy requests that the Court
grant the City's Motion for .Summary Judgment and dismiss Plaintitls' case with prejudice.
Dated this

31

day of August. 2015.

2 The

c.ited statistics are generalit..ed statistics· that make no reference to the building industry in
Pocatello, Idaho. Any claim that.that the building industry will be banned is pure coajecture.
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF - S
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIX1H JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
Register No.CV-2014-01520-0C
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
-vsCITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER

On August 17, 2015, the above entitled matter came before the Court for the purpose of a
hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint and Motion to File
AMICUS Curaie Brief on National Association of Home Builders in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Summazy Judgment filed by Steven Taggart. Nathan Olsen, appeared on behalf of the
Plaintiff, Blake Hall, appeared for the Defendant and Steven Taggart appeared on behalf of the
National Association of Home Builders.
Sheri Nothelphim performed as Court Reporter for this proceeding.
Register CV-2014-01520-0C
MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER
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The Court heard argument from Steven Taggart and counsel for the Defendant.
The Court advised that the Motion to File AMICUS Curaie Brief shall be granted. The
Court is allowing counsel for the Defendant 14 days to respond.
The Court heard argument from counsel regarding the Motion for Leave to File First
Amended Complaint.
The Court advised that this Motion would be taken under advisement and a written decision
shall be issued.

DATE September 2, 2015.

District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

L_ _

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of_ .
2015, I
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each fthe following individuals ·
in the manner indicated.
Blake G. Hall
Hall Angell & Starnes
1075 S Utah Ave., Ste 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

(
(
(
(

) U.S. Mail
) Email
) Hand Deliver
) Facsimile

I
I

:I

Michael D. Gaffney
Beard St. Clair Gaffney
2105 Coronado St
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

( ) U.S. Mail
() Email
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

Nathan M. Olsen
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

() U.S. Mail
( ) Email
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile

Steven Taggart ·
Maynes Taggart PLLC
PO Box 3005
Idaho Falls, ID 83403

( ) U.S. Mail
(. )Email
( ) Hand Delivery

j

j

l
I
I

I

I

7____ day of

DATED this _ _

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH IDDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,'
Defendant.

---------------

)

)

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISCUSSING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS
CERTIFICATION, AND DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT

)

This case comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, and Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Leave to File First
Amended Complaint. Having reviewed the facts and law, the Court now issues this decision,
· granting summary judgment for Defendant, discussing Plaintiffs' motion for class certification,
and denying Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint.
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FACTS1

This case originated with Building Contractors Association ofSoutheast Idaho v. City of
Pocatello ("Building Contractors") case, Bannock County Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C, over
which this Court presided. 2 As the Building Contractors case directly pertains to this case, the
Court will lay out a brief factual history. The City of Pocatello ("the City" or "Defendant") owns
and operates water and sewer systems for residents of~he City. The wastewater treatment facility
is the Water Pollution Control Facility ("WPCF") and serves the cities of Pocatello and
Chubbuck and other areas within Bannock County. The WPCF was financed by issuing revenue
bonds pursuant to Article 8, Section 3. of the Idaho Constitution and the Idaho Revenue Bond
Act. There are two different types of fees associated with the water and sewer systems: I) user
fees and 2) connection/capacity fees. User fees are monthly fees that every user of the water and
sewer system pays for the service they receive. The City adopted a connection/capacity fee in
Fiscal Year 2007 upon the recommendation of a water and wastewater study provided by Red
Oak Consulting. The connection/capacity fees for water and sewer services are one-time fees
assessed only to builders of new construction and the fees are based on an "equity buy-in"
system, which is designed to recover a new connector's proportionate share of the City's
wastewater backbone facility costs.
At the time of Building Contractors, a "Payment-In-Lieu-Of-Taxes" ("PILOT") was a
component of the user fees charged to the water and sewer department.3 The City conceded that
the PILOT component was essentially a tax charged directly to the City's own water and sewer
The following facts have been taken from the Parties' pleadings and affidavits in the record.
Both Parties agreed, during the April 13, 2015 hearing, that the Court could take judicial notice of the facts in the
Building Contractors case.
3 The PILOT component has been called various names over the years, including "rate of return," ''return on equity,"
and "franchise fees." The "return on equity" policy referred to city-owned public utilities making a transfer to the
general fund. The City renamed the transfer "Payment-In-Lieu-Of-Taxes'' in 2011.
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department to transfer water and sewer funds to the General Fund, as if the department was
operating like a private utility company. Prior to March 2013, the connection/capacity and user
fees were comingled into the water and sewer funds, then the money was transferred from the
water and sewer funds into the General Fund.4 Both the water and sewer department recovered
the PILOT component through a fee charged to all users of the water and sewer system. The City
· has shown that it does not charge a PILOT component to.t]:1e connection/capacity fees, but only
to the user fees charged to customers of the systems.
In Building Contractors, the plaintiffs, the Building Contractors Association of Southeast
Idaho, sought declarative and injunctive relief against the City's connection/capacity fees,
alleging that the fees were in violation of the Idaho Constitution and the Idaho Revenue Bond
Act. The Court ultimately issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to

Reconsider and Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Reconsideration ("Reconsideration Decision")
on November 15, 2013, in which it concluded:
1. The City's connection and user fees are not arbitrary or unreasonably imposed. The

imposition and collection of the connection and user fees themselves are not
unconstitutional acts or a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.
2. There is no evidence that the connection fees are being used by the City to fund future
capital improvements in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.
3. Through the use of the PILOT fee transfer program, or any other transfer program with a
similar intent, such as a rate of return program or a return on equity program, the Court
declares that the City is imposing an impermissible tax to the extent that connection and
user fees are being assessed a PILOT fee for general fund purposes, and such practices
The water and sewer departments currently have money held in four different fund groups. Funds 31/32 are
operating funds comprised of user fees collected by the water and sewer department, respectively. Funds 31/32 also
contained the PILOT component to the user fees charged by the departments. Funds 37/38 hold the
connection/capacity fees collected by the water and sewer departments. It was created in March of2013 with
beginning balances drawn from the corresponding operating funds in an amount equal to the total amount collected
in capacity fees since 2007. Funds 60/61 are the debt service funds from the water and sewer department.
Previously, money transferred into Funds 60/61 from Funds 31/32, but since 2013 the money has been transferred
from Funds 37/38. Funds 73/74 are construction funds where proceeds from bonds are placed for water and sewer.
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must cease and are hereby enjoined because they are unconstitutional and a violation of
the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. This means that connection and user fees must be adjusted
to the extent that th~y include a charge for the PILOT fee. In addition, no PILOT fee
transfers from any water or sewer account to the general fund are permitted.
However, to the extent that connection and user fees are being transferred from
the water and sewer accounts to the general fund, through any appropriate process,
however named, for the purpose of paying expenses related to the operation,
maintenance, replacement, and depreciation of existing water and sewer systems,
including only those general City expenses needed to operate the water and sewer
departments, such as HR, financial, legal and accounting, such transfers are permitted and
are not hereby enjoined. 5
On December 19, 2013, after the Reconsideration Decision, the City adjusted the user
rates and discontinued assessing the PILOT component to the user fees. Each Pocatello resident
user saw an approximate 10% decrease in their water and sewer utility bills. Subsequently in

Building Contractors, there was an order to show cause hearing in which the Court conclucled
that there was insufficient evidence to show that the PILOT component was used in calculating
the connection/capacity fees. The Court determined that the evidence indicated the
connection/capacity fee was calculated entirely separate from any consideration of a PILOT
component and that the evidence unequivocally demonstrated that the PILOT component was
only assessed to the user rates.
This current case is brought by Plaintiffs Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park, Ed Quinn, and,
potentially, the identified clas.ses of Plaintiffs ("Plaintiffs") who are users/customers, seeking a
refund for the City's imposition of the PILOT component in past years, which was found
unconstitutional and in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act in Building Contractors.
Plaintiffs initiated this litigation to have the Court award damages based on three claims: ( 1)
unconstitutional taking in violation of Article 1, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution and the

5

Reconsideration Decision, p. 26.
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Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied to state action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) state law unjust emichment; (3) state law equitabie estoppel
and/or equitable tolling. Plaintiffs moved to certify two classes of users and Defendant moved
for summary judgment. After a hearing on both matters on April 13, 2015, the Court allowed
both parties to submit supplemental briefing. In the interim, the National Association of Home
Builders made a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief in opposition to Defendant's
motion for summary judgment and Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint. The Court held_ a
hearing on those issues on August 17, 2015 and granted the National Association of Home
Builders' motion for leave to file an amicus brief, and has considered the same. The Court also
allowed Defendant additional time to respond to the amicus curiae brief and Plaintiffs' renewed
motion to amend. Thereafter, the Court took the matters ·under advisement.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Sununary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. '"6 The party moving for
summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of
material fact. 7 A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt is not sufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact. 8
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court "liberally construes the
record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable

Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, B. V., 148 Idaho 89, IOI, 218 P.3d 1150, 1162 (2009) (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c}).
Vreeken, 148 Idaho at 101,218 P.3d at 1162.
8 Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 436, 196 P.3d 352, 354 (2008}.
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inferences and conclusions in that party's favor.'' 9 "If there are conflicting inferences contained in
the record or reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be
denied." 10 However, "[i]t is well established that a party against whom a motion for summary
judgment is sought 'may not merely rest on allegations contained in his pleadings, but must
come forward and produce evidence by way of deposition or affidavit to contradict the assertions
of the moving party and establish a genuine issue of material fact. '" 11
ANALYSIS

I.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
The Court begins its analysis with the Motion for Summary Judgment, concluding that if

that Motion is resolved in favor the City, other pending motions are likely rendered moot.
Therefore, as to the merits of the case, Plaintiffs challenge three of Defendant's factual
assertions. First, Plaintiffs assert that the PILOT component should be considered a fee, not a
tax. Second, Plaintiffs dispute that the PILOT component was immediately discontinued after the
Court's decision in Building Contractors and assert that the PILOT was collected into 2014.
Third, Plaintiffs maintain that the PILOT component was charged to the connection/capacity
fees. Each of these disputed facts will be discussed in turn before moving to Plaintiffs' other
substantive claims.
A. PILOT Component as a Tax
As a threshold matter, this Court must determine whether or not the PILOT component is
considered a tax or a fee in order to analyze Plaintiffs' claims. Defendant argues that the PILOT ·
component was found to be a tax, albeit an unconstitutional tax, under this Court's decision in
Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 747, 890 P.2d 331,333 (1995).
Bilow v. Preco, Inc., 132 Idaho 23, 27, 966 P.2d 23, 27 (1998).
11 McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 770, 820 P.2d 360,365 (1991) (quoting Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho
706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990)); see also I.R.C.P. 56(e).
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Building Contractors. 12 Plaintiffs disagree and allege that the PILOT is a fee because the
connection/capacity fee and the use fee were both designated as ''fees," thus any component of
those fees, i.e. the PILOT, carries the same designation.
''Fees and taxes are generally distinguished in that fees are for the purpose of regulation
whereas taxes are solely for the purpose of raising revenue." 13 If a fee or charge is imposed
primarily for revenue raising purposes~ it is in essence a tax and can only be upheld under the
power of taxation. 14 Article 4, § 6 of the Idaho Constitution permits municipal corporations to
impose their own taxes, however, such power is limited by the taxing power given to the
municipality authorized by the legislature. 15 In Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d
1272 (1991 ), the Idaho Supreme Court pronounced a two-part test to analyze the validity of a fee
or tax: "First, we must detennine whether the connection fee constitutes an impermissible tax.
Secondly, we must determine whether the connection fee is appropriately and reasonably
assessed. ''16 Under the first step of the analysis, a court must consider if, on its face, whether the
fee is a tax or a regulation. This first step was thoroughly analyzed in the Court's prior decisions
in Building Contractors. The Court found, regardless of what the transfers were called or
described, that the PILOT component was an impermissible tax because it was a method to
generate revenue transferred into the General Fund. Notably, this Court stated in its

Reconsideration Decision:
After the connection and user fees were comingled into the water and sewer funds, the
evidence supports, and the City concedes, that the City then transferred money from the
water and sewer funds into the General Fund under transfers that have been called by
Throughout this opinion, the Court will use the tenns "illegal tax," ''impermissible tax," "disguised tax,"
"unconstitutional tax," and "improper tax" synonymously.
13 BHA Investments, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348, 352-53, 63 P.3d 474, 478-79 (2003).
14 Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City ofCoeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 743, 890 P.2d 326,329 (1995).
15 Brewster v. City ofPocatello, 115 Idaho 502,504, 768 P.2d 765, 767 (1988).
16 Id. at 437, 807 P.2d at 1275.
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various names~ PILOT/rate of return/return on equity/franchise fees. The City concedes
that this PILOT charge is a tax charged to the City's water and sewer department as if it
was ·operating as a private utility conipany. 17

***
Also similar to Brewster, the Court finds below that the City's PILOT fee policies
transferring revenue from connection and user fees are not regulatory fees permissible
under the City's police power because it does not bear a reasonable relationship to the
cost ofregulating the water and sewer systems. Rather, this Court has found, similar to
Brewster, that the PILOT fee transfers are impermissible taxes because they are used to
generate revenue to meet the needs of the public at large. 18

***
Since the PILOT fees are or have been transferred from revenue collected from "rates,
fees, and charges" of the water and sewer system, i.e., connection fees and user fees, and
are not used for a regulatory purpose nor for purposes allowed by the Idaho Revenue
Bond Act, the Court finds, as a matter of law, that the PILOT fee transfers are
impermissible taxes assessed against the user fees, connection fees, or both - all of which
is contrary to Idaho statutory and case law. 19

***
Additionally, any PILOT fees drawn from user fees are also impermissible taxes. 20

***
The Court DENIES the City's Motion to Reconsider the Court's March 28, 2013
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
finding that the PILOT fee transfers are impermissible taxes on the water and sewer funds
which are derived from the revenue collected from the connection fees and/or user fees. 21
In this case, the analysis to determine whether or not the PILOT component is considered
a regulation or tax is exactly the same as it was in the underlying case. It is clear from the
decision in the underlying case that not only did the City concede the PILOT component was a
tax, but this Court determined the PILOT component, irrespective of whether it was part of the
connection/capacity fees or user fees or what it was titled, was considered an impermissible tax.

17 Reconsideration
18

Id
19 Id
20 Id
21 Id

Decision, p. 8 (internal citations omitted}.

at 17-18.
at 22.
at 23.

at 25.
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Therefore, this Court reaffirms the conclusion that the PILOT component is an impermissible
tax.
B. Collection of the PILOT after the Reconsideration Decision
Next, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant did not immediately discontinue charging the
PILOT component after the Court's 2013 decision in Building Contractors. Plaintiffs assert the
component was collected into 2014. However, the PILOT transfer to the General Fund during
Fiscal Year 2014 in the amount of$206,904 was actually made in October of2013. 22 The
remaining transactions for FY2014 were cancelled after the Court issued its Reconsideration
Decision in November 2013.23 Thus, Plaintiffs' have identified no evidence that Defendant
continued to charge the PILOT component to the user fees after the Court's fmal decision in
Building Contractors.
C. PILOT as a Component in the Connection/Capacity Fees
As the Court determined that the PILOT component is a tax, the Court must then
determine whether or not there was a PILOT component contained in the c01mection/capacity
fees before considering Plaintiffs' substantive claims. Defendant argues that the collection of the
colUlection/capacity fee was fully analyzed in Building Contractors and the Court concluded that
the connection/capacity fee was appropriate and not improperly collected. Plaintiffs maintain that
the connection/capacity fee contains a PILOT component.
Initially in Building Contractors, it was unclear whether or not the PILOT component
was a part of the connection/capacity fees. However, in this Court's decision on the Order to
Show Cause, its position was clarified:

22
23

Second Affidavit ofJoyce Stroschein, p. 4, 19.
Id
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Plaintiff has filed an application for order to show cause, requesting that the Court enter
an order suspending the assessment and collection of connection fees until the City
recalculates the connection fees, as it has the user fees. Plaintiff argues that the record
contains sufficient evidence indicating that the City included the PILOT fee in calculating
the necessary connection fee it would charge. After reviewing the facts in the record,
specifically those cited by Plaintiff, the Court concludes that there is insufficient evidence
that the PILOT fee was used in calculating the connection/capacity fees, and declines to
enter the Order to Show Cause.24

***
Although the above facts indicate that the water and wastewater utility rates were set after
taking the connection fee into account, there is nothing in the above cited evidence to
indicate that the PILOT fee was used to calculate the proper connection fee. To the
contrary, the evidence in the case indicates that the connection fee was calculated entirely
separate from any consideration of a PILOT fee. 25

***
Even if the statements made by Mr. Swindell were to be treated with limited weight, as
Plaintiff argues they should be, the Gallagher report, which Plaintiff relies upon in
making its arguments, clearly indicates that water and wastewater user rates were
calculated differently than connection fees, and that the PILOT was considered only in
setting the water and wastewater user rates. 26
The evidence pointed to by Plaintiff simply does not refute the statement in Mr.
Swindell's fourth affidavit, that there is no connection between capacity fees and PILOT
fees. In fact, reviewing the evidence ~learly demonstrates that the PILOT was only
assessed to the user rates. As the City has adjusted the user rates there is no basis for
granting Plaintiff's Application for Order to Show Cause.27
Here, Plaintiffs have not provided any new evidence to show the PILOT component was
used to calculate the connection/capacity fees. Interestingly, Plaintiffs attempt to use the Court's
prior decision in Building Contractors to argue that the Court "already found and decided that
the transfers of co~mingled funds into the general fund were, in effect, "a charge" to both the
Decision on Plaintiff's Application for Order to Show Cause, CV-2011-5228-0C, filed February 13, 2014, p. 1.
Id., p. 4.
26 Id., p. 5.
21 Id.
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user and connection fee payers."28 To the contrary, in its previous decision, the Court found that
revenue collected from both the connection/capacity and user fees from the water and sewer
funds could have been poured into the General Fund via the PILOT component. 29 Yet while the
Court did determine that the user fees contained a PILOT component, it did not conclusively find
that the connection/capacity fees contained a PILOT component. The Court concluded that, if the
connection/capacity fees were being assessed a PILOT component for general fund purposes,
such practices were unconstitutional and were enjoined as a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond
Act. However, as shown from the Order to Show Cause Decision, it is clear that the City had
included a PILOT component in calculating the user fees. This Court shed light on the confusion
regarding the connection/capacity fees and categorically established that there was no evidence
to show that the PILOT component was used in calculating the connection/capacity fees. In this
case, Plaintiffs have relied on the evidence and decisions from Building Contractors, which do
not support their assertions. 30 Thus, there continues to be no evidence to establish that the
connection/capacity fees contained a PILOT component.
D. Idaho Tort Claims Act

Turning then to the Plaintiffs' substantive claims, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' statelaw claims fail under· the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The Court looks to both whether valid tort
claims have been asserted and whether Defendant is immune from any or all of Plaintiffs' state
law claims, even if those claims were valid. To evaluate whether the Idaho Tort Claims Act
("ITCA") is applicable, either as an assertion of a valid claim or whether any immunity exists, a
court must engage in a three-step analysis:
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to City's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7 (emphasis included}.
Reconsideration Memorandum Decision, p. 12.
30 As discussed fully below, the Cowt denies Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint and as such, disregards any
new factual assertions and claims that are outside the scope of the pleadings.
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First, we must determine whether "tort recovery is allowed under the laws of Idaho." This
is essentially a determination of whether there is such a tort under Idaho Law. Second,
this Court determines if "an exception to liability under the ITCA shields the alleged
misconduct from liability." Finally, "if no exception applies, [we examine] whether the
merits of the claim as presented for consideration on the motion for summary judgment
entitle the moving party to dismissal."31
.
The first step in the analysis is whether Plaintiff's claim is allowed under the laws of
Idaho. Under J.C.§ 6-903, a governmental entity is subject to liability for money damages
arising out of certain conduct and those of its employees acting within the course and scope of
their employment to the extent a private party would be liable. Here, even Defendant has
conceded that Plaintiffs have alleged wrongful conduct that could subject a governmental entity
to liability in their three state law claims - unconstitutional talcing, unjust enrichment, and
equitable estoppel/equitable tolling. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' three state law claims
are initially allowed under Idaho law.
The second step is whether "an exception to liability under the ITCA shields the alleged
misconduct from liability."32 J.C. § 6-904A provides, in pertinent part:
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope of
their employment and without malice or criminal intent and without reckless, willful and
wanton conduct as defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any
claim which: .....Arises out of the assessment or collection of any tax or fee.
Therefore, even if the Plaintiff's state tort claims could qualify as valid claims under J.C.
§ 6-902, under§ 6-904(A), Defendant cannot be liable for any claim that arises out of the
assessment or collection of any tax or fee. All of Plaintiffs' state law claims - unconstitutional
taking, unjust enrichment, and equitable estoppel/equitable tolling - arise out of the collection of

Rees v. State, Dep't ofHealth & Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 14--15, 137 P.3d 397, 401-02 (2006) (internal citations
omitted).
32 Id. (internal citations omitted).
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the PILOT component, which was found to be a tax. 33 Thus, all of Plaintiffs' claims arise out of
the collection of a tax by Defendant, which is an exception to liability under the ITCA that
shields the alleged misconduct from liability. 34 Consequently, Defendant is immune from
Plaintiffs' state law unconstitutional taking, unjust enrichment, and equitable estoppel/equitable
tolling claims because they arise out of a collection of a tax by a governmental entity. No further
consideration of the third factor is necessary and summary judgment is GRANTED to
Defendant, as to each of those state law claims.
E. Uneonstitutional Taking

As swnmary judgment was granted to Plaintiffs' state law claims, the only claim
remaining is Plaintiffs' federal unconstitutional takings claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendants argue that the PILOT component is a
tax, albeit an unconstitutional tax, but that the collection of a tax is not considered a taking
because taxes are not a recognizable protected property interest. Plaintiffs disagree and assert the
PILOT component collected by the City is a property interest protected under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that private
property will not be taken for public use without just compensation.35 There is a two-step
analysis to a takings claim: (1) plaintiffs must establish it possess~ a compensable property
interest and (2) that the government entity took that private property interest for public use

without just compensation.36

33 The Court would note, hypothetically, if the PILOT component had been considered a fee, that summary
judgment would still be granted for Defendant on Plaintiffs' state law claims because the immunity under I.C. § 6904A applies to the assessment and collection of a tax or fee.
34 See Rees at 14-15, 137 P.3d at 401-02 (internal citations omitted).
35 U.S. Const. amend. V.
36 See Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992); See Shortv. U.S., 50 F.3d 994, 1000
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
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(

Plaintiffs' taking claim is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, which is characterized by federal
standards, not state standards, in "the federal interest in uniformity and the interest in having
'firmly defined, easily applied rules."37 To that end, this Court will apply federal case law in
interpreting Plaintiffs' federal takings claim. "Summary dismissal of a taking claim is
appropriate where the circumstances alleged in the complaint, even if taken as true and all
reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff, cannot establish that a talcing has
occurred. " 38
Initially, the Court must determine where there is a compensable property interest. There
is a wealth of federal cases where courts concluded that a government-imposed obligation to pay
money, i.e. a tax, is not a per se taking of private property within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment. Courts have employed several approaches in making this conclusion, but taken
together, the cases lead to an ultimate determination that a tax is not a compensable taking. Some
courts have made that determination on the groWids that money is not "property" within the
meaning of the Takings Clause. 39 Other courts "have concluded that a governmental-impose
obligation to pay money are not the sort of governmental actions subject to a takings analysis."40

Osborn v. Salinas, 131 Idaho 456,458,958 P.2d 1142, 1144 (1998) citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 270,
105 S. Ct. 1938, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1985) (internal citation omitted).
38 Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 756-57 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
39 United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 n. 9, 110 S.Ct 387, 107 L.Ed.2d 290 {1989) (considering and
rejecting the view that money is private property that can be physically occupied by the government: "Unlike real or
personal property, money is fungible."); Atlas Corp. v. United States; 895 F.2d 745, 756 (Fed.Cir.1990)("Requiring
money to be spent is not a taking of property."); Unity Real Esta.te Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 674-78 (3d Cir.
1999)(rejecting the application of a takings analysis to the tax imposed by the Coal Act).
4 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 29, 40-41 (2000) a.ffd, 271 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
See Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d 1571, 1576-77 (Fed.Cir.1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 810, 117 S.Ct. 55, 136
L.Ed.2d 18 ( l 996)("[T]he principles of takings law that apply to real property do not apply in the same manner to
statutes imposing monetary liability."); Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. FDIC, 62 F.3d449, 455 & n. 2 (2d
Cir.1995) (per se takings analysis is inapplicable to congressional imposition of monetary liability); Commercial
Builders v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931, 112 S.Ct. 1997, 118 L.Ed.2d
593 (I992)(a purely financial exaction does not constitute a taking).
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The Federal Circuit in Branch described why a takings analysis does not fit the obligation to pay
money to the government:
To be sure, analyzing the assessment under the principles of takings law is awkward. If a
particular governmental action is deemed a taking, it means that the government may
engage in the action but must pay for it. Thus, if the assessment growing out of the crossguarantee provision was a talcing of the assets of the Maine National Bank, the
government has to pay for what it took. But because the property allegedly taken in this
case was money, that leads to the curious conclusion that the government may take the
.
bank's money as long as it pays the money back. 41
Here, Plaintiffs must first establish they have a compensable property interest to complete
the takings analysis. According to federal law, regardless of what grounds the determination is
made upon, Plaintiffs' claim fails at this step because the Takings Clause is not implicated by the
collection of a tax. This Court recognizes that the tax here, the PILOT component to the user
fees, was previously held to be impermissible. However, a tax, even an impermissible tax, is still
a tax. The same laws and standards apply to a governmental-imposed obligation to pay money,
even one found to be impermissible. As the Sixth Circuit stated, in a case concerning the
overpayment of income taxes that a city retained, "since the Fifth Amendment takings clause is
not implicated by the collection of taxes, it is not implicated by a miscalculation of the tax
credits."42 In United Stat~s Shoe Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1378 (Fed.Cir.2002), the court
found that the government-imposed tax was not a per se taking of private property, even though
the tax at issue was declared unconstitutional.43 Therefore, even if taken as true that the PILOT
component is an impermissible tax and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the
Plaintiffs, they still cannot establish that a taking has occurred because collection of a

Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d 1571, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The same awkwardness exists here, i.e., where
Plaintiffs ( or the classes of users) seek to be reimbursed money that can only be collected from the same users that
would receive the reimbursement.
42 Laborde v. City ofGahanna, 561 F. App'x476, 479 (6th Cir. 2014).
43 Id. at 1383-84.
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governmental-imposed tax is not subject to a takings analysis. Accordingly, an analysis of the
second takings step, i.e., to ascertain if the PILOT component was used without just
compensation, is not required as Plaintiffs did not established that an illegal tax is a compensable
property interest. Summary judgment is GRANTED to Defendant as to Plaintiffs' federal takings
claim concerning the user fees.
F. Retroactive Application

Plaintiffs claim that this Court's ruling in Building Contractors has a retroactive effect.
Defendants oppose that view and assert there is no evidence that the Court meant for the
decisions in Building Contractors to apply retroactively. Retroactive application to past and
pending cases is left to the sound discretion of the court.44 While the usual rule is that decisions
of the Idaho Supreme Court apply retroactively to all past and pending cases, the Court still has
the discretion to limit the retroactive application in a decision. 45 The Court has provided:
We may hold that it does not apply even to the case in which the decision was
announced; or that it applies only to that case and not to other past or pending cases; or
that it applies to both that case and pending cases, but not to past cases.46
·
When deciding whether to limit the retroactive application of a decision, courts weigh
three factors: (1) the purpose of the decision; (2) the reliance upon the prior law; and (3) the
effect upon the administration of justice if the decision is applied retroactively. 47 Courts balance
the first factor against the other two to determine whether to limit the retroactive application of
the decision. 48

BHA Investments, Inc. v. City ofBoise, 141 Idaho 168, 173, 108 P.3d 315, 320 (2004).
Id
46 Id.
47 Id (citing Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19,523 P.2d 1365 (1974)).
48 Id. (citing Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 570 P.2d 284 (1977)).
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The Court has already extensively discussed Building Contractors and the determinations
made in that case, so it will limit the factual discussion in analyzing the retroactive effect of that
decision. There, this Court determined "that any fee which includes a PILOT component is
unreasonable, arbitrary and contrary to statute" and found that: 49
... any portion of the user and/or connection fees that are assessed in order to pay the

PILOT fee to the City, .do not conform to the statutory requirements of LC. § 50· 1028
and must be excluded from any fee assessment going forward. 50

First, the purpose of the Building Contractor's decision was to prevent Defendant from
continuing to charge the PILOT component once it was held to be unconstitutional. Defendant
immediately complied with the directive and ceased collection of the PILOT component,
fulfilling the purpose of the decision. As to the second factor, reliance upon prior law, the Court
assesses what prior law Defendant relied upon, not the laws the Court relied upon.51 Defendant
relied upon what it perceived to be compatible prior law, i.e., City of Chubbuck v. City of
Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 899 P.2d 411 (1995), before initiating the PILOT component. In that

case, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that Pocatello could charge a rate of return component for
Chubbuck's wastewater treatment because the Revenue Bond Act allows the collection of
revenue to cover the costs of operation, maintenance, replacement and depreciation, including
creating and maintaining reserves for such expenses. 52 Based on that decision, Defendant began
charging the PILOT component, a rate of return, to user fees. This Court distinguished the City

49

Reconsideration Decision, p. 24 (emphasis added).

so Id

See BHA Investments Inc., 141 Idaho at 173, 108 P.3d at 320 (where the Court analyzed the City's reliance on an
ordinance and a statute.).
52 City of Chubbuck v. City ofPocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 202, 899 P.2d 411, 415 (1995); I.C. § 50-1033(b), (e); see
also Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho 434,441,807 P.2d 1272, 1279 (1991) ("We hold that under these
circumstances a municipality may collect fees, rates or charges pursuant to the power granted in the Idaho Revenue
Bond Act to pay for maintenance, depreciation and replacement of system components.").
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of Chubbuck decision in Building Contractors, holding that a rate of return is acceptable if
charged to another city, but not to residents or utility customers of the city providing the service.
The third factor considers the effect upon the administration of justice, '''that is, the
number of cases that would be reopened if the decision is applied retroactively,' or the increase
in the number of cases resulting from the determination regarding the decision's retroactivity."53
There is no evidence here that any cases would be reopened if Building Contractors is applied
retroactively. As to the concern over the number of cases that could arise, Defendant points out
that there could be a number of cases if the decision is applied retroactively because each water
user would potentially be able to recover the PILOT component. There is.a valid concern that if
Building Contractors is applied retroactively, City resident would be adversely affected. In order
to recover the PILOT component, property taxes would increase and significant financial and
human resources would be needed to determine the amount of the PILOT to be returned to each
user, especially considering the different classifications of users. Again, a practical consideration
is that applying the decision retroactively would simply require collection of fees from the very
customers (in many cases) who would be receiving those fees back.
In balancing the purpose of the decision against reliance upon prior law and the effect
upon the administration of justice, the Court declines to hold that the Building Contractors
decision should be applied retroactively. This Court finds that the purpose of the Building
Contractors case was accomplished once Defendant stopped charging the PILOT component.
That factor weighs heavily against retroactivity as the main purpose of the Building Contractors
decision was served because the decision ensured Defendant would not continue charging an
unconstitutional tax. In addition, the factor of reliance is very strong in this action. Defendant in
BHA Investments, Inc. 141 Idaho at 173, 108 P.3d at 320 (internal citations omitted.)
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good faith believed it had the authority to charge the PILOT component based on an Idaho
Supreme Court decision, but again, once the determination came down that it did not have the
authority under City ofChubbuck, Defendant ceased collecting the tax. Moreover, the effect on
the administration of justice would be substantial and has a probable adverse effect on the
residents of Pocatello. In Building Contractors, it was made clear that the ruling to discontinue
charging the PILOT component was assessed "going forward" and now the Court, in its
discretion, con:finns that the decision in Building Contractors applies to pending cases, but not to
past cases. 54 Therefore, after weighing the three factors, summary judgment is GRANTED to
Defendant on this issue.

II.

Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification
Although the merits of the case have been fully deliberated above, the matter of class

certification is taken up for discussion. It could be appropriately argued that the question is now
moot and need not be decided or discussed at all. The Court adds some consideration of the
question only for the benefit of the parties and potential appellate courts should this matter be
appealed.
In its motion for class certification, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 23, Plaintiffs move that two
classes be approved: (1) Capacity Fee Payers in the City of Pocatello and (2) User Fee Payers in
the City of Pocatello. The class representative for Capacity Fee Payers is Ed Quinn, a builder,
who would represent approximately 1,374 potential class members that have paid the
connection/capacity fees for new construction from Fiscal Year 2007 through 2013 to
Defendant. 55 The class representative for the User Fee Payers is Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park,

54

55

Id
Affidavit ofEd Quinn, p. 2-3.
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owned and managed by Logan Robinson, which would represent approximately 16,000 potential
class members that have paid user fees from Fiscal Year 2007 through 2014 to Defendant. 56
Class certification is within the discretion of the trial court. 57 The burden of establishing the requirements to certify a class, by a preponderance of the evidence, is on the party seeking to
bring a class action.58 Generally, the scope of review ofan order denying or granting a motion to
maintain a class action is narrow. 59 In order to certify a lawsuit as a class action, the trial court
must find that all four factors in Rule 23(a) exist and that at least one factor in Rule 23(b) exists.
The prerequisites to a class action under Rule 23(a) provide:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of
all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions oflaw or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 60
If the court finds that a necessary factor is absent, it does not need address the other
factors. 61 The federal rule for class certification, F.R.C.P. 23, is substantively identical to Idaho's
rule. 62 When a rule in Idaho is identical in all material respects to an equivalent federal rule, the

Affidavit ofLogan Robinson, p. 2-3.
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, -U.S.--, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011); Consol.
Edison Co. ofN.Y., Inc. v. Richardson, 233 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed.Cir.2000); Jones v. United States, 118 Fed.Cl.
728, 732 (2014).
58 Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317,324,297 P.3d 1134, 1141 (2013), reh'g denied(Apr. 9,
2013)
59 Pope v. lntermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217,237,646 P.2d 988, 1008 (1982).
60 I.R.C.P. 23(a). The prerequisites are commonly referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.
61 BHA Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho at 171-72, 108 P.3d at 318-19.
62 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) provides: (a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: ( 1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable; (2) there are questions oflaw or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
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Idaho Supreme Court has allowed our courts to look to those federal cases for assistance in
interpreting the Idaho rule.63
To begin with, "courts have held that the class must be adequately defined and clearly
ascertainable before a class action rnay proceed. "64 The United States Supreme Court in WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes declared:

Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. A party seeking class certification
must affinnatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule-that is, he must be
prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions
of law or fact, etc. We recognized in Falcon that "sometimes it may be necessary for the
court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification
question," ... and that certification is proper only if "the trial court is satisfied~ after a
rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied ... " Frequently
that "rigorous analysis" will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiffs
underlying claim. That cannot be helped. " '[T]he class determination generally involves
considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiffs
cause of action.' " Nor is there anything unusual about that consequence: The necessity
of touching aspects of the merits in order to resolve preliminary matters, e.g., jurisdiction
and venue, is a familiar feature of litigation. 65
Considering numerosity, a plaintiff must provide some evidentiary basis beyond a bare
allegation of the existence of numerous class members. 66 Yet, a court may "draw reasonable
inferences from the facts presented to find the requisite numerosity."67
For the second prerequisite, commonality, even a single common question will suffice. 68
Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members "have suffered the
same injury." 69 Not only must the proposed class have suffered a violation of the same provision

Martin v. Hoblit, 133 Idaho 372,376,987 P.2d 284,288 n. 3 (1999) citing Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328,
334,612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (1980).
64 Ries v. Arizona Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523,528 (N.D. Cal. 2012) citing Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural
Beverage Co., 268 F.R.D. 365,376 (N.D.Cal.2010).
65 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551-52, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (20ll)(intemal citations omitted.)
66 Id at 2551.
67 McCuin v. Sec'y ofHealth & Hum. Servs., 817 F.2d 161, 167 (1st Cir.1987).
68 Dukes at 2556,
69 Id. at 2551 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. o/Sw. v. Falcon, 451 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)).
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of law, but their claims must depend upon a common contention. "That common contention,
moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution-which means that
detennination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one
of the claims in one stroke."70 Questions concerning merit ''may be considered to the extent-but
only to the extent-that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for
class certification are satisfied.''71 Commonality is sufficient with "[t]he existence of shared legal
issues with divergent factual predicates" or "a common core of salient facts coupled with
disparate legal remedies within the class. 72
Next, the Ninth Circuit emphasized how to analyze typicality:
Where the challenged conduct is a policy or practice that affects all class members, the
underlying issue presented with respect to typicality is similar to that presented with
respect to commonality, although the emphasis may be different. In such a case, because
the cause of the injury is the sam.e ... the typicality inquiry involves comparing the injury
asserted in the claims raised by the named plaintiffs with those of the rest of the class. We
do not insist that the named plaintiffs' injuries be identical with those of the other class
members, only that the unnamed class members have injuries similar to those of the
named plaintiffs and that the injuries result from the same, injurious course of conduct. 73
The test of typicality is "whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether
the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other
class members have been injured by the same course of conduct."74 It does not require that the
class members be identically positioned to each other or to every class member. 75

Id.
Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1195, 185 L. Ed. 2d 308 (2013).
72 Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998).
73 Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 685 (9th Cir. 2014).
74 Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d497, 508 (9th Cir.1992).
75 Id., 754 F.3d at 686; See Ellis, 657 F.3d at 985 n. 9 ("Differing factual scenarios resulting in a claim of the same
nature as other class members does not defeat typicality.").
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As to the last prerequisite, the requirement is concerned with whether "the named
plaintiffs are appropriate representatives of the class whose claims they wish to litigate."76 To
ascertain whether the representation meets this standard, courts ask two questions: "(1) Do the
representative plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class
members, and (2) will the representative plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action
vigorously on behalf of the class?" 77 Rule 23(a)(4) only requires that named plaintiffs understand
their duties and are willing to perform them. 78 Adequate representation by counsel "depends on
the qualifications of counsel for the representatives, an absence of antagonism, a sharing of
interests between representatives and absentees, and the unlikelihood that the suit is collusive."79
Plaintiffs define two classes to be certified, the Capacity Fee Payers and the User Fee
Payers, in order to recover damages from the collection of the illegal PILOT component in the
capacity/connection and user fees. 80
A. Capacity Fee Payers

As to the Capacity Fee Payers, the class would be defined as members who have paid the
cmmection/capacity fees for new construction that contained an illegal PILOT component from
Fiscal Year2007 through 2013 to the City of Pocatello.81 "It is axiomatic that for a class action
to be certified a "class" must exist." 82 Looking ~yond the pleadings, there is some overlap with
the merits of the underlying claim here in order to determine if a class of Capacity Fee Payers
Dukes at 2550.
Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 957 (9th Cir. 2003).
78 Local Joint Executive Bd ofCulinary/Bartender Trust Fundv. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1162 (9th
Cir. 2001).
79 In re N Dist. o/California, Dalkon Shield IUD Products Liab. Litig,., 693 F.2d 847, 855 (9th Cir. 1982), as
amended(July 15, 1982) citing 7 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§§ 1765-1769 at 615-57.
80 The Court recognizes that the detennination for class certification comes at the same time as summary judgment,
but class determination will only overlap with the merits of the case to the extent necessary when considering the
factual and legal issues.
81 Plaintifft' Memorandum in Support o/Class Certification, p. 12.
82 Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655,669 (7th Cir. 1981).
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can even exist. Plaintiffs' proposed class definition presumes that the connection/capacity fees
contained a PILOT component. As this Court extensively discussed above, there is no evidence
that the capacity/connection fees contained a PILOT component. There cannot be a class
consisting of connection/capacity fee users who have paid into the illegal PILOT component
when the PILOT component was never part of the connection/capacity fees. The proposed
Capacity Fee Payers were never assessed the illeg~l tax, thus Plaintiffs' proffered definition and
the class cannot exist. Therefore, the Court would have denied Plaintiffs' motion to certify the
class of Capacity Fee Payers.
B. User Fee Payers

The second proposed class, User Fee Payers, is defined as members as who have paid
user fees that contained an illegal PILOT component from Fiscal Year 2007 through 2014 to the
City of Pocatello. 83 Unlike Capacity Fee Payers, it is clear that the user fees did contain a PILOT
component, so the class can exist and the definition is adequate. Beginning with numerosity, the
class would certify all user fee payers in Pocatello, approximately 16,000 users. Defendant did
not contend that the class was not numerous and it is apparent to the Court that the amount of
members in the class would be so numerous that joinder of all user fee payers would be
impracticable.
As for commonality, Plaintiffs submit the following common question of law and fact:
Whether user ... fees transferred to the general fund under the improper and illegal
"PILOT" programs constitute a taldng for which the fee payer are entitled compensation.
Here, all proposed members would share the same factual and legal basis. The class
members are any and all residents of Pocatello that paid user fees for water and sewer services to

83

Affidavit ofLogan Robinson, p. 2-3.
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Defendant during the applicable years, fees that were then impennissibly transferred as an
improper tax. Plaintiffs contend that action constitutes a taking of property under the Idaho and
United States Constitutions and/or unjust enrichment entitling the class to compensation. All user
fee payers suffered the same injury, paying the illegal tax contained in the user fees, irrespective
of whether the users paid different amounts of fees. Further, all users would employ the same
legal claims that depend on a common contention-that the collection of the illegal PILOT
component was a taking - in their pursuit of damages. However, as is set forth amply above, any
state tort claims cannot be asserted against the Defendant for the collection of a tax, regardless of
the names by which the tax was called. In addition, there can be no "takings" claim with regard
to the collection of an illegal or unconstitutional tax. Thus, although the Capacity Fee Payers
meet the requirement of a common question of law or fact, it is impossible to certify a class if the
substance of the claim cannot be legally asserted.
The third prerequisite is whether the class representative's claim is typical of the claims
of the entire class. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' class representative is not typical of the
putative class because the representative user fee payer, Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park through
Logan Robinson, is a residential user and does not represent commercial, industrial, multifamily, etc. users in Pocatello. The interests and damages awarded to a single residential user in
Pocatello may be different from those of a commercial, industrial, multi-family, etc. user in
Pocatello. As the only user fee payer representative is a residential user, Hill-Vu's residential
account does not encompass all categories of user fee payers in Pocatello. It seems clear that Mr.
Robinson paid his residential user fees and suffered an injury from the alleged taking as a result
·of the improper tax, like all the residents who paid user fees. But, the burden is on the alleged
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representative to make a clear showing that all claims by all customers would be the same and
that has not been done here. Thus, there has not been a sufficient showing of typicality.
Looking at the final prerequisite, conflict of interest, Defendant argues that Mr.
Robinson, operating as Hill-Vu, is not an adequate representative of potential class members
because he only represents residential users and not commercial, industrial, renters, multi-unit
accounts, etc. Defendant asserts each group of user fee payers would have varying interest as
members that Mr. Robinson would not represent. Plaintiffs assert that the user fee class
representative has sufficiently represented the interests of the class, has conferred with counsel,
produced documentation, and propounded discovery. If damages had ever been an outcome in
this case, it is likely that renters, for example, would not bear the burden of higher property
taxes, while commercial and residential property owners would. It is not clear whether that
would create a conflict of interest between some users and others. While all users would have a
common interest in receiving compensation for the past collection of an illegal tax, it has not
been sufficiently established that the interest is common enough to certify a large class of very
different types of users. The Court is not talcing the position that there is conflict of interest
between counsel for Mr. Robinson and other potential members of the class, but only that the
differences among potential class members may present a conflict which has not been and cannot
be fully reviewed by the Court at this time. The Court concludes that it would not have certified
the class of User Fee Payers for the reasons identified above. Thus, no further discussion of
I.C.R.P. 23 is required.
III.

Plaintifrs Renewed Motion For Leave to File First Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs wish to amend the complaint to add new facts and allege a new claim based on
the City's alleged improper spending of the connection/capacity fees for bond repayments. A
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district court has the discretion to grant or deny a motion to amend a pleading. 84 I.R.C.P. 1S(a)
provides that after a responsive pleading has been filed, "a party may amend a pleading only by
leave of court ... and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. ,,gs In the interest of
justice, courts should favor liberal grant of leave to amend a complaint.86 "The pwpose behind
allowing a party to amend its complaint is so all claims will be decided on their merits and to
provide notice of the claim and the facts at issue."87 Our Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the
reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in interpreting the comparable federal rule:
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or
amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of
allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the
rules require, be freely given.88
"The time between filing the original complaint and the amended complaint is not decisive."89
Rather, ''timeliness is important in view of the Foman factors such as undue delay, bad faith, and

°

prejudice to the opponent."9 For example, in Clark v. Olsen, the district court abused its
discretion by denying the plaintiffs motion to amend without a justifying reas_on, even though
seven years separated the original and amended complaints and the defendants had moved for
summary judgment prior to the motion to amend.91 Appropriate factors to consider include
r
whether the proposed amendment would delay upcoming hearings or trial, whether the motion to
amend comes after court-imposed deadlines have passed, and whether substantial work has

Terra-W., Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393,395, 247 P.3d 620, 622 (2010); Harris v. Rasmussen, 106
Idaho 322, 324, 678 P.2d 114, 116 (Ct. App. 1984).
85 1.R.C.P. 15(a).
86 Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847,934 P.2d 20 (1997).
87 Iron Eagle Development, LLCv. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487,492, 65 P.3d 509,514 (2003).
88 Carl H. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871, 993 P.2d 1197, 1202 (1999) (quoting
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227,230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222,226 (1962)) (internal quotations omitted).
89 Carl H. Christensen Family Trust at 871, 993 P.2d at 1202.
90 Id
91 Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 324-26, 715 P .2d 993, 994-96 (1986).
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already been completed. 92 A trial court may also consider whether the amended pleading sets out
a valid claim or whether the opposing party has an available defense to the newly added claim. 93
The court may not, however, weigh the sufficiency of the evidence related to the additional
claim.94
Here, Plaintiffs seek to amend the complaint to add new facts and allege a new claim
based on the City's alleged improper spending of the connection/capacity fees for bond
repayments since Fiscal Year 2015. Plaintiffs based their new factual assertions on Joyce
Stroeschein's affidavits and the Red Oak Studies conducted in 2006 and 2010. Plaintiffs'
allegations include that the "Red Oak studies falsely disclosed both the intent and the actual use
of the connection fees, as well as the basis for calculating the connection fees." Plaintiffs' new
claim is for declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating the water and sewer
connection/capacity fee as they are unlawful and unenforceable under Article 8, Section 3 of the
Idaho Constitution. Initially, Defendant objected to the motion to amend because Plaintiffs did
not abide by Rule 7(b)(3) as Plaintiffs indicated in their Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Complaint that they would be filing a brief within 14 days and requesting oral argument.
Plaintiffs did not file a brief or request oral argument, but instead submitted a Renewed Motion
for Leave to File First Amended Complaint with a supporting memorandum approximately a
month later. However, the Court allowed Defendants additional time to submit supplemental

See, e.g., Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851,858,230 P.3d 743, 750 (2010) (holding that the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it denied a motion to amend filed "well over a year'' after the initial complaint because the
amendment "would require additional evidence and witness gathering." and the facts alleged by the movant would
not establish the proposed amended claim); Hinkle v. Winey, 126 Idaho 993, 997, 895 P.2d 594, 598 (Ct.App.1995)
(holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to amend when the proposed
amendment was based on facts arising a year or more after the facts giving rise to the original complaint and
allowing the amendment "almost certainly" would have required "a delay of the trial").
93 Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 41, 44, 122 P.3d 300,303 (2005).
94 Id.
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briefing on the issue after the hearing on August 17, 2015, so the Court considers that no harm or
unfairness has befallen Defendant for not having adequate time to brief the Court on this issue.
Next, the Court takes into consideration the relevant factors in determining whether or
not to allow Plaintiffs to amend their complaint, beginning with undue delay and timeliness.
Plaintiffs motion to amend their complaint comes after court-imposed deadlines have passed.
On December 19, 2014, the Court entered its Order Setting Jury Trial ("Scheduling Order"),
which mandated that ''motions to add parties or amend pleadings shall be filed no later than 60
days after the date of this order."95 Under the Scheduling Order, any motion to amend the
complaint must have been filed by February 17, 2015. Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Leave to
File First Amended Complaint on June 12, 2015, well past the deadline, and stated a
memorandum brief would follow within two weeks pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3).96 Plaintiffs filed
their Renewed Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint on July 10, 2015, again well
past the Scheduling Order deadline. Additionally, while Plaintiffs argue their new allegations did
not arise until well after the complaint was filed, Plaintiffs assert they learned about the improper
use of connection/capacity fees for bond repayment from the affidavits of Joyce Stroschein.97
However, the Court notes that the new factual assertions and claims stem directly from the First
Affidavit of Joyce Stroschein, which was filed on August 29, 2014, and the Red Oak studies
from 2006 and 2010. The Red Oak studies have been available since the underlying case and
certainly from the very beginning of this action. Allowing the amendments when the information
Plaintiffs relied upon was available nearly a year ago would only further delay the litigation to
Order Setting Jury Trial, p. 2-3.
Plaintiffs did not subsequently file a supporting memorandum within two weeks. Instead, Plaintiffs filed a
renewed motion to amend their complaint on July 10, 2015 along with a supporting memorandum.
97 Strangely, ·while Plaintiffs depend on Stroschein's affidavits as part of the factual basis for their new claims, at the
same time, Plaintiffs assert they are prejudiced as a result of Stroschein 's fourth affidavit being filed after the motion
for summaryJudgment hearing.
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allow Defendant time to respond to the new issues, which could have been raised much earlier,
Further, substantial work has already been completed by both Parties. Defendant's motion for
summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' claims entailed abundant briefing on all sides, as did
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.
Additionally, Defendant argues that the proposed amendments are futile because the
record shows that the connection/capacity fees were only used to repay debt services for existing
infrastructure consistent with the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, and not "utilized for general fund or
for future expansion of the water and sewer system. "98 Plaintiffs argue their amended claims
have merit because the City has improperly assessed and used connection/capacity fees for bond
repayment in violation of the Idaho Constitution and statutory laws and contrary to what it had
presented in the Red Oaks study. Without weighing the sufficiency of the evidence related to the
new claim, the Court notes it has already held that the collection of the connection/capacity fees
were consistent with Idaho law and the only relief avaiiable has been mandated by in Building
Contractors, where the Court ordered the City to properly budget and expend the

connection/capacity fees according to law. The validity of Plaintiffs' new claim is extremely
questionable as Plaintiffs are requesting the same relief requested in Building Contractors, i.e.,
"declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating the water and sewer connection fees." 99
As to prejudice, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant will not be prejudiced because the trial
has been pushed to its secondary date in January of 2016, but that date may be pushed as well.
This Court disfavors moving trial dates and while there may be a need to do so again at a later
date, Plaintiffs cannot proclaim that since moving the trial date may happen, Defendants are not

Loomis, 807 p.2d at 1278.
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend, p. 1-2.
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prejudiced. Defendant asserts it is prejudiced because the new cause of action has already been
adjudicated in Building Contractors.
Defendant also brings up a res judicata defense. In regards to claim preclusion or res
judicata, the Idaho Supreme Court has declared:
Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim
or upon claims "relating to the same cause of action ... which might have been made."
There are three requirements for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action: (1) same
parties, (2) same claim, and (3) final judgment. Additionally, this Court has interpreted
claim preclusion to hinge on whether the matter "might and should have been litigated in
the first suit." The burden of proof for res judicata is on the party asserting the affirmative
defense and it must prove all of the essential elements by a preponderance of the
evidence. 100
.First, Defendants argue that plaintiffs in the Building Contractors case are in privity with
Plaintiffs in this litigation because the named Plaintiff, Ed Quinn, was the President of the
Building Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho and submitted affidavits in the Building
Contractors case alleging the same facts. Second, Defendant argues that the relief sought in the
amendment has already been addressed in Building Contractors. Plaintiffs there sought to
invalidate the capacity fee and now Plaintiffs here seek to do the same and recover damages
associated with the paid fee. Third, Defendants assert the Court previously held that the
collection of the connection/capacity fees and the amount of the fees charged were appropriate
and not in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, thus a final judgment was entered as to this
issue. Plaintiffs emphasize that Ed Quinn was not a party to the previous action, thus the res
judicata defense fails. Plaintiffs also assert that they are alleging the City has improperly
allocated connection/capacity fees toward bond repayment since Fiscal Year 2015 and beyond,

°

Kootenai Elec. Co-op., Inc.
omitted).
10

11.

Lamar Corp., 148 Idaho 116, 120,219 P.3d 440,444 (2009) (internal citations
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which was not an issue that was decided or identical to the issues decided in the Building
Contractors case as it occurred after that case was decided.

The Court declines to find that res judicata applies in this instance. However, given the
numerous other factors considered-undue delay, timeliness, court-imposed deadlines,
substantial work being done, prejudice, and validity of the claim - the Court, in its discretion,
DENIES Plaintiffs' renewed motion to amend their complaint based on those factors.

CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that the PILOT component is regarded as a governmental-imposed
illegal tax, which was only charged to user fees and not connection/capacity fees. The PILOT
component was ceased after this Court's decision in Building Contractors and there is no
evidence that it was collected into 2014. The Court grants summary judgment to Defendant on
all claims. Further, the Court declines to apply the decision in the Building Contractors case
retroactively. Lastly, Plaintiffs' renewed motion to amend their complaint is denied.
. The question of class certification is moot. However, the Court has included some
discussion of that question for the benefit of the parties.
The trial in this matter is vacated.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATEDthis

(l,fj__

dayof

Af~

, 2015

~
District Judge
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Attorneys for Pluintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY

HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf
of itself ~md all others similarly situated, ED

'

Case Number: CV-2014~1520~:QC ··
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QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others

similarly sintated,
Plaintiffs,

MOTION TO RECONSIDER

vs.
CITY OP POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs, Hill-Vti Mobile Home Park and Ed Quinn thro1.1gh counsel of record and

pur.suw1t to Rule l l(a)(2)(B) and/or Rule 59(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
res.pectfully moves this Court for fill order reconsidering its ":Memorandum Decision Granting
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Discussing Plain.tiffs~ Motion for Class
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Certification, and Denying Plaintiffst Renewed Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Complaint' al1d "Judgment.. entered on November 10~ 2015. The supporting n1emorandlllll and

a request for oral argument will be filed within 14 days as set forth unde1· IRCP § 7(h)(3)(C).
This Motion is st1ppo11ed by the affidavits and pleadings previously filed as well as the record ii-1
this case and in Baunock County Case No. C:V-20 I 1-5228-0C (Building Contractor;~ v. City qf

Pocatello).
As will be specifically addressed in Plaintiffs forthcoming memorandum. the Court
overlooked a n11mber of relevant facts and clear authority it its decision. Moreover, in that the
City was allowed to introdiice entirely new argwnents and additional alleged facts in its reply
briefs~ Plaintiffs did not have sufficient opportunity to respond as allowed under the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure, and therefore making the Court's awarding summary judgment premature.
. DATED this 24th day ofNoven1ber, 2015.

NathanM. Olsen
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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ISBN: 3558
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Nathan M. Olsen

Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen
485 '':R'' Street, Idaho Falls~ ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Fax: (208) 524"3391
ISBN: 7373
Attorneys for Plaintif±s
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THI SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAIIO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HI~L-VU MOBILE HOME PARK. on behalf
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED ·
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others

Case Number: CV-20l4-1520-0C

similarly situated,
Plaintiff..'>,

MOTION TO DISALLOif\1. ··

vs.

CITY OF POCATELLO) an Idaho
municipality,

Defendant.
Plaintiffs, by and through counsel ofrecorcl, and pursuant to l.R.C.P. 54(e)(6) and (d)(6);

hereby objects to an award of Defonclmrt City of Pocatello~s attorney fees and costs and moves
the Court to Motion to Disallow Defenda11t's Attomeys I:ees and Costs.
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hearing, well in excess of what would be reasonably required for such a hear.ing. Additionally.

.\

much of Defendant's ~ransaction detail is blocked out and Defendant 'has ~ailed to provide any

c-.xplanation or analysis of.differentiation of the fees it is allegedly claiming resulted from
Pla.intifls' ~1frivolous" and "non-frivolo\1s" claims. Given the fact that much of the rec.ord in this
case was. already developect in the prior case, a11d a.11 that occurred were a couple of pre:wtriaL
motions and limited discovery, Defendant's reas1Jnable fees should be no more than half of what

it fa claiming.
4. Defendant is not entitled to $368 in travel expenses., because such ex.pensei; are not
I!.

'

.

~·exceptional" under IRCP § 54(d).
DATED this 4th day of December, 2015.

Na
M.Olsen
.Attorneys tbr Plaintiffs

-·;

' J
'

~1

;
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If deemed necessary by the Court for further briefing or argument on Plaintifrs' Motion to
Disallow -- notwithstanding the Defendant's blatant and apparent deficiencies with it~: fee request
- Plaintiffs' Motion will be fi.rrther supported by a memorandum and tequest for }lea,ing filed
within 14 days in accordance with Rule 7 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and will also be
addressed in part in their forthcoming memorandum in support of their motiun .lbr
reconsideration. The Plaintiffs' basis for this motion can be sun.unarizecl as follows;
1. Defendant has tailed to timely or properly file it~ attomey fee request under the
applicable statutes, including IC § 6-918A, wlrich provides the "exclusive" i·emedy for the

awarding of attorneys fees in an action to "recover money damages'' for claims against
~overnment entities, or applicable federal statutes for Plaintiffs' federal takings claims.

2. Defendant is not entitled to sanctions u11der IRCP § 1 l(a)(l) because it has not shown
that Plaintiffs' claims were both not "well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law Ol'

good faith argument for the extension, modification. or reversal of existing law';

lllld

"interposed

for any impropi.,:ir purpose~ such as to harass or to cause mmecessary delay or lleedless increase in
the cost of litigation.'' Of further note, Defendant has not shown "with clear and convincing
evidence" that Plaintiffs were "guilty of bad faith in the commencement, conduct, ma:i.t1tenance
or defense ofthe action," the burden of proof required under IC § 6~918A.
3. Defendant's: attomey fees are excessiv~ unreasonable or otherwise deficient under the

factors set forth under lRCP § 54(e)(3). For instanCe Def'endant's attom.eys spent over 24 hours
7

and neatly $5,000 in working on a 1'sur reply brief' to address Plaintiffs' argument!i- which
Defendant is now claiming were ··without foundation" and •'frivolous." Defendant's ai'torneys
also spent nearly 65 attorney hours and .approximately S11,000 to prepare for a "show cause"
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IN THE DISTlUCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others
sjmilady situated,
Plaintiffs,

Case Number: CV-2014-1520-0C

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

vs.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs, HUl-Vu Mobile Home Park and Ed Quinn through counsel of record and
pursuant to Rule 1l(a)(2)(B) and/or Rule 59(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, provide the

following memorandum in support of their Motion to Reconsider the Court's "Memorandum
Decision Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Discussing Plaintiffs' Motion
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for Class Certification, and Denying Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Complaint" and HJudgment" entered on November 10, 2015 (Memorandwn Decision). This
memorandum is supported by the affidavits and pleadings previously filed as well as the record
in this case and in Bannock County Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C (Building Contractors Case),
including in particulat pleadings identified herein.

SUMMARY
Plaintiffs request that the ColU't reconsider two key mlings in its Me111ornndtm1 Decision,
while reserving thefr rights to address the Court's "discussion" with regard to class certification
in the event that their Motion to Reconsider is granted. First, the Comt should reconsider
whether the impermissible PILOT fees that were collected under a City resolution establishing
"user fees" for utility services pursuant to IC§ 50-1028, et al., but then were used for the
unauthorized PILOT program for general revenue purposes could still be considered a "taking"
for purposes of the federal and state constitution. In addition, the Court should acknowledge that
there are at least disputed facts as to whether the City• s imposition of the PILOT program was
indeed ''reckless" or "willful" making it liable under IC § 6-904A, given its complete disl'egard
of the legal advice that it sought from the Idaho State Attomey General prior to implementing the

pl'Og.t·am in 2007, among other facts in the record suggesting such conduct.
Second, the Court should reconsider whether it has misapplied its authority to not
"retroactively" apply the Building Contractors Case. A closer review of the authority 011 this
issue suggests that only the Idaho Supreme Court has jurisdiction to decide whether its decisions
should not be retrnactively applied. Fut'ther, Plaintiffs largely rely upon previous Idaho Supreme
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Court authority decided well before the City implemented its PILOT pmgram, some of which is
cited by this Court in the Building Contractors Case, essentially rendering the "retroactivity''
claim 111oot. Finally, the Court should consider whether the complete prohibition of the Plaintiffs
to recover damages from harms done to them as a result of the impermissible PILOT fee
adversely "effects the administration of justice."
Finally, in the event that the Court grants Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsidel', the timeliness
issues with regard to their motion to amend their complaint will be moot. Therefore, for
putposes of judicial economy, the Court should allow Plaintiffs' motion to amend which simply
addresses hanns that occmred in relation to this case after their initial complaint was filed in this
matter.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
In Idaho, motions to reconsider are authorized by Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure. I.R.C.P. § 1l(a)(2)(B). The Rule provides that 1'a motion fol' reconsideration of
any interlocutory orders oftbe trial court niay be made at anytime before the entry of final
judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment.'' Id. The case
law applying Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) permits a patty to present new evidence when a motion is brought
under that rule, but does not 1'equire that the motion be accompanied by new evidence. Johnson

v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 (Idaho 2006). It is entirely permissible for a
trial court to reconsider its own interlocutory orders for facial errors 01· errors of law. Id. A
motion to reconsider a final judgment may also be properly filed under I.R.C.P. 59(e), or

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER- Page 3

744

· considered under that Rule. Ross v. State, 141 Idaho 670, 671, 115-PJd 761, 762 (Id. App.
2005).
The burden is on the moving party to "draw to the comt's attention any new evidence that
the movant may be relying upon." Id. "Indeed, the chlef virtue of a reconsideration is to obtain a
full and complete presentation of all available facts, so that the truth may be ascertained, and
justice done, as nearly as may be." Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank ofN. Idaho,
118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990).
ARGUMENT
I.

The User Fees Collected Under the City Resolution Which Were Impermissibly
Used for the PILOT Constitutes a "Taking'' Because tJie City bad No Authority to
Impose tile PILOT in the First Place.
The Court's Memorandum Decision suggests that once it determined in the Building

Contractors Case that the PILOT was a "tax,n a recovery under the takings provisions of the
federal constitution and 42 USC § 1983 does not apply. (Mem. Dec. pp. 14~ 16.) However, upon
closer review of the facts and authority. this is an incorrect approach taken by the Court and
would in effect deprive plaintiffs from ever being able to obtain relief for the tmauthorized
collection and use of fees for general revenue purposes- which is clearly not what the Idaho

Supreme Court has intended in its prior decisions.

In taking anothe1· more thorough look at this issue, the Court should consider the
resolutions that the City implemented from which the PILOT was· derived. The City Resolutions
establishing the User Fees for each of the years that the impermissible PILOT programs we1'e in
existence contai11s the following virtually language:
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.WHEREAS, Pocatello Municipal Code Section 13.16.180 authorizes sanital'y sewer rates
and plant capacity fees to be set from time to time by Resolution; aud,
WHEREAS, the City Council retained the engineering firm of Red Oak Consulting to
prepare a rate study to pmject revenues and costs for 2011~2015 and to recommend necessary
sanitary sewer rates thereafter; and
WHEREAS, the City Council has determined that fees and charges for the sanitary sewer
system as previously set by Resolution (applicable resolution) should be revised for Fiscal Year
(applicable year) in accordance with that study;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE
CITY OF POCATELLO THAT SEWER RATES AND FEES FOR FISCAL (YEAR)
SHALL BE AS FOLLOWS:
(Feb. 13, 2015, Aff. LoganRobh1sonpar. 2, Ex. A)
As has been referenced numerous times in this case and the pl'evious Building
Contractors Case the "Red Oak studies,, that the City relied upon in establishing the fee rates
never classify any portion of the utility fees as "taxes;' but rather as "fees" collected fo1· the

purposes .allowed under IC § 50-1033, et al. Additionally, the City's CFO Dave Swindell i11 his
initial affidavit in support of the City's Motion for Summary Judgment in the Building
Contractors Case refers to the PILOT as a "fee" throughout, classifying it as a "franchise feet
"impact fee,U or "internal franchise fee" thl'oughout. (Oct. 9, 2012, Af£ of Dave Swindell par's
1-13.)
Thus, the facts unquestionably show that the City implemented and represented the
PILOT as part of the utility "fee'' under the guise ofIC § 50-1028, et al. The City only decided to
re-term the PILOT as a "tax" well afte1· the fact, and clearly for the sole purpose of attempting
avoid liability.
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This attempt by the City to re-classify its fee as a "tax'' to avoid liability has been tried by
other public entities in a takings claim, and has been soundly rejected by the Idaho Supreme
Court. The Coul't should again consider the underlying facts and procedural histo1·y in BHA

Investments, Inc. ~. CUy ofBoise, 141 Idaho 168, 108 P.3d 315 (2004). In this case, the district
court had accepted the City of Boise's argument that its "liquor license transfer fee,, was in fact a
"disguised tax" and therefore the plaintiffs were required to "pay the tax under pmtest,, pursuant
to Idaho law in order to preserve a claim of recovery. Id. 141 Idaho at 176, 108 P.3d at 323. The
Idaho Supreme Court resoundi11gly defeated such notion, _with the following analysis and holding
which is highly l'eleva11t to this case:
We have held that when a govemmental entity imposes what is on its face a tax, the
taxpayer must pay it under protest in order to preserve the right to claim a refund. Walker
v. Wedgwood, 64 ldaho 285, 130 P.2d 856 (1942) (income tax); Shoup v. Willis, 2 Idaho
108, 6 P. 124 (1885) (property tax). We have also held that a city's imposition of a
purported fee that does not bear a reasonable relationship to sel'vices to be provided by
the city is in reality the imposition of a tax. Brewster v. City ofPocatello, 115 Idaho 502,
768 P.2d 765 (1988). We have not held, however, that when a city imposes a fee that it
has no authority to impose at all, such fee must be paid under protest before it can be
recovered.
The purpose of the analysis regarding excessive fees is to prevent a city from imposing an
illegal tax by masquerading it as a fee. TI1at analysis does not apply, however, where the
city does not have the authority to impose either the tax 01· the fee. If it has no auth01•ity
to impose any fee at all, it cloes not matter whether the fee imposed bears a
reasonable relationsbip to the services p.-ovided. It is illegal neardless of the
amount of the fee. In tltis case, the City did not have the authority to impose either a
fee for the transfer of a liquor license or a tax on the transfe1· of a liquor license.
Therefore, the analysis of whether liquor license transfer fee was in reality a disguised tax
does not apply.

We have decli11ed to apply the payment-under~protest requit·ement to an action seeking
recovery of unlawful fees. In Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n, Inc. v. Idaho
Public Utilities Conunissiou, 125 Idaho 401, 871 P.2d 818 (1994), we held that interstate
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motor cartiers were entitled to recover the portion of their state registration fees that
exceeded the amount authorized by federal law even though they had not paid those fees
under protest. There was no stati1te requiring that the fees be paid under protest in order to
challenge them, and we refused to apply the payment-of-tax-under-protest requirement to
the motor carriers in that case.

The City ordinance denominated the sum owing as a "transfer f~e. 11 not a tax. Ju
BHA I, tile City argued that it was a properly imposed fee and not a tax. Now. the
City contends it was a tax all along and that Bravo and Splitting Kings should be
genied recovery because tlley clid not J>ay that "tax" under protest. Where the Cit~
denominated the sum owing as a "fee," the payment..of..fax-un<ler-protest
requfrement does not apply. The district comt ened in holding. that Bravo and Splitting
Kings were required to have paid the liquor license transfer fee under protest in order to
bl'ing this action.

Id. (emphasis added)
In essence, the BHA Cmut has clearly indicated that a City can't impose what it first
classifies as a 11fee," and then avoid liability by later identifying it as a "tax." As the Supreme
Court aptly notes, it is not really a question as to whether the monies were used as a "fee" or a
"disguised tax," but rather whether the city had the authority to impose the fee in the first place I

Id. In BHA, the City of Boise had no legal ai1thority to impose a "liquor license transfer fee» and
therefore it mattered not how tbe City classified the fee, i.e. as a "fee" or "tax." Id. In addition1
the BHA Court held that the unauthorized fee constituted a 11taking" of private property,
compensable under the "United States and Idaho Constitutions'' and not subject to the Idaho Tort
Claims Act. Id. 141 Idaho at 172, 108 P.3d at 319.
The same principle applies here. The City imposed a usel' fee upon the users of the
system pursuant to resolution and IC § 50-l 028, et al. It then used a significant po11io11 of those
fees for the unauthorized PILOT (and all of its various named iterations, i.e. the "impact fee,"
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"internal franchise fee/' "Retum on Equity/' etc...). The City never had authority under law to
implement the PILOT regardless of its classification or improper use as a general revenue somce
or a "disguised tax.,, Thus, it is and should be considered a "taking" subject to compensation
under the Idaho and U.S. Constitution;

TI1e Supreme Court has also rece11tly clarified this issue to further suggest that a
"disguised tax'' is still considered a "fee', for the pm:poses of a takings claim. In re Certified

QuesNon ofLaw 'White, 156 Idaho 77,320 P.3d 1236 (2014). In that case, the Idaho Supreme
Court received a certified question from the U.S. District Court fo1· the District of Idaho with
regard to when the statute of limitations applied upon the payment of a tax. Id. However, in so
doing, the Court discussed the differences between what is considered a "tax'' and a "fee,, for the
purposes of a taking under the Idaho and Federal Constitution, stating:
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to acknowledge some confusion resulting from
the parties' interchangeable use in their briefing of the terms II fee" and II tax. 11 A tax is
genemlly a tax. A fee can be either a legitimate fee or a disguised tax.

Id, 156 Idaho at 82, 320 P .3d at 1241 1236 (2014) (emphasis added)
Thus, the Supreme Court has fmiher clarified that a fee used as a ''disguised tax" is still afee for
purposes of a takings. Thus, in this case, even if the PlLOT were classified as a "disguised tax,"
it is still an improperly collected "fee" for the pmposes of a takings action. ·
Finally, as inherent in the BHA decision, to not allow plaintiffs to recover the improperly

collected fees because they are re-classified as "taxes" would be unjust and would in fact
condone improper conduct of the City. In BHA, the City of Boise was clearly attempting to avoid
liability after-the-fact by re-defining their improper fee as a "tax', which was "not paid under
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pmtest" by the plaintiffs, and therefore not recoverable. The City i11 this case takes a similar
track, attempting to avoid liability under the takings provisions of the Idaho and U.S.
Constitution by first collecting the monies as a "fee" and then conve1ting them for use as a "tax''

fo1· general revenue purposes. The effect of allowing this impropriety would be toforever bar the
damaged fee paye1·s from 1·ecovering improperly imposed fees illegally and unconstitutionally

used for jegeneral revenue" purposes. That is the very injustice that the Supreme Coul't
emphatically addressed in BHA Investments, and should not be tolerated by this Court.
Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration should therefore be granted.

II.

There are Disputed Facts as to Whether the Imposition of the PILOT Fee was
Recldess, Wilful or Wanton Conduct making it Actionable under IC § 6R904A.

In dismissing the plaintiffs' "state claims/' in particular their "unjust elll'ichment," and
"equitable estoppel" claims, the Court's Memorandum Decision relies upon IC§ 6-904A which

exempts entities from liability under the Idaho Tort Claims Act for claims which "arise out of the
assessment or collection of any tax or fee." (Mem. Dec. pp. 11-13.) However, in so doing, the

Court provided no analysis as to whether there was factual support that the City acted "without
malice" and "without reckless, willful and wanton conduct' which is defined under IC § 6~
904D(2), and which would make the City liable under IC§ 6-904A even under the plaintiffs'

state claims.
"Reckless, willful and wanton conduct" is defined in the act as "intentionally and
knowi11gly (doing) or (failing) to do an act creating unreasonable risk of harm to another, and
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which involves a high degl'ee of probability that such harm will result." IC § 6~904A. The term
"malice'' in a civil context, as been defined very similarly by the Idaho Supreme Court:
At a minimum, malice involves the intentional commission of a wrongful or
unlawful act without legal justification or excuse, whether or not the injury was
intended.

Anderson v. City ofPocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 187, 731 P.2d 171, 182 (1986).
The record in this case (which includes the Building Contractors Case) contains a
substantial amount of evidence that - construing the facts most favorably to the plaintiff as the
moving pal'ty - at the· vety least raises a materially disputed fact as to whether the City has acted
with such intent, and therefore allowing tllis question to go before the jury.
Chiefly, in 2007, the City made a request to the Idaho State Attorney General for an
· opinion as to the legality of the PILOT, which it then completely defied and disregarded. (See
again the Attoiney General's file attached to the Feb. 13, 2013, Affidavit of Nathan Olsen,
submitted in the Building Contractors Case. 1) Then Mayor Roger Chase not only wrote to the
Attorney General seeking his opinion on the matter, he personally met with the Attorney General

as well. (Id. Ex. B.) In his cotrespondence to the Attomey General, Mayor Chase admitted that
he wanted to "move the city away from (unpopular) property taxes and to a fee based system." Id.
He then sought Han opinion to make sure your office is still comfortable with the City charging
(the PILOT"), Id. On February 6, 2007, the Attorney Generars office did indeed provide a

The Comt should also take into account Mr. Olsen's affidavit wherein he notes that the
City failed to prnvide its correspondence with the. AG in its discove1-y responses, therefore
purposefully withholding this highly relevant evidence which was obtained only by a subpoena
directly to the AG.
1
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detailed legal opinion indicating that the City's PILOT fee "does not conform to the requirements
of existing case law.,, (Id. Ex. C.)
On April 10, 2007, the City attorney requested that the Attomey General "reconsider" its
opinion in light of the Supreme Cou1t decision City of Chubbuck v. City ofPocatello, 127 Idaho
198, 899 P.2d 411 (1999), among other decisions. (Id. Ex. D.) On April 19, 2007, the Attorney
General's office responded, indicating that "we have carefully reviewed the issue, the l'elevant
autho1'ities, and the arguments that have been raised; however, based on this review and
consideration, we are not inclined to change our previous conclusions.'' (Id. Ex. E.) The letter
then ftuther advises the City as follows:
Regardless of whether the largest percentage of the fee is imposed for other than revenue
raising purposes, the fact remains that one prut of the fee has been calculated with the
specific intent of providing funding for municipal services that are separate and apart
from the w1del'lying regulato1y purpose. No matter what these flmds are called, to the
extent they are 11ot reasonably related to the regulated activity, it is our opinion that they
are an impermissible revenue raising assessment.
(Id. Ex. F).
Notwithstanding this clear advice and warning from the State Attorney General's office -

provided at the City's own request, the City nevertheless pl'Oceeded with its illegal and illK
advised PILOT fee which improperly collected nearly $30 million until it was shut down by
Court order in November of 2013. The City also took measures to hide the fact that it had
received this advice. Fmther, it co11tiimed to advance the City ofChubbuck v. City ofPocatello,
127 Idaho 198,899 P.2d 411 (1999) as a legal basis for the PILOT, despite the Attomey
General's advice of its 111applicability. Ajm·y could find that the conduct of this City was
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"creating unreasonable risk of harm" to the plaintiffs, including a "high degree of probability
that such harm will result." IC § 6-904C(2). In other words, the jury may find that the City
knowingiy proceeded with implementing this blatantly illegal PILOT program, at a massive and
unsuppo1'ted cost to rate-payers, and that this conduct is wilful, reckless, etc.
Additionally, the Court should not disregard plaintiffs' "spoliation,, and "destruction of
records" claims contaitied within their Complaint, which is further evidence of the City's
reckless and wilful conduct. (Complaint par. 17.) Again, these claims are supported by the
record in the Building Contractors Case, including the pleadings and affidavits provided i11
support of the "Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Sanctions under IRCP 37(b)" filed on May 26,
2013 .. ·The Court will recall that there were a large number of records on this issue that should
have been maintained by the City u11der the public records retention statute, but were otherwise
discarded or destroyed- eve11 after the City became aware of the plaintiffs' claims. (See again,
the Mem. and affidavits filed i11 support the motion on May 26, 2013.) These are additional
facts that should go to the jury's consideration.
In s1mm1ru·y, in that the Comt did not even consider the City's conduct in implementing

the impermissible PILOT fee, plaintiffs' motion for consideration should be granted even under
their claims falling under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. There is evidence to suggest that the City

acted with "malice', and with "recklessness/' etc.. :, that removes the exemption of liability under
IC§ 6~904A.
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III.

The Authority Relied Upon by the Court on the Retroactivity of the Bnil<ling
Contracto1·s Case Docs Not Apply.

The Court's Memorandum Decision detel'mines that the City is not liable to plaintiffs'
claims in this case based upo11 its decision in the Building Contractors Case because its decision

will not be retroactively'' applied. Upon closer review, this ruling misapplies this principle and
11

is in many l'espects n011sensical.
Again, the Idaho Supl'eme Court's decision in BHA Investments, Inc. v. City ofBoise,
141 Idaho 168) 108 P.3d 315 (2004) contains the applicable authority fol' when a decision should

not be applied retroactively. This Court should take a much closer look at BHA, including the
principles behind non-retroactive application and its limitations. BHA 's procedural history
indicates a prior Supreme Court decision wherein the Court had determined that the "tl'ansfer
fee" in dispute was not authorized by law. See, BHA Investments, Inc. v. City ofBoise, 138 Idaho
356, 63 P.3d 482 (2003). After remand, the district made a number of other decisions 011 the case
which were then appealed and addressed in the second BHA case. In addition, a companion case
B1'(IVO

Entertainment, L.L. C. v. City ofBoise was filed on the very same issues, which was

dismissed by the district cotll't which held that the Supreme Cow·t's decision in first BHA case
should not be "retl'oactively applied." BHA 11141 Idaho at 171, 108 PJd at 318. One issue on

appeal was whether the Supreme Comt's decision in the first BHA decision finding the fee to be
unauthorized should be "retroactivelt' applied. It is critical to consider the complete holding of
the BRA Comt on this issue:
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The decisions of this Court apply pl'Ospectively, to all fnttire cases. The issue is whether
and to what extent they apply retroactively to past or pending cases. The usual rule is that
decisions of tliis Court apply retroactively to all past and pending cases. State v. Tipton.
99 Idaho 670, 587 P.2d 305 (1978). For policy reasons, however, this Court has
discretion to limit the retroactive application of a particular decision. We may hold that it
does 11ot apply even to the case in which the decision was announced; or that it applies
only to that case and not to other past or pending cases; or that it applies to both that case
and pending cases, but not to past cases. Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 570 P.2d 284
(1977). When deciding whether to limit the retroactive application of a decision, we
weigh three factors: (1) the pmpose of the decision; (2) the reliance upon the prior law;
and (3) the effect upon the administration of justice if the decision is applied
retroactively. Thompson v. Hagan, 96 ldaho 19,523 P.2d 1365 (1974). We balance the
first factor against the othe1· two to determine whether to limit the retroactive application
of the decision. Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606,570 P.2d 284 (1977).
Id. 141 Idaho at 173, 108 P.3d at 320, (2004)(emphasis added)

Upon fiuiher review of the precise ruling of the Supreme Court and its supporting "policy
reasons, •t whether there is a restriction on the ''retroactiven application of a decision clearly
applies only to appellate decisions, or decisions of the Supreme Cowi, and are further limited to
decisions that in effect "overrules" or "rejects" a prior law. A detailed disc1.IBsion of this policy is
discussed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 608"609, 570 P.2d 284,
287-88 (1977). In Jones, the Court notes that appellate decisions have the added element of
establishing "rules" or "stare decisis,, to which society is bound. The Comt fi.uiher references
upon the principles set forth in 10 ALR3d 1377-78, which suggests that the decision on whether
or not to "retl'oactively" apply a decision is only applicable to a ''judicially changed rule,, or an

"ove1rnli11g decision." hi other words, the central question is first whether the previous law is
"changed" or "ovenuled" as a result of the appellate decisions, before there is even any
discussion as to whether this new authority can be applied retroactively.
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Given the full consideration of the policy on this issue, this Court's ruling that prevented
plaintiffs from seeking relief for liabilities established under the Building C011trnctors Case is not
supported by applicable law. First, this Court simply does not hold the same status as the
Supreme Court or an appe11ate court, whose decisi011s have widespread ramifications, i.e. in the
establishing of "rules" that all of society must abide. It therefore did not have jurisdiction in the
first place to decide whether it could limit the "retroactive" effect of its decision.
Further, this Court's decision did not establish any ''mle" that "changed" or ''overruled,,
any prior existing law or 1·ule- and in/act the reverse is tl'ue. This Cotut's J\4emora11dui;n
Decision issued on November 15, 2013, in the Building Contractors Case is replete with
numerous references to Idaho Supreme Court decisions that were decided well before the City
implemented its PILOT program. In other words, the 2013 decision did not "change" or
"overrule" prior or existing I'Ule, b1.1t rather affirmed prior rules established by the Idaho Supreme
Co1.ut which made the PILOT fee impermissible under law.2 In essence, there is no ''retroactive"
application of the law here, but rather the Citis conduct being challenged in this case is
"prospective" to the rules and precedent previously established by the Idaho Supreme Cotnt. All
this Court did in its Novembe1· 2013 decision was uphold those rules.

The City shouldn't be allowed to errantly rely upon the City of Chubbuck v. City of
Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 202, 899 P.2d 411, 415 (1995) decision either to exempt itself from its
improper conduct. The retroactivity doctrine certainly should not apply to even a good faith
misinterpretation of existing authority, which would negate almost any potential liability and
again is not a proper application of the reotroactivity principle.
2
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Of flll'ther note, in this case the plaintiffs are not relying entirely upon the decision of this
Court in the Building Contractors Case for its authority in supporting their claims in this case.
Plaintiffs' briefing in this case is replete with Idalm Supreme Court authority decided well before
the City's ini.plementation of the PILOT fee, and in particular the BHA Investments decision
decided iu 2004. There is simply no authority or justification that allows this Court to in effect
nullify the application of prior rules established by the Idaho Supreme Comt - which in actuality
is a perverse use of its power. ·
Finally, the Coutt' s errant reliance on this "retroactivity" principle is plainly manifest in
the resulting inconsistencies. The Court is preventing the plaintiffs from relying upon findings or
rnlings in the Building Contractors Case which support their claims, while at the same time
relying upon such rulings and findings which support defendant's claims. For insta.11ce, the Court

.

has decided to "retroactively" apply the Building Contractors Decision with regal'd to whether
there was PILOT component in the connection fee, but will not apply its decision retroactively
with regard to the City's liability prior to on its impermissible PILOT program. In other words,
the Court relies heavily upon the Building Contractors Case in granting summary judgment to the
City on i~sues decided in the case, effectively granting such decisions "retroactive," but not doing
the same for the plaintiffs. This in itself demonstrates the misguided approach taken by the Court
on this issue, and the need for reconsideration:
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IV.

The Court Disregards the Hal'sh and Unjust Ramifications of its Decision to Deny
Plaintiffs' Relief.
Even if the Court had authority to conduct an analysis of whether it should ''retroactively"

apply the Building Contractors Case (i.e. via the three factors outlined in BHA Investments), its
decision does not address whatsoever the manifest injustice and damages that plaintiffs,
including in particular Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park (Hill-Vu), as a result of the City's illegal
PILOT program.
The Memorandum Decision notes the potential "adverse effects" of having to repay the
fees improperly collected in the PILOT program. However, it disregards the serious harms that it
caused Hill-Vu and other rate payers. Hill-Vu's owner Logan Robinson-who is not a resident
of the City of Pocatello-indicates in his May 21, 2015, affidavit that the City had collected
$840,000 from him in user fees since the implementation of the PILOT program.
Conservatively, assuming that 10% of those fees consisted of the PILOT component, no less than
$84,000 was improperly taken by the City. That is serious and substantial harm to which this
Court paid no heed. The Court's analysis should not be one sided. It should not also simply

a1.ltomatically disregard the harms to other rate payers.
Again, there is no authority or justification for the Court to decide not to retroactively
apply the Building Contractors Case (including the Idaho Supl'eme Court authority cited in the
case). Regardless, the Court must consider the injustice or harms that the City's improper
conduct caused, and yet adds another reason to reconsidel' its Memorandmn Decision.
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V.

In the Event that tl1e Court Grants their Motion to Reconsider, Plaintiffs Should be
Allowed to Amend Their Complaint.

If the Comt grants plaintiffs 1 motion to reconsidel', in the interest of justice, it should at
the same time reconsider and grant plai11tiffs' motion to amend their complaint. In that there is
no trial date set for this matter, the deadlines set in the Court's prior scheduling order- which
were contingent upon the trial date - are no longer applicable. This essentially renders moot the
Couit' s basis to deny plaintiffs Motion to Amend.

The Plaintiffs' amended complaint simply adds additional relief based upon co11duct of
the City on this matte!' that occurred after plaintiffs filed their initial complaint. Plaintiffs allege
that the City's decision to allocate the equivalent of all the connection fees collected from 2007
through 2015 toward bond re-payment (regardless of whether it was used for water and sewer
bonds) is a blatant violation of the Idaho Constitution and its supp01ting statutes, as well as a
misl'epresentation of the intended use of these fees as stated in the Red Oak studies. (See
proposed Amended Complaint.) The complaint alleges that such as un~authorized use of the fees
constitutes a taking and further warra11ts declamtory and injunctive relief.
Because these are claims that largely became ripe after the 2013 Building Contracto1·s
Case had been decided, they are in effect new claims, and nothing prevents a separate action
from being filed on these claims. However, because many common law rutd facts apply to these
new claims that exist in this case, it is in the best interest of judicial economy to simply allow the
amendment so all of the issues could be considered at the same time in the same Cou1t. This
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would also prevent the expense of filing a separate claim and moving to consolidate the claims
under IRCP § 20(a).
CONCLUSION

The legal issues and facts in this case are extraordinarily complex, but also have
significant ramifications. Although much of this Motion to Reconsider asks the Court to again
consider authority and facts previously cited, the Court should take a more in depth and
deliberate look at this authority and the application of the facts in this case. In so doing and
pursuant to the foregoing, the Court should grant plaintiffs' motion to reconsider.
DATED this 81h day ofDecember, 2015.

Nathan M. Olsen
Attomeys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that 011 the g•b day of December, 2015, I served a trne and correct copy of
the foregoing document 011 the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage
thereon, Ol' by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule 5(b), I.R.GP.

r~ ()

Persons Served:

Method of Service:

Blake G. Hall, Esq.
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

( ) mail

fux ( ) email

FAX: (208) 621-3008

EMA IL: bgh@hasattomeys.com

Honorable Stephen S. Duim
624 E. Center, Room 302
Pocatello, ID 83201

;I

( ) mail ( ) hand ( ) fax

email

(Chambe1's Copy)

FAX: (208) 236-7208

EMAIL: karlnv@bannockcounty.us
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAML. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP
J.075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
l'SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484
bgh@hasa1tomeys.com
§la@hasattomeys.com
nrs@hasattomexs.com
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf ofhimself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C

.

DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 'fO

: ·;

'!;:

RECONSIDER

v.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
I.'

. Defendant.

I

COMES NOW Defendant, City of Pocatello, by ancl through its attomey of record,

pursuant to Rules l l{a)(2){B) and/or 59(e), Idaho Rules ofCivi1 Procedure, and herehy requests
that the Court deny Plaintiffs~ Motion to Reconsider.
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, which seeks to have this Court
second-guess its prior summary judgment ruling and also rulings in the Building Conrractors

1°

i

'
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case. Throughout the brief, Plaintiff merely suggests that the Court make a "closer r,~viewofthe
facts and authorityt take "another more thorough look at this issue," that the Court should
..again consider tbe underlying facts and procedural history," failed to closely examine the law,

consider the "complete" holdings of cases, misapplied the law. or rendered a "nonsensical"
decision in applying the matter prospectively. {Pl. Memorandum In Support Of Motion to

Reconsider) p. 4, 6, 13 ). The present motion is merely an attempt to reargue the same issues that
were fully briefed and considered by the Court.
Plaintiff has failed to provide the Court with any new evidence or law that would justify a
reversal of the prior motion for summary judgment. Rather, the Plaintiffs cite the same authority,

evidence, and affidavits previously filed with the Court. Nothing new to consider was provided,
rather a plea to re-examine the same information and law that has been carefully examined her.e
and in the Building Contractors case. This careful examination led to a well·reasoned and legally
. !.

supported decision on Defendant's Motion for Summ~ Judgment. Because there is no new

't

evidence or Jaw advanced in Plaintiff's motion. denial of the motion for reconsideration is
appropriate. Plaintiffs' present motion is nothing but an improper attempt to get the Court to re,.
examine previously argued issues, not only from the instant case but also from the Building

Contractors matter. Because the instant motion is nothing but an attempt to reargue the same
issues and merely requests the Court to "take another look" at the issues, an award of attorneys'

foes is appropriate. See I.RC .P. 11.
-f

.t
..:

ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment to Defendant on
all claims advanced by Plaintiffs. Plaintiff brings this motion under either Idaho Rule of Civil

Procedure 11 (a)(2)(B), which governs motions for reconsideratio1t1 of interlocutory orders or
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under Rule 59(e), which is the vehic;;le for altering or amending a judgment. "The decision to

;'.?:\

grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the sound discretion of the trial

. t"ir,
11

court." Campbell v. Reagmi, 144 Idaho 254, 258, 159 P.3d 891, 895(2007) (quoting Carnell v.

Barker Mgmt. Inc., I 37 Idaho 322,329, 48 P.3d 651,658 (2002)). Because a recom:ideration
motion ''is not a vehicle for re~litigating old issues, presenting the case m1der new theolies1
securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a 'second bite at the apple'': (See Sequa

-.,:! ;

C01p. v. GBJ C01p., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2nd Cir. 1998)), "[aJ party seeking reconsideration must

show more than a disagreemen,t with the Court's decision, and recapitulation of the c:ases and
arguments considered by the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving
party's burden." United States v. West/ands Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 111l~1131 (E.D.Cal.
2001) (internal citations omitted). Simply pu~ motions for reconsideration are not 'the proper

vehicles for rehashing old arguments," United States v. De Rong Shang, No. 2:11-CR-110·
RLH, 2012 WL 234646, at* I (D. Nev. Jan. 25, 2012) (emphasis added); see also Curtis v. MH.
King Co.~ 142 Idaho 383, 388, 128 P .3d 920,. 925 (2005)). The motion to reconsider 1s not

"intended to give an unhappy litigant one additional chance to sway the judge." Durkin v.
Taylor, 444 F.Supp. 879, 889 (E.D.Va.1977) (emphasis added). The burden rests on tl1e party

seeking iteeonsideration to present new evidence or Jaw that warrants a change in the Court's
prior ruling. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 473, 147 P.3d l 00, 105 (2006).
lJ1 the instant case, Plaintiffs have presented this Court with W! new evidence or Jaw.

Plaintiffs only cite information that was previously available to, and in fact was cousidcrcd by
the Court, merely asking the Court to take a "more thorough look" at infonnation that Plaintiffs

believe the Court did not understand and/or consider. Tile entirety of Plaintiffs' nwtion is

premised on the flawed assumption that this Court did not analyze and consider the evidence and
\'
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law cited to the Court in the briefing by the Parties. There is no basis for such assumptions. In

summary, Plaintiffs• motion is nothing more than a veiled attempt to take a "second bite at the·
-~

apple," which is an inappropriate basis for a motion for reconsideration.
A.

.

- ,J~ :

The City Bas Never Claimed the PILOT Was a Fee in This Litigation.

Tile first claim for reconsideration centers entirely 011 whether the PILOT was a tax or

fee. Curiously, Plaintiffs advance an argument that was squarely addressed in the Building

_.ii..

Contractors matter and bas no bearing on tl1is case. Plaintiffs are seeking reconsideration hex:e uf

an issue that was addressed by the Court in the Building Contractors case-namely, whether the

I

I
'

PILOT was classified as a fee or tax. Plaintiffs erroneously suggest that the City has attempted to

misclassify the PILOT in an attempt to gain some advantage in this litigation. Thfa argument is
completely contrary to the facts here and in the Building Contractors matter. As this Court noted
in its Memorandum Decision and Order, the City has maintained throughout this litigation that

l

. I

the PILOT was a tax. Any argument that the PILOT was a fee was advanced en.tirely by the

i

;;, i
·. I

Plaintiffs in this matter. (Order, p. 6·7).

I

In analyzing the PILOT, the Court properly looked at the purpose of the charge. bl
considering whether the PILOT was a fee or tax, the Court noted, "a court must consider if, on

its face, whether the fee is a tax or a regulation. This fll'St stm !Vas thorougblv am!Jyzed in tl!£
,,

'•

~Court's prior decisions in Building Cbntractors/' (Otder, p. 7 (emphasis added)). The Court

recognized that ··the analysis to detennine whether or not the PILOT component is coni;;idered a
regulation or tax is exactly the same as it was in the underlying case." (Order, p. 8 (emphasis

added)). Namely1 that the Court unequivocally analyzed the PILOT, as continued by the City in
I

Building Contractors, and concluded that the PILOT was a tax because it was a method to
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generate revenue transferred to the General Fund. (Order, p. 7). The Courts discussion of thi$

issue was thorough and fully analyzed the PILOT. (Order, pp. 6.;9). 1

•\,

•,
l{:ii
,

Ultimately, this request of Plaintiffs is improper because it seeks reconsideration of an
issue that was definitively addressed and analyzed in the Building Contractors case. This· is
precedent that cannot be ignored by the Court and is binding on the parties. There: is no viable

argument to reconsider an issue established in a prior case.
B.

No Evidence Was Presented By Plaintiffs That The City Acted 'With ''Malice or

Criminal Intent" And With "Reckless, Willful And Wanton Conduct."
Plaintiffs suggest that the Court should have found there was a dispute of fact with

respect to the application of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Idaho Code § 6-904A( 1). A n~view of the

record and the records submitt~ in support of the Motion to Reconsider (which are the same
documents that were submitted in the Building Contractors and on summary judgmellt here) do
not support any finding that the City acted with Malice or Criminal Intent and with Reckless

Wi11ful and Wanton Conduct.
Idaho Code § 6~904A states in relevant part as follows:
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course
and scope of their employment and without glice or criminal i}!tent
yd without reckless, wfilful and wanton con<lyg as defined in section
6~904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any claim which:

Plaintiffs suggest that classification of the PILOT as a fee would make the taking "riot subject"
to the Idaho Tort Claims Act citing BHA Investments. (Pl. Memo In Support, p. 7). ElHA makes
no such ruling and Plaintiffs misread the plain language of the case. Further, as addressed in
Idaho Cc,de § 6-904A, the Tort Claims Act would apply equally to a tax or fee·. (See Order, p. .13,
fo. 33 ('"The Court would note~ hypothetically, ifthe PILOT component had been considered a
foe, that summary judgment would still be granted for Defendant on Plaintiffs· state law claims
because the immunity under J.C. § 6~904A applies to the assessment and collection of a tax or
foe.")).
1
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1. Arise,s out of the assessment or collection of any tax or f~.

~ -:

LC.§ 6.. 9Q4A(l) (emphasis added).

'·,!

Thus, under Jdaho Code§ 6·9048(5), Plaintiffs must be able to show that the City acted

with "malice or criminal intent" and with "reckless, willful and wanton conduct ... 1' "Reckless,
wiJlfuJ and wanton c-onduct" is a statutorily defined term. Reckless, willful and wa:11ton conduct·

is defined as "when a person intentionally and knowingly does or fails to do an act creating
unreasonable risk of harm to another, and which involves a ,high degre~.J.!f..ernhfbility th!!

such harm will result." (Emphasis added). While not statutorily defined, the J.d;iho Supreme

,.
'-;i

Court has clarified the definition of ~•malice"' under the Idaho Tort Claims Act as follows:

I

"malice here means 'actual' malice, which we define as the: intentional comr!}ission of a
,nrongful or unlawful act, without legal justification or excuse and with ill wiJ!t whether or
not injury was intended." Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176. 188,731 P.2d 171,183

(1986). ···criminal intent" has also been defined by the Idaho Supreme Court as ··th1:, intentional
.m..1£ll!!!!!sion of what the person knows to be a crime." James v. City qf Boise, 158 Idaho 713,

730, 351 P.3d 1171, 1188 (2015), reh'gdenied (Jwie 19, 2015), reh'g denied (July 20, 2015).
In this case, there has never been any argument or evidence that the City acted witb

malice o,r criminal intent and with reckless, willful aud wanton conduct. Plaintiffs would ask this
Court to simply find a genuine issue of fact without presenting any actual evidence of malice or

criminal intent and reckless, willful and wanton conduct. A review of Plaintiffs, briefing reveaJs

,,

-, l

that Plaintiffs never suggested, argued, or even mentioned the words malice, criminal intent, and
reckless, willful and wanton conduct in their briefing on the City' Motion for Summary
Judgment. Plaintiffs are now relying on an opinion letter from tl1e Attorney General's Office as a

basis to claim malice or criminal intent and reckless, willful and wanton conduct. Attomey
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General Opinions are considered advisory only and are not binding authority. See Hansen v.

White, 114 Idaho 907. 915, 762 P.2d 820, 828 (1988}; Sandpoint Convalescent Services, Inc .. v. ,

'!

:1)}
.. ·i·
~

Idaho Department

f.!f Health

and Welfare, 114 Idaho 281, 283,

11.

4, 756 P.2d 398, 400, n. 4

1

-:iJ
. J~l

(1988);Hol{v Care Ctr. v. State, Dep't of Employment, 110 Idaho 76, 82, 714 P.2d 45t 51 (1986).
The Attomey General's opinion even confirms that their letters were merely an ' 1opinion'' and

were an "infonnal and unofficial response." (Olsen Aff., .Exs. C and E). The, City ·Nas certainly

~i :;,;.
:. · ~·
'
.;

entitled to disagree with the Attorney General's Opinion and rely, on the binding authority found

~

:

~

j,

·,)

. ·.r

in City of Chubbuck v. City qf Pocatello, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 411 (199:5). As noted by ~his
Court, the City "relied upon what it perceived to be compatible prior law. i.e.t City t.f Chubbuck
v. City of Pocatello, 12? Idaho 198, 899 P.2d 411 (1995), before initiating the PILOT

component." (Ordert p. 17).

?,}
·i
·. ~

This Court. however. "distinguished the City of Chubbuck decision in Building

. ,i'._l
'~

Contractors, holding that a rate of return is acceptable if charged to another city, but not to

i

,. ~r
l

residents or utility customers of the city providing the service. Reliance 011 City q{Chubbuck and

·l

disagreeing with an advisory Attorney General's Opinion cannot be classified as malice or
criminal intent. Indeed, as was confirmed by the Affidavits of David Swindell in the Building
-~ l

.,,

Contractors matter, the PILOT was enacted to keep property taxes lower. (2nd Swindell Aff.~ 41! 4;
3rd

Swindell Aff.,

,r 12).

It is illogical to suggest that the attempt to keep property taxes lower

would be an act carried out with malice (i.e., an "intentiona1 commission of a wrongful or
unlawful act, without legal justification or excuse and with ill wilJ.") or criminal intent (i.e., the

.

\

·i:r

;'intentional commission of what the person knows to be a crime."). The record is also devoid of
c:vidence to suggest that the City acted with reckless, willful and wanton conduct (Li::., a ..person· ·

intentionally and knowingly does or fails to do an act creating unreasonable risk of harm to
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another"). Attempting to maintain a lower property tax cannot be deemed to be an unlawful or

wrongful act. While the City was deemed to have not correctly applied Idaho law,- it was certainly not perfonned with malice or criminal intent and reckless, willful and wanton conduct. .

-,

.·•'

As suchi the Plaintiffs' claims that fall within the Idaho Tort Claims Act fail and Pla1ntiffs have

,;:J

never provided this Court with any evidence to suggest otherwise.

C~

The.re is No Legitimate Factual Basis Fo1· a Spoliation or Dest1·uction of Records
Claim.
Arty claim for spoliation is not well taken and should be ignored by the Court. The Court

will recall that a claim of spoliation and destruction of evidence was advanced in the Building
'')

Contractors matter. Plaintiffs sought sanctions and an inference of spoliation, which was denied
',

by the Court. Plaintiffs h~ve not raised this issue in this litigation until this motion for

reconsideration as they are again attempting to advance the same claim in this 11tigation. All
discovery from the Building Contractors matter was completed and in the possession of
Plaintiffs' counsel. As the Court will note, there has been no motion to compel discovery in this

case. Th1!re is no basis to advance th.is claim here.
As with the Building Contractors matter, the City has not withheJd any eviderice in this

matter. There is no basis for the allegations that the City has withheld, discarded, or destroyed
documents in this matter. As addressed previously, all of the documents in the City's actual
possession that it had located were produced. Additiona11y, the City fa.cilitated a record

production that numbered in excess of 20,000 pages of documents from Red Oak Consulting.
Prior to commencing the Building Contractors case, Plaintiffs' counse.J conducted an extensive
public records request in 2010 and received near1y lOtOOO pages of documents from; 5 boxes.

Presumably those documents were review~d and analyzed and subsequently produced by
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Plaintiff through "discovery. This argument was previously considered on the same ~xounds in the
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Building Contractors matter and entirely without merit.
Moreover, the claimed spoliation and destruction of documents, if any, would not

overcome the dearth of evidence of malice or criminal intent and reckless, willful W;lnton
conduct. As noted in the Building Contractors briefing, the documents were not maintained and

were destroyed consistent with the City's document retention policies. The briefing in the
Building Contractors matter fully covers the appropriateness ofthe City's actions. None of the

City's conduct would overcome the presumption of immunity under Idaho Code 6w904A.
JD.

The Court is Entitled to Confirm That its Own .Oecision Was Meant to Have

Prospective Application.
Plaintiffs inappropriately suggest that the Court did not properly analyze the c:ase law and
facts of this matter, misapplied the law and rendered a ~•nonsensicaJ" decision. {See

Pl.

.. f

.,\·1

'\

.Memorandum !11 Support Of Motion To Reconsider, p. 13). This position is quite presumptuous
and ignores the lengthy and well reasoned Memorandum Decision and Order drafted by this
Court that properly analyzed applicable case law. To suggest that the Court did not intend to

have the Building Contractors decision be prospective only is dfaingenuous and ignores the plain
i

language of the Court: "In Building Contractors, it was made clear that the ruling to discontinue
charging the PILOT component was assessed '"l!!ing forwa~(!!'' and now the Court, in its

i

discretion, confirms that the decision in Building Contractors applies to )E!endl!yg cases, but
J!!2t.J!.J>ass cases." (Order, p. J9 (emphasis added)).

As noted by the Court, ,iretroactive

application to past and pending cases is left to the sound discretion of the court." (Order, p. 16).
'1':

In this case, the Court was confirming its intent, as the author of the Building Cont-'Ylctors case,

to apply the decision prospectively. The Court detailed its reasoning for prospective application:
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''the purpose of the Building Contraclor 's decision was to prevent Defendant from continuing to .
charge llhe PILOT component once it was held to be unconstitutional.'' (Order, p. 17). As the
Court recognized, the City immediately complied with this- mandate. The Court did not abuse its

.; -~

discretion in confinn the origina] intent of prospective application of the Building Contractors
holdings.

Moreover, there is no validity to the argument that a Court cannot apply a cm~e it decided

.,.,

,ii

.,

I

prospectively. Further, Plaintiffs' argument that only the Supreme Court has authori.iy to apply a
case prospectively is mistaken. For example, in Jones v. Wats_on, 98 ldaho 606, S70 P,2d 284
(1977), the district court ruled that a holding in an unrelated case should only hav,~ prospective
applicatilon. The Idaho Supreme Court analyzed the criteria used to determine the effect of a

-~ .. :~

ruling and concluded that ..the trial court ruled correctly in applying the decision in Lipe v.

Javelin Jprospectively." Id. at 609, 570 P.2d at 287. Certainly the Idaho Supreme Court has the
ultimate responsibility in confinning whether the Court was correct in its applic:ation. BHA
lnvestmen-ts, Inc. v. City of Boise. 141 Idaho 168, 108 P .3d 31 :5 (2004), do1~s not ~tand for the

proposition that only the Idaho Supreme Court can pronounce prospective application. Rather, is
confirms that the district court has the ability to make a detenni11ation of prospective app1ication.

and the Idaho Supren:ie Court has the ability to review such determinations. To suggestthat this
Court does not have the ability to determine whether a case is applied prospectively is a severe

misstatement of the law.
Again, the Court here did not need to make a dctcnnination to apply Building

Contractors prospectively because that was already done by the clear language pronounced by
this Court. (See Building Contractors Nov. l Si 2013 Memo Decision un.d Order On

Reconsideration, pp. 24 and 26 (concluding that assessment of the PILOT "must be excluded
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO IU:CONSIOEll • 10
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from any fee assessment going foiward.")). The Court merely confinned this pronouncement

here. Ultimately, Plaintiffs are simply requesting the Court second-guess itself without providing
any new evidence in law that would support reconsideration. There is certainly no validity to a .

.·

iq
,,

suggestion that the Court failed to closely examine the law. consider the ·~complete" holdings of
:,)
cases, misappJicd the law, or rendered a "nonsensicaf' decision in applying the matter

prospectively. (See Pl. Memorandum ln Support Of Motion To Reconsider, p. 13). The Court ·
should deny Plaintiffs' request for recoll)ideration.

·-;\;
.

E.

. .~

·.J

There Is No Evidence Of Any Harsh And Unjust Ra1iaifications To Plaintiffs'.
PJaintiffs' make the unsupportable and conclusory statement that the Court ignored or

disregarded the claimed "serious harms" the non~repayment of the fees would have on Hill~Vu
.and othier ratepayers. There is no foundation that the Court did not fully and appropriately
consider all aspects of a repayment of the PILOT. As this Court is aware, the City provided

.

"i

'Y

testimony of how a damage award would be calculated and p.aid. The City confinned that the any
damage award would be paid by increased property taxes born only by property owners in the
City. The Court confinned tlris, recognizing the financial and. human resources to calculate any ·
award, as well as "a practicaJ consideration is that applying the decisi-On retroactively would

simply require collection of fees from the very customers (in many cases) w'ho would be
t'eceiving fees back.'~

The Court properly summarized the ramifications of retroactive application on all
Pocatello residents: '"the effect on the administration of justice would be substantial and has, a

. i;;

.j

probable adverse effect on the residents of Pocatello." (Order, p. 19). In making such a
statement, it is apparent that the Court analyzed the potential burdens associated with a damage

award from all angles, including the claimed banns to ratepayers. Any claim of subi:,tautial hann
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO l'lAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER· 11
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to Mr. Robinson and others, is completely disingenuous. As noted in the briefing, J\.1r. Robinsop,

.as a property owner in the City would bear a significant increase in his property taxes 'that wo~d
likely exceed any recovery. Thus, any claim that rate payers suffered a serious and substantial'

harm is without foundation. Rather~ the only evidence in the record is that a damage award

' i_;

would seriously mtd substantially harm affect individuals such as Mr. Robin.son through
increased property taxes that exceed any damage recovery. (See 3rd Stroshein Aff., 1~1· 3-9).

,:,

,:,

F.

The Court Properly Denied Plaintiffs' Motion For Leave To Amend.

·)
'

~

There is no basis for reconsideration of the denial of P1aintiffs' Motion for Leave· to .

Amend. Even assuming that the Court granted the motion for reconsideration, there would be no

legitimate argument to reconsider the denial of the Motion for Leave to Amend. Plai.ntifl's simply
assume that with a new trial date that all relevant scheduling dates would be vacated and reset.· ·
This is aITT unfounded proposition. The date for amending the complaint has long since expfred.
Moreover, as fuUy addressed in the briefing, the purported claim is legally unsupportable and
should be denied because it would be a frivolous amendment subject to immediate di:~mnissal.

G.

The Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider is Frivolous and Attorneys' Fees Should Be
i.•

Awarded.

. a\

:~

The City requests an award of attorneys' fees for responding to Plaintiff's Motion

·.,,:

.~

·'l/

pursuant to Rule 11, I.C. § 12-117 and I.C. § 6-91 SA. Plaintiffs, motion fails to advance any

cognizable support justifying reconsideration. Rather, Plaintiffs simply ask the Court to take a
second look at law and evidence previously submitted and argued to the Court. Plaintiffs
requests reconsideration of issues that were actually addressed in the Building Contractors

matter or issues that were otherwise clearly addressed~ using the same evidenc:e and law
.,::i
;'

considered in the underlying Motion for Summary Judgment. The instant motion is frivolous and
OEFENDANrs OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER• t2
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can only be described as a drain on judicial resources. This matter has resulted in a _significant .

waste of judicial resources and tremendous costs for the Defendant. The theme in this matter is
Plaintiffs~ general dissatisfaction with the Court's legal rulings and a dogged determination to

improperly chaUenge issues that have been addressed by the Court. As such, this Motion for
Reconsideration is frivolous and an award of attorneys' fees is warranted. See Gusta1•es v . .

Gustaves, 138 Idaho 64, 71, 57 P.3d 775, 782 (2002); see also In re Doe, 149 Idaho 669, 675,
239 P.3d 774, 780 (2010). An award of Attorneys, fees are requested and wmrnnted pursuant to

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and 11 and Idaho Code Sect~ons 6-918Aand 12-117.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants respectfully request that the Court den:v Plaintiffs'
Motion to Reconsider.
DATED this

J.L day of December. 2015.

•,

.r

'.;· !
. ~l

. t~ :

.'/
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INT~ DISTRICT COURT OF THE Sl:XTH JUll>ICIAL DISTRIC1'
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANn 1roR BANNOCK COUNTY
- - - ~ - - I D " I I I I F I _ I _ _ __

HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK., on behalf
of itself and all others shnilarly situated, ED
QUINN2 011 behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated,

Case Number: CV-2014-1520--0C

' i'

Plaintiffs,

MEM0l~.ANDU1VI IN SUPPOJRT OF
MOTION l'O llECONSll][)Jf.R
!~-

vs.
CITY OF POCATELLO. an Idaho

• ~· I

mtmicipality,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs1 HillftVu Mobile Home Park and Ed Quinn through counsel of record provide

the following Reply in support of their Motion to Rec:on$ider.

This Reply is supported by the

,r,

pleadings and record in this case, itl.Clucling itt the Bannock County Case No. CV-2011..:5228-0C

(Building Contractors Case).
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This Reply addresses a number of'ntlsnomers contained within "Defendant'f: Opposition
to Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsicler"including the followmg:

I.

Plnintiftst Motion to Reconsicler is Appropriate to Correct Errors Regai·dless of
New Evidence.
1n primarily citing authority outside of Idaho, the Defendant City of Pocatello (City) .

argues that "new evidence" is necessary or essential
in a Motion to Reconsidea; and Hi.a(' it isI,;not
,··,:
,·.

,•,{,_

~·.

.

appropriate f~t the 1lial court to take another look at the facts ~d law in the· case. (Def s- Op~~
Br. Pp- 2-3 .) That argument holds no merit. ln fact, the oft cited Idaho authority indicated in

Johm,·on v. Lambros, 147 P.3d 100. 105, 143 Idaho 468 473 (Idaho App. 2006) sng~;,:stq
7

otherwise:
-

'

Indeed) a rule requil'i11g 11ew evid_e11ce on a motion for reconsideration would bt! a cause
for concem. Jt wouldJjreveni"a party jrorri drawifl.g the trial court's attention to 1trrors of
law or fact in the initial decision, precluding co1·rection ofeven flagrant errors ,?xcept
through an appeal.

-.

j'

Id. (emphasis added)
Additionally, the Idaho Supr~me Court has recently held:

A motion tor reconsideration is a motion which allows the court-. when ne-vv law is
applied to previously presented facts, when m~w facts
applied to previoTJsly presented
:taw, or ru1r combination thereof- to reconsider the correctness ofan 'i11terlocutory
order.

are

Johnson v. North Idaho College 153 Idaho 58~ 62,278 P.3d 928~ 932 (2012) (emphasis added).
11

The legal issues in this case are complex and the record in the case, wllich inducles the
.,-

Building Contractol's Case, is vast. Tu their motion for reconsideration, the Plainti:ff1, have

,i ~

i;>rovided additional authority and analysis with regard to the law. and iu particular tel the rarely

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER-Page 2
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considered concept of .limiting the "retroactive application,, of a· Court decision. TJ.11.:: P:b:dntiffs
';{_,

have also referred to additional information contained in the record about how

···.•f

the PILOT h~s

been classified as a''fee'' from the very outset, and have pointed to evidence in the reccii:d that
suggest that the City could have acted with malice in its enactmeut of tqe PILQT.

i';!

;i,

'..:i

Hence, the Plaintiffs have shed additional light on both the law aJO.d the facts in this case,
\ ,!

which is completely appropriate and acceptable in a Motion to Re,consider. The Plah1tiffs·have

:3imply requested the Q:iurt to correct certain le,b1Bl and/or factual errors with its initial cfocisiDn -

·.if;

which is not only acceptable~ but is in fa.ct encouraged by the Idaho Supreme Court if even for

•

I

the reason of avoiding m.1 1muecessary appeal to correct such errors. Id

u.

The City hos Not Met its Bu1·deil on Summary Judgment and Requests: tlu'l1 the
Court Overstep its Bounds. ·

'

,r

,'

....... .I_',;
•, ·t

Given the City's response to Plaintiffs Motion to .Reconsider, it is worth reminding the
Court that it is the City who has brought a summary judginerrt motion and therefore has the ·
heightened ·burdell to d~prive Plaintiffs, consideration of their claims by a jury through sunnnmy
judgment. Conversely. in defeating a motion for summary judgment, the non-n1ovir.1g Jparty

merely needs to "by affidavit or othetwise .•.set forth specific facts showing that ther1:: i.s a
genuine issue for trial." IllCP § 56(e). The City is hnp1'0perly requesting thaL llrl.s Comt
.,1:,.
,,•

disregard certain evidence on the record and also to make an intei11retation of certain disputed
facts, and thus usurping the Constitutionally protected role of ~e jury.

The trial court's limited and restricted role in .making factual detenniuations in s11mma1y
judgment motions and the moving party's strict burdt:m. in providing sumrnazy judgment was ·

·------------------·----·-----REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER- Page 3
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recently reiterated, ru.J.d emphasized by the Idaho Supreme Court in Nield ·11. Pocatello H~~alth

:1

Servs.• Inc., 156 Idaho 845,857,332 P.3d 714, 757 (2014):

As we: have reiterated in our recent cases, upon a motion for su1mnary j udgmemit,, all ..
disputed facts are liberally co11strued in favor of the non-moving party. TI1e bur~en of
proving the absence of a material fact rests at all times .upon the moving party. This
burden is onerO\.lS because even n[c]ircumstan:tial evidenc,: can create a genui.m, :issue of
material fact. 11 Moreover. all reas01lable it1ferm1ces which ,can be made from the.record
shall be made in favor oftbe party resisting the= moli.on. {f'the recor,l r:ont,1.ins c,01if/ictiT1ig
inferences. upon wliicli,reasonable minds miglit reach diflerentcon.t:lusi(Jld', a '·· :' ·
·Sl,!liima,y)lldgn,ent must b(? denied because dll doubts aJ•e to lie res()•lw~d agaifr.ist ti,~
movhig party. The requiren1ent that all reasonable infureuces be constiued in thfi light
. most favorable to the non-moving party is a strict one. Nevertheless, when a pat'l;y moves . ·
:for sununmy judgment the opposing partyis case must not. rest on mere speculatkm
because a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact.
Notwithstanding the utility of a swmnmy judf.,'lnent, a. motion for summary judgment ·
should be granted with caulior1. Furiliermo1·e, it is well-establislied that on si11mna,y
judgment, a: trial court is. 11.()t tillowed to weigh tlie :evidence and reso,[ve all ·ti1nibts.
,. ·
against t/1.e mova1it:
, -·

.:.:ii
;,"

. ~ -~

·'

.,

/i:\

The trial c01,ut, when confronted by a motion for summary judgn1e11~ must d,:~te.r:m.ine if
there a1'e factual issues which should be resolved by the trier of fae,1:s. On such a :motlon it
is not the ftu1c1ion of the trial court to weigh the evidence or to determine those issn.es.
Moreover, all doubt't must be 1·esolved against the party moving for ,i si1-mmar.}~
jitdgment.
·:::,,;.

Additionally, a motion for summary judgmeut should be denied if the pleadings,
admissions, depositio11s. and affidavits raise any ques1ior1 of credibility of witnc}mses ot
weight of the evidence~

. ,t .•
:

-.~

Id. (citations omitted)(en1phasis added)

'.ln essence. this 'Court oversteps its bol.U.lds when it makes conclusions, weighs evidence

-

·~; •.

:

. \·~·
;;·_-

or even inferences with regard to conflicting facts in !he case. 11bat responsibility squardy
1 ·,

belongs with the jury.
-fe.

,,
l,•

.
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In this case

~w

:

.

.

.-

.

as they arc allowed to do 011 a Motion to Re<;onsider (see 'irifra Sr;:c:tiori I) ·-

the Plaintiffs have ~ointed to evidence 011 the record to suggest that the City acted with malice
and recklessness under IC § 6-904A{l) with regard to its enactment of the PILOT fee. (See· again
Plffs Mcm. Supp. MTR pp. 9-12.) Plaintifts note tha:t prior to. er.m.c1ment of the PILOT. the City

,: r:'.

,·

sought m1 opinion from the Idaho Attorney General on the legality of the program. with the
express intent of foist~ng more of the ge11eral reve.ntie requirements of the City onto :fee:,,JP.ayers
l'atber than through the regular channel of property ta.ices. fd. Plaintiffs suggest that the City's' '.

de:fian~ and disregard of the AG oph:rlon which tt sought, or in other words acting against the
adv.ice of its own cotmsel to implement an unlawful program that improperly shifts reve:m1e
burdens to fee payers; could be· construed as acting_{with-malice.. and recklessness. 1 ·P.la:intiffs. ·
:linther suggest that there is evidence on the record to suggest that the City improperly (fostroycd

or failed to :maintain certain records, and to disclose certain infbnuation relevant to the Plaint.iffst

clain1s~ which can further demonstrate the City's reckless conduct.
Rather th.an let a jury decide whether this conduct rises to the level of malice a11d. reckless. ·
',·.

willful and wanton conduct. the City instead inappropriately reque.sts that the C_ourt n:mke that

,L

determ:u:iation. (Def. Opp. Br. pp. 6-8.) Regardless of what the Court may think or believe with
tegard to the City's conduct in light of the AG opinion and otl1er conduct, it must "r<'i~:olve all,
doubts'" in favor of the Plaintiffs as the non-moving party, fflld allow the jul"y to interpr{~t. the ·

Its also worth noting that the Mayor's correspondence in this matter actually personally
re:fers to the Plai:llrt;iff HillMVu' s ow11er Logan Robinso,n, thus furthe1· sugsesting ''Hl wU:I'"' directed
specifically to Mr. Robinson in the City's defiance of the AG opinion. See Feb. 13, 201.3~ Olsen
1

Aff. Ex. A~ Dec. 26, 2006 letter from Mayor Chase to AO Lawronce Wasden.
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER- Page 5
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City's actions. Shnply put~ the Court shonld not decide this matter, and should ther(,fore· deny

"l .

the City's motion for summary judgment.

III.

Authority; Cited by the City Furthcl" Confirms the Plaintiffs' Argument tJl:tat the
Court Erred 1n its Application of the Retroactivity·Dm:trinc.

Interesti11gly, the City asserts the Idaho Supreme Couit decision Jones v. Watson, 98
Idaho 606, 570 P.7d 284 (1977) for the •'propositlon" that the ~determination of prospective ,
•

.

:

,·

'

; ~-

:

'

·,

•

•

i

'

'

application,, is not limited to the decisions of the Su.preme Court- calling Pla~11tifls"" a,:si:ertkfrt,
•

..!

•

:·•

~\

.. ·(

.'·,it

'

·'.·

. ~ .::·

otherwise ua severe misstmeme11t of the law." (Def mOpp. Br. p. 10.) In actuality, the Jorres_
decision only further affirms Plaintiffs' argument a11d the policy therein, and should further
assure the Couit of the need to co1Tect its error.

...
•\

· .•.'

l

In Jones. duritlg the proceedings in the distlict court; the Idaho Supretne Com1 i:;sued ~

decision Lipe v. Javelin Tire Co., Inc., 96 Idaho 723, S36 P.2d 291 (1975) which sp(:1c:itically
! ·_

"'ove1Tuled'" prior Supreine Court authority on the issue in question (relating to the interpretation
1.·-

of the long mm statute on the statute oflimitatio11s). .Jones, 98 ldaho at 608-610, 570 .P.2d at
286"88. The district couit decided not to retroncti vely apply the Lipe decisiort. Id.
Much of the Jor11iY decision. addressM the policy and linritations of the retroactive

.application doctrine:
··.:"•.,

The alter.native of prospective application of decisions hfL~. a sound ba.~ds it:t policy and
.legal theo1y. As the Washington Supreme Co1xt noted: 11 So it is that the doctr.iue of
prospective overruling has attached in many areas: in constitutional law, contracts} torts;
criminal law. taxation, and in the field of procedure. giving the doctrine both ss1nction and
acceptance throughout qur jurisprudence. Pros.JJective overr11Ung ilnp11.rts tlmtfinal
,rlegree. of l'e,:llien.ce, to d,e otherwise rigid concepts ofst,ire decl.ns, so .nece.!i'$1lry to
prevent the. system from hecoming b1·ittle. It enables the law under stare declr!.s to grow
and chang~ to meet the everwchanging needs ofan ever-c.hanging society and y~;t,, at once. . -

.

~~ f- ~

i ..,
-'

.... ~ .j
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to preserve the very society which gives it shape. The determination of whether an
overruling' decision shall be applied retroactively or prospectively. is a matter li~ft to ·state
1oou1is fur determination on a case-by-case basis. As tlie Alaska Supreme Court noted:· 11 A
.~tate supreme cottrl has unfettered discretion to· apply a particular ruling either pureiy
prospectively, purely retroactively~ or partially retroacfivdy, limited only 'by the juristic~
philosophy of the judges their conceptions of law. its origin and nature."

·l ~ ':

.... ;

. ·!I·,

-r

Tile tleterminntion of whether a rule is to be given retrotcic:tive. aJ7plktt.tion i.§' generally
made pu.1'Suant to a balancing process, wherein the gtdn to be achievecl in .~he
ia:dministratio~1 ofjustice by accomplishment ofthe p,urpose oftlte.l!J'JJ!..J1:lUJ:t.(1tJ.,eJirst
,d·iterion) is balance,/ against the a1lve1'Se effects on tJ,e atlministriitio~ ofjtjr~rti'ce ,.:.
,resuliingfrom the extent to wllich t/Je courts kave mistakenly but hi gootlj1tjftlt ,reii(!d ;
on the prevailing ruk (the second criterion) andfrom an application of tJ,e m~w rule.
for the purpoie of reconsiderbig deter,nin.ations already fmally made pursna:nt to tlte
then pnwniling rule (the thirr.l criterion).
ld (citations omitted) (emphasis added)
,.

In essence~ the Jones decision affnms the need for the ''overruling decision" ofa "prevailing·

,.

rule" ,or stare decises b~fore there is even a collsideration of whether the ·~new rule~' should be

tetroactively applied. Id. It also further suggests that this power is limited to the "stat,::: supreme

' I ; ~.

court" which- is. the judicial body that sets the rule.
In tbis case. the Court's Memorandum Decision in the Building Contractors Case was not

,,

•.,:.

in any way an "overruling decision'' of a "prevailing xule.'' Ilrfact, the reve1·se is tr.ue~. It iu truth

relies upon pl'ior Idaho Sup1:eme Court authority in it:11 decisioµ. The Plaintiffs in this c~se are
relying on this very same prior Supreme Cou1t authority, o.,; the "prevailin.g mles" in support of

f

,,.•

their claims in this case - as well as additional Supre1ne Court authority (i.e BliA Investments)
decided well before the City implemented its impermissible PILOT program.

Further, in actuality, the Court in this case has erl'antly deprived Plaintiffs from r,elying

upon the e~isting authority or "prevailing rule~t set by the Supreme Court. That approach simply ·
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is inapposite of the policy adopted by Idaho with regard to the retroactive application of Supr!;!me.
Court rules. Surely the district court does 11ot have authority to effectively disregard or suppl~t

rules established

by the higher authority of the Supreme Court.

l'hat is an imp~oper use of

the

district court's power and jurisdiction.

In short, the district court's Memo1·andum Decision in the Building Contractors Case was_
not mi "overruling" decision of a "prevailing mle/ butratb.er an affinnation of exis6llg rnles -.. :'.~·'·,!

adopted by .th~ Supreme Court. Therefore, this Court neither has the basis no:r the awtho-rity to

:.·:
···:-i·i/
-;i·

1::·:,i.'.11

only ''prospectivetyt·apply thesel'ulcs. and doing so is an error.

.

...C ;·..

CONCLUSION

Pursuant to the foregoing~ as well as the argum.ents and evidence set forth. in Plaintiffs'
_prior pleadings, including those not refuted by the City, this Court should grant Plaintil:fs'
~. j I

J,

I

Motion to Reconsider.

.

}

DATED tl1is 61h day of January, 2016 ..
PETERSEN Moss HALL

& OLSEN

~"~-.

~ Nathan M. Olsen

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

.

:.,

t ,_,
.·

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-·---~~--

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER- Page 8

783

t.l

:·.···

-:~

'_:;.
"

L

f

'I.

. ··.~- !

CHR.11FICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, with :111y office.'ili .

}i

Idaho Falls, Idaho. and that on the 61Ei day of January. 2016, I served a true and corre.ct copy oftl;le

:foregoing document on the persons listed below by frrst class mail, with the correct postage
..
) "i

thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule S(b), I.R.C.P. ·

Persons Served:

Method of Service:

Blake G. Hall, Esq.
:HALL ANGELL & ST~BS~ LLP
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste·. 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

( ) mail. ( ) hand (

4ax ()e1mii1

FAX: (208) 621-3008
Ii.MAIL: bgh@hasattomeys.tom

}Io11orable Stephell s~ Dmm
624 E. Center, Root.n 302
Pocatello, ID 8320) .

I~ .

!"l

( ) mail .( ) hand ( ) fux (

..,.;;mail

(Chambe.rs Copy)

FAX: {208)236-7208

EM.All..; kar1av@bannockcomuy.us

~-~Stephen D. Hall

.

-!'"

...

~
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
·municipality,
Defendant.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

This case comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration ("Motion")
of this Court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant, filed November 10,
2015. For reasons set forth below, this Court denies Plaintiff's Motion.
FACTS

The underlying facts of this case, and a companion case, Building Contractors
Association ofSoutheast Idaho v. City ofPocatello ("Building Contractors"), Bannock County
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Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C, 1 have been fully set forth in prior decisions, are incorporated
herein by reference, and will not be repeated.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 I(a)(2)(B) provides that "[aJ motion for reconsideration
of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the entry of final
judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment." Final
judgment was entered in this case but no argument is made the Plaintiffs' Motion is untimely.
The decision of whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration made pursuant to Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure I l(a)(2)(B) is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.2 The party
requesting the motion for reconsideration is permitted to present new facts or law to aid the court
in its reconsideration but is not required to do so. 3 However, if new evidence is presented the
burden is on the moving party to bring the new evidence to the courts attention. 4

ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs state that their Motion addresses two primary issues. The Court views the
Motion as raising three primary issues and the Court's analysis will be limited to those issues.
They are: 1) whether the collection of the PILOT fees, which this Court has determined was an
impermissible tax, can still be a constitutionally prohibited ''taking" even the fees are a tax,
rather than a fee; ·2) whether questions of fact exist regarding Plaintiffs' state claims, which were

this Court's original decision on summary judgment ("Building Contractors MJS") and subsequent decision
on Reconsideration in Building Contractors ("Building Contractors Reconsideration"), and the Court's decision on
summary judgment in this case ("Hill-Vu MSJ"), filed November 10, 2015. The Parties have consistently agreed
that the Court can and should take judicial notice of the facts in Building Contractors, and that case is relied on by
Plaintiffs in this motion as well.
2 Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,560,212 P.3d 982, 990 (2009). In reviewing whether a trial court
abused its discretion, this Court applies a three-part test, which asks whether the district court: (1) correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion; and (3) reached its
decision by an exercise of reason.
3 Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct App. 2006).
4 Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'! Bank, 118 Idaho 812,800 P.2d 1026 (1990).
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dismissed pursuant to an application ofl.C. § 6-904A; and 3) whether the Court improperly
failed to allow damages through a retroactive application of the Building Contractors decisions.
1.

The PILOT "tax" is not a constitutional taking.

Plaintiffs continue their argument that the PILOT fee in this case was not a tax, but a fee.
That issue has been fully analyzed by this Court previously.5 Plaintiffs cite the City resolutions
and other facts where the City classified the PILOT as a fee rather than a tax and argue that this
shows that the Court's prior takings analysis is in error. The Court disagrees. As stated
previously, the critical point is what the money charged is used for, not what it is called. The
Loomis case was clear that "if rates, fees, and charges are imposed primarily for revenue raising

purposes they are in essence disguised taxes subject to legislative approval and authority. "6
Based on the Court's prior analysis, there is no question that the PILOT fees were disguised
taxes.
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue that even if this is true, the collection of those taxes is still a
constitutionally prohibited taking because the City never had the authority to impose the fee in
the first place, citing BHA Investments, Inc. v. City ofBoise.7 Plaintiffs ·reliance on BHA is
misplaced: That case involved a liquor license transfer fee charged by the City of Boise. The
Idaho Supreme Court held that there was no statutory authorization for the imposition of such a
fee and, as such, the fee could be recovered under a "takings" analysis. However, the Court also
stated: "We have also held that a city's imposition of a purported fee that does not bear a
reasonable relationship to services to be provided by the city is in reality the imposition of a tax.

See Building Contractors MSJ, pp. 17-23; Building Contractors Reconsideration, pp. 19-23, Hill-Vu MSJ, pp. 6-9.
Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho 434,437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1276 (1991) (citing Brewster v. City ofPocatello,
I 15 Idaho 503, 768 P.2d 766 (1989))(emphasis added).
7 141 Idaho 168, I08 P.3d 315 (2004).
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Brewster v. City ofPocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 (1988).'' 8 In Brewster, which was
cited with approval in the Loomis analysis, the City of Pocatello was attempting to impose a
street use fee to assist in the maintenance of city streets, but that fee was struck down as being a
disguised tax. In Loomis, an equity buy-in fee similar to that charged in this case was approved
as in compliance with the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. Both those cases clearly and fully set out
the statutory authority for cities to assess fees for water, sewer and related facilities. 9 It is not the
authority to charge the fee that was ever in question, but whether the fee is being used
improperly for revenue raising purposes and was, therefore, a disguised tax. In this case the City
clearly had the authority to charge the fees, but to the extent it used those fees for improper
purposes, that portion of the fee was a disguised tax and could not be collected. This is not a
constitutional "taking" but an improper method of raising revenue. Plaintiffs' contention that the
City did not have the authority to charge the fee is legally unsupportable.
In summary, the City was authorized to charge the fee in question, but the PILOT portion
of the fee was a disguised tax used for improper revenue raising. The analysis of this Court that
a tax cannot be a proper basis for a claim of unconstitutional "taking," under either the Idaho or
U.S. Constitutions is consistent with the law that applies. 10 Plaintiffs' Motion in this regard is

DENIED.
2.

The City's PILOT fee was not collected with malice and reckless, willful and

wanton conduct.

In analyzing the Plaintiffs' state tort claims, this Court relied on I.C. §6-904A for the
proposition that such claims cannot be asserted for the collection of a tax. Plaintiffs correctly

141 Idaho at 176, 108 P.3d at 323.
This Court has reviewed that analysis in other decisions. Building Contractors MSJ, pp. 15-17; Building
Contractors Reconsideration, pp. 19-23.
io See Hill-Vu MSJ, pp. 13-16
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point out that the Court did not fully analyze this case in light of the preliminary language of that
statute which reads: "A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course
and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent and without reckless,
willful and wanton conduct as defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code, ... " 11 In other words, no
state tort claims associated with the collection of a tax may be made as long as the governmental
entity, the City of Pocatello in this case, has not acted with malice and the City's conduct is not
reckless, willful and wanton. The last phrase is defined in LC. §6-904C as follows: '"Reckless,
willful and wanton conduct' is present only when a person intentionally and knowingly does or
fails to do an act creating unreasonable risk of harm to another, and which involves a high degree
of probability that such harm will result." The City is correct in stating that both "malice" and
"reckless, willful and wanton" conduct must be shown. The statute does not define "malice."
However, it is generally accepted that "[o]ne acts with actual 'malice' when moved by a spiteful,
malignant purpose that is unrelated to a legitimate interest." 74 Am. Jur. 2d Torts § 19. Since
§6-904C requires a lack of "malice or criminal intent," this statement of the Idaho Supreme
Court, which specifically references this statute, is instructive:
The term malice has been variously defined. See generally 52 Am.Jur.2d, Malice,
§ 1. At a minimum, malice involves the intentional commission of a wrongful or
unlawful act without legal justification or excuse, whether or not the injury was intended.
Tinkerv. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485-86, 24 S.Ct. 505,508, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1903). This is
referred to as "legal" malice. 52 Am.Jur.2d, Malice, § 1. However, the use of the
disjunctive term "or" in the phrase "without malice or criminal intent" indicates that
malice as used here qualitatively differs from criminal intent. LC.§ 6-904. Criminal
intent closely equates to the above definition of "legal" malice. Thus, the term malice as
used in§ 6-904 must refer to more than mere "legal" malice. Malice here must refer to
"actual malice." Accord, Ladnier v. Murray, 572 F.Supp. 544, 549-50 (D.C.Md.1983),
reversed in part on other grounds, 769 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.1985). "Actual" malice
encompasses the conunon meaning of the word, which connotes ill will. 52 Am.Jur.2d,
Malice, § 1. We conclude and hold that malice here means "actual" malice, which we
However, the Court does note that this applicability of this statute to this set of cases has been raised and
discussed previously and this is the first time the Plaintiffs have asserted that anything the City did was with malice
and reckless, willful and wanton conduct.
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define as the intentional commission of a wrongful or unlawful act, without legal
justification or excuse and with ill will, whether or not injury was intended. 12

Plaintiffs refer primarily to the fact that the City sought the opinion of the Idaho attorney
general as to whether the PILOT was properly included in water and sewer rates. The attorney
general gave his opinion that the PILOT improperly generated revenue. Nevertheless, and based
on its own view of an existing case, City a/Chubbuck v. City ofPocatello, 127 Idaho 198,899 P.
2d 411 (1999), the City chose to proceed with the PILOT. Ultimately the PILOT was declared to
be an illegal tax in Building Contractors. This, Plaintiffs' reason, is evidence that the City did an
intentional and illegal act which created an unreasonable risk ofhann, i.e., higher utility rates,
with a substantial likelihood that such harm would result. The Court disagrees.
All of the evidence referred to in the Court's prior decision, which support the conclusion
that the City was attempting to generate additional revenue, also unequivocally supports the
conclusion that the City was doing so to shift the tax burden from property taxes to user fees, and
had implemented the PILOT based on an analysis of both statutes and case law. 13 Thus, it is the
Court's view, as a matter of law, that there is no evidence to support the conclusion that the City
acted, in implementing the PILOT, in a way which was intentionally illegal and designed to
create an umeasonable risk of harm to Pocatello ratepayers. If this were the case, virtually every
taxing decision would be suspect. More importantly, however, Plaintiffs must also show that the
City acted with actual malice, meaning with ill will, and no such showing of any kind has been
made in this case. 14

12 Anderson

v. City ofPocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 188, 731 P. 2d 171, 183 (1986){emphasis added). Both parties cited
portions of this entire quote, but the more complete statement sets forth the standard for malice more accurately.
13 Building Contractors MSJ, pp. 18-23; Building Contractors Reconsideration, pp. 20-23.
14 Plaintiffs make a secondary argument on this issue, claiming that there is some evidence. in the Building
Contractors case to support a contention of "spoliation of evidence." Plaintiffs Memorandum, p. I2. However, the
Court finds this contention to be without merit, as it references primarily allegations made and not further referenced
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The. Court confirms its prior decision that the Plaintiffs' state tort claims are barred by the
application of LC. §6-904A. Plaintiffs' Motion in this regard is DENIED.
3.

Building Contractors will not be applied retroactively.

Finally, Plaintiffs challenge the Court's decision to not apply the Building Contractors
decisions retroactively, essentially asserting that only the Idaho Supreme Court can make such a
decision. First, the Court notes that it addressed the question of retroactivity in its original
decision only because Plaintiffs were claiming that this Court intended the Building C~mtractors
decisions, which struck down the PILOT, to allow a claim for reimbursement of any PILOT
collected. This Court was simply reaffirming its prior decision that the Court, in the Building
Contractor decisions, specifically stated that the decisions were prospective only. 15
Again, Plaintiffs misread BHA Investments, Inc. v. City ofBoise. Clearly the Idaho
Supreme Court was discussing whether to apply its decision prospectively or retroactively. But
there is nothing in BHA to suggest that district courts cannot make the same determination in the
appropriate circumstance. As noted by the City, that is exactly what happened in Jones v.
Watson, 98 Idaho 606,570 P.2d 284 (1977). Just because a district court decision is subject to

appellate review does not mean that only the Idaho Supreme Court ~an make a decision about
retroactivity.
More importantly, the contention is not relevant here. The current case was never about
whether Plaintiffs would be allowed to recover PILOT fees paid in the past, through an
application of the dee:ision in Building Contractors. This case was and is being decided on the
merits, i.e., is there a legal basis for the recovery of the PILOT fees, which had previously been
declared improper? This Court has determined that the answer to that question is in the negative,
in Building Contractors, or discovery sanctions sought which were not granted. See Building Contrators MSJ, pp.
30-33.
15 Building Contractors Reconsideration, p. 24.
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i.e., no recovery is allowed. To the extent that Plaintiffs are·seeking to circumvent the question
ofrecovery on the merits of the claim, but instead are trying to recover just because this Court
declared the PILOT illegal in 2013, this Court has determined that such may not be permitted. In
short, Building Contractors, which was limited to the legality of the PILOT fee, will not be
applied, by itself, to allow recovery of the PILOT fees paid without any other legal justification
therefore.
Plaintiffs Motion for review of the Court's retroactivity analysis is DENIED.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. Defendant's
request for attorney fees, based on the contention that the Motion for Reconsideration was
frivolous and without foundation, is also DENIED. Plaintiffs did raise one new issue as it
applied to the application of I.C. §6-904A, and did reasonably seek further review of certain cases
of the Idaho Supreme Court. Although the City appropriately argues that, for the most part, the
Motion raises issues which have been thorough analyzed and decided previously, the Court is not
left with the abiding belief that the Motion was frivolously pursued.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATEDthis

<g~

dayof

~

, 2016.

~

District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \ ()
day of ._ ~c:JQ
, 2016, I
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals
in the manner indicated. ·

(',1 U.S. Mail

Blake G. Hall, Esq
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

Michael D. Gaffney, Esq
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

(./j U.S. Mail

Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

('J) U.S. Mail

Steven Taggart, Esq.
MAYNES TAGGART PLLC
P.O. Box 3005
Idaho Falls, ID 83403

(.,iU.S.Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile
I

DATED this

\f)

day of ,

~)c ].'")

, 2016.

\

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.

--------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
REQUEST FOR COSTS AS A MATTER OF
RJGHT, DENYING DEFENDANT'S
REQUEST FOR DISCRETIONARY COSTS
AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's request for costs and attorney fees.
Plaintiffs have objected to Defendant's request.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In any determination of an award of costs and fees, the threshold question is which party
prevailed. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) states: "In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney
fees, which at the discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or
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parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute or contract." [Emphasis
added]. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) governs the prevailing party issue:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs,
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part
and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments
obtained. [Emphasis added by this Court.]
The determination of who is the prevailing party is committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. Rockefeller v.Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 82 P.3d 450 (2003).
The legal basis for an award of costs is I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l). Some costs are awarded to a
prevailing party as a matter of right and some costs can be awarded in the discretion of the Court.
Discretionary costs are allowed "upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional
costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse
party." When objections to discretionary costs are made the Court "shall make express findings
as to why such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed." Such costs
may also be disallowed without objection, in the discretion of the Court and upon express
findings. The determination of whether a cost is "exceptional" involves an evaluation both of the
cost itself, i.e., whether it is the kind of cost commonly incurred in the type of litigation at issue,
and whether the case itself is exceptional. City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d
1118 (2006); Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 109 P.3d 161 (2005);

Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 960 P.2d 175 (1998).
The award of attorney fees is governed by I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l), which provides that such an
award is discretionary, to the prevailing party, "when provided for by any statute or contract."
Whether to award fees and the amount of the fees awarded are matters of discretion, unless it
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involves a specific determination of a statute which allows for attorney fees.

Grover v.

Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60,205 P.3d 1196 (2009); Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705,201 P.3d 1282
(2009); Contreras v. Rubley, 142 Idaho 573, 130 P.3d 1111 (2006).

If fees are awarded, the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, must consider the
factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). Sanders v. Lankford, 135 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 823
(Ct.App.2000); Boe/ v. Stewart Title Co., 131 Idaho 9, 16, 43 P.3d 768, 775 (2002); Brinkman v.

Aids Insurance Co., 115 Idaho 346,351, 766 P.2d 1227, 1232 (1988). The district court must, at
a minimum, provide a record which establishes that the court considered these factors. Building

Concepts, Ltd v. Pickering, 114 Idaho 640,645, 759 P.2d 931,936 (Ct.App.1988). A trial court
need not specifically address all of the factors contained in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) in writing, so long
as the record clearly indicates that the court considered them all. Brinkman, 115 Idaho at 351,
766 P.2d at 1232. In addition, a court need not blindly accept those attorney fees requested by a
party, and may disallow those fees that were incurred unnecessarily or unreasonably. Craft Wall

ofIdaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker, I 08 Idaho 704, 706, 701 P .2d 324, 326 (Ct.App.1985). The party
seeking fees has the obligation to provide sufficient information to support the award and, failing ·
.

to do so, the fees will not be awarded. Hackett v. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261, 7.06 P.2d 1372
(Ct.App. 1985).
FACTS
The facts of this case are fully set forth in this Courfs decisions on the City's Motion for
Summary Judgment and the.Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and will not be repeated here.
In short, Plaintiffs sought reimbursement of a portion of certain water and sewer fees paid
between 2007 and 2013 related to the City's collection of a PILOT component in those fees. The
claim was based on multiple legal theories, both constitutional and statutory. The Plaintiffs

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C
MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Page3

796

claims were dismissed in the decision granting the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and
that decision was confirmed in the decision on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration.
As noted above, the threshold question is whether one party prevailed. In this case that
question is easily answered. Summary judgment was granted to the City on all claims and the
Plaintiffs did not prevail on any of their claims or theories. The City is the prevailing party in
this matter.

ANALYSIS

1. Costs. As the prevailing party, the City is entitled to an award of costs permitted as a
matter of right under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C). The only costs sought as a matter ofright are $66.00
for a filing fee and those costs are awarded. The discretionary costs sought are $368 .60 in travel
expenses for counsel traveling to Pocatello from Idaho Falls on various occasions. It is up to the
parties as to who is hired to represent them and the Court confirms the right of any party to do
so. It is common for parties in southeastern Idaho to retain counsel from a variety of cities
. within that area. But travel expenses for an attorney hired 50 miles from Pocatello, while
reasonable and necessary, are not exceptional under these circumstances and those costs will not
be awarded.

2. Attorney Fees. The threshold issue in any request for attorney fees and costs is which
party prevailed. The City prevailed and argues it is entitled to attorney fees and costs under LC.
I.C. §12-117 and I.R.C.P. 11. Idaho Code § 12-117 applies to the award of attorney fees and
costs where one of the parties is a municipality. See Hehr v. City of McCall, 155 Idaho 92, 305
P.3d 536 (2013):
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse parties a
state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, political subdivision
or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, ifit finds that the
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. LC. § 12-117.
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Under this statute an award of fees and costs is only appropriate where "'the other party
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law."' Ciszek v. Kootenai County Bd Of Com 'rs, 151
Idaho 123, 135,254 P.3d 24, 36 (2011) (quoting Burns Holdings, LLC v. Madison County Bd Of

County Com'rs, 147 Idaho 660,664,214 P.3d 646,650 (2009)).
Similarly, I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(l) provides in pertinent part: "The signature of an attorney or
party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the pleading, motion or other
paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry
it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that· it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation." When pleadings are filed which fail to comply with this obligation then attorney fees
can be awarded. For practical purposes, the standard is the same as LC. §12-117.

It is the Court's view, in its discretion, that the Plaintiffs' had a reasonable basis in both
fact and law to pursue their claims in this case. The issues were important and required careful
consideration of the law that applied. The Plaintiffs did not file pleadings in violation of I.R.C.P.
1 l(a)(l). The claims were well grounded in fact and justified a thorough review the applicable
law. No fees are awarded here.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court awards costs as a matter of right to the
Defendant in the amount of $66.00, but declines to award either discretionary costs or attorney
fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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DATEDthis

r~

'bf}- dayof

, 2016
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served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals
in the manner indicated.
Blake G. Hall, Esq
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

(~1 U.S. Mail

Michael D. Gaffney, Esq
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

(1) U.S. Mail

Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

(l) U.S. Mail

Steven Taggart, Esq.
MAYNES TAGGART PLLC
P.O. Box 3005
Idaho Falls, ID 83403

DATED this

\C,

( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

(/j U.S. Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
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, 2016.
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Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant.

--------------

)

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C

AMENDED JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: Judgment is entered in favor of the
Defendant and against the Plaintiff and said case is DISMISSED. Costs are awarded to the
Defendant in the amount of$66.00.
DATEDthis

gt1..- day of

~

, 2016.

s
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Blake G. Hall, Esq
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

V) U.S. Mail

Michael D. Gaffney, Esq
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

( ) Overnight Delivery
·c ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

Nathan M. Olsen, Esq.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Steven Taggart, Esq.
MAYNESTAGGARTPLLC
P.0. Box 3005
Idaho Falls, ID 83403

DATED this

\C'>

(.I)U.S. Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile
(Ii') U.S. Mail

( ) Overnight Delivery
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Michael D. Gaffney
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado St., Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Fax: (208) 529-9732
ISBN: 3558
Nathan M. Olsen
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen
485 "E" Street, Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Fax: (208) 524-3391
ISBN: 7373

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.

Case Number: CV-2014-1520-0C

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Filing fee: $129.00
Fee Category: L.4.

CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality,
Defendant/Respondent.
TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, CITY OF POCATELLO; THE PARTY'S
ATTORNEY, Blake G. Hall, 1075 S. Utah Ave., Suite 150, Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402;
and THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

NOTICE OF APPEAL - l
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I.

The above named appellants, Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park, on behalf of itself and

all others similarly situated, Ed Quinn, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
appeal against the above named respondent, City of Pocatello, to the Idaho Supreme Court from
the "Judgment" entered in the above entitled action on the 101h day of November, 2015, and the
"Amended Judgment" entered in the above entitled action on the 10th day of February, 2016,
Honorable Stephen S. Dunn presiding.
2.

Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments

described in paragraph 1 above are appealable under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(l), I.A.R.
3.

The preliminary statement of the issues on appeal that the appellants intend to

assert in the appeal are as follows:
A.

Did the District Court err in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims on summary

judgment?
4.

Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No.

5.

Is a reporter's transcript requested? No.

6.

The appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's

record in addition to those automatically included pursuant to Rule 28, I.A.R.. See attached
Exhibit A (highlighted documents only).
7.

I certify:

A.

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the reporter's transcript if a transcript has been requested;
B.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

803

C.

That the appellants' filing fee has been paid; and

D.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

to Rule 20, I.A.R.
DATED

this 18th day of March, 2016.

Nathan . lsen
Attorney for the Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, with my office in
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 181h day of March, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule 5(b), I.R.C.P.
Persons Served:
Blake G. Hall, Esq.
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

Method of Service:

~ I ( ) hand ( ) fax ( ) email

FAX: (208) 621-3008
EMAIL: bgh@hasattomeys.com

Honorable Stephen S. Dunn
624 E. Center, Room 302
Pocatello, ID 83201

~ l ( ) hand ( ) fax( )email

FAX: (208) 236-7208
EMAIL: karlav@bannockcounty.us
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CV-2014ClosE:d
!
!r.ase:0001520-District Filed: 04/15/2014 Subtype: Oth_er Judge: Stephen Status: pending.
I
!- oc
Claims
S Dunn
clerk action
Hill - VU Mobile Home Park, etal. vs. City Of Pocatello

!'

1

'

Defendants:City Of Pocatello
Plaintiffs:Hill - VU Mobile Home Park Quinn, ED

1
12/23/2015 1

IofRegister Date
actions:
04/15/2014 File 3 Court Records
04/15/2014 New Case Filed-Other Claims
0411512014 com_~lain_t Jury Demand and request for class
cert1f1cat1on;
04/15/2014 Summons Issued
Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type
not listed in categories B-H, or the other A
04/15/2014 listings below Paid by: Petersen Moss & Hall
Attorney5; At Law Receipt number: 0012514
Dated: 4/15/2014 Amount: $96.00 (Check) For:
0411512014 Plain~iff: Hil_l - VU Mobile Home Park Attorney
Retained Michael D Gaffney
0411512014 Plaintiff: Quinn, ED Attorney Retained Michael D
Gaffney
0411512014 Plain~iff: Hill - VU Mobile Home Park Attorney
Retained Nathan M. Olsen
0411512014 Plaintiff: Quinn, ED Attorney Retained Nathan M.
Olsen
0510612014 Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Without Cause
I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)(E)
Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify
05/14/2014 Without Causes/ J. Naft 5-14-14; transferred to
Judge Dunn for reassignment
05/16/2014 Disqualification Of Judge - Automatic
Administrative Order of Reference; matter
05/16/2014 referred to Judge Nye for resolution; /s J Dunn
05/16/14
05/16/2014 Disqualification Of Judge
0611612014 Plaintiffs motion to disqualify for cause IRCP
40d2A2: aty Nathan Olsen for plntfs
Notice of hearing; on Motion to Disqualify for
06/16/2014 Cause IRCP on 7"17"2014@ 2pm: aty Nathan
Olsen for plntf
0611612014 Affidavit of counsel in support of motion to
disqualify for cause: aty Nathan Olsen for plntf
Filing: I1 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Hall Angell
06/27/20l 4 & Starnes Receipt number: 0021231 Dated:
6/27/2014 Amount: $66.00 (Check) For: City of
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Pocate11·6 \.defendant)
0612712014 Objection to plaintiffs motion to disqualify for
cause; aty Blake Hall for def City of Pocatello
0612712014 Answer to Complaint; aty Blake Hall for Def City
of Pocatello
0612712014 Defendant: City of Pocatello Attorney Retained
Blake G Hall
07 JO 112014 Affiavit of service - srvd on City of Pocatello on 6-

18-2014

0710712014 Affidavit of Nathan Olsen; aty Michael Gaffney for
plntfs
0710712014 Notic;:e vacating hearing; Plaintiffs Motion to DQ
on 7-17-2014@ 2pm:
0710712014 Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
07/17/2014 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated
0711012014 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/17/2014 02:00

PM)

0711412014 Order for Submission of Information for
Scheduling Order; /s/ J Nye, 7-14-14
0712812014 Joint submission of information for scheduling
order; aty Blake Hall for ef
0713112014 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/20/2015 01:30

PM)

08/06/2014 Order Setting Jury Trial; /s/ J Nye, 8-6-14
0810712014 Affidavit of Nathan M. Olsen; atty Nathan Olsen
for pltfs
Application for Pre-Judgment Write of
08/07/2014 Attachment Pursuant to IC §8-502; atty Nathan
Olsen for pltfs
0811112014 Hearing Scheduled (Order to Show Cause

09/08/2014 02:00 PM)

08/11/2014 Order To Show Cause; atty Nathan Olsen for pltfs
0811812014 Certificate of service - (Order to Show cause and
this certiicate) aty Nathan Olsen
Notice of service - first set of discovery requests
08/21/2014 to to def and this notice: aty Nathan Olsen for
plntf
0812912014 Defendants intent to appear and contest entry of
pre judgment writ of attachment; aty Blake Hall
0910212014 Affidavit of Nathan R Starnes; aty Blaek Hall for
def City of Pocatello
.
091021201-4-sAffida~it 9fJoyce A Stroschein ; aty Blake
. .. ·
J?ef. city of Pocatello . ·

Han tac

0910212014 Defendants response to plaintiffs order to show
cause; aty Blake Hall for city of Pocatello
0910212014 Motion for Order Shortening Time; atty Blake Hall
for def
09/02/2014 Notice of Hearing; atty Blake Hall for def
0910212014 Defendant's Motion to Quash Subpoena to David
Swindell; atty Blake Hall for def
09/05/2014 Order Shortening Time; /s/ J Nye, 9-5-14
Defendant's Notice of Intent to Produce
Testimony
and Evidence at Hearing on Order to
0910512014
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c~\is( atty Blake Hall for def

Hearing result for Order to Show cause
scheduled on 09/08/2014 02:00 PM: District
· 09/08/2014 Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Stephanie
Morse Number of Transcript Pages for this
hearing estimated: Less than 100 pages.
Minute Entry; Motion to Quash Subpoena is
09/09/2014 GRANTED, OSC hearing vacated; /s/ J Nye, 9-914
09/11/2014 Order Quashing Subpoena; /s/ J Nye, 9-11-14
0912412014 Notice of service - Defs responses to plaintiffs first
discovery requests, and this notice: aty Blake Hall
Order Transferring Case; matter transferred to J
10/16/2014 Dunn based on agreement by the parties; /s/ J
Nye, 10-16-14
1210212014 Order for Submission of Information for
Scheduling Order /s J Dunn 12/01/14
1211512014 Parties agreed response; aty Michael Gaffney for
plntf
12/19/2014 Order Setting Jury Trial /s J Dunn 12/19/14
1211912014 Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
07/20/2015 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated
1211912014 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 08/04/2015 09:00
AM)
1211912014 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/05/2016 09:00
AM)
0211712015 Motion for certification; aty Michael GAffney for .
plntf
0211712015 Affidavit of Logan Robinson;' aty Micahel Gaffney
Qf ntf
.

~-

-Jar

0211712015 Plaintiffs Memorandum in support of class
certificatio; aty Michael Gaffney for plntf

.

0211712015 Affidavit of Ed Quinn: atyMic:hael Gaffney fo~
. _plntf .
0211712015 Affidavit of Michael D Gaffney; aty Michael
·
Gaffney for plntf
0211712015 Notice of hearing; set on 3-16-2015@ 2pm: aty
Micahel Gaffney for plntf
0211712015 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/16/2015 02:00

PM)

0212612015 Amended notice of hearing; set for 4-13-2015 @
2pm: aty Michael Gaffney for plntf
0212712015 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/13/2015 02:00

PM)

QJ/1 Gl?O+S r:Jefe·ndants Motion for summary judgment·
·
r ·
Blake Hall for def

·-

al;y

03/16/2015 Notice of hearing; set for 4-13-2015 @ 2pm: aty
Blake Hall
0311612015 Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 04/13/2015 02:00 PM)
0311612015 Second Affidavit ofJoyce A Stroschein; aty Blake ...

- - - - .J:ialL03/16/2015 Defendant~ Memorandum in support of
· - ~ summary Ju gment; aty Blake Hal.L-
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0311812015 Plaintiff~\-dbt and expert witness disclosure; aty
Michael Gaffney for plntf
0312712015 Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
03/16/2015 02:00 PM: Continued
0312712015 Matin for enlargement of time and to continue
hearing, IRCP 56(c): aty Micahel Gaffney for plntf
0313012015 Affidavit of Michael D Gaffney; aty Michael
Gaffney for plntf
·
Withdrawal of motin for enlargement of time and
03/30/2015 to continue hearing, IRCP 56(c): aty Michael
Gaffney for plntf
Affidavit of Nathan M Olsen in support of plaintiffs
04/01/2015 -~emorandum m oppa~1E1on to CltvsMobon fQL
·
Summary Judgment; aty Nathan_ Olsen . .
.
·Plaintiffs Memorandum in oppo.sitiqg to Cjtys
04/01/2015 fifobon for summary Judgment; aty Nathan ...
()fsen for plntfs
0410712015 Defendants response in objection to motin for
class certification; aty Blake Hall folr def
0410712015 Third Affidavit ofJoyce A Stroschein; aty Blak,e
,..
Hall forded
~

04/07/2015 Affidavit of Blake G Hall; aty Blake Hall for def
·Defendants reply memorandum in ·supportof
04/08/2015 ir!;Ptin for summary judgment; aty Blake Hall for
'def
.

.

.

.

-

04/10/2015 Motion to Shorten Time (Gaffney)
04/10/2015 Order Shortening Time /.s J Dunn 04/10/15
Defendant response in opposition to plaintiffs
04/10/2015 motion to strike portions of stroschien affidavits:
aty Blake Hall for def
Defendants response in oppositin to plaintiffs
04/10/2015 motin to strike affidavit of Blake Hall and third
affidavit of Joyce Stroschein ; aty Blake Hall
04/10/2015 Affidavit of Blake Hall; aty Blake Hall for def
04/10/2015 Affidavit of Sarah Roberts; aty Blake Hall
0411012015 Affidavit of Leslike Georgeson'; aty Blake Hall for
def
0412012015 Defendants Fact and expert witness disclosure;
aty Blake Hall for def
_05/22/2015=Vit of Logan Robinson; aty Nathan Olsen fc;>r
0512212015 =avit of Nathan Olsen; aty Nathan Olsen for
0512212015 Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum ; aty
..
"Nath ah Olsen for plntfs ·
·
05/29/2015 Affidavit of Ed Quinn; aty Nathan Olsen
0~10512015 .Fourth.afi'idavit of Joyce Stroschein; aty Bla~e
·
I latrfo~ def
_
Defendant Sur Reply Meroacandum in support of
06/05/2015 ·"'motion for summary judgment; aty Blake Hall for
def
Motion objecting to and to strike the fourth
06/12/2015 affidavit of Joyce Stroschein; aty Nathan Olsen
for plntf
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06 /l2/20l 5 Motion foneave to file first Amended complaint;

I

'·

aty Nathan Olsen forplntf

0611512015 Amended complaint Jury demand and request for
class certification; aty Micahel Gaffney for plntf
Defendant response in oppositin to plaintiffs

06/18/2015 motin to strike fourth stroschien affidavit; aty
Blake Hall
Motion for leave to file AMICUS Curiae Brief of
0710612015 No!io~a.1 Association of_Home Builders in
Oppos1t1on to Defs Matron for Summary
Judgment; aty Steven Taggart for national
.

.

.

AMICUS CURIAE Brief.of Notional Association of
O7/O 6/'2.0 l 5='1:fi:,m e: Bui Ide rs _in 0('.>posiiton of Def City of .
.
.
_POcatello's Motm for Summary Judgment; a~
·:,Steven TAgQ.§.!:t, . .
.
Defendants response in oppositin to plaintiffs

07/07/2015 motion to amend complaint; aty Blake Hall for
def
0710812015 Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
08/04/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
04/13/2015 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing
07/08/2015 Held Court Reporter: Sheri Nothelphim Number
of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated:
less 100

0710812015 Defendants opposition to motion for leave to file
Amicus Curiae Brief; aty Blake Hall for def

0711012015 Renew~d motion.for leave to file first amended
complaint; aty Mrchael Gaffney

Memorandum in support of renewed motion

07/10/2015 forleave to file first amended complaint; aty
Michael Gaffney for plntf
Notice of hearing on motin forleave to file Amicus
Curiae
Brief on national association of Home
0711312015
Builders in opposition to Defendants Motion for
Summary Judgment; aty Steven Taggart
Defendants response in opposition to plaintiffs

07/16/2015 renewed motion to amend complaint; aty Blake
Hall for def city of pocatello

07/27/2015 Affidavit of Blake G. Hall
0712712015 Motion to Vacate Hearing on Plaintiffs REnewed
Motion to File Amended Complaint (Hall)

0810712015 Order; vacate and reset hearing to 08/1715 at
2:30 p.m. /s J Dunn 08/07/15
OB/l0/ 2015 Hearing Sch.eduled (Motion 08/17/2015 02:30

PM)
REply in Support of Renewed Motion for Leave to
08/14/2015 File First Amended Complaint (Olsen for
Plaintiff)_
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
08/17/2015 02:30 PM: District court Hearing
08/21/2015 Held Court Reporter: Sheri Nothelphim Number
of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated:
less 100
0813112015 Defendants Response in opposiitn to plaintiffs
motin to amend complaint; aty Blake Hall
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0813112015 Defendant~ Opposiitn to Amicus Curiae Brief: aty
Blake Hall for def
Minute Entry and Order; Court allow Amicus
0910212015 Curiae Brief; Court take Motion for Leave to File
First Amended Complaint under advisment; s/ J
Dunn 09/02/15
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any
0910312015 File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by:
petersen moss & hall Receipt number: 0028214
Dated: 9/3/2015 Amount: $10.00 (Check)
ll/l0/2015 Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
01/05/2016 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated
Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment, Discussing
ll/l0/2015 Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification, and
Denying Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Leave to
File First Amended Complaint; /s J Dunn
11/09/15
Judgment entered in favor of Defendant and
11/10/2015 against Plaintiff and case is dismissed; /s J Dunn
11/09/15
11/10/2015 Case Status Changed: Closed
1112012015 Affidavit of Blake G Hall in support of request for
costs and attorneys fees: aty Blake Hall for def
Defendants Memorandum of authority in support
11/20/2015 of costs and attorneys fees against plaintiffs: aty
Blake Hall
·

111.2412015 ~otion to reconsider; aty Michael Gaffney for

·-

=-

- --

--plntfs

12/04/2015 Motion to disallow; aty Nathan Olsen for plntf
1210812015 Memorandum in support of motin to reconsid
a'J'.:._ a · an· sen for plntfs~
12/08/2015 Notice of hearing; set on 1-11-2016 @ 2pm:
1211112015 Defendants response to plaintiffs motin to
disallow; aty Blake Hall
1211112015 Notice of hearing; set for Plaintiffs Motion to
disallow on 1-11-2016@ 2pm: aty Blake Hall
1212212015 ·Defen~ants opposition to plaintiffs motin to
reconsider; aty Blake Hall
1212312015 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/11/2016 02:00
PM)
1212312015 Ca~e Status Changed: Closed pending clerk
action
0110612016 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider •
--'-------'-{-,: Olsen for Plaintifil.._ ·
·
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
01/11/2016 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing
01/12/2016 Held Court Reporter: Sheri Nothelphim Number
of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated:
less 100
0211012016 Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiff's Motion
for Reconsideration /s J Dunn 02/08/16
Order Granting Defendant's Request for Costs as
a Matter of Right, Denying Defendant's REquest
02/10/2016 for Discretionary Costs and Denying Defendant's
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Request h.,,·Attorney Fees; /s J Dunn 02/08/16

IL ____

Amended Judgment; Judgment is entered in
of the Def and ag the plaintifss this case is
favor
0211012016
DISMISSED, costs are awarded to the def inthe
amount of $66.00: s/ Judge Dunn 2-8-2016

·---
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Cases for:

- ··,-........
-~

Building Contractors Assn of Southeast Idaho .. )
Bannock

...... ___ ........ .-.: :.~~.:,.: . . . - c--"'3-caseift=ound. · ~:~.

f------

Building Contractors Assn of Southeast Idaho vs. City Of Pocatello
~- l
CV-2011-0005228.
.
.
Stephen
S
.
Closed
I
1case:OC
D1str1ct
Filed: 12/09/2011 Subtype: Other Claims
Judge: Dunn
Status. 04124120141
Defendants:City Of Pocatello
Plaintiffs:Building Contractors Assn of Southeast Idaho
In
Judgment Disposition Disposition P rt·
Favor
Disposition: Date
Type
Date
Type
a ies
Of
City Of Pocatello (Defendant),
All
I
Building Contractors Assn of
01/15/2013 Other
Parties
Southeast Ida.ho (Plaintiff)
1

Il

Register of Date
!actions:

·1

I

12/09/2011
12/09/2011
12/09/2011
12/09/2011

Court Records
New Case Filed-Other Clafms
Complaint Filed
Summons Issued

. Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not listed in categories B-

12/09/2011 H, or the other A llstings below Paid by: Nathan M. Olsen Receipt
number: 0042615 Dated: 12/9/2011 Amount: $88.00 (Check) For;
1210912011 Plaintiff: Building Contractors Assn of Southeast Idaho Attorney Retained
Nathan M. Olsen

.

0112312012 Affidavit of service - srvd on City of Pocatello on 1-11-2012 thru Ruth
Whitworth (summons and complaint)
02/21/2012 Answer to complaint; aty Blake Hall for def
02/21/2012 Defendant: City of Pocatello Attorney Retained Blake G Hall
0212812012 Order for Submission of Informatlon for Scheduling Order /s J Dunn
02/27/12
0310312012 Stipulation pursuant to order for submission of information for
scheduling order; aty Nathan Olsen

03/21/2012 Order Setting Jury Trial /s J Dunn 03/15/12
03/21/2012 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/12/2013 09:00 AM)
03/21/2012 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/?1/2013 09:00 AM)
0312612012 not~ce of service - plntfs first set of discovery requests to def: and this
notice: aty Nathan Olsen

0512112012 Notice of service - Plntfs first discovery requests and this notice : aty
Blake Hall

0612212012 Motion to compel discovery and to allow additional interrogatoies; aty
Nathan Olsen
0612212012 Affidavit of Nathan M Olsen in support of motin to compel discovery and
to allow additional interrogatories; aty Nathan Olsen

06/22/2012 Notice of hearing; set for 7-23-2012: s/ Nathan Olsen
06/27/2012 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/23/2012 02:00 PM)
0711312012 Memorandum in support of motion to compel discovery and to allow
addltional interogtories: aty Nathan Olsen

07/19/2012 Defendants Opposition to Motion to compel; aty Blake Hall for def
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 07/23/2012 02:00 PM: District
07/24/2012 Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Sheila Fish Number of Transcript
Pages for this hearing estimated: less 100
07/31/2012 Order on Motion to Compel; /s J Dunn 07/30/12
0910712012 Notice of service - srvd Defs Supplemental responses to plaintiffs first

discovery requests and this notice: aty Blake Hall for Def City of pocatello

0911912012 Notice of service - Defs Third Supplemental responses to plaintiffs first

discovery requests and this notice: aty Blake Hall for def City of Pocatello

Notice of service - Defs Fourth Supplemental Responses to plaintiffs first
· lO/l6/20l2. discovery requests: and this notice: aty Blake Hall for def Clty of
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Pocatello
11/13/2012 Motion for summary judgment; aty Blake Hall
or
·
1111312012 Affidavit of D?ivid K Swindell in s
..
ju gme ,
a e all for def aty of Pocatello
1111312012 Defendants Memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment;
aty Blake Hall for Defendant City of Pocatello
11/13/2012 Notice of hearing; set for 12-10-2012@ 3pm:
1111412012 Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Judgment 12/10/2012 03:00
PM)
1111512012 Notice of service - Defs First set of Interrog and requests for production.
of documents to plntf: aty Blake Hall for def
1112012012 Plaintiff's 56(f) Motion for ~ontinuance to Allow Discovery in Advance of
Summary Judgment Heanng (Olsen)
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's 56(f) Motion for Continuance to Allow
11/20/2012 Discovery in Advance of Summary Judgment Hearing and to Vacate Trial
Setting (Olsen)
11/20/2012 Motion to Vacate Trial setting (Olsen)
11/20/2012 Notice of Hearing (Olsen)
11/20/2012 Motion to Shorten Time (Olsen)
1112312012 Defendant's Opplsition to plaintiffs 56f Matron for continuance; aty Blake
Hall for Def City of Pocatello
·
11/23/2012 Affidavit of Justin Armstrong; aty Blake Hall for def City of Pocatello
1112712012 District Court Hearing Held 11/26/12 Court Reporter: Sheri Turner
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less 100
Hearing
result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on
1112712012
12/10/2012 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated
1112712012 Hear!ng result for Jury Trial scheduled on 02/12/2013 09:00 AM:
Hearing Vacated
1112712012 Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Judgment 01/17/2013 03:00
PM)
Minute Entry and Order; Def Motion for Summ Judgment reset for
1112912012 01/14/13 @ 3 pm; Deposition of David Swindell to be completed by
12/14/12; Plaintiff response to Summ Judgment due by 01/4/13; Def
reply by 1/11/13; 2/12/13 trial vacated; /s J Dunn 11/28/12
12/03/2012 Defendants witness disclosure; aty Blake Hall for def City of poc
1210612012 Notice of taking Deposition duces tecum of David K Swinde~I; set for 1214-2012 @ 9am: aty Nathan Olsen forplntf
1210612012 Amended Notice of taking deposition duces tecum of David K Swindell;
aty Nathan Olsen for plntf
12/06/2012 Motion for order shortening time; aty Blake Hall for def City of Pocatello
1210612012 Defendants Motion to quash subpoena for records to Red Oak
Consulting; aty Blake Hall for def
12/06/2012 Notice of hearing; set for 12-10-2012@ 2pm:
1210712012 Stipulation to withdraw subpOf:na and vacate hearing on motion to
quash; aty Blake Hall for def
12/10/2012 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/10/2012 02:00 PM)
12/18/2012 Notice of Compliance (Olsen for Plaintiff)
01/04/2013 Affidavit of Syd Wood; aty Nathan Olsen
0110412013 Plaintiffs response to defendants Matin for summary Judgment and
Motion to strike; aty Nathan Olsen
01/04/2013 Affidavit of Nathan M Olsen; aty Nathan Olsen
01/04/2013 Affidavit of Ed Quinn; aty Nathan Olsen
01/04/2013 Motion for relief; aty Nathan Olsen
0110412013 Notice of hearing; set for Motion for Relief on 1-14-2013 @ 3 pm: aty
Nathan Olsen

Ol/ll/2013 Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 12/10/2012 02:00 PM: Hearing
Vacated
.
01/11/2013 Motion for Order Shortening Time (Hall for Def)
01/11/2013 Notice of Hearing on Motion to Strike (Hall for def)
01/11/2013 Def's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Hall for Def)
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01/11/2013 Defs Motion td;;;·thke Affidavit of Ed Quinn and Syd Wood (HalhviDef)
01/11/2013 Opposition to Plantffs Motion to Strlke (Hall Def Def)

O1/11/2013 Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Relief under IRCP 3 7(b) (Hall for Def)
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on
01/25/2013 01/14/2013 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Sheri
Turner Number of Transcrlpt Pages for this hearing estlmated: less 100
.

'

Supplemental response to defs motion for sumniaryjudgmentand in
02/13/2013 support of plaintirrs'IR"CP 37 MbLIPfi fm Sdtlc!fnns: acy l<larnan Qlsen f§r
...~rnt(
02/13/2013 Affidavit of Natban Olsen · at'>( Nathan Olsen for plntf
; 211412013 Notice of service - Plaintiffs Supplemehntal Answer to Defs First set of
Interrog and req for production to plaintiff: aty Nathan Olsen for plntf
0212712013 Defendants surreply in support of motion for summary judgment; aty
Blake Hall for def City of Pocatello
03L2812013 Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion foe St1mmary
~ . ·
PJdgrneot: /5' J Dunn0312Btl 3 .
_
03/28/2013 Stipulation to Waive Jury Trial
04/18/2013 Stipulation to Vacate Trial Setting (Olsen; Hall ·
0412212013 Defendants Memorandum in support of motion for reconsideration; aty
Blake Halt for def City of Pocatello
0412212013 Notice of hearing; set for 5-13-2013 @ 2pm: aty Blake Halt for def City
of Pocatello
Defendants
Motion for reconsideration; aty Blake Hall for def City of
0412212013
Pocatello
04/26/2013 Continued (Jury Trial 09/04/2013 09:00 AM)
04/26/2013 Order Re-Setting Jury Trial /s J Dunn 4/26/13
04/26/2013 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/13/2013 02:00 PM)
0510612013 Response in opposition to defendants motion for reconsideration; aty
Nathan Olsen
0510612013 Response in <?P~osition to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration;
(Olsen for Plaintiff)
.
Defendants
reply Memorandum in support of motion for reconsideration;
0510912013
aty Blake Hall for def
05/09/2013 Second affidavit of DAvid K Swindell; aty Blake Hall for def
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 05/13/2013 02:00 PM: District
05/17/2013 Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Sheri Turner Number of Transcript
Pages for this hearing estimated: less 100
05/28/2013 Affidavit of David Hunter; aty nathan Olsen
05/28/2013
Affidavit.. of. AIIetz; ..atv oathan·.Olsen
.
..~
....
0512812013 Memorandum ih s_upport of-plai~tiffs ~enewed motion ft:ir sanctions u~der
.. ·
IRCP 37b and Motion for recons1derat1on; aty nathan Olsen for plntf
,.,-

cp 37h Motion for
0512812013 Affida~it of Nathan M Olsen in su ·
~ sanctions: at Nat
0512812013 Notice of hearing; set for Renewed Motion sanctions on 6-10-2013@
_
2pm: aty Nathan Olsen

I! '

0513112013 Defendant's Motion for Additional Time Pursuant to IRCP 56(f) (Hall ofr
Def)
05/31/2013 Affidavit pf NMathan R. Starnes (Hall for Def)
05/31/2013 Notice of Hearing; Def's Motion pursuant to IRCP 56(f)
05/31/2013 Motion for Order Shortening Time (Hall for Def)
0610512013 Defendants opposition to renewed motin for sanctions under IRCP 37b:
aty Blake Hall for def City of Pocatello
0610512013 Second affidavit of Nathan R Starnes; aty Blake Hall for def City of
Pocatello
06/07/2013 Affidavit of Nathan Olsen; aty Nathan Olsen
0610712013 Objection to defs Motion for Additional time pursuant to IRCP 56f: aty
Nathan Olsen
Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for
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06/07/2013 Sanctions Und~; 1RCP 37(b) (Olsen for Plaintiff)
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 06/10/2013 02:00 PM: District
06/14/2013 Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Sheri Tu mer Number of Transcript
Pages for this hearing estimated: less 100
Notice
of taking deposition of Justin Armstrong; on 7-9-2013@ 9:30
0612412013
am: aty Nathan Olsen for plntf

0612612013 Amended Notice of taking deposition of Jon Herrick on 7-15-2013@
1: 1 S pm: aty Nathan Olsen for plntf
07/01/2013 Stipulation for substitution of counsel; aty Blake Hall for def
0710112013 Notice of taking deposition of Jon Herrick on 7-9-2013@ 9:30; aty
Nathan Olsen for plntf

0710112013 Amended notice of taking deposition of Justin Armstrong; on 7-15-2013
·
@ 1:15 pm: aty Nathan Olsen for plntf
0710912013 Defendants opposition to plaintiffs motion for reconsideration; aty Blake
Hall for Def City of Pocatello

0710912013 Affiavit of John Gallagher in support of motion for summary judgment;
aty Blake Hall for def
·
0711212013 Defendants opposition to plaintiffs motion for reconsideration; aty Blake
Hall for def City of Pocatello

0711212013 Affidavit of John Gallagher in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Hall for Def)
0810612013 Motion to Strike and Exclude the Testimony and Report of John
Gallagher (Olsen for Plaintiff)

08/06/2013 Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Reconsideration (Olsen)
0810612013 Memor~ndu':' in Support of Plaitniff's Amended Motion for
Recons1derat1on (Olsen)

Notice of Hearing; Amended Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to
08/06/2013 Strike and Exclude the Testimony and Report of John Gallagher on
08/19/13 2 pm (Oslen for Plaintiff)

08/06/2013 Affidavit of David L Hunter (Olsen for Plaintiff)
08/06/2013 Affidavit fo Nathan M Olsen
0810912013 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/19/2013 02:00 PM) Amended Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion to Strike and Exclude

0811312013 Defendant opposition to plaintiffs motion to strike and exclude testimony
and report of John Gallagher; aty Blake Hall

0811312013 Defendant opposition
aty Blake Hall for def

to plaintiffs amended motion for reconsideration;

08/13/2013 Affidavit of John Gallagher; aty Blake Hall for def
08/13/2013 Third Affidavit of DAvid K Swindell; aty Blake Hall for def
08/13/2013 Affidavit of Blake Hall; aty Blake Hall for def
0811612013 Plaintiffs reply memorandum in support of motion to strike and exclude
the testimony and report of John Gallagher; aty Nathan Olsen for plntf

Motion to strike the August 12 2013 affidavits of John Gallagher and
08/16/2013 DAvid K Swindell for consideratjion in support of defendants motion for
summary judgment; aty Nathan Olsen for plntf

0811612013 Reply t.o def~ndants opposition to plaintiffs amended motion for
recons1derat1on; aty Nathan Olsen

08/19/2013 Affidavit of service - s/ atty Nathan Olsen for plntf
0812112013 Decision on Plaitniff's Mof1on to Strike and Exclude the Testimony and
Report of John Gallagher /s J Dunn 08/20/13
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 08/19/2013 02:00 PM: District
0812312013 Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Sheri Turner Number of Transcript
Pages for this hearing estimated: less 100 Amended Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion to Strike and Exdude

0812612013 Fourth Affidavit of David K Swindell; aty David Swindell for def City of
Pocatello

0812812013 Hear!ng result for Jury Trial scheduled on 09/04/2013 09:00 AM:
Hearmg Vacated
Affidavit of Nathan M Olsen in support of supplemental Memorandum in

09/30/2013 support of plaintiffs amended motion for reconsideration; aty Nathan
Olsen
Supplemental Memorandum in support of plaintiffs Amended Motion for

816

https://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.do?schema= BAN NOCK&county=Bannock&roaDetail=yes&partySequenceaa284531 &displayName=Building+C... 4/7

/---,,,_

3/18/20,16

-----

09/30/2013 reconsideration;<..

Idaho Repository- Case History Page

ly Nathan Olsen

11/15/2013 Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider
and Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Reconsideration; /s J Dunn 11/13/13
Final Judgment; Judgment is partially granted for plaintiff, Building
Contractors, Association of Southeast Idaho, and partially granted for Def
City of Pocatello: (it is hereby dedared that any assessment of a PILOT
1111512013 fee by the City of Pocatello to the municipal water and sewer department
ls impermissible. Further, the City is enjoined from using the PILOt fee
as part of the calculation of u.ser and or connection fees charge to the
.\
public. to any other extent judgment is granted for Defendant:) s/ Judge j
unn 1-13-2013
11/15/2013 Case Status Changed: closed
1112712013 Memorandum of authority in support of plaintiffs memorandum of fees
and costs against defendant: aty Nathan Olsen for p lntf
1112712013 Memorandum of costs and attorneys fees and affidavit of Nathan Olsen;
aty Nathn Olsen for plntf
12/09/2013 certificate of compliance; aty Kirk Bybee
1211012013 Defendant objection to plaintiffs memorandum of fees and costs; aty
Blake Hall for def
1211912013 Notice of waiver of objection to plaintiffs memorandum of fees and costs;
aty Nathan Olsen for plntf
1212012013 Defendants motion to strike plaintiffs notice of waiver of objetion to
plaintiffs memorandum of fees and costs; aty Blake Hall for def
12/20/2013 Notice of hearing; set for 1-6-2014@ 2pm: la
12/23/2013 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/06/2014 02:00 PM)
12/23/2013 Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk action
12/31/2013 Application for order to show cause; aty Nathan Olsen for plntf
1213112013 Affidavit of Nathan Olsen in support of application for order to show
cause; aty Nathan Olsen
Plaintiffs response to defs motion to strike plaintiffs notice of waiver of
1213112013 objection to plaintiffs memorandum of fees and costs and response in
opposition to defs objection to plaintiffs memorandum of fees and costs;
aty Nathan Olsen for plntf
1213112013 Notice of hearing; application for Order to Show Cause on 1-6-2014@
2pm
0110212014 Motion to shorten time for hearing on plaintiffs application for order to
show cause; aty Nathan Olsen for plntf
Defendants notice of intent to produce testimony and evidence at
01/02/2014 plaintiffs heaerintg on its application for order to show cause; aty Blake
Hall for def
Defendants
objection to plaintiffs application for order to show cause; aty
0110212014
Blake Hall tor def
01/02/2014 Notice of hearing; set for 1-6-2014@ 2pm: aty Nathan Olsen for plntf
Defendants Reply motion to strike plaintiffs notice of waiver of objection
0110312014 to plaintiffs memorandum of fees and costs and reply opposition to defs
objection to plaintiffs memorandum of fees and costs: aty Bleke Hall for
def
·
0110312014 Defendants Motion to strike portions of affidavit of Nathan M Olsen; aty
Blake Hall for def
Defendants
Motion to strike plaintiffs application for order to show cause;
0110312014
aty Blake Hall for def
01/08/2014 Hearing Sc_heduled (Motion 01/27/2014 02:00 PM)
Hearing result fo"r Motion scheduled on 01/06/2014 02:00 PM: District
O1/09/2014 Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: sheri Nothelphim Number of
Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less 100
0110912014 Minute Entry and Order; Court take Request for Fees and Costs under
advisment; /s J Dunn 01/08/14
0111012014 Order Denying Plaintiff's Request for Attorney Fees and Costs /s J Dunn
1/10/14
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 01/27/2014 02:00 PM: District
01/29/2014 Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Sheri Nothelphim Number of
Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less 100
i
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf)
of itself and all others similarly situated, )
ED QUINN, on behalf of himself and all )
other similarly situated,
)
)
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
)
)
)
vs.
)
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
)
)
municipality,
Defendant/Respondent, )
)
)

Supreme Court No. 44074
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

_____________

I, Robert Poleki, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that the
above and foregoing record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound
under my direction as, and is a true, full, and correct record of the pleadings and
documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho appellate
Rules.
I do further certify that there were no exhibits marked for identification or
admitted into evidence during the course of this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal
of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this~ day of

f'{\G

2016.

ROBERT POLEK!,

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
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(Seal)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNlY OF BANNOCK

HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf)
of itself and all others similarly situated, )
ED QUINN, on behalf of himself and all )
other similarly situated,
)
)
)
Pia intiffs/Appellants,
)
)
vs.
)
)
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
)
municipality,
Defendant/Respondent, )
)
)

Supreme Court No. 44074
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

_________

I, ROBERT POLEKI, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District,
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that I
have personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT and CLERK'S RECORD to each of the Attorneys of
Record in this cause as follows:
Blake G. Hall
Hall Angell Starnes, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

Nathan M. Olsen
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen
485 E. Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal
of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this _ _ day of

(Seal)

, 2016.

ROBERT POLEKI,
Clerk of the District Court
Bannock County, Idaho Supreme Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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